Published in Inroads, the newsletter of Citizen Advocacy Eastern Suburbs, Issue 6 (December, 1997)
These are located on the Citizen Advocacy Network website,
in the section on articles and policy documents.
We must touch his weaknesses with a delicate hand. There are some faults so nearly allied to excellence, that we can scarce weed out the fault without eradicating the virtue. -- Oliver Goldsmith (1728 - 1774), Irish-born writer,The Good-Natured Man
In Citizen Advocacy, an advocate is asked to represent the interests of his/her protege, as if those interests were the advocate’s own. In other words, the citizen advocate must strive to put him/herself in the shoes of the protege, and then act in the sincerely perceived interests of that person. And in representing his/her protege’s interests, consistent with the principle of advocate independence, the advocate is expected to act independently of other parties in the protege’s life --including the citizen advocacy office.
Yet, if it is felt that an advocate’s actions have adversely affected his/her protege, that perception will naturally be of concern to other involved parties, notably the citizen advocacy office which is responsible for facilitating the relationship. Obviously, the citizen advocacy office’s response in any given situation must take into account aspects such as: being clear about the facts (as opposed to someone’s interpretation of the reality); the intent of the advocate’s actions (was it a deliberate effort or a genuine mistake?); and how those actions have impacted on the protege. However, if it is established that the perceived or real (adverse) outcome cannot be attributed to intentional wrongdoing by the advocate, it may be helpful for the citizen advocacy office to reflect on, or be reminded of, certain cautionary "maxims" -- reviewed below -- if there is to be a reconciliation of the discrepancy between expectations and reality.
1. Coming to terms with the imperfection of all human beings, including their propensity to err.
A self-evident truth, though not always accepted graciously, is that human beings are not perfect, and will never evolve into a state of perfection. The limitations of humans are manifested in a myriad of ways daily, including in an inherent susceptibility to errors of judgement. Given the innate imperfection of the human character, it is demonstrably true that individuals do not consistently act in their own interests, nor in the interests of others, at all times.
Logically, being a citizen advocate does not confer immunity from the human frailty of fallibility of conduct. It is, therefore, conceivable that an advocate who acts with and for his/her protege will, sincerely but mistakenly, embark on a course of action which may not be beneficial --and may even be harmful -- to the protege. Granted that no human is omniscient, for a citizen advocate, the possibility of mistaken advocacy is heightened when the reality of what is in the protege’s best interests is not easily knowable. For example, the nature of the protege’s situation, and the issues encountered, may be unavoidably complex, and/or the person’s disposition is inscrutably impassive (perhaps he/she is non-reciprocating), so as to render it difficult for the advocate to anticipate, or be affirmed by, the fruits of the advocacy effort.
Consequently, it must be expected that, on the balance of probabilities, a citizen advocate -- like everyone else -- will not be impervious to misjudging his/her protege’s interests. The best that can be hoped and achieved is that any such errors are few in number and minor in impact. However, an acceptance of this reality by the citizen advocacy office should not be interpreted as a callous complacency about the costs to the protege as a result of a misdirected effort; indeed, as mentioned below (point 4), the office must be responsible and discerning in its work, endeavouring to facilitate the formation of a match which will be primarily beneficial to the protege -- even if such a relationship cannot be impermeable to human flaws.
2. Acknowledging the importance of demonstration of commitment, rather than perfection of conduct, of an advocate.
If it is conceded that human foibles invariably militate against the conduct of perfect advocacy, we are more likely to be cognisant of, and ascribe importance to, other factors which lend validity to an advocate’s engagement. If an advocate makes a mistake, the commission of the error should be seen in the context of his/her level of demonstrated commitment, indicators of which may include the following.
(a) One measure of the depth of commitment of an advocate may be the duration of his/her involvement with the protege. If an advocate displays fidelity to the protege, as reflected in the endurance of his/her involvement, the validity of such a long-term association must be recognised, and contrasted with the impetuous, short-lived efforts of some so-called advocates, whose conduct has been characterised by Dr Wolf Wolfensberger (the founder of Citizen Advocacy) as "advocate-and-run-advocacy."
(b) The care and thought which an advocate invests in analysing the implications of an action on behalf of the protege, will also be indicative of his/her commitment. If an advocate is apt to carefully evaluate the likely benefits and costs of an advocacy effort, particularly one which has the potential to be considerably costly to the protege, then the conscientiousness of the advocate should be acknowledged -- even if, regrettably, the advocacy goal is unsuccessful.
(c) The preparedness of an advocate to share in the costs of, or make reparation for, an advocacy effort which has detrimental consequences for the protege, can offer an insight into the strength of the advocate’s commitment. Despite the occurrence of a mistake, the genuineness of an advocate’s commitment may be evident, particularly if that advocate: willingly seeks to redress the effects of his/her actions; does so in a vigorous and self-sacrificing manner, corresponding to the costs incurred by the protege; demonstrably learns from, and is anxious not to repeat, that error.
3. Being careful about judging the propriety and efficacy of an advocate’s actions.
Even if there is no clear causal link between the actions of a citizen advocate and the realisation of an (undesired) outcome for the protege, it may be easy to succumb to the temptation to be critical of the efforts of the advocate who, as an independent person, is not constrained by the rules imposed -- explicitly or implicitly -- by other parties.
Often, the service system for people with disabilities, some of whose clients may be in citizen advocacy matches, is antagonistic towards the advocates, anathematising them as loose cannons on the deck of the imperial service armada. Almost invariably, the hostile response of the mighty service empire has less to do with concern for its clients (over whom it can exert considerable, even total, control), than to display contempt for anyone -- especially a mere mortal like an "untrained" citizen -- who dares to point out the emperor’s nakedness. Yet, the "outside interference" of an advocate may be precisely what is needed, if the interests of the protege are to be effectively protected from any injurious effects of the service system of which the person is a client.
From the perspective of the citizen advocacy programme, too, office staff must be very careful about assessing the quality of an advocacy effort on the basis of an advocate’s actions. For example, an advocate may undertake a course of action which diverges sharply from that anticipated by the citizen advocacy office. However, if the principle of advocate independence is to hold any meaning, the citizen advocacy office should defer to the advocate (with whose mode of action the office may disagree) to act in his/her protege’s best interests -- unless there are compelling reasons to question the advocate’s motivation. After all, there may be many roads which lead to Rome or the attainment of an advocacy goal, and the citizen advocacy office must promote the advocate’s primary loyalty to the protege to independently pursue that path which, in the view of the advocate who is in direct contact with the protege, is likely to yield a beneficial outcome for the latter.
Thus, the citizen advocacy office must be cautious about hastily judging the probity and effectiveness of an advocacy effort, on the tenuous premise that it (or another party) disagrees with the advocate’s actions.
4. Never losing sight of the prodigious responsibility of the citizen advocacy office to facilitate suitable matches.
Recognition that the advocate will not always get it right (points 1 & 2 above), should not be extrapolated to mean that an advocacy endeavour is not worth engaging in because it is prone to human error. Indeed, that reality adds moral weight to the responsibility of the citizen advocacy office to discerningly recruit suitable advocates: those citizens who, despite their fallibility, are essentially principled and resourceful to assume effective advocacy roles. Of course, the citizen advocacy office, too, can (and does) make mistakes in striving to facilitate relevant matches; however, it must maximise the probability that the advocate’s response will advance -- not impede -- the interests of the protege. For instance, in its recruitment of advocates, the office should seek citizens who display, or are likely to have, good judgement and keen insight (in addition to particular advocate characteristics suited to specifically-defined advocacy roles). Conversely, the office should avoid inviting as advocates, people who clearly exhibit a cavalier attitude or a lack of commonsense. That way, the citizen advocacy office will succeed in fortifying the likelihood that the advocate’s actions will elicit maximal benefits, and minimal costs, to the protege. To do any less would amount to absolution of the prodigious responsibility of the citizen advocacy office.
Human imperfection dictates that perfect advocacy can be no more than a quixotic quest. Genuine errors of judgement by committed advocates should not invalidate the intrinsic morality of their advocacy. This does not mean we should be indifferently fatalistic about any costly consequence; but reconcile with that possibility, whilst minimising the likelihood of its occurrence. But to simply deny the potential for mistakes is to deny our humanity.