



BRILL

JOURNAL OF PACIFISM AND NONVIOLENCE
2 (2024) 257 – 291



Journal of
Pacifism and
Nonviolence

brill.com/jpn

Forum



On Andreas Malm's *How to Blow Up a Pipeline*

Brian Martin | ORCID: 0000-0002-6261-7677

Emeritus Professor, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of
Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia

bmartin@uow.edu.au

Alexandre Christoyannopoulos | ORCID: 0000-0001-5133-3268

Dr, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Loughborough University,
Loughborough, UK

a.christoyannopoulos@lboro.ac.uk

Isak Svensson | ORCID: 0000-0002-1242-4180

Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University,
Uppsala, Sweden

Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham | ORCID: 0000-0002-7495-5972

Professor, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland,
Maryland, US

Alexei Anisin | ORCID: 0000-0003-3348-1376

Dr, Anglo-American University, Prague, Czech Republic

Antoine Durance

Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux, Bordeaux, France

Manuel Cervera-Marzal | ORCID: 0000-0003-4965-7620

Professeur Associé, Faculté des sciences sociales, Université de Liège, Liège, Belgium

Received: 2 September 2023 | Accepted: 31 May 2024 |

Published online: 28 August 2024

Abstract

Andreas Malm says sabotage is needed to save the world from climate catastrophe. In this Forum, scholars of pacifism and nonviolence caution against such a course of action by pointing to several important factors at play in determining the success or otherwise of activist campaigns, including barriers to participation, organisational dynamics, loyalty shifts, the backfire effect, and the role of framing and public opinion. Ongoing research into pacifism and nonviolence presents a nuanced picture of the current strategic landscape of climate activism, revealing lessons that the climate movement must consider as it reflects on what repertoire of action to embrace to enhance its effectiveness and mitigate the unfolding climate emergency.

Keywords

climate change – sabotage – nonviolence

Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Brian Martin: Introduction: Sabotage versus climate change?

A powerful worldwide movement has emerged to bring a halt to the emission of greenhouse gases and prevent the worst consequences of climate change. The movement is up against powerful opponents: companies producing fossil fuels and their government allies, as well as people sceptical of climate science and reluctant to change their climate-damaging lifestyles.

Climate change can be thought of as an emergency in slow motion, but an emergency nevertheless. Some campaigners have become frustrated, feeling that current methods of action are not enough. In his 2021 book *How to Blow Up a Pipeline*, Swedish climate activist Andreas Malm argues that conventional approaches are insufficient and need to be supplemented by direct action against exemplary targets. He gives the example of slashing the tyres of SUVs

on the streets of wealthy suburbs of Stockholm, with leaflets for owners explaining that they are contributing unnecessarily to global warming.

Despite its title, Malm's book offers little practical advice on carrying out sabotage. It might be more accurately titled *Why the Climate Movement Needs Sabotage in its Repertoire*. Malm is not the first or only activist to make this argument (and the recent spate of attacks on famous art masterpieces around the world, even though activists have generally been careful not to actually damage the art work, seems to illustrate a growing openness towards property damage), but his book has become the most prominent exposition of this view.

Malm expresses criticisms and frustration about nonviolent action. More broadly, his book raises some questions for pacifists and supporters of civil resistance. Can sabotage be a useful component of climate campaigns? How far can the repertoire of nonviolent action extend? What are the limitations of sabotage (and more broadly "violence" against property) as a technique? In this Forum, each contributor addresses questions raised by Malm and other proponents of sabotage as a climate campaign technique. Malm's case hinges on a number of key arguments, including that "sabotage" must be understood as a form of violence rather than nonviolence; that the failures of climate activism are attributable to the refusal to use violence; and that sabotage would be more likely to succeed – or at any rate to succeed more quickly – where other nonviolent techniques have hitherto failed. As the contributors to this Forum show, however, these arguments are highly questionable.

Isak Svensson starts by disputing Malm's contentions that scholars of civil resistance assume a priori that nonviolence will always be effective and that they are ignoring the challenges of cross-country comparisons. He then notes how attention to three causal mechanisms crucial to movement success – the numbers of participants, organisational aspects of violent and nonviolent activism, and loyalty shifts – cautions against the assumption that violence will hasten climate change mitigation.

Brian Martin argues furthermore that sabotage is the "wrong form" of radicalism, because it is likely to increase repression and make harder the generation of a fruitful backfire effect (another important factor that partly explains the success of nonviolent movements), and because plenty of other radical alternatives are available anyway.

Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham reflects on the impact of activist tactics on the important variable that is public opinion, arguing that although sabotage might gather attention, that attention risks being counterproductive.

Alexei Anisin calls for further research on the efficacy of unarmed collective violence (such as riots and sabotage) within movements otherwise often coded as "primarily nonviolent", building on the scholarship that has already

suggested that such forms of militant activism might enhance the chances of effectiveness.

Antoine Durance and Manuel Cervera-Marzal discuss some of the limitations of statistical analyses comparing causality between nonviolent and violent strategies, the importance of mobilisation framing in legitimising or delegitimising activist movements, and the question of whose support the climate movement should be seeking.

Alexandre Christoyannopoulos then concludes by providing a more nuanced and internally diverse account of “pacifism” than is presented by Malm’s caricature of it, and by reflecting on how labels like “violence”, “pacifism” and “nonviolence” are contested both within and outside activist movements negotiating the limits within which to deploy a diversity of tactics.

These issues are important because the climate itself is vitally important, so being as effective as possible is crucial. If Malm is right, it is a mistake to refrain from sabotage, but if he is wrong, or if sabotage is carried out the wrong way, climate campaigning, and the climate, will pay the price.

Isak Svensson: How to blow up chances for success

Andreas Malm’s *How to Blow Up a Pipeline* is a well-articulated argument for more forceful action in the age of the escalating climate crisis. Pointing to decades of popular mobilisation that has evidently led to insufficient political action which is nowhere near the systematic change that is required to meet the challenges, Malm asks “At what point do we escalate?” Malm makes a strong case against climate fatalism and defeatism and also – at first glance – against the wisdom of the climate movement to commit to nonviolent discipline in their actions.

Most ethical theories allow for the use of violence as self-defence. Given the existential consequences that the current policies have for people around the world (today, and increasingly so over time), a strong ethical case could be made in favour of taking up violence to defend the right to life. In this Forum, I choose to be agnostic on this ethical question. Rather, I am here focused on the question of the expected *effectiveness* of using violence. I will here take up Malm’s critique against the perspective of strategic nonviolence – nonviolent civil action which is pursued on the basis of its expected effectiveness – and discuss which conclusions we can draw from the emerging research field on nonviolent uprisings.

Malm’s argument against nonviolent action stands on two pillars. First, he questions the claim that nonviolent campaigns would be more effective than

violent ones, which has most prominently been demonstrated in Chenoweth and Stephan's seminal work (2011). Many nonviolent uprisings, he points out, were never strictly nonviolent, but resorted to violent means as well (in parallel with using nonviolent means, or subsequently as a form of conflict escalation). The study of civil resistance, from Malm's perspective, draws the wrong conclusions from historical evidence. The gist of the second part of his argument is the question of *time*. The extreme urgency of the climate crisis leads Malm to conclude that we cannot wait for a change to be achieved through nonviolent action. Even if nonviolent action may be effective in the long run, the use of violent means would increase the effectiveness and more rapidly bring about change. I will discuss these two pillars in turn.

The study of nonviolent uprisings

From the empirical fact that most maximalist popular uprisings and revolutionary movements (that is, campaigns over regime change, territorial autonomy, or end of colonial rule) have included both violent and nonviolent components, Malm draws the conclusion that the violent component is not only a necessary component but also that it is this component that explains the outcome. Behind seemingly nonviolent campaigns – the US civil rights movement, Gandhi's satyagraha campaign in India, the revolution in Iran in 1979, and the anti-apartheid campaign – Malm sees violent action as the key to transformative change. However, that popular mobilisation commonly includes fringe violence does not necessarily mean that it is the occurrence of violence that explains why uprisings are successful. His argument is diagonally opposite to Schell's (2003) in which the latter showed how some of the major historical violent revolutions (such as the Russian and French revolutions) were successful not primarily due to the opposition's pursuit of violent action – which really played a minor role in the overall transformation – but rather due to the underlying popular nonviolent mobilisation, the refusal of key actors to collaborate with the regimes, and the acts of massive popular non-cooperation (including strikes) which undermined the regime's pillars of support.

Malm caricatures the study of strategic nonviolent action, a field of scholarly inquiry that has generated far more insights, as well as many more nuances on this precise subject, than what is recognised in his account. He portrays the study of civil resistance as if it would build on the premise that nonviolent action is invariably successful. In fact, the recognition that nonviolent campaigns vary in their outcomes (sometimes successful, sometimes not) is the very point of departure for the study of civil resistance, which seeks to identify the conditions under which nonviolent campaigns are more likely to be successful (Zunes 1994; Vinthagen 2015; Sharp 1973; Schock 2005). Malm's

disdain for systematic cross-country comparison (“the comparison of apples and oranges”, p57), his critique against civil agency-based explanations (“effectively turning activists into omnipotent agents in causal chains”, p57), and his accusation that this field of research obviates the fact that most unarmed uprisings have contained violence (“unarmed collective violence present in lion’s share of transitions, but ignored”, p61) are three lines of critiques based on a superficial reading previous of research. In fact, the field of civil resistance has at this stage of research reached more or less a consensus regarding these three points. First, in order to explain the impact of civil resistance (and its alternatives) we need *both* comparisons (which can establish correlation and controls for systematic confounders) across cases as well as tracing the causal processes in individual cases (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). Second, we need to take into account *both* structural as well as agent-based factors (Schock 2003, 2005; Ackerman and Rodal 2008; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). And third, the fact that *both* violence and nonviolence can co-occur has been intensively discussed and explored (for a recent overview, see Chenoweth 2023; see also Onken, Shemia-Goeke, and Martin 2021) in the debates on *nonviolent discipline* (Mitchell 2023; Nepstad 2015; Pinckney 2016), *radical flanks* (Tompkins 2015; Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Schock and Demetriou 2018; Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2021), and *conflict escalation* (Bramsen 2020; Gustafson 2020; Ives and Lewis 2020; Ryckman 2020; Vogt, Gleditsch, and Cederman 2021; Mustasilta and Svensson 2023).

Violence and time

Let us now turn to the other part of Malm’s argument – turning to violence will increase the speed of getting the desired results. If we draw insights from previous research on nonviolent uprisings, there are reasons to be sceptical of this claim. Previous research points to some key problems, from a strategic perspective, with the use of violence by an opposition movement. Violence will affect three key causal mechanisms that have been identified as crucial for achieving success in resistance campaigns.

The first of those mechanisms is the ability of nonviolent uprisings to generate a massive *number of participants* (DeNardo 2014; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Chenoweth 2021; but also note Butcher and Pinckney 2022). Nonviolent means offer many more options for inclusions, have lower thresholds for taking part, and appeal to broader segments of the population, than campaigns relying on armed means. With higher numbers follows a generally higher probability of including actors who uphold the power structures to be challenged. As wider social networks are mobilised, the chances increase that people will withdraw their acceptance and refuse to collaborate with

the challenged regime. Nonviolent tactics can also help to diversify participation and broaden the base of a nonviolent uprising. Higher numbers will also increase the resilience of a movement against repressive counter-actions. Violent tactics, on the other hand, may alienate people who are risk-averse, people who may be sympathetic to a cause but are not yet fully committed, and people who are not mentally, physically, or ideologically ready to resort to violence. An uprising may therefore appeal to a smaller portion of the population than is the case if a movement remains nonviolent in its tactics. With smaller numbers, the vulnerability of those participating will increase, which may shrink the numbers further.

The second mechanism is *the organisational aspect* of nonviolent struggle. Organised nonviolent campaigns are often more effective than un-organised ones (e.g. Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014), and the ability of an uprising to tap into pre-existing organisational structures such as religious organisations (Nepstad 2021), labour movements (Butcher, Gray, and Mitchell 2018), student organisations (Dahlum 2019), and women's organisations (Chenoweth 2019), will shape the dynamics and outcomes of nonviolent movements, increasing the leverage of a movement. Once a movement shifts to violent tactics, however, the ability to create broad-based alliances between non-military civilian organisations will generally decrease. The organisational needs and functions of organisations pursuing violence are very different from those fighting through nonviolent struggle. A recent analysis of contemporary violent political protests (Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022), which would resonate with the concept of *unarmed collective violence* that Malm uses, demonstrates that the chance of success among decentralized movements taking up violent means was small: in only 6,8% of the conflicts was the challenger successful, and in the majority of the conflicts the opposition that took up violent means did not achieve their results.

The third mechanism is what is called *loyalty shift*. This is when actors critical for upholding a challenged power structure shift their loyalties from the current order to the challengers. The use of violence comes with tactical risks: tightening the commitment of those actors, rather than helping to create a shift in loyalties. Loyalty shift is less likely if the opposition uses violence (Nepstad 2011, 2013). Resorting to violent means, however, can distort and delay an uprising, as violent action has a tendency to escalate when cycles of repressive countermeasures, violent popular backlash, and movement violence contribute to further polarisation.

Ultimately, the jury is still out when it comes to the claim that the use of violence can help accelerate progress, but so far, we have good reasons to be sceptical.

***Brian Martin*¹: Sabotage is the wrong climate radicalism**

The climate movement is an amazing social phenomenon. Rachel Carson's 1962 book *Silent Spring* is sometimes cited as the trigger for the modern environmental movement; at that time, climate change was not even on the agenda. Environmentalists in the 1960s and 1970s were concerned about pesticides, air pollution, forestry, species extinction, nuclear power, whaling and a host of other issues. Even for those concerned about the environmental effects of burning coal, oil and gas – the fossil fuels – the possibility of global warming decades hence was, for most campaigners, hypothetical. If mentioned at all, it was an argument why exponential growth in the use of fossil fuels could not continue indefinitely.

Over the subsequent decades, concern about climate change gradually increased in salience until, in the 2020s, it has become the biggest environmental issue worldwide, one causing angst among large numbers of people, and leading to unprecedented levels of popular support and activism. This is remarkable for two main reasons. First, the most severe effects of global warming will affect future generations. Unlike labour or feminist activism, the motivation is less about injustice today and more about injustice in the future (although extreme climate events are admittedly increasingly frequent). Second, until recently, few climate concerns have been based on overt injustices that trigger public outrage. The murder of George Floyd motivated the Black Lives Matter movement, and the #MeToo movement was motivated by high-profile reports of sexual harassment and rape. Not so the climate movement, for which one of the few motivational symbols is polar bears sitting on ice floes.

What the climate movement has in common with other social movements is that it confronts incredibly powerful opponents with vested interests. Active opponents of the movement are fossil-fuel companies and complicit governments. To these can be added the involvement of large numbers of people in consumerist societies, built around high-energy lifestyles.

To add to the challenge, climate change is seen by campaigners as an emergency. If drastic action is not taken today, or in the next few years, the consequences decades hence may be catastrophic. This leads directly to another challenge.

¹ Thanks to Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Mark Diesendorf, Ned Dobos, Julia LeMonde, Erin Twyford and Molly Wallace for helpful comments.

Action?

Given that climate action is seen as a moral imperative, and furthermore as responding to an emergency, what should be done? Conventional political action – including writing letters and articles, lobbying, election campaigning, voting and petitions – is one option. However, it is not working rapidly enough. The reason is obvious. Companies, governments and many citizens have a stake in the continued use of fossil fuels, and companies have more lobbying capacity than activist groups. Another option is nonviolent action, including boycotts, strikes and physically intervening to hinder operations, like coal mining and export, that generate greenhouse gases. Many courageous campaigners have put their bodies on the line. But this too seems insufficient to stop the fossil-fuel juggernaut.

Enter Andreas Malm, whose 2021 book *How to Blow Up a Pipeline* presents a case for using sabotage as part of climate activism. Malm is not the only such advocate, but his book is the most articulate and influential voice, so it is worthwhile examining his arguments.

Malm's argument is straightforward: climate action is both necessary and urgent, but neither conventional nor nonviolent action has been enough. Therefore – this is the crucial step – stronger action is needed, and stronger for Malm means sabotage should be part of climate activists' repertoire.

Malm is careful to say that saboteurs should always avoid harming humans. The immediate target is objects, like pipelines. Sabotage does have an indirect effect on humans, influencing their future decisions. The key question concerns this influence. Who is influenced and how? Malm assumes sabotage will raise the costs of climate-damaging activities, causing those involved to alter their behaviour in the direction of reducing climate impacts.

He tells of his own involvement in a campaign in which activists went to wealthy suburbs of Stockholm and deflated the tyres of SUVs, leaving leaflets explaining the need to switch to climate-friendly vehicles. This campaign had, in effect, two components: damaging vehicles that contribute to global warming, and sending a message to SUV owners. Malm does not report on any follow-ups by the saboteurs on whether SUV owners switched to smaller vehicles, so we don't know whether the first component did anything except increase purchases of SUV tyres. Malm does say the reaction of many owners was incredibly hostile, so perhaps the message was not received as intended.

Despite the lack of evidence of benefits from his own efforts, Malm argues that sabotage is a needed addition to climate activism. He proceeds by dismissing nonviolent action as insufficient and presenting an original and questionable analysis of past campaigns. One of his examples is the suffragettes in England, who campaigned for the vote for women. Some suffragettes broke

windows and started fires: they engaged in property damage as a tactic. Malm assumes that the movement was successful *because* of this, but others have argued that the movement succeeded *despite* these militant methods (Lakey 2015). Similarly, Malm attributes the success of the Iranian revolution to sabotage, when there is contrary evidence (Stephan 2009). Basically, Malm believes that when both violent and nonviolent methods were used in a successful campaign, violence was essential for success.

A different understanding can be obtained by studying the dynamics of nonviolent campaigns. Gene Sharp (1973), in part three of *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, presented a set of stages of nonviolent campaigns, beginning with “laying the groundwork” and then “challenge brings repression”. Repression here often means that activists are subject to violence – for example, beatings, arrests and shootings. Sharp says campaigners need to maintain nonviolent discipline, in other words not to respond violently in the face of attacks. If they can do this, one possible outcome is “political jiu-jitsu”: the repression is counterproductive, generating greater support for the campaign.

In Sharp’s framework, is sabotage a form of challenge that can potentially lead to political jiu-jitsu? Possibly not, given that Sharp did not include sabotage among his 198 methods of nonviolent action.

A closer examination is possible by using the backfire framework (Martin 2007). Powerful perpetrators of injustice can use a variety of methods to reduce public outrage – for example, hiding their actions, devaluing the targets and reinterpreting the events by lying, blaming and framing. These methods have been used in numerous famous cases, for example the beating of protesters at Dharasana in India in 1930 during the salt satyagraha, the shooting of protesters in Sharpeville, South Africa in 1960, and the shooting of protesters in Dili, East Timor in 1991. In each of these cases, the perpetrators of the brutality and killing accused the protesters of using violence. The point of blaming the victim is to change the outside perception from a gross injustice to a contest, however unbalanced, in which both sides use violence. The power of nonviolence against a violent opponent is that it mobilises greater support precisely because unresisted violence is seen as unfair. In Dharasana, Sharpeville and Dili, the perpetrators tried to hide or counter this perception of unfairness, but there was sufficient evidence by credible witnesses to cause the attacks to backfire.

One of the troubles with sabotage is that it is far harder to generate this backfire effect because saboteurs are the perpetrators. Deflating SUV tyres did not generate sympathy.

Backfire is not the only purpose of sabotage. Another is the direct effect on technological systems contributing to climate change, from SUVs to pipelines.

Is this likely to be sufficient to compensate for political downsides? Malm does not make this argument because he is focused on the morality and urgency of direct action. However, morality and urgency do not automatically lead to effective, long-lasting campaigns. Indeed, framing climate change as an emergency has the potential downside of orienting campaigners to governments as saviours, despite governments being less likely to take action than their populations (Hodder and Martin 2009).

One of the strengths of nonviolence is increased participation: it is far easier to join many types of nonviolent action. Children, people with disabilities, women, elders – all can play useful roles in rallies, strikes and boycotts. Front-line soldiers, in contrast, are more likely to be young fit men.

What about sabotage? This depends on the sabotage, but in practice most participants have been young and fit, as shown in the film inspired by and with the same title as Malm's book.

Another radicalism

The mainstream response to address climate change is to support renewable energy – from the sun, wind, and tides – to replace the energy obtained by burning fossil fuels. There is considerable research showing that, in many places, solar and wind power are cheaper than fossil fuels, and can be introduced far more rapidly than the other suggested alternative, nuclear power, which has its own set of problems as well as being hugely expensive. An energy system based on renewables – which has been described as a soft energy path (Lovins 1977) – has many advantages, yet it leaves the structure of society largely unchanged. Political oppression and economic inequality can exist in a low-carbon future. Is there another way?

An alternative is to promote social change that is synergistic with climate action. Imagine guerrilla actions to install insulation in housing for poor people. This is a completely different sort of nonviolent action. In contrast to attacking the rich, it is a form of “constructive resistance” (Sørensen, Vinthagen, and Johansen 2023). Transport activism has been a feature in many countries for decades, including blockades of new roads and cyclists collectively taking to the streets. Could pedestrian actions promote “walkable cities” (Balsas 2019; Speck 2012)?

A key driver of energy use is consumerism, which is promoted through advertising, planned obsolescence, and media coverage of the lifestyles of the wealthy and famous. Many people aspire to bigger houses, bigger cars and bigger offices, as well as designer clothes and ever more possessions. In contrast are those promoting a life of rich relationships with self, others, and the environment (Sclove 2022). Climate activists could connect with anti-consumerist

campaigns to break the belief that having more, especially more than neighbours and co-workers, brings satisfaction.

Meat production uses a great deal of energy and other resources. Eating less meat benefits the climate as well as the welfare of animals. The climate movement has many affinities with the animal liberation movement, including addressing dilemmas over direct action and violence (Best and Nocella II 2006).

The world's military activities contribute greatly to global warming. The peace movement should be considered a crucial ally of the climate movement (Crawford 2022).

Stronger links could be forged with trade unions. This could include developing plans to retrain workers in energy-intensive sectors of the economy for jobs in a green economy. It could include climate bans: trade union bans on participation in projects harmful to the climate, analogous to green bans (Mundey 1981; Roddewig 1978).

Banks and insurance companies play a crucial role in financing energy projects. Already, the reluctance of some banks to support new energy-intensive developments is playing a role in climate campaigning. This is aided by campaigns targeting financial institutions.

There may be a role for grassroots organising (Fisher 1984; Mann 2011) – for example, going door-to-door to talk with residents, asking them for their suggestions on how to tackle global warming. Rather than presuming to have all the answers and telling people what they must do, organising can be more participatory, a process of mutual learning and breaking down stereotypes. Organising has the potential of bringing diverse constituencies into the climate movement and fostering creativity in campaigning methods. Organising and nonviolent action can be synergistic (Engler and Engler 2016).

The climate movement has already shown enormous strength in fostering awareness globally and sharing ideas about action. Rather than thinking non-violence has been tried and isn't enough, a radical alternative is to think that nonviolent alternatives have only begun to be tested and to explore a wide range of participatory actions and diverse alliances.

Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham: Sabotage and complex public opinion

Malm advocates for the incorporation of sabotage into the repertoire of civil resistance aimed at climate change. His call is rooted in two ideas: “successful” resistance in the past has often (if not always) been accompanied by sabotage

(i.e. destruction of property), and sabotage is required for movements to impose enough costs to industry and governments to generate change.

The function of sabotage in the fight against climate change is (at least) two-fold: to impose costs on the current fossil fuel-based energy system and to call greater attention to climate emergency. By calling greater attention to the issue, activists hope to do two things. First, they want to bolster political will to make painful policy changes. Second, they want to increase popular mobilisation around the issue. This second function of increasing attention (generating mobilisation) intersects with a few important questions surrounding popular perceptions about both climate change and tactics of resistance that are the focus of this essay.

Beyond the extreme position of “climate science deniers”, there is a diverse set of perspectives about who is primarily responsible for excessive greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. Globally, we see evidence of blame being laid at the feet of industry, government, “western” economic development, the divine, and a hodgepodge of other “bad actors” (Artur and Hilhorst 2012; Eguavoen 2013; Sheridan 2012; Schipper 2010; Rudiak-Gould 2015). Even if people largely see climate change as the result of the fossil fuel-based economy, they do not necessarily link this “blame” to a consistent set of actors that are responsible for fixing the problem. Moreover, beyond thinking about questions of responsibility for causing climate change, there are diverse views on which actors are responsible for *addressing* increasing global temperatures and hazards that result from them.

In a practical sense, this diversity of perspectives poses a challenge for the broader climate movement. Both the historical narratives that Malm provides and the more current stories of sabotage suggest that activists must choose their targets with care, presumably so that they do not decrease movements' legitimacy (among other reasons). Yet, backlash to sabotage is likely when both movement members and the broader population have different views on responsibility, and thus differ in their beliefs about who is a legitimate target of this violence. If this occurs, sabotage may have the effect of decreasing mobilisation and political engagement rather than increasing it.

Malm highlights the multitude of different responses to sabotage tactics with the chilling story of reactions to the 2007 event where activists deflated a tyre on dozens of SUVs in an affluent suburb of Stockholm. One individual responded by saying not only should the activists be arrested but that they would prefer to see paedophiles on the street rather than these activists (p83). While this example is extreme, it highlights the large variation that exists in public opinion about resistance tactics (beyond the question of targets addressed above).

Public opinion about nonviolent tactics is not universally positive, even among the political left. A recent study of American opinion of tactical choice suggests that the most important factor determining support for different tactics was partisan alignment with activists (Croco, Cunningham, and Vincent 2023). This raises a question about contextual factors that might mitigate or exacerbate the intended effects of sabotage, especially when there is a high degree of political polarisation. Other cross-cutting features, such as racial identity, have been shown to strongly condition responses to activism (Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011). Sabotage as a tactic may succeed in bringing attention to the movement, but it may be attention that undermines support rather than increases it – even among people sympathetic to the activists' goals. Sabotage is also likely to be paired with other nonviolent tactics, making it difficult to discern how these tactics affect support for the broader cause and for specific activist organisations.

Another area where differential perception and public opinion can impact the power or intended effect of sabotage is the complex set of environmental hazards and issues that individuals encounter. For some, the most proximate concern related to climate change is flooding, for others it is fires, and for others it is food security. Studies show that exposure to hazards are a key determinant of both individual feelings of responsibility and assigning blame on the government (Clancy and Solomon 2015; Griffin et al. 2008). Each hazard is also linked to varying complex systems (ecological and political) and potential failures of adaptation by different actors (including local governments, communities and individuals, and international actors). Political leaders can and do advance narratives that fit their own belief systems by selectively using scientific evidence as it relates to local hazards (Bankoff, Frerks, and Hilhorst 2004). Again, there are ample opportunities for activists and citizens to see climate change as a problem, but prioritise or focus on different aspects of it depending on their experiences. This provides yet another mechanism through which we might expect very different views about use of and targets of sabotage within and beyond the climate movement.

Sabotage brings attention to the climate crisis, but not always the type of attention which advances the political goals of climate activists. It can fall short because people disagree on who is responsible for causes and consequences of climate change. This is compounded by the fact that people are not universally receptive to nonviolent tactics, let alone sabotage. Some acts of sabotage may play the role Malm suggests, but others could induce backlash towards the movement and prove counterproductive. It is unclear, as of yet, how much the overall efficacy of sabotage for the climate movement will depend on who deems which targets legitimate and how the public responds.

Alexi Anisin: Nonviolence and morally-induced property destruction

Scenes of broken windows, looted shops, and burning cars are not uncommon at protest demonstrations, especially in high-profile waves of collective action that have arisen in the last few years across advanced liberal democracies such as the United States or France. While many see property destruction as an aberration of a protest that might have gotten out of hand, there appears to be an increasingly prominent shift towards considering the efficacy of property destruction and unarmed forms of violence in resistance campaigns (Lehoucq 2016; Kadivar and Ketchley 2018; Jackson 2023). Recent academic exchanges have discussed the utility of different protest strategies (Pressman 2017; Onken, Shemia-Goeke, and Martin 2021; Anisin 2021), and much attention has been cast on Malm's *How to Blow up a Pipeline* (2021), which has recently been adopted in a feature film and is starting to become a beacon of contemporary climate justice movements. Malm, a self-proclaimed leftist whose aim is to stop the ongoing climate "death spiral" brought about by fossil fuel industries, argues that "We're over the cliff. Apocalyptic heating is a done deal, no matter what" (p149).

Interestingly enough, Malm's suggestion of property destruction echoes a dynamic that has been addressed within a notable set of critiques that have arisen in research on civil resistance (Anisin 2020; Onken, Shemia-Goeke, and Martin 2021; Anisin 2021). Recent scholarly exchanges pose unresolved questions about the nature of violence in social change in today's world. Are unarmed forms of violence, including rioting, property sabotage, and rock throwing more effective than strict adherence to civil disobedience? Is peaceful protest enough? In this essay, I will draw attention to methodological challenges which underlie how social scientists have coded nonviolent protest strategies. Particular attention will be given to observations of different forms of violence in aggregated (annual) data versus event-based data. Engaging with Malm's contributions, especially those pertaining to the usage of different strategic protest actions, is relevant to the wider study of nonviolent civil resistance and the implications that unarmed forms of violence pose for our understanding of the effectiveness of different protest strategies. Focusing on this broader spectrum of ideas can significantly enhance the relevance of academic literature for practitioners and activists, especially in light of the fact that some of the most significant protests in recent history in liberal democratic contexts, such as the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States and the Yellow Vests protests in France, experienced widespread occurrences of riots and unarmed violence.

Riots and other forms of unarmed violence, however, have typically been viewed as belonging to an umbrella of protest strategies that were classified

by Chenoweth and Stephan (2008; 2011) as “primarily nonviolent.” While these inquiries were grounded in an analytical foundation that integrated an impressive amount of data and popularised nonviolence to the general public, the authors operated under the presumption that such oppositional movements are largely nonviolent and, in turn, glossed over the intricate and complex variations of events that unfold across wider landscapes of protest and revolution. Chenoweth and Stephan produced what at the time were among the first quantitative data on nonviolent movements and coded nonviolent strategy dichotomously. This set the status quo for how quantitative social inquiry on civil resistance would be carried out and is still prominent at the time of writing this essay. Dozens upon dozens of studies published in high-ranking academic outlets have drawn from datasets that were put forward by the authors. General prescriptions found in interdisciplinary research on nonviolence tell us that nonviolence is not only more effective than violence, but that it is also more attractive because of moral factors (Dahlum, Pinckney, and Wig 2023). Interestingly enough, Malm also advocates a moral-based set of logics, albeit for unarmed forms of violence via property destruction in a struggle against the fossil fuel industry. Malm also notes that militant action is not a first, but a last resort, with nonviolent mass mobilisation needing to be the first resort where possible (p115). In taking such a position, Malm believes that in time, the intention to blow up pipelines and intelligent sabotage will grow to be universal in scope across humanity because “less and less deniable calamities should resonate with broader and broader layers” (p118).

Malm contends that Chenoweth and Stephan’s inquiries on resistance campaigns are problematic because they are based on a “comparison of apples and oranges” (p57). Explanations of noteworthy historical revolutions such as the fall of the Iranian regime or the labelling of the anti-apartheid struggle as nonviolent sounds “more like a morning prayer than an account of what happened” (p58). Along these lines, Martin (2021) brings up a pertinent point in response to Malm’s criticism of Chenoweth and Stephan’s work:

he seems to assume that violence is what makes campaigns successful. It is also true that nearly every campaign using violence also involves non-violent actions. Should we assume that the effectiveness of such campaigns is due to its nonviolent components?

In previous research, I approached this matter (Anisin 2018, 2020) by disaggregating resistance strategies to demonstrate that many movements that have been considered by scholars to be “primarily nonviolent” are actually filled with much more violence than commonly assumed. What’s more, it appears that a

mixture of unarmed violence and nonviolence is most effective in the context of large-scale regime-change-seeking campaigns. Specifically, if different resistance tactics are broken down, one will quickly observe that movements which are labelled as “primarily nonviolent” actually include significantly more violence than typically acknowledged (Anisin 2024). This is a key issue that Chenoweth’s (2023) recent article in the *Annual Review of Political Science* attempts to deal with. Chenoweth admits that unarmed collective violence has “more ambiguous effects” on the chances for nonviolent movements to succeed in comparison to “organized armed violence” (Chenoweth 2023, 57). Simultaneously, however, Chenoweth defends her original classification of a “primarily nonviolent” resistance strategy which she contends is a practice that is deliberately maintained by leadership and the vast majority of participants of a given movement (Chenoweth 2023, 58). Chenoweth argues that if violence occurs alongside nonviolence as an exceptional episode within a broader process of contention, then this constitutes a violent flank. Movements that feature a violent flank have been observed to bring about both positive and negative effects and, given the relatively complex and even contradictory observations made thus far in different studies, researchers are recommended to clarify the conditions under which different outcomes are likeliest to arise (Chenoweth 2023, 65). Chenoweth encourages researchers to disentangle different outcomes of nonviolent resistance; to embrace methodological pluralism; and to further identify mechanisms of movement success (see Chenoweth 2023, 72).

If data on protest strategies are disaggregated from annual-based observations, one will observe that there are numerous different episodes of contention within a given tide of revolutionary dissent and many of these episodes are marked by protests that feature explicit strategies, interactions, and events which are not necessarily connected to any larger civil-resistance-advocating leadership structure, but are nevertheless causally important because of the outcomes they can lead to or bring about (Anisin 2024). It could be the case that heightened tension induced by burning cars, sabotaged property, broken windows, and rioting would lead some members of police or security forces to overreact and open fire on protesters. If this was found to be empirically salient, this of course would strip conceptual support away from one of the key transformative mechanisms (repression backfire) that has been hitherto associated with success rates of nonviolent civil resistance. Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) quantitative analysis found that nonviolent campaigns were 46 times likelier to experience success if regime security forces defected during the campaign. Without accounting for contextual conditions and variance(s) across different events, such a result remains dubious because it is premised on the assumption that campaigns are primarily nonviolent. There are numerous

other examples of this sort which represent comparable inquiries that should be carried out with disaggregated data to explore key causal mechanisms, including security force defection.

Contemporary scholarly discourse on the efficacy of various protest strategies is predicated upon an analytical framework that draws from aggregated datasets which assume oppositional movements are predominantly nonviolent in nature. These assumptions and their associated methodological approaches, while initially helpful for facilitating a mass dissemination of knowledge, are inherently flawed. The characterisation of a collective movement as primarily nonviolent tends to obscure the nuanced and often complex reality of event-based variances that manifest within a broader continuum of dissent. Such oversimplifications fail to account for the multifaceted nature of protest dynamics and thereby diminish the analytical utility of this categorisation. Along these lines, the phenomenon of property destruction is a salient example of unarmed violence that challenges conventional narratives and underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of protest actions. Malm's work has successfully managed to translate a complex issue into a more understandable and popular set of ideas surrounding activism. These ideas intersect between various academic disciplines and have sparked discussions that extend beyond the confines of traditional research paradigms. They also underscore the need for a more thorough and multifaceted approach to research. Therefore, it is critical for future research endeavours to transcend these limitations through more rigorous methodological approaches, enhanced theoretical frameworks, and a more holistic consideration of the implications of protest dynamics.

Antoine Durance and Manuel Cervera-Marzal: From efficacy to legitimacy: The difficult assessment of the outcomes of sabotage

In 2024, 52 years after the Club of Rome's Meadows report and 36 years after the creation of the IPCC, hopes for the fight against global warming seem low. Still largely dependent on fossil fuels, the combustion of which makes a major contribution to global warming, our societies see an increasing number of heatwaves, fires and floods every year, illustrating the scale of this catastrophe for almost all living beings on our planet. Against this backdrop, Andreas Malm denounces our inability to face up to the climate emergency, entangled as we are in an incomprehensible business-as-usual. Having been involved in the fight against global warming for several decades, environmental activists are the main targets of *How to Blow Up a Pipeline*. An environmental activist since

COP1 in 1995, Andreas Malm describes the failure of a climate movement to break away from its moral and strategic pacifism. In this influential essay, the author draws on the history of social movements, political science and political theory to answer “Lanchester’s paradox”: given the urgency of climate change and the failure of nonviolent strategies, why haven’t environmental activists yet turned their attention to actions against the infrastructures responsible for global warming, in order to push governments to impose a definitive ecological and energy transition? After describing the limitations of campaign-level statistical analysis in the study of causality between nonviolent (as well as violent) action strategy and mobilisation outcomes, we discuss the role of mobilisation framing in legitimising (or delegitimising) mobilisations. Finally, we question the profile of the public whose support the climate movement should seek, according to Malm, and whose potential criticism could thus justify a change of strategy.

How to measure effectiveness?

In this book, sabotage is presented as an effective strategy, representative of that revolutionary ideal that the liberal civil disobedience of the climate movement seems to have lost. An eternal subject of debate within mobilisations, the effectiveness of methods of action has also gradually developed within the research community. In their now famous book *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (2011), Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan analysed 323 mobilisation campaigns conducted between 1900 and 2006. After categorising these campaigns according to their violent or nonviolent character, the researchers showed that nonviolence is twice as likely to succeed as violence. Inspired by this book, other researchers proved the superior effectiveness of nonviolence in toppling authoritarian regimes (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013) or mobilising large sections of the population in mobilisations (Başer 2019).

Over time, however, Chenoweth and Stephan’s work became the subject of a number of criticisms, calling into question their findings. Anisin (2020) questioned Chenoweth and Stephan’s choice to categorise as nonviolent campaigns those relying “primarily” (but not exclusively) on nonviolent methods. Campaigns including stone-throwing and the use of Molotov cocktails were therefore considered nonviolent. Criticising the binary categorisation of methods of action into only two categories, Anisin proposed a more precise analysis based on the intermediate category of “unarmed violence” proposed by Kadivar and Ketchley (2018). Using an expanded version of Chenoweth and Stephan’s NAVCO database, he demonstrated that “unarmed violence,” formerly categorised as nonviolent, was more effective than strictly nonviolent actions.

This argument couldn't have come at a better time for Malm, who seeks to critique the effectiveness of nonviolence. Confronting the "sanitized history, bereft of realistic appraisals of what has happened and what hasn't" (p61) put forward by strategic pacifism advocates, Malm defends the role of police car destruction and arson of police stations in the victory of protests during the Iranian Revolution or the Arab Springs. According to him, many victories of social mobilisations could never have occurred without violence.

These criticisms are part of a broader debate about the difficult categorisation of methods of action in campaign-level analysis. Faced with the dichotomy that distinguishes only between violence and nonviolence, the choice to diversify the categories of analysis is undoubtedly relevant. However, these analyses still struggle to grasp the diversity of methods used in the context of mobilisation. By reducing a campaign consisting of numerous, potentially different actions to a single categorisation, the researcher demonstrates simplification. As Onken et al. (2021) remind us, this is indeed a limitation inherent in studies examining complex campaigns and seeking to draw conclusions about their effectiveness. Observing the limitations of campaign-level analysis, Chenoweth recommends organisation-level and event-level analysis that offers more precise, localised, and nuanced understandings of strategies and tactical changes.

Beyond categorisation, work on the effectiveness of methods of action also raises the difficult question of causality between action strategy and mobilisation outcomes (Giugni 1998). Statistical analyses inform us about the predominance of a certain action method within a set of considered successful (or unsuccessful) mobilisations and usually only observe a correlation between a method of action and an outcome of a mobilisation. As Chenoweth (2023) points out, these campaign-level statistical analyses struggle to account for the potentially diverse consequences of resorting to an action method. In parallel with achieving the objectives of a campaign in the long term, she assumes that a method can also have negative impacts in the short or medium term. Like Onken et al. (2021) responding to Anisin (2020), Chenoweth also advises the use of mixed methods to study, through qualitative analyses, the mechanisms of resorting to violence (or nonviolence) and their reception by the various actors involved in the mobilisations (protesters, media, police, state, etc.).

Framing mobilisations

Furthermore, the question of effectiveness contributes to a broader question raised by Malm: that of the legitimacy of a mobilisation. While proof of the effectiveness of an action method can convince external actors of the value of a mobilisation, it is not necessarily a sufficient (or even necessary) argument. In this sense, Malm attempts to defend the moral justification of sab-

otage. Although advocated by several environmental activists, Malm refuses to categorise this method as nonviolence, arguing that this effort constitutes “more than a conceptual stretch, a waste of rhetorical effort” (p102). Believing that public opinion in Northern countries considers the destruction of property as violence, the author proposes accepting this categorisation while presenting this violence as “*different in kind* from the violence that hits a human (or an animal)” (p102). Not affecting subsistence goods but luxury goods or infrastructure contributing to climate change, this violence would thus be less severe than violence against people. But would it be legitimate? According to William Smith (2018) cited by Malm, sabotage could indeed be justified in an emergency context to disrupt practices that could lead to irreversible effects, if gentler tactics have yielded no results and if the targeted wrongdoers violate a convention or charter (p105).

Despite this argument, the rhetorical battle is not won. By embracing violence, activists risk being labelled as terrorists. Described as a catastrophe by Malm, this rhetoric would erase “the moral capital the climate movement has amassed” (p111). Highlighting the role of collective action frames (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000) and their perception by external actors, Malm poses an interesting question: how do we perceive the action methods employed in social movements? While statistical studies defend clear categorisations of methods of action, these are the subject of discussion within activist circles and are therefore far from being consensual, universal and fixed. Although some studies seem to believe in the existence of a perfectly “objective” qualification of action methods, these can be considered, according to Onken et al. (2021), as social constructions, the result of negotiations that are never fully stabilised.

Knowing this, the complex question of framing tasks arises. Malm proposes presenting the violence used by environmentalists as of a different nature, always “constrained, proportionate, and discriminating” (Smith 2018, 18–19, cited in Malm 2021, p111) and targeting infrastructures responsible for an imminent catastrophe for living beings.

As they are not the sole actors involved in framing tasks concerning mobilisations, activists face other interpretations of reality and perceptions of action methods. These framing tasks are thus part of a conflictual process opposing, notably, the framing of militants to that of opponents of the movement, audiences, and the media (Benford and Snow 2000). Alongside the legitimisation effort inherent in the framing tasks of militants, other frames can lead to the delegitimation of a mobilisation. Presenting a demonstration as a threat and as the work of groups of individuals of different political affiliation or nationality can thus increase support for repression among readers (Edwards and

Arnon 2021), confirming Malm's desire to avoid as much as possible the label of terrorist.

Playing a major role in the perception that external actors have of mobilisations, the framing of collective actions results from several tasks. These are carried out by a multitude of actors directly or indirectly involved in the mobilisations and sharing different opinions. The activists and opponents of the movement are, of course, the primary actors involved, each attempting to legitimise or delegitimise the mobilisations based on their cause, the profiles of the activists, or the action methods employed. In turn, the media also participate in these framing tasks. Interviewing certain activists, police officers, politicians, observers, presenting the context of the mobilisation in a certain way, or showing or telling certain actions rather than others, can influence the perception that viewers will have of this mobilisation. Through their statements, politicians also fully participate in framing mobilisations (see, for example, the statements of the French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin regarding environmental activists opposed to mega reservoirs, whom he described as eco-terrorists). Finally, it should be noted that sociologists studying social movements themselves participate in framing reality, as Howard Becker (2007) noticed. As illustrated by books like *How to Blow Up a Pipeline* and *Why Civil Resistance Works*, research on the effectiveness of violence or nonviolence is taken up and cited by activists to justify the use of certain action methods. The relationships and influences between social movements and researchers are thus much more numerous and diverse than this neutral image of research might suggest.

Who to convince?

Aware of the framing struggles regarding the methods of action of social movements, of which he is also a significant actor, as evidenced by the sales and comments on his book, Malm nevertheless remains vague about the targets of his argumentation and the responses to criticisms of his strategy. Presented as the main culprits of climate change, the wealthiest are certainly not the ones Malm aims to convince. The same goes for the ruling classes leading the most polluting states, whose likelihood to be “implementing compulsory restrictions on the consumption of the rich – on themselves, that is – is about the same as them donning leather jackets and proclaiming war communism” (p93). Therefore, knowing that not everyone can be convinced, the question arises of which members of this “community of opinion” (p121) to persuade. If, as we have seen, Malm takes a stance against “perfectly civil disobedience” seeking naïvely the support of all and thus failing to exert a sufficiently significant pressure to compel states to impose transitions, he does not completely overlook the question of legitimacy and the “dint of the numbers” (p17). “Actions should

be undertaken if plan, goal and execution can be explained and garner support in an intimate relation to the existing consciousness, to be pushed up a notch" (p119). In Gramscian terms, Malm argues that actions should not only conform to common sense; they should transform it. Malm thus mentions the harmful risk of the radical flank, the disaster that would represent a loss of legitimacy. It is necessary, he says, to avoid "tactics that would put off too many people" (p119). So finally, the following question arises: at what point should reproaches be listened to and actions adjusted accordingly? Far from being trivial, this balancing between legitimacy and radicalism is crucial. Beyond the questions of violence and nonviolence, debates about effectiveness and ineffectiveness, the main issue of the climate movement is and will remain that of its legitimacy.

Alexandre Christoyannopoulos: Approaching pacifism and diversity with eyes wide open

Malm's *How to Blow Up a Pipeline* paints in detail an alarming picture many activists are frustratingly familiar with: an increasingly catastrophic trajectory for our planet on the one hand, and a simultaneous set of economic and political decisions on the other that not only fall far short of rising to the challenge, but also have actually been accelerating the pace of the unfolding catastrophe. Reading it makes you want to "do something about" it.

The book describes many examples of nonviolent actions motivated by that drive. That the situation has only been getting worse would seem to suggest these forms of activism are failing. In such a context, it is understandable and appropriate for activists to be revisiting debates about the comparative effectiveness of different tactics. In stimulating such a debate as well as reminding its readers of the climate emergency, of the failures of political and economic leaders, and indeed of the particularly pernicious impact of luxury consumption (not least by these same political and economic elites), the book's contribution to public and activist debates is helpful and to be welcomed.

It is also fair to recognise that Malm acknowledges some of the reasons why nonviolent tactics are so widespread and why many of their advocates prefer them, from the tactical advantages they bring (pp23–24) to the way they lower barriers to participation (pp114–115). Moreover, critical though he is of Extinction Rebellion for example, he also acknowledges its "achievements," including how it "massively shifted the point of gravity in domestic politics" (p129).

Malm says explicitly that "non-violent mass mobilization should (where possible) be the first resort" (p115). He is clear that he is not advocating interpersonal violence or violence against other sentient beings, that what he is

calling for *is* violence *but* only against property and as a last resort (pp101–111). What he is advocating is emphatically not “terrorism”, but “vandalism”, “sabotage”, or “the fine art [...] of controlled political violence” (pp107–110). In the process, he is rather scathing of what he calls pacifism.

It is in reaction to the latter that I focus my critical remarks. That is, seeing that several contributions in this Forum already cover many of the critical comments warranted by the scholarship on nonviolence and civil resistance, my remarks focus more specifically on the way “pacifism” is caricatured, and on how a more nuanced understanding of it can enrich discussions about diverse tactics in environmental activism.

“Pacifism”

Malm presents what he calls pacifism as an absolute, creed-like and sacrificial refusal to commit acts of violence in all circumstances. It is a “doctrine” of “absolute non-violence” (p31) that “yields a priori to the worst forms of evil” (p31), an “exhortation to *surrender* to suffering and atrocity” (p32). If not, in other words if a pacifist concedes that there might be rare scenarios where violence is acceptable, then the pacifist “ceases to be a pacifist and becomes like everyone else” (p32). There can be “no such thing as ‘contingent’ or ‘relative pacifism’” because a “pacifist who makes exceptions is a just war theorist” (p32). Pacifists, however, are imbued “with a self-righteousness, borne out of the fetishization of one sometimes useful type of tactic” (p128). Some even indulge in “a mystical rejoicing” in “suffering” that is supposed to be “redemptive” (p33, partly quoting Martin Luther King). In the very first paragraph where he turns his attention to pacifism, Malm recounts how a young man who had entered a mosque in Oslo in August 2019 and started shooting intent on perpetrating a massacre was only thwarted by a 65-year-old man who threw himself over the attacker, wrestled with him and “held him in a chokehold until police arrived” (p31). This, Malm says, would be “unacceptable” to a pacifist (p31).

This is a classic caricature of pacifism, but also a misrepresentation of it on at least three counts. Firstly, individuals do not function like institutions. By and large the primary concern of pacifists is with war, in other words with organised political violence. Wars kill. They destroy. They accelerate centralisation and the drift towards authoritarianism. They (re)produce military-industrial interests that often end up being self-fulfilling. Preparing for them requires military training and funding. In short, wars transform and militarise the societies absorbed in them (Christoyannopoulos 2022; Dobos 2020; Hutchings 2018; Jackson 2017, 2020; Ryan 2013, 2015). The way all this plays out, both in preparing for such an eventuality and in immediately reacting to it if and when it comes, is markedly different to how an individual might prepare and

respond to another individual attacking them. It is one thing to use some force to instinctively restrain someone like the Oslo assailant, another to plan and build a military to confront a state threatening invasion. To imply that pacifists contradict themselves and undermine their critique of organised violence (and how it constitutes its agents) if they are willing to use force to protect individuals under immediate attack is to conflate fundamentally different phenomena.

Secondly, few pacifists go as far as arguing that they would not use any force even in situations of genuine interpersonal emergency. They might have more qualms than others about using any such force, and they might try to remain as restrained as possible, but few self-proclaimed pacifists have gone as far as to claim that even if their children were attacked they would not contemplate using force to defend them (even Tolstoy, often presented as an example of a particularly absolutist pacifist, was not consistent on this: Christoyannopoulos 2020, 38-42). It is possible to be alarmed by and denounce the institutionalisation and exercise of organised violence whilst also accepting that extreme scenarios of individual self-defence may require some force. This moreover touches on another reason why some pacifists see the “domestic analogy” as unsound when it comes to thinking about how violence *might* operate to disable a threat, because it simply does not work the same way on the collective level as it might on an interpersonal one (Wallace 2020).

Thirdly, thwarting a massacre by wrestling with an attacker and holding him in a chokehold is markedly different from killing him. Both involve physical force and violence, but non-lethal violence is not the same as violence inflicted with intent to kill. There are different degrees of violence, just as there are different types of violence – against sentient beings, against property, structural, psychological, verbal, epistemic, etc. Even in extreme scenarios of interpersonal emergencies, a considerable range of reactions might be available up to and including some force before really running out of options and using lethal violence. Pacifists do not counsel passivity in the face of violence (to the contrary: they are triggered by it and agitate to tackle it), but they are among the keenest to genuinely explore all options instead of automatically defaulting to lethal retaliation.

Malm's description of pacifism resembles that of some classic criticisms of it circulating in anarchist circles (Churchill 2007; Gelderloos 2013, 2018) and reflects fairly common views beyond activist circles (Jackson 2018). And in fairness, some of the claims he makes along the way might be a fairly accurate description of *some* pacifists. But to present such a caricature as “pacifism” is to misrepresent it and thereby overlook the richness, complexity, and internal diversity of pacifist comments about violence and how to respond to it (Christoyannopoulos 2024).

Malm seems aware of some of that diversity when referring to “contingent pacifism”, but he quickly dismisses it out of hand despite decades of scholarship about it (see Christoyannopoulos 2023, 8–9). He also seems aware of an established distinction between “principled” and “pragmatic” pacifism (Atack 2012; Nepstad 2015) but again dismisses oversimplified caricatures of them instead of engaging with their internal richness and complexity (pp34–36). Ignored, too, is the possibility of further variations including “technological”, “nuclear”, and “epistemological” pacifism, for example (Cady 2010, 2023). One particular variant is “ecological pacifism”, with its concerns about the impact of war and militarism on the environment (Cady 2010, 74–5; Väyrynen 2023). Another is “anarcho-pacifism”, with arguments about the functioning of the global political economy and the violence upon which it rests that resonate with much of Malm’s critique of the capitalist world order (Christoyannopoulos 2022). This book, however, presents a “straw person” version of pacifism for Malm to go on to make his case for escalation.

Either way, although a few pacifists *are* absolute in their rejection of all violence, and some for instance do speak of redemptive suffering, pacifism comes in many variants and has much more to contribute even to debates about environmental justice than Malm’s framing and dismissal of it would seem to suggest.

Diversity of tactics

The primary purpose of *How to Blow Up a Pipeline* is to invite environmental activists to seriously consider actions beyond strict “pacifism” and “nonviolence”, including notably sabotaging pipelines and deflating the tyres of SUVs. In a sense, his concern is therefore more about “nonviolence” than “pacifism” (although the terms can be used interchangeably by both advocates and detractors, they denote slightly different, if complementary, foci: Christoyannopoulos 2023). For Malm, the pacifist obsession with nonviolence in environmental activism has proved ineffective long enough to warrant escalation to violence against property, especially given the increasing urgency of the climate emergency.

But here, the assumption that escalation will be more effective is questionable (as discussed by others in this Forum), as is the further assumption that the failure of environmental activism so far is due to its commitment to nonviolence. No researcher on nonviolence has claimed that nonviolence is *guaranteed* to work, nor that violence *never* works. Overall, however, the empirical evidence suggests that nonviolence succeeds more often and begets better outcomes – because it appears to be a more effective strategy for facilitating the mechanisms identified by researchers as associated with movement success (such as building broad-based, diverse support for a movement, eliciting

defections from those holding up the unjust system, etc.). As others noted in this Forum already, comparing historical examples does come with challenges, but the scholars working on this are aware of these and applying themselves to tackle them carefully.

One major difficulty with using historical examples to reflect on tactics to confront the climate emergency, however, is something Malm touches on himself. The maximalist goal is not to topple an authoritarian regime, to stop the building of a dam, or to get a colonial power to leave – in other words, hinging on a relatively small pool of politicians changing course. It is much broader than that. Effective action to tackle the climate emergency depends on a commitment to change course from not just the political elites of one country but those of every country, as well as from the economic decision-makers embedded in and benefitting from the current global economic order – the multinational corporations, the wealth funds, the energy companies, energy-greedy industries, the transport sector, the agricultural sector, lobbyists, media barons, etc. In the process, lifestyles especially for the middle classes upwards need changing too. No historical campaign, violent or not, has ever succeeded in bringing about so massive a transformation on a global scale. Yet that is what is needed. Stopping global warming involves a full confrontation with a very resilient capitalist global political economy and consumerist culture. The scale of the challenge is unlike that of any historical example of violent or nonviolent resistance. It should not be surprising that even tactics that seem to have been comparatively more effective historically have not succeeded yet. But this lack of success may be due less to the chosen tactics than to the nature and scale of what needs to change.

The research, to date, and taken as a whole, is ambivalent on the impact of “radical flanks”. Across the world, activists in the climate movement have been attracted to and have deployed dozens of different tactics, adapted them, learnt from multiple campaigns, and recurrently agonised about what to do next. Some of these tactics have been “spikier”. Some have involved criminal property damage – such as throwing soup at (the glass that is protecting) artworks (Cain 2022). The temptation presented by Malm to deploy violence against property is understandable, even if only to give stronger legitimacy and momentum for less “violent” activists to extract concessions (Malm seems aware of this dynamic and happy to embrace it for greater effectiveness). But the potential effectiveness of such tactics is never guaranteed, and the question will always be: how far, how radical, how much “spikier”?

It is here that debates are often sparked, tempers raised on all sides, and caricatures and accusations traded about “violence”, “nonviolence”, and “pacifism”. What counts as what is often contested (I discuss this at greater length

in Christoyannopoulos 2024). Malm, for instance, accepts that what he is advocating is “violence” (against property), but some nonviolent activists (e.g. Collectif 2019; Govier 2008; Kalicha 2020; Kuhn 2013; Orosco 2018) for instance would describe sabotage and vandalism as militant “nonviolence” (because not violent against sentient beings), as Malm in fact acknowledges in passing (p100, but only to then disagree p101). What Malm describes as “pacifism” does echo views that some in the climate movement have an attachment to, but there are many who would use terms like “pacifism” and “nonviolence” in different ways to capture a wider diversity of arguments and preferences. The 198 tactics Sharp labelled “nonviolent” in 1973 does range from symbolic protests to non-cooperation and more confrontational interventions, and sticking to only the least confrontational of tactics may not serve the climate movement best.

An important insight that the scholarship on pacifism and nonviolence brings, however, concerns how these tactics are then framed by those *outside* activist movements. Adversaries can be expected to denounce and to seek to discredit. Accusations of “violence” or even “(eco-)terrorism” are levelled precisely because they perform a function rather effectively. The more “violent” an action can justifiably be claimed to be, the easier the vilification for its antagonists, and the more detrimental the impact therefore on third parties, wider public opinion, and those acting as the cogs of the system targeted for change. Witness, for instance, the vitriol (including threats of physical violence) that Malm and his fellow activists attracted for merely deflating tyres in Stockholm in 2007 (pp82–83); the condemnation and sentencing as “terrorists” (with sentences of 6 and 8 years in prison and over \$3m to pay in restitution, on initial charges totalling a potential 110 years) that befell the two Catholic Worker activists who damaged the North Dakota Pipeline in Iowa in 2017 (pp97–122); or the damaging notoriety and consequent backlash caused by the few Extinction Rebellion activists who stopped traffic in the London underground and light rail in 2019 (pp124–125).

As I have argued elsewhere (2024), activists advocating violence tend to assume that with enough targeted force the system they are targeting can be brought down. By contrast, those advocating nonviolence seem more concerned with the impact of their action on public opinion, keen not to scare away potential supporters and converts whilst still aiming to pressure those with decision-making power to act. Pipelines might be the veins of the global capitalist political economy and they might often be exposed and vulnerable, but any physical damage done to them might prove less consequential in terms of movement effectiveness than how such actions will be framed and received by those outside the movement. The scale of the climate emergency is unprec-

edented, as is that of the complex global political and economic system that needs changing. But the problem is not “pacifism”. Climate activism will continue to benefit from a diversity of tactics, but within certain limits. Rigorous research into pacifism and nonviolence – including insights on how intended audiences actually respond to particular tactics – can help approach debates about where to draw that line with eyes wide open.

References

- Ackerman, Peter, and Berel Rodal. 2008. “The Strategic Dimensions of Civil Resistance.” *Survival* 50 (3): 111–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330802173131>.
- Anisin, Alexei. 2018. “Social Causation and Protest Mobilization: Why Temporality and Interaction Matter.” *Territory, Politics, Governance* 6 (3): 279–301.
- Anisin, Alexei. 2020. “Debunking the Myths Behind Nonviolent Civil Resistance.” *Critical Sociology* 46 (7–8): 1121–39. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920520913982>.
- Anisin, Alexei. 2021. “Reinforcing Criticisms of Civil Resistance: A response to Onken, Shemia-Goeke, and Martin.” *Critical Sociology* 47 (7–8): 1205–18.
- Anisin, Alexei. 2024. *The Singularity of State Repression*. Vernon Press.
- Artur, Luis, and Dorothea Hilhorst. 2012. “Everyday realities of climate change adaptation in Mozambique.” *Global Environmental Change* 22 (2): 529–36. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.11.013>.
- Atack, Iain. 2012. *Nonviolence in Political Theory*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Balsas, Carlos J. L. 2019. *Walkable Cities: Revitalization, Vibrancy, and Sustainable Consumption*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Bankoff, Greg, Georg Frerks, and Thea Hilhorst, eds. 2004. *Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development, and People*. London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications.
- Başer, Ekrem T. 2019. “Mobilization, Repression and the Choice between Violent and Nonviolent Tactics.”
- Becker, Howard S. 2007. *Telling about society*. London: University of Chicago Press.
- Belgioioso, Margherita, Stefano Costalli, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2021. “Better the Devil You Know? How Fringe Terrorism Can Induce an Advantage for Moderate Nonviolent Campaigns.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 33 (3): 596–615. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1559836>.
- Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (Volume 26, 2000): 611–39. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611>.
- Best, Steven, and Anthony J. Nocella II. 2006. *Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.

- Bramsen, Isabel. 2020. "From Civil Resistance to Civil War: Nonstrategic Mechanisms of Militarization in the Syrian Uprising." *Peace & Change* 45 (2): 256–86. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pech.12369>.
- Butcher, Charles, John Laidlaw Gray, and Liesel Mitchell. 2018. "Striking It Free? Organized Labor and the Outcomes of Civil Resistance." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 3 (3): 302–21. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogy010>.
- Butcher, Charles, and Jonathan Pinckney. 2022. "Friday on My Mind: Re-Assessing the Impact of Protest Size on Government Concessions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66 (7–8): 1320–55. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221099887>.
- Cady, Duane. 2010. *From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum Paperback*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Cady, Duane. 2023. "A Time – and a Project – for Pacifism and Nonviolence Studies." *Journal of Pacifism and Nonviolence* 1 (1): 41–51. <https://doi.org/10.1163/27727882-bja00005>.
- Cain, Sian. 2022. "Climate activists attacking art 'severely underestimate' fragility of works, gallery directors warn." *The Guardian*, 11 November, 2022. Accessed 28 May 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2022/nov/11/climate-activists-attacking-art-severely-underestimate-fragility-of-works-gallery-directors-warn>.
- Celestino, Mauricio Rivera, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2013. "Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3): 385–400. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312469979>.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2019. "Women's participation and the fate of nonviolent campaigns." *ICNC Special Report Series*, 2019. https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/womens-participation-and-the-fate-of-nonviolent-campaigns-english_page/.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2021. *Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2023. "The Role of Violence in Nonviolent Resistance." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26 (1): 55–77. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051421-124128>.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2013. "Understanding nonviolent resistance: An introduction." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3): 271–6. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313480381>.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Kurt Schock. 2015. "Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns?" *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 20 (4): 427–51. <https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-20-4-427>.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why civil resistance works: the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Jay Ulfelder. 2017. "Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (2): 298–324. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576574>.

- Christoyannopoulos, Alexandre. 2020. *Tolstoy's Political Thought: Christian Anarcho-Pacifist Iconoclasm Then and Now*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Christoyannopoulos, Alexandre. 2022. "An Anarcho-Pacifist Reading of International Relations: A normative critique of international politics from the confluence of pacifism and anarchism." *International Studies Quarterly* 66 (4). <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqac070>.
- Christoyannopoulos, Alexandre. 2023. "Pacifism and Nonviolence: Discerning the contours of an emerging multidisciplinary research agenda." *Journal of Pacifism and Nonviolence* 1 (1): 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1163/27727882-bja00011>.
- Christoyannopoulos, Alexandre. 2024. "Mapping the landscape between pacifism and anarchism: accusations, rejoinders, and mutual resonances." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481241257806>.
- Churchill, Ward. 2007. *Pacifism as Pathology: Reflections on the Role of Armed Struggle in North America*. Edinburgh: AK Press. 1986.
- Clancy, Connor P., and Sarah Beth Solomon. 2015. "A Survey on Climate Change: How Beliefs Shape Responsibility." *Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics at Colby* 2 (1): 1–19.
- Collectif Désobéissances libertaires, ed. 2019. *Une critique anarchiste de la justification de la violence: Réponses aux écrits de Peter Gelderloos et des tendances autoritaires au sein du black bloc*. Lyon: Atelier de création libertaire.
- Crawford, Neta C. 2022. *The Pentagon, Climate Change, and War: Charting the Rise and Fall of U.S. Military Emissions*. Cambridge: MIT.
- Croco, Sarah E, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Taylor Vincent. 2023. "Protests and persuasion: Partisanship effect on evaluating nonviolent tactics in the United States." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (1): 26–41. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221146577>.
- Dahlum, Sirianne. 2019. "Students in the Streets: Education and Nonviolent Protest." *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (2): 277–309. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018758761>.
- Dahlum, Sirianne, Jonathan Pinckney, and Tore Wig. 2023. "Moral Logics of Support for Nonviolent Resistance: Evidence From a Cross-National Survey Experiment." *Comparative Political Studies* 56 (3): 326–62. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221100198>.
- Davenport, Christian, Sarah A. Soule, and David A. Armstrong. 2011. "Protesting While Black?: The Differential Policing of American Activism, 1960 to 1990." *American Sociological Review* 76 (1): 152–78. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410395370>.
- DeNardo, James. 2014. *Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion*. Vol. 41. Princeton University Press.
- Dobos, Ned. 2020. *Ethics, Security, and The War-Machine: The True Cost of the Military*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Edwards, Pearce, and Daniel Arnon. 2021. "Violence on Many Sides: Framing Effects on Protest and Support for Repression." *British Journal of Political Science* 51 (2): 488–506. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000413>.

- Eguavoen, Irit. 2013. "Climate Change and Trajectories of Blame in Northern Ghana." *Anthropological Notebooks* 19 (1): 5–24.
- Engler, Mark, and Paul Engler. 2016. *This Is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt Is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books.
- Fisher, Robert. 1984. *Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing in America*. Boston: Twayne.
- Gelderloos, Peter. 2013. *The Failure of Nonviolence*. London: Active Distribution.
- Gelderloos, Peter. 2018. *How Nonviolence Protects the State*. Olympia: Detritus. 2005.
- Giugni, Marco G. 1998. "Was it Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (Volume 24, 1998): 371–93. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.371>.
- Govier, Trudy. 2008. "Violence, Nonviolence, and Definitions: A Dilemma for Peace Studies." *Peace Research* 40 (2): 61–83.
- Griffin, Robert J., Zheng Yang, Ellen ter Huurne, Francesca Boerner, Sherry Ortiz, and Sharon Dunwoody. 2008. "After the Flood: Anger, Attribution, and the Seeking of Information." *Science Communication* 29 (3): 285–315. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547007312309>.
- Gustafson, Daniel. 2020. "Hunger to Violence: Explaining the Violent Escalation of Nonviolent Demonstrations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64 (6): 1121–45. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719890669>.
- Hodder, Patrick, and Brian Martin. 2009. "Climate crisis? The Politics of Emergency Framing." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 5 September, 53–60.
- Hutchings, Kimberly. 2018. "Pacifism is dirty: towards an ethico-political defence." *Critical Studies on Security* 6 (2): 176–92. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2017.1377998>.
- Ives, Brandon, and Jacob S. Lewis. 2020. "From Rallies to Riots: Why Some Protests Become Violent." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64 (5): 958–86. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719887491>.
- Jackson, Richard. 2017. "Pacifism and the ethical imagination in IR." *International Politics* 56 (2): 212–27. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0137-6>.
- Jackson, Richard. 2018. "Pacifism: the anatomy of a subjugated knowledge." *Critical Studies on Security* 6 (2): 160–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2017.1342750>.
- Jackson, Richard. 2020. "A Defence of Revolutionary Nonviolence." In *Revolutionary Nonviolence: Concepts, Cases and Controversies*, edited by Richard Jackson, Joseph Llewellyn, Griffin Leonard, Aidan Gnoth and Tonga Karena, 18–41. London: Zed.
- Jackson, Richard. 2023. "The Challenges of Pacifism and Nonviolence in the Twenty-first Century." *Journal of Pacifism and Nonviolence* 1 (1): 28–40. <https://doi.org/10.1163/27727882-bja00001>.
- Kadivar, Mohammad Ali, and Neil Ketchley. 2018. "Sticks, Stones, and Molotov Cocktails: Unarmed Collective Violence and Democratization." *Socius* 4: 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023118773614>.

- Kalicha, Sebastian. 2020. *Anarchisme non-violent et pacifisme libertaire: une approche théorique et historique*. Translated by Gaël Cheptou. Lyon: Atelier de Création Libertaire.
- Kuhn, Gabriel. 2013. "Violence Sells... But Who's Buying?". Accessed 4 May. https://www.alpineanarchist.org/r_gelderloos_review_tfon.html.
- Lahey, George. 2015. "'Suffragette' Raises Question of Property Destruction's Effectiveness." *Waging Nonviolence*, 12 November, 2015. <https://wagingnonviolence.org/2015/11/suffragette-raises-question-property-destruction-effectiveness/>.
- Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2016. "Does Nonviolence Work?" *Comparative Politics* 48 (2): 269–87.
- Lovins, Amory B. 1977. *Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace*. New York: Ballinger.
- Malm, Andreas. 2021. *How to Blow Up a Pipeline: Learning to Fight in a World on Fire*. London: Verso.
- Mann, Eric. 2011. *Playbook for Progressives: 16 Qualities of the Successful Organizer*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Martin, Brian. 2007. *Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Martin, Brian. 2021. Is sabotage needed to save the Earth? *Waging Nonviolence*. Accessed 11 July 2023.
- Mitchell, Liesel. 2023. "Moving the masses: Does nonviolent discipline matter?" Doctor of Philosophy, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago.
- Munday, Jack. 1981. *Green Bans and Beyond*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.
- Mustasilta, Katariina, and Isak Svensson. 2023. "Divided We Fall: Ethnic Cleavages, Movement Cohesion, and the Risk of Escalation to Civil War in Non-Violent Uprisings." *Civil Wars* 25 (1): 103–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2023.2177054>.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2011. *Nonviolent revolutions: Civil resistance in the late 20th century*. *Oxford studies in culture and politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2013. "Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring military defections and loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3): 337–49. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313476529>.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2015. *Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2021. "Religious Support for Civil Resistance Movements: When and How Does It Contribute to Regime Change?" *Socius* 7: 23780231211054997. <https://doi.org/10.1177/23780231211054997>.
- Onken, Monika, Dalilah Shemia-Goeke, and Brian Martin. 2021. "Learning from Criticisms of Civil Resistance." *Critical Sociology* 47 (7–8): 1191–203. <https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205211025819>.
- Orosco, José-Antonio. 2018. "Pacifism as Pathology." In *The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence*, edited by Andrew Fiala, 199–210. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Pinckney, Jonathan. 2016. *Making or Breaking Nonviolent Discipline in Civil Resistance Movements*. Washington: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

- Pressman, Jeremy. 2017. "Throwing Stones in Social Science: Non-violence, Unarmed Violence, and the first Intifada." *Cooperation and Conflict* 52 (4): 519–36.
- Roddedwig, Richard J. 1978. *Green Bans: The Birth of Australian Environmental Politics*. Montclair, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun.
- Rudiak-Gould, Peter. 2015. "The Social Life of Blame in the Anthropocene." *Environment and Society* 6. <https://doi.org/10.3167/ares.2015.060104>.
- Ryan, Cheyney. 2013. "Pacifism, Just War, and Self-Defense." *Philosophia* 41 (4): 977–1005. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9493-7>.
- Ryan, Cheyney. 2015. "Pacifism(s)." *The Philosophical Forum* 46 (1): 17–39. <https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12053>.
- Ryckman, Kirssa Cline. 2020. "A Turn to Violence: The Escalation of Nonviolent Movements." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64 (2–3): 318–43. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719861707>.
- Schell, Jonathan. 2003. *The Unconquerable world: power, nonviolence, and the will of the people*. Macmillan.
- Schipper, E. Lisa F. 2010. "Religion as an integral part of determining and reducing Climate Change and Disaster Risk: An agenda for research." In *Der Klimawandel*, edited by Martin Voss, 377–93. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Schock, Kurt. 2003. "Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36 (4): 705–12.
- Schock, Kurt. 2005. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Schock, Kurt, and Chares Demetriou. 2018. "Nonviolent and Violent Trajectories in Social Movements." In *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, 338–53.
- Sclove, Richard. 2022. *Escaping Maya's Palace: Decoding an Ancient Myth to Heal the Hidden Madness of Modern Civilization*. Boston: Karaville Press.
- Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: Porter Sargent.
- Sheridan, Michael J. 2012. "Global warming and global war: Tanzanian farmers' discourse on climate and political disorder." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6 (2): 230–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2012.669572>.
- Smith, William. 2018. "Disruptive Democracy: The Ethics of Direct Action." *Raisons politiques* 69 (1): 13–27. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rai.069.0013>.
- Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51 (4): 464–81. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581>.
- Sørensen, Majken Jul, Stellan Vinthagen, and Jørgen Johansen. 2023. *Constructive Resistance: Resisting Injustice by Creating Solutions*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Speck, Jeff. 2012. *Walkable City: How Downtown Can Save America, One Step at a Time*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

- Stephan, Maria J. 2009. *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security* 33 (1): 7–44. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.7>.
- Sutton, Jonathan, Charles R Butcher, and Isak Svensson. 2014. "Explaining political jiu-jitsu: Institution-building and the outcomes of regime violence against unarmed protests." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (5): 559–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314531004>.
- Svensson, Isak, Susanne Schaftenaar, and Marie Allansson. 2022. "Violent Political Protest: Introducing a New Uppsala Conflict Data Program Data Set on Organized Violence, 1989–2019." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66 (9): 1703–30. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221109791>.
- Tompkins, Elizabeth. 2015. "A Quantitative Reevaluation of Radical Flank Effects with Nonviolent Campaigns." In *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 103–35. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Väyrynen, Tarja. 2023. "Feminist Ecological Pacifism and Care in the Anthropocene." *Journal of Pacifism and Nonviolence* 1 (1): 91–103. <https://doi.org/10.1163/27727882-bja00003>.
- Vinthagen, Stellan. 2015. *A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works*. London: Zed.
- Vogt, Manuel, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Lars-Erik Cederman. 2021. "From Claims to Violence: Signaling, Outbidding, and Escalation in Ethnic Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65 (7–8): 1278–307. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002721996436>.
- Wallace, M. S. 2020. "Wrestling with another human being: the merits of a messy, power-laden pacifism." *Global Society* 34 (1): 52–67.
- Zunes, Stephen. 1994. "Unarmed insurrections against authoritarian governments in the Third World: A new kind of revolution." *Third World Quarterly* 15 (3): 403–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599408420388>.

