

Civilian-based Defense

EXPLORING A NONVIOLENT STRATEGY FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

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In This Issue

- Grassroots Effort for CBD
 - New International Campaign for Civilian-based Defense 1
Paul E. Anders
 - Document One: Ahimsa Satyagraha International Campaign for Nonviolence 2
 - Document Two: Brief for the Canadian Defence Policy Review Submitted by Cooperation for Peace, Hamilton and Area 3
 - Document Three: International Campaign for Nonviolence—Coordinators and Contact Persons 5
- Modern Access to *Civilian-based Defense* Articles 6
Cathy Flick and Suzanne Pearce
- Lecturing the Military on Nonviolent Defense 6
Robert J. Burrowes
- Civilian-based Defense, Popular Control, and Robert Burrowes 8
Paul E. Anders
- Civilian-based Defense and Catholicism 9
Klaus Heidegger
- Association News
 - Labor and Literary Notes 14
Philip Helms
 - Other News 14

Books

- *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler 15
Reviewed by Melvin G. Beckman
- Book Review Essay: The Need for Civilian-based Defense in Canada
 - Floyd W. Rudmin, *Bordering on Aggression: Evidence of US Military Preparations Against Canada*
 - David Orchard, *The Fight for Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American Expansionism* 15
Reviewed by George H. Crowell
- Souad Dajani on Palestinian Strategy 18
Paul E. Anders

- Recently Received 19
- Books for Sale on Civilian-based Defense 19
- Around the World 20
- Editor's Note 20

Grassroots Effort for CBD

New International Campaign Promotes Civilian-based Defense

Paul E. Anders

A new international campaign is promoting nonviolence, including civilian-based defense, to governments. Shanti Sahyog (Co-operation for Peace, India) and its president, Dr. Suman Khanna, have already helped establish a network of groups and individuals in ten countries. Canada and England now have coordinating committees for the campaign.

Joy Warner, of Cooperation For Peace Hamilton (Shanti Sahyog) in Ontario, Canada, recently introduced me to this international campaign. For Canada their goals include, among others, "The introduction of a nonviolent defence component in the existing defence structure patterned after civilian-based defence." The statement of purpose by the Canadian group appears below (Document One). Other countries are using similar statements with the name of the country changed where appropriate.

The twenty people of the Hamilton group have been working on this effort since September and studying the ideas of Gene Sharp and Gandhi. The Canadian government, newly elected last autumn, has embarked on a defense policy review, and the group has presented a brief to the government (Document Two).

For readers who may want more information, we include a list of coordinators/contact persons (Document Three), provided by Dr. Khanna.

The brochure of the originating organization says: "SHANTI SAHYOG (Cooperation for Peace-India) is a registered, all-India Peace NGO [nongovernmental organization] guided by a vision of positive peace. It is affiliated to Samarbete For Fred (Cooperation for Peace-Sweden) which was founded in 1983 in Stockholm and is dedicated to peace education and citizen diplomacy.

Valentin Seveus—Secretary General of Cooperation For Peace-Sweden—envisioned a similar NGO in India and so Shanti Sahyog was born. Cooperation for Peace-Sweden has a Russian affiliate too... Cooperation for Peace-Russia...It also has a branch office in the USA."

Dr. Khanna teaches in the department of philosophy at Delhi University. She taught at McMaster University in Ontario last summer and will be teaching there again this summer. A peace researcher, she has done postdoctoral work in Canada and Scandinavia. She is the author of *Gandhi and the Good Life*, published in 1985. This spring she talked about the campaign, in Britain's House of Lords in their ongoing seminar series on global responsibility and politics. She will give a presentation on July 7 in London at the Gandhi Foundation before leaving for India on July 9.

Both Dr. Khanna and the Hamilton group would appreciate comments on their plans and on the two documents that follow. Their addresses are in Document Three. Dr. Khanna's temporary address is Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster University, 1280 Main St. W., Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4K1; telephone: 905-525-9140, extension 24759; FAX: 905-570-1167 ■

Civilian-based Defense (ISSN 0886-6015) is published quarterly by the Civilian-based Defense Association (CBDA) to provide information about civilian-based defense (CBD) as an alternative policy for national defense and to make available international news, opinion, and research about CBD. The Association is a nonprofit membership organization founded in 1982 to promote more widespread consideration of CBD and engage in educational activities to bring CBD to public attention. CBD means protecting a nation against invasions or coups d'état by preparing its citizens to resist aggression or usurpation by withholding cooperation and by active noncooperation rather than military force. Tactics include strikes, encouraging invading forces to desert, encouraging other countries to use sanctions against the invader, etc. Citizens would learn how to use CBD before aggression starts, which distinguishes it from spontaneous resistance. Prior preparation and publicity would enhance its effectiveness and also make it a deterrent to attack. ■

Document One

Ahimsa Satyagraha

Interantional

Campaign for

Nonviolence

Editor's note: The campaign is still working on this document and would appreciate comments from readers. This is the Canadian version of the campaign statement, from which I have dropped some repetitive elements.

(Ahimsa is the Indian word for nonviolence. Satyagraha is the Sanskrit word coined by Gandhi for nonviolent resistance.)

Sponsored by SHANTI SAHYOG (Co-operation For Peace, India)

"The Law of Nonviolence which is the Law of Love is the Law of our Species...And just as a scientist will work wonders out of various applications of the Laws of Nature, even so the human being who applies the Law of Love with scientific precision can work greater wonders."
GANDHI

World Military Expenditure: \$ 2 MILLION per MINUTE
Canadian Military Expenditure: \$ 30 MILLION per DAY

40, 000 CHILDREN from our GLOBAL VILLAGE DIE EVERY DAY due to malnutrition and lack of simple health resources. More people have died from hunger in the past two years than were killed in World War I & World War II combined.

We demand the following from the Government of Canada:

1. THE SPONSORING OF APRIL 6TH - THE ANNIVERSARY OF GANDHI'S SALT MARCH/SATYAGRAHA - AS THE INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR NONVIOLENCE BY THE UNITED NATIONS.
2. THE ALLOCATION OF ONE DAY OF CANADIAN ANNUAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES TO NGO'S [nongovernmental organizations] WORKING FOR NONVIOLENCE.
3. THE INTRODUCTION OF A NON-

VIOLENT DEFENCE COMPONENT IN THE EXISTING DEFENCE STRUCTURE PATTERNED AFTER CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENCE.

(For more information see, for example, the writings of Gene Sharp or contact the Civilian-based Defense Association, 154 Auburn St., Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139-3969, USA.)

4. THE OPTION FOR SOLDIERS TO BE TRAINED IN NONVIOLENT DEFENCE RATHER THAN VIOLENT DEFENCE.
5. THE OPTION FOR TAXPAYERS TO DIVERT THEIR DEFENCE TAX TO NONVIOLENT DEFENCE.

It should be noted at the outset that this is no ordinary signature campaign. The aim is to gain universal support for nonviolence by withdrawing further popular consent for the war system. We do not merely want to engage other committed peace activists. Add your signature only if 1) you are willing to act as a nonviolence evangelist who will enlist the support of at least 20 people (this is negotiable) and 2) you and the other signatories are able to donate a minimum of \$10 to support the cause. Our aim is to collect in 1 year a total of 1 minute of world military expenditures—\$2 million—in order to create nonviolence study funds at educational institutions in all countries participating in this SATYAGRAHA/NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE...

The time has come to uproot the war system by legitimizing nonviolence as a means of conflict resolution...Millions of refugees seek shelter from violence, the ecological balance is threatened, an accidental nuclear war continues to threaten the globe, and yet global arms budgets consume...\$1,000 billion a year.

We plan to launch this Campaign on August 6, 1995—HIROSHIMA DAY.

PHASE 1 INTERNATIONAL SIGNATURE CAMPAIGN—August 6, 1995 to August 6, 1996

On August 6, 1995 NGOs and people committed to a nonviolent world order will launch a year-long signature campaign in their countries to petition their respective Governments to delegitimize violent conflict resolution. The five demands have already been listed. The signatures will be presented simultaneously to our respective Legislatures on August 6, 1996.

The name, address, telephone number, and profession of the signatory will be

collected. The signature list will then be computerized so that we are able to tell our Governments exactly how many people do not support the war system. Demand the right to divert your defence tax to nonviolence.

We will have a world-wide mailing list of people who do not support war!

There are two pre-conditions to signing the petition: 1) the signatory has to find at least 20 other people to sign (negotiable) and 2) the signatory and the other signatories are able to donate a minimum of \$10 to a bank account opened for this purpose...The importance of symbols in a nonviolent struggle cannot be overstated.

Attempts will be made to collect signatures of VIPs on the opening day of the Campaign (August 6, 1995). This will require a lot of preparation and planning. We will attempt to publish this list the next day in the national newspapers.

On August 6, 1995 we will gather children in the Capital city of every participating country for a candlelight vigil at sundown. After an half-hour of music and dance the children will snuff out their candles to symbolize the daily death of 40,000 children world-wide. If possible, the children will gather on the 6th of every month during the year-long Campaign, including August 6, 1996—the day we present the signatures to our Legislatures.

This campaign has already been initiated in Bangladesh, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, India, Sweden, and the United States.

ALL SIGNATORIES WILL BE ASKED TO FAST ON THEIR BIRTHDAY FOR THE DURATION OF THE CAMPAIGN AS A SIGN OF THEIR PERSONAL PROTEST AGAINST THE WAR SYSTEM.

A conscious attempt will be made to involve 18 year-olds actively in this Campaign because these young adults usually have the right to vote. Lectures, films, and workshops, showing the need for nonviolence today will be conducted to educate students and the general public. School children will be taught how to create and play peace-games. All this forms part of the constructive programme.

Since publicity is the hallmark of this Campaign, we will publicize the Campaign by printing the campaign's logo on articles of daily use, such as T-shirts, tumblers, mugs, stationery, etc. On top of the logo will be the slogan "SUPPORT

NONVIOLENCE" and under it "SAY NO TO WAR".

An attempt will be made to give wide publicity for this Campaign through the national and local media. Even a satellite transmission on our collection of first-day signatures from statesmen and other notables on August 6, 1995 and on August 6, 1996 is planned!

The participating countries will be in constant contact with each other. Be sure to provide your fax number.

A peace song especially written for the Campaign will be sung in all the countries in their respective languages during the year long Campaign.

On August 6, 1966 after presenting the collected signatures to our respective Governments we will give them a deadline of three months by which they have to comply with our demands. When this happens we will have succeeded for the first time in history in legitimizing nonviolence as a means of conflict resolution in our political structures! Global popular power will have won the day! If our Governments do not concede to our demands we will be compelled to launch Phase II of our Campaign. According to the Gandhian form of Satyagraha we must continue "fighting" until we make the injustice of the war system visible.

PHASE 2 AHIMSA SATYAGRAHA

In all the participating countries the signatories will surround their respective Legislatures on November 11—REMEMBRANCE DAY—and continue to do so every day indefinitely as a protest until our Governments concede to our demands. The signatories can opt to withhold their tax returns until the Government allows their defence tax dollars to be used for nonviolent defence. The signatories will also fast for the day that the Legislatures are surrounded. The fasting satyagrahis will hold candles and roses—the candles are symbolic...so Governments may see the light of Truth...and the roses are symbolic...to distinguish between the wrong-being-done and the wrong-doer. The roses are for our Legislators to assure them that we are not against them...But we are against war, against the death of innocent children, and against the destruction of our global village!

For more information, contact Cooperation for Peace—Hamilton and Area:
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Document Two Brief for the Canadian Defence Policy Review Submitted by Coopera- tion for Peace, Hamilton and Area

Introduction

Cooperation for Peace is an international campaign for non-violence sponsored by Shanti Sahyog (Cooperation for Peace India). The campaign seeks to gain universal support for non-violence by delegitimizing violent conflict resolution, i.e. the war system. The campaign has already been initiated in India, Sweden, Bangladesh, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. (See attached list) Cooperation for Peace, Hamilton and Area is working with these groups.

The campaign has four demands and a request which we will elaborate upon in this presentation. They are:

- 1) The allocation of one day of Canadian annual military expenditures to non-governmental organizations (NGO's) working for nonviolence.
- 2) The introduction of a nonviolent defence component in the existing defence structure patterned after Gene Sharp's nonviolent civilian-based defence.
- 3) The option for soldiers to be trained in nonviolent defence rather than violent defence.
- 4) The option for taxpayers to divert their defence tax to nonviolent defence.

We also request that the Government of Canada sponsor April 6, the anniversary of Gandhi's salt march/satyagraha, as the International Day for Nonviolence by the United Nations.

- 1) The Allocation of One Day of Canadian Annual Military Expenditures to

NGO's Working for Nonviolence

All Canadian taxpayers are very conscious of the government's need to use the money it receives from taxes as carefully and as efficiently as possible.

For many years, significant numbers of Canadians have worked together through various organizations to encourage attitudes that foster peace and non-violent conflict resolution, and to inform people about what they can do to promote it in our global village. There can no longer be winners and losers in international conflict: either everyone wins by working together, or everyone loses, and human civilization ends. If the goal of the Ministry of Defence is conceived as extended security for Canada, it is clear that we are truly secure only if peace is maintained.

These volunteer efforts for peace do not show in any statistical way in Canada's productivity, yet they are very significant. The funds which have supported this volunteer service, unfortunately, have been extremely limited, and have restricted the work which the volunteers would have liked to have done.

A fund could be established with specific goals for non-violent education and peaceful conflict resolution skills training, developed in consultation with those already experienced in this field. Organizations would then be able to develop project proposals that would fulfil these goals, and apply for funding. They would be responsible for reporting upon the use of all funds received. Tools could be developed for evaluating project effectiveness. Subsequent funding would be related to the effectiveness of programs successfully completed.

Volunteer service would be a strong component of projects proposed by community organizations supporting peaceful conflict resolution and non-violent defence. If this service were valued at regular employment rates, it becomes apparent that the cost of programs run by NGO's to government is remarkably low. Volunteer leaders from various peace groups and other organizations which might support a non-violent defence component in Canadian defence policy already have considerable expertise in networking and making funds stretch to accomplish maximum effect.

It is the conviction of Cooperation for Peace, Hamilton and Area, that the provision of government funding to voluntary organizations which provide public education on peaceful conflict resolution skills and non-

violent defence would be a desirable and economical use of a small proportion of the Ministry of Defence's budget.

2) The introduction of a Nonviolent Defence Component in the Existing Defence Structure Patterned after Gene Sharp's Nonviolent Civilian Based Defence

Currently, the world's governments and media promote violence as a legitimate and reasonable means of resolving conflict. As long as violence is regarded as a legitimate and reliable way of dealing with conflict rather than as a last resort if negotiations and economic sanctions fail, however, individuals and nations will continue to resort to violence even if other means have not been exhausted. Consequently, peaceful conflict resolution becomes more difficult.

While history reveals the prevalence of the use of violence and threats of force, most notably in this century, it also establishes the viability of nonviolent responses to aggression and oppression. Such notable examples of the success, or partial success, of nonviolent resistance include: German resistance against France and Belgium in the Ruhr Valley in 1923; Norwegian and Danish resistance to Nazi occupation during the Second World War; the Czechoslovak uprising against Russian occupation in 1968; the Polish workers' movement for independent trade unions and democratization in 1980-81; the 1944 revolutions in El Salvador and Guatemala against established military dictatorships; the overthrow of Marcos in the Philippines, the East European revolutions of 1989, and the defeat of the attempted Soviet coup in 1991.

In 1986, the Swedish parliament voted unanimously to include a nonmilitary resistance component in their overall defence policy. The Swedish Commission on Nonmilitary Resistance has been conducting seminars for educators at the regional level, and have circulated informational brochures on nonmilitary resistance to all Swedish households.

In February 1991, before there was widespread international recognition of Lithuanian independence, the Lithuanian Supreme Council voted to make nonviolent noncooperation their first line of defense in the event of an intensified Soviet occupation. The principles were used by officials in Latvia and Estonia as well, as they planned their resistance to Communist coups backed by Soviet occupation forces. The

three Baltic countries are all considering including large civilian-based resistance components within their overall defence policy, which will also include military components. A joint conference of representatives from the defence ministries of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Sweden was held in June 1992 with the Albert Einstein Institution with which Gene Sharp is associated.

Canada, because of its vast geographic area and sparse population, does not have the economic or human resources to defend itself militarily against foreign invasion and occupation. Consequently, the only way in which Canada may attain self-reliance in defence is through the introduction of a nonviolent defence policy, or Civilian Based Defence, at least as a major component in the overall defence plan.

Just as any government is dependent upon the cooperation and assistance of its populace, internal or external powers that seek to usurp control of a nation, militarily or otherwise, cannot succeed without the support or acquiescence of the populace. For example, such occupying powers or oppressive regimes are dependent upon economic resources, labour, public administration, the police, the courts, etc., which are, in turn, dependent upon the cooperation, submission, obedience or assistance of the nation's citizenry.

Civilian Based Defence involves the training of the populace of a nation in the techniques of nonviolent resistance. Such techniques of non-cooperation with, and disruption of, an illegitimate order include: strikes, boycotts, mass rallies, "illegal" transmissions of information (underground media), or failure to comply with new laws or policies by such segments of this society as teachers, law enforcement and the judiciary. In this way, the populace may reject attempts at indoctrination or obstruct economic gains to the attackers.

The motivation for such a policy of nonviolent defence is not ambiguous. Civilian Based Defence is purely a defensive defence policy, and is, therefore, unlike military defence policies, not threatening to other nations. An established policy of Civilian Defence may also serve as an efficient means of deterring internal takeover or foreign invasions.

The inclusion of a nonviolent defence component in Canada's defence structure now will serve to legitimize nonviolent conflict resolution as well as provide for the

possibility of the eventual dismantling of Canada's military and the delegitimization of violence. It will provide Canada with greater self-reliance in terms of defence, and will therefore provide greater independence in foreign policy. A nonviolent component to Canada's defence policy will also greatly reduce the amount of raw materials, industrial capacity, financial resources and energy supplies our military defence consumes.

References:

Glossop, Ronald J. *Confronting War: an examination of humanity's most pressing problem*

Sharp, Gene. *Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal*

3) The Option for Soldiers to be Trained in Nonviolent Defence rather than Violent Defence

Cooperation for Peace (Shanti Sahyog) Hamilton and Area agrees with the statement made in a draft document by church leaders from Project Ploughshares that "The international community must urgently develop and nurture a deep and abiding commitment to reducing violence and to adopting non-violent alternatives in the pursuit of security. This commitment must include promotion of non-violence as a value, the development of non-violence as a formal security strategy, and the introduction of formal non-violence training into our security institutions." (January 11, 1994)

Many young people join the armed forces today because they see no jobs or future for themselves in our current economy. These young men and women are not necessarily committed to war and violence: in fact, it is only after "boot camp" training and indoctrination that they are able to envision killing another human being. We believe that all members of the Canadian Armed Forces and those who are to be inducted should therefore have the choice between a traditional military training and training in non-violent theory and practice. This non-violent defence component should include training in conflict resolution techniques and mediation skills as well as training in search and rescue techniques, environmental restoration and cleanup, disaster relief in the case of earthquakes, floods, train derailments, etc.

Those who opt for this nonviolent training should also receive education in civilian based defence techniques patterned

after the methodology of Gene Sharp. These include non-cooperation with the opponent, sanctions, strikes and protests. These nonviolent soldiers could subsequently play an important role in teaching civilian based defence strategies to the general population of Canada, since the success of nonviolent defence depends on the cooperation of the whole population to resist the invader.

It is abundantly clear that traditional military training has not been successful in preparing Canadian soldiers for their new role as peace keepers/peace builders. Peace cannot be made at the end of a gun barrel. Training in cross-cultural communication and understanding of the psychological manipulation which creates the "enemy" mentality are crucial. Peace building must address basic economic, social, and political needs. People who feel valued are more likely to be willing to die for those who value them. Peace building requires training in mediation and civilian based defence; arms control; sanctions (excluding food and medicines); information collection and distribution; diplomacy; civilian intervention; exchanges of food and tools for weapons. These are all far more likely to bring about peace than the use of armed force.

4) The Option for Taxpayers to Direct Their Defence Tax to Nonviolent Defence
According to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, everyone has the fundamental freedom of conscience. Each individual's option as a taxpayer should be that he or she be allowed to give a portion of their tax dollars to nonviolent defence instead of a military defence. This should be a right of conscience according to the Canadian Charter.

Just as soldiers should not be forced to participate in killing if it is against their conscience, so taxpayers should not be forced to pay soldiers to kill on their behalf. A person's conscience must be uppermost in both cases.

The sponsoring of April 6th — the anniversary of Gandhi's salt march/satyagraha — as the International Day for Nonviolence by the United Nations
On April 6th, 1930, the people of India, led by Mahatma Gandhi, commenced a satyagraha or nonviolent movement against the unjust salt law. At this time there was a

British monopoly on salt manufacturing and no Indian was allowed to make or sell salt, which is essential for human survival. Salt was therefore a powerful symbol for the people of India. In addition, many traditions surround salt use, and the ways that it should be handled and discarded in the Indian home. The government monopoly on salt enabled the British to control the very pulse of the Indian people. When Gandhi chose this significant law as an issue for a *satyagraha*, he made the injustice of Britain's rule over India clearly visible.

As well, Gandhi chose April 6th as the date to commence the salt *satyagraha* because it was the one-year anniversary of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Punjab. This starting date commemorated the tragedy when General Dwyer fired openly and without warning at a peaceful gathering of Indians. Thus, on April 6th, 1930, the whole of India, from one end to the other, suspended business and observed a general day of self-purification, fasting and prayer to commence civil disobedience against the salt law in India. It is appropriate, then, both as a means to legitimize nonviolence, and in honor of Gandhi's principles and approach, to have the United Nations sponsor this significant date, April 6th, as the International Day for Nonviolence.

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Document Three

International Campaign for Nonviolence: Coordinators and Contact Persons

List prepared by Dr. Suman Khanna

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Modem Access to Civilian-based Defense Articles

Cathy Flick and Suzanne Pearce

We are exploring opportunities to provide the CBDA magazine in electronic archives on PeaceNet and the Communications for a Sustainable Future (CSF) database. This project will include providing regular information on various computer forums about the articles available and how to access them, and in some cases posting the articles themselves in whole or in part. The CSF database should be eventually accessible by anyone with e-mail capability as well as by those who can use ftp and gopher. If you have an e-mail address and would like to be kept informed about the progress of this project and/or you have access to computer forums that might make suitable homes for some CBDA material, please contact us at the e-mail addresses below.
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Suzanne Pearce: spearce@igc.apc.org ■

Lecturing the Military on Nonviolent Defense

Robert J. Burrowes

Robert Burrowes has been a nonviolent activist, educator, and researcher since 1981. During that period he has been involved in a variety of nonviolent action campaigns. He is best known for his war tax resistance, his involvement in the campaign of the Melbourne Rainforest Action Group, and his membership on the Gulf Peace Team (which was camped on the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia during the outbreak of the Gulf War). As a result of his war tax resistance, he was declared bankrupt (in November 1991) and, given his refusal to cooperate with the bankruptcy trustee, convicted of contempt of court (in April 1992). One outcome of his bankruptcy is that his passport has been seized. Apart from his ongoing activism, he is now writing a book which will identify the political and strategic lessons learned by the Gulf Peace Team. His address is Robert J. Burrowes, P.O. Box 167, North Carlton, Victoria 3054, Australia. E-mail: burrowes@peg.apc.org. Telephone: + 61 3 387 3398

On 25 November 1993 I gave a lecture on nonviolent defense at the Command and Staff College at Fort Queenscliff, Australia. The officers attending the lecture were participants in a twelve-month strategic studies course. During the last weeks of this course, the officers are expected to attend several lectures which present alternative ideas about security and defense; the lecture I gave was one of these. The lecture was attended by 81 majors; 60 from the Australian Army and the balance from Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.

When I was first asked to conduct the lecture, I thought that it was an excellent opportunity to present an alternative way of understanding defense to an important audience—members of the next generation of the Australian Army High Command—even if I only had 80 minutes! I was pleased to have the opportunity and spent considerable time preparing the lecture—although, given the audience, I set myself a single modest goal: to expose my audience to the idea of nonviolent defense¹ as a viable

defense strategy. After carefully questioning the officer who requested me to conduct the lecture, reading an article which discussed ideas about how to present nonviolent defense to a military audience² and consulting scholars like Brian Martin, I prepared a lecture which was designed to build on the officers' knowledge of the strategic theory of Carl von Clausewitz.

I chose this approach for two reasons. Firstly, Clausewitz is the strategic theorist who is most respected by most military people. And secondly, during my own research on nonviolent defense, I had developed a strategic theory of nonviolent defense which drew heavily on Clausewitz (as well as Gandhi and recent conflict theory). By using Clausewitz, I hoped to explain nonviolent defense in a way which my audience could easily understand (because it built on their existing knowledge) and in a way which would give it credibility (because it was consistent, in important ways, with 'their' strategic theory). As part of my preparation, I sent a reading guide and two case studies (which I was told would be read!) and I prepared several visual aids—including a slide, a video (of the Philippines Revolution) and several overhead transparencies.

I had arranged to arrive in time for lunch, so that I could meet the officers beforehand. This was an excellent opportunity to learn more about their strategic studies course and to gain an informal sense of their personal views. It was a valuable time! And it left me scolding myself on at least one count. I had learned during my research on nonviolent defense that only a select few of the academic and military strategists who write or teach in the field of strategic studies understand Clausewitzian theory. Most strategists tend to quote one of Clausewitz's more memorable lines and then pass on to more accessible (but less insightful) theorists. So my belief—acquired during the original telephone call—that the officers attending the course were familiar with Clausewitzian theory was exposed as groundless. I should have known!

My lecture of forty minutes went according to plan except that I was modifying it as I went because of the lunchtime revelation. As I spoke, and particularly as I explained and illustrated the practice of nonviolent defense, I could sense the rising desire of my audience to question me. And after a short break, they had their chance.

The questions flowed thick and fast.

They asked questions such as How would you reallocate the defense budget if Australia was using nonviolent defense (ND)? It seems that a strategy of ND relies on a mutual 'agreement' by governments not to use the military; that is, one in, all in. If one country uses military force, how can ND work? It seems that the strategy requires 'an enemy on the ground'. How long would an Australian government last if it let an enemy land on Australian territory? Nonviolent defense is based on the belief that a government needs public support for its strategy. But what of aggressor countries governed by military dictatorships? If you had been commander of the Australian armed forces during World War II, how would you have prevented the Japanese invasion of Australia? Where does deterrence fit into this strategy? It seems that a strategy of nonviolent defense requires a certain level of morality on the part of the aggressor. What if the enemy is genocidal? It seems that the Tibetan resistance is a classic case of nonviolent defense. Hasn't this depended on the morality of the Chinese? How successful was ND against Japan during World War II? How do you defend an area which is resource-rich but sparsely populated? How do you get the population involved in a strategy of ND given society's increasing reliance on professionals? How should the military approach an opponent which is using ND?

I answered each of these (and other) questions as effectively as I could given the strict time limit of forty minutes. And despite their obvious skepticism, the spirit of the session was friendly. According to the feedback I received later, my lecture was judged a success given that I had managed to stimulate so many questions so late in the course! And I was asked if I would do the lecture again the following year. But while my hosts seemed satisfied with the outcome, I was much less so for several reasons.

Some of these were inevitable given the nature of the exercise. As I hinted above, having been asked to lecture on nonviolent defense to a group of military officers, I was not naive enough to believe that I was about to win a large number of instant converts to nonviolence. But my feelings of dissatisfaction went deeper than simply experiencing the reality of this insight during the lecture itself. In fact, it has taken me more than a month to fully identify these feelings and to formulate my response to them as outlined below.

Firstly, many of the questions assumed that the military officers and I shared a common understanding of the nature of society, the notion of security, the causes of conflict and the purpose of defense. For example, they accepted the widely held belief that the purpose of military defense is to defend a country against evil aggressors, whereas I believe that the purpose of military violence is to defend structures of exploitation. These structures—including patriarchy and capitalism—systematically exploit women; indigenous peoples; the people of Africa, Asia and Central/South America; non-human species; the environment and working people generally. Given our very different social cosmologies, an adequate answer to many of their questions would have required a long discussion which revealed the profound differences in our ways of understanding the world. This was not possible in the lecture format and in the time available, which, despite my modest expectations, I found frustrating. Should I agree to participate in another session of this type (which counterpoises a brief lecture on nonviolent defense with a year of military defense)? Should I insist on a different format and more time? One approach which David Yaskulka uses—which is mentioned in the article referred to above—is to lead 'war games' (in which one half of his audience uses civilian-based defense). Or should I refuse to be involved?

Secondly, I have realised in retrospect that I pitched too much of the lecture at their heads. Because I wanted to make nonviolent defense sound like a credible alternative, I planned a lecture which was supposed to build on 'their' knowledge of strategic theory. This failed on two counts. Firstly, as noted above, their knowledge of this theory was very limited. And secondly, it let them debate the strategic and tactical merits of nonviolent defense without getting too deeply into the ethics and their feelings about defense generally. I personally believe that nonviolent defense, when it is planned and strategically applied, is indeed more effective than military defense. Moreover, I think that this can be demonstrated to a neutral audience. But to rely on arguments which allow people to ignore the ethical and emotional issues which the question of defense obviously raises is an error which I will not repeat.

Finally, the lecture once again raised for me that perennial question: how do I want to spend my time? If I was an advocate of

civilian-based defense, then I may choose to spend more of my time talking to the military. But, as a staunch critic of that approach, there is less justification for me spending my time trying to persuade the military to adopt nonviolent forms of defense. My personal preference is to work with other nonviolent activists (broadly defined) or with those who are exploring what it means to be an activist. Part of my reason for this preference is that it maximises my personal effectiveness (on the assumption that working with fellow activists will generate the greatest number of new activists and maximise the impact of our nonviolent action campaigns).

In the light of this, how much time should I spend talking to those people who are among those least likely to respond positively and actively to nonviolence? Don't get me wrong; I think that sharing knowledge about nonviolent defense with military personnel is important. But the question is: should I do it? On balance, I have realised that I do not feel that this lecture was the best use of my time. Thus, having learned a lot from the experience and having gained a better idea of what to do next time, I may teach nonviolent defense to a military audience in future—but it will depend heavily on the format and time which is made available to me. And I will continue to devote most of my energy to those people who are more likely to be ready to hear the message of nonviolence.

Notes

1. There are several forms of nonviolent defense. In essence, advocates of CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE (CBD) are concerned with defense of the nation-state, its government and territory. They seek its adoption (in whole or in part) by national governments, and it refers to a nonviolent strategy working under the direction of a government. Like military defense, it would rely on centralised decision-making and hierarchical organisation for its implementation. For a discussion of CBD, see Gene Sharp. *Civilian-based Defense: A Post-military Weapons System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. In contrast, while advocates of SOCIAL DEFENSE (SD) are less specific about their defense preoccupation, the focus is clearly nonstatist and antilistist. It is concerned with defense at community level. Advocates seek its acceptance by the community at large and it is a defense strategy based on grassroots

initiatives. It would rely on cooperation and communication among community-based groups for its implementation. For a discussion of SD, see Brian Martin. *Social Defence Social Change*. London: Freedom Press, 1993.

In my recent research, I decided to use the original name NONVIOLENT DEFENSE (ND) to describe a defense strategy conducted in accordance with the strategic theory and the strategic framework which I developed by synthesising selected elements taken from the strategic theory of Clausewitz, the conceptions of conflict and nonviolence developed by Gandhi and recent research in the fields of human needs and conflict theory. While it shares the grassroots orientation of SD, I believe that ND goes considerably beyond both CBD and SD as a defense strategy.

2. Yaskulka, David. 'How to Introduce Civilian-based Defense to Military and other Traditional Defense-oriented Audiences'. *Civilian-based Defense*, vol. 8, no. 4, August 1993. pp. 1-3. ■

Civilian-based Defense, Popular Control, and Robert Burrowes

Paul E. Anders

In his excellent article in this issue "Lecturing the Military on Nonviolent Defense," Robert Burrowes writes, "It [civilian-based defense] refers to a nonviolent strategy working under the direction of a government. Like military defense, it would rely on centralised decision-making and hierarchical organisation for its implementation" (note 1).

CBD and our magazine are trying to be clear on what civilian-based defense (CBD) is. I questioned Burrowes's characterization of CBD, and he kindly suggested that I write a rejoinder, which this is. He has interesting things to say about my views, and I hope he will share them with us in the next issue. Other readers of this magazine are also invited to join the debate.

Although CBD is perhaps generally thought of as defense organized and directed by the government of a national state, that might not necessarily obtain. Gene Sharp writes, "There is almost no doubt that a civilian-based defense policy would have to be considered and adopted through the normal democratic process and governmen-

tal decision. The governmental apparatus and resources would then be available for the preparation of the new policy, which would have to be considerable, and for assistance during the changeover. It may, however, be worth exploring other possible models for adoption" (*Social Power and Political Freedom* [Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980], p. 233, emphasis added.)

In a country with a history of military coups, the democratic government might be reluctant to organize an anticoup defense for fear of angering the quiescent military. In such a case, nongovernmental organizations might organize wide resistance by the general population to a future coup and such a defense could be termed CBD.

Making centralized decision-making and hierarchical organization an essential part of CBD does not seem to be a position of advocates of it whom I have read, nor does it seem advantageous. Gene Sharp, for example, wrote, "Civilian-based defense would also remove the centralizing influences endemic to military systems and introduce the decentralizing influences associated with nonviolent sanctions...These would together contribute to the development of a less centralist and a more pluralistic social and political structure, with greater popular participation" (*Making Europe Unconquerable*, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985, p. 179). In discussing measures to promote civilian defense, Adam Roberts mentions that "the decentralization and diffusion of power, to encourage popular involvement in political and economic affairs, and to make it harder for the enemy to seize control of the state machinery, could be promoted" (in *Civilian Resistance as a National Defence*, Penguin, 1967, 1969, p. 254).

Also, Burrowes's next sentence refers the reader to Sharp's book *Civilian-based Defense*, so the incautious might infer that his presentation of the matter comes from Sharp.

In conclusion, adoption of CBD by a government and its continued direction by a government, even one with centralized decision-making and hierarchical organization, seems the likely way in which CBD would be adopted and organized, at least for now. It could, however, be organized on a nongovernmental, noncentralized, and nonhierarchical basis. How it would in fact come about would depend on the conditions in particular countries. ■

Civilian-based Defense and Catholicism

Klaus Heidegger

Klaus Heidegger has a doctorate in theology from the University of Innsbruck. Last year he worked for the educational program of Pax Christi and was a teacher at a public school. From 1988 to 1992 he served as federal secretary for the Catholic Youth Organizations in Austria and as chairperson for the Ecumenical Youth Council of Austria. For the time being, he lives in Somerville, Massachusetts, is taking care of his little daughter, and volunteers for the Civilian-based Defense Association.

"Therefore take up the whole armor of God, so that you may be able to withstand on that evil day, and having done everything, to stand firm. Stand therefore, and fasten the belt of truth around your waist, and put on the breastplate of righteousness. As shoes for your feet put on whatever will make you ready to proclaim the gospel of peace. With all of these, take the shield of faith, with which you will be able to quench all the flaming arrows of the evil one. Take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God."
(From the Letter of Paul to the Ephesians 6,13-17)¹

INTRODUCTION

The following study focuses on the question: What is the relationship between civilian-based defense and Catholicism? I will discuss this question on two levels. First, I will consider the theological and philosophical background of the Church in this matter. Where can we find arguments in the theology and philosophy of the Church that support the ideas of a civilian-based defense? In my answer I will reflect on the New Testament as well as on the teaching of the Church. Second, I will appraise the organizational qualifications of the Church for a civilian-based defense.

Two short clarifications have to be made at the beginning. Civilian-based defense shall be seen in this article in its strict definition given by Gene Sharp and the Albert Einstein Institution, that is, as the prepared use of nonviolent resistance by civilians as a means of national defense. By Catholicism I mean the faith, the practice, and the system of the Catholic Church.

Catholic or Catholicism is used here in the narrow meaning, i.e., relating to the Roman Catholic Church.

As a theologian and active member of the Church as well as one who is engaged in the quest for the development and usage of nonviolent actions, these questions have been of interest for me for many years.

FOUNDATIONS FOR A CHRISTIAN-MOTIVATED CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

The Gospel of Active Nonviolence

In the quotation above, the Apostle gives a clear message: Christians have a new way of resisting the evil. Yes, they should struggle and defend themselves and withstand the evil, but their armor is different - it is the armor of God. The helmet of the Christians is salvation and their sword is the word of God. Here we have wonderful metaphors for the behavior that should characterize Christians according to the ethics of the New Testament. Paul's imagery depicts the nature of a Christian withstanding and resistance.

Logically, the words of Paul mirror the Gospels, the life, the deeds and words of Jesus Christ. What the New Testament tells us about the struggle for justice and liberation, about the attitude towards enemies, and about the behavior in conflicts is obvious. For Christians, the Bible is an appeal to a nonviolent way, though we do not find the term *nonviolence* there. Yet Jesus and his followers chose very deliberately a strategy that we can call in today's political language a nonviolent struggle.

Among the Jews in the first century of the Christian era, there were frequent resistance struggles, both against the lords in their own land and against the Romans.² Especially in Jesus' home province, Galilee, at times this led to armed resistance. Some scholars argue that at the beginning some adherents of an armed resistance were even among the apostles and the inner circle of the Jesus' movement. However, Jesus unmistakably and clearly demanded a rejection of violence. His program of nonviolent struggle is laid down in the Sermon on the Mount, which is sometimes called the "Magna Charta of Christian pacifism." In some of the Bible translations, the third beatitude reads "Blessed are the nonviolent..." But what does nonviolence in the deepest sense mean? The center part of the Sermon on the Mount gives this answer: Love your enemies. This is a love that will

end hostile conflicts and bring about justice.

Yet, more important than Jesus' words written down by the evangelists is the practice of Jesus and his disciples. In it we can find some of the most essential elements of a nonviolent struggle. If we compare the list of 198 methods of nonviolent actions that were elaborated by Gene Sharp³ with the prophetic and challenging conduct of Jesus and his first followers, we notice how many of these methods were applied by Jesus and his movement. Examples are the many public speeches against different kinds of injustice and violence; the symbolic public acts and actions of civil disobedience like the breaking of Sabbath laws, cf. Mk 2.23-3.6; Mt 12.1-14; Lk 6.1-11; forms of nonviolent intervention like the cleansing of the temple, cf. Mk 11.15-19; Mt 21.12-13; Lk 19.45-48). More important, however, are methods that are summarized by Gene Sharp in the subclass of social intervention. He speaks of the establishment of new social patterns or the creation of alternative social institutions.

This was just what Jesus and his disciples did. He announced the beginning of the kingdom of God. The Jesus movement formed a community of solidarity with the poor in an oppressed country. The new congregations empowered their members to engage in the struggle for justice and peace. The reason that the Romans persecuted Jesus and similar prophets was that the organizing of solidarity seemed to them to be at least as dangerous as armed resistance. This was what they saw as dangerous in the Jesus movement.

Nonviolent struggles against the political oppression of the Jewish people by occupying Roman forces, against economic and social deprivation because of the tax system, and against the violence of people like Herod were not limited to the Jesus movement. The first century Jewish historian Flavius Josephus tells of such a struggle shortly after the death of Jesus. It is a very good example from a long history of nonviolent resistance that elucidates the social context of the Jesus movement.

The emperor Caligula demanded that his portrait be hung in the temple in Jerusalem, thereby hoping to seal the subjugation of the Jewish nation. When they should have been preparing their fields, thousands of Jews left their homes and moved to the coastal flatlands near Jaffa. They told the Roman governor that they opposed the putting up of the portrait. They refused to return to their

houses. Failure to prepare their fields would mean their death. But this was also their best weapon. The Roman governor would not have been able to pay the tributes that Rome required and Rome would then dismiss him. So he found himself in an impossible situation and was forced to appeal to Caligula to forgo the erection of his official portrait.

Such examples of nonviolent resistance surely influenced the thoughts of the first Christian communities. They resemble the message of the New Testament. If this book is taken as a yardstick for the peace politics of the Church and Catholics, the commitment for nonviolent struggle and the rejection of violence are undeniable. Yet, do we see that commitment in the teaching and the doctrine of the Church?

Church's Teaching on Defense

The Catholic magisterium, i.e., the body of authoritative teaching, plays a much greater role for Catholics than for Protestants. Tradition is a cornerstone of the Church as much as are the Holy Scriptures. That's why we have to consider the official statements of the hierarchy in the past and present in any reflection on the relationship between civilian-based defense and Catholicism. If we look at most of the recent statements of the magisterium, we can discover three main arguments.

First of all, the official documents of the Church recognize the "right to legitimate defense" in an attack against a person or state.⁴ This right is deduced from the fundamental right of the integrity of the human being. In the classic theory, the Church spoke of a "jus ad bellum" (the right to wage war). This right has always been connected with the possibility of taking up arms and with the "jus in bello" (the rights and plights in waging war).

Unfortunately, most of the time the official Church's speaking about "legitimate defense" does not hint what kind of defense this may be. Also within the Church, far too many identify defense solely with military means and with the right to use violence. Defense is thought of as "defensive war." This leads to the false conclusion that the legitimacy of military means can be automatically derived from the legitimacy of defense. Gordon Zahn severely criticizes the present tendency of Church representatives or moral theologians merely to replace just war with just defense. This would only help

to legitimize most wars because warmongers always say that they act in defense. Instead of asking about the legitimization of war or defense, Zahn proposes that we should give more considerations to "justifiable means."⁵

We can easily make connections between the official Church's thinking on the right to defense and civilian-based defense. Advocates of nonviolent defense systems can help the Church to specify what forms of defense are best. They have to break up the mental identification of defense with military systems.

Second, in official doctrine, one should avoid as much as possible approving the use of violence and especially the killing of one's attacker. One tries to go as far as possible in the realization of "Thou shalt not kill." This is why the Church praises "those who, renouncing violent action to safeguard some rights, use defensive means which, by the way, are at the disposal of even the weakest."⁶ The Second Vatican Council says that nonviolent defense is praiseworthy "given that this can be done without harming the rights and the duties of others or of the community."⁷ Pope Paul VI, later argued in his encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (*Peace on Earth*, section 125) that people are becoming more and more convinced that disputes which arise between states should not be resolved by recourse to arms, but rather by negotiation.

Third, most recent official church documents use the one or the other of the classic just war criteria. Referring especially to the dreadful nature of weapons of mass destruction, theologians use the criterion of proportionality. If violence is after all inevitable, it must be proportional. This leads into the theory of just war that has dominated the theology and practice of the Church since Augustine. The main elements of the just war doctrine are the following: There must be a just cause to use war or military intervention. This has to be carried out with the right intention. There should be a reasonable chance of success. A legitimate military action must furthermore emanate from a competent authority. Finally, there is the already mentioned criterion of proportionality.

Whereas the Pope, most bishops, and many theologians still maintain the argument of the classic just war theory, Catholic peace activists and peace movements try to abandon this framework. In my opinion, we really should depart from this tradition. After all, it still consists of the assertion that

war can be waged under certain conditions. Nevertheless, it's possible to argue the case for civilian-based defense also in the framework of the just war theory. How?

Most important is the criterion "last resort." This means that in the doctrine of just war a war or military intervention must be the very last means to reestablish justice. Before recourse to military force and war, one has to have exhausted all nonmilitary means.

We may argue that war is never the last resort. For there are always peaceful means for resolving conflicts, provided one has the will to prepare, to develop, and to use them and the patience to give them time to work.⁸ Such argumentation can lead us directly to the need to develop nonviolent forms of defense. Even following the conservative tradition of the Church, we should put much more thought, education, and money into nonviolent conflict resolution.⁹ For, as Christian Mellon put it, we should think of the last resort criterion in a dynamic way: "In times of peace, where there is no immediate threat of aggression, the last resort criterion demands that we multiply the number of non-military means of conflict resolution, so that, when the need arises, it is possible to push further and further back the limit after which no means other than military seem effective."¹⁰

Furthermore, we could use the just war criterion of not harming civilians and of proportionality. A number of theologians argue that because of modern weapons technology and modern warfare every war contains the danger of a total war. Again, this leads to the obligation to avoid war and to search for nonviolent methods.

Thus, I have brought just a few examples of how to use just war criteria in favor of the idea of civilian-based defense. To be understood correctly: I do reject the theory of just war. However, at the same time I have noticed in many discussions with representatives of the Church, that I can garner more support for the idea of nonviolent struggle if I use some of the criteria they are familiar with.

In general, "Theologians have become more sensitive to the suggestion of the use of nonviolent means of resisting infringements of rights, and in particular of acts of aggression, and of invasions,"¹¹ writes Father Jean-Yves Calvez, a professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris. His optimistic appraisal continues: "The majority do not believe that these techniques

constitute a satisfactory solution in all cases. Nonviolent methods of defense occupy nonetheless a much higher place than before in Christian thought." As one example, Calvez mentions the embargo that would have been an alternative in the Gulf crisis in 1991.

Encouragements

There was one document from the top of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church that was embraced by peace activists all over the world. I am referring to the peace pastoral *The Challenge of Peace*. It was approved by the U.S. Catholic bishops in 1983.¹² The lengthy letter was welcomed by those who work for a civilian-based defense. In this pastoral, the bishops called for consideration of "popular defense" as an alternative course of action. Some of the sentences show us the bishops' clear position during the Cold War.

I think that it is encouraging for proponents of nonmilitary defense to keep the bishops' words in mind. That's why I will quote them extensively. They wrote: "We must find means of defending peoples that do not depend upon the threat of annihilation. Immoral means can never be justified by the end sought... Non-violent means of resistance to evil deserve much more study and consideration than they have thus far received. There have been significant instances in which people have successfully resisted oppression without recourse to arms. Non-violence is not the way of the weak, the cowardly or the impatient. Such movements have seldom gained headlines even though they have left their mark on history. The heroic Danes who would not turn Jews over to the Nazis and the Norwegians who would not teach Nazi propaganda in schools serve as inspiring examples in the history of non-violence."

The text goes on like a classic description of civilian-based defense that could have been written by Gene Sharp himself, whom the bishops cite: "Non-violent resistance, like war, can take many forms depending upon the demands of a given situation. There is, for instance, organized popular defense instituted by government as part of its contingency planning. Citizens would be trained in the techniques of peaceable non-compliance and non-cooperation as a means of hindering an invading force or non-democratic government from imposing its will. Effective non-violent resistance requires the united will of a people and may demand as much patience and sacrifice from

those who practice it as is now demanded by war and preparation for war."

The bishops use their strongest possible argument for their position. They interpret their call for nonviolent means as the will of Jesus Christ: "We believe that efforts in the direction of developing nonviolent means of defense against attacks and to solve conflicts 'best correspond to Jesus' demand for love and justice."

A decade later, in November 1993, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops released another statement for the tenth anniversary of their peace pastoral. It is entitled "The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace."¹³ Gene Sharp and Roger Powers of the Albert Einstein Institution were among those who were asked to advise the bishops in their new statement, so it's no surprise that the new statement includes again a strong call for nonviolent struggle and at least indirectly support for civilian-based defense. I will mention only two important points.

As previously, the bishops praise the power of nonviolence: "It [nonviolence] ought not to be confused with popular notions of nonresisting pacifism. For it consists of a commitment to resist manifest injustice and public evil with means other than force. These include dialogue, negotiations, protest, strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience and civilian resistance. Although nonviolence has often been regarded as simply a personal option or vocation, recent history suggests that in some circumstances it can be an effective public undertaking as well." To make it concrete, they mention the nonviolent revolutions in the Philippines and in Eastern Europe. Then the letter reiterates the demands for research, education, and training in nonviolent means. Though very cautiously, the bishops mention the superiority of nonviolent means: "In some future conflicts, strikes and people power could be more effective than guns and bullets."

Following further development of theories of nonviolent struggle, the bishops give more attention to economic sanctions in their 1993 statement. Because of the positive as well as the negative effects economic sanctions may have, the bishops' statement sets valuable criteria on when and how sanctions can be justified. They much resemble criteria once used in the just war doctrine. First, the bishops say all the less coercive measures should have been taken. Economic sanctions should only be considered in response to aggression or grave and

ongoing injustice. Second, proportionality requires avoiding grave and irreversible harm to civilians. Third, the bishops ask for the consent to sanctions by substantial portions of the affected population. Finally, the bishops urge that sanctions should always be part of a broader process of diplomacy.

In the last ten years, there have not been many statements by the Church or by ecumenical gatherings that did not mention a commitment for the development of nonviolent alternatives of defense. In 1989, for example, the European Ecumenical Assembly in Basel, one of the most important steps in the ecumenical initiative "Process of Commitment for Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation," vowed to develop nonviolent alternatives and give them highest priority.

On a more practical level, I could cite a number of examples, where bodies and representatives of the Church and Catholic communities were involved in the practice of nonviolent means as an alternative to war. One proposal, for instance, came from the former president of Pax Christi-Italy, Bishop Tonino Bello. He pursued the idea of a peace corps of the Catholic Church to be composed of conscientious objectors. He also proposed an unarmed contingent of conscientious objectors that could be sent as a human buffer to areas like the fighting zones in the former Yugoslavia. In support of Bello's idea, Eileen Egan, founder member of Pax Christi USA, writes: "The concept of Peace Corps of the Catholic Church is an idea whose time has come."¹⁴ Other representatives of the Church try to realize similar ideas by supporting the development of a global peace service (cf. my article in the previous issue of *Civilian-based Defense*).

Among Catholic peace organizations, there is a lot of eagerness for nonviolent defense systems. Pax Christi, the official Catholic peace movement, has on many occasions openly promoted the idea of alternative nonviolent defense systems. To mention only one, Pax Christi International outlined the following policy in 1987: "The fact that nonviolent defense as a socially organized way of resolving conflict is still in its infancy should not deter us from striving to understand it and promote it as an alternative to the generally accepted methods of conflict resolution, particularly as an alternative to defense by contemporary methods of warfare and deterrence. Orga-

nized popular defense (civilian-based defense) consisting of planned nonviolent strategies and tactics by citizens trained in nonviolent struggle, deserves more study and consideration that has hitherto been given to it."¹⁵

ORGANIZATIONAL PRECONDITIONS FOR A CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

In my opinion, there is no other organization in the Western industrial countries whose organization is theoretically more suited for a civilian-based defense than the Catholic Church.

First, the Catholic Church has a mass basis. Advocates of civilian-based defense like Gene Sharp or Christopher Kruegler have tried to convince as many people as possible of the advantage of civilian-based defense. A large participation in a nonviolent struggle is seen as essential for success. Ackerman and Kruegler say that "objectives need to attract the widest possible base of support. This is not to equate success with sheer numbers but rather to suggest that unity, commitment, and the massed potential of nonviolent sanctions will be likely to diminish if some sectors stand more to gain than others... Widely shared objectives also create the potential for more widely distributed risks and reduce the likelihood that any single party or circumstance can become a decisive target."¹⁶

I myself come from Austria, where the population is nearly eighty percent Catholic. We find similar predominance also in Poland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain. There are around fifty million Catholics in the United States. Worldwide the Catholic Church has around a billion members. No doubt the Church can be a very powerful mass base for any nonviolent struggle.

Second, I will look at some of the requirements presented by Ackerman and Kruegler in their chapter about "organizational strength." The wideness of support is only one aspect of organizational strength. The Catholic Church's structure can be utilized for "efficient fighting organizations"—a term used by Kruegler and Ackerman. "To wage nonviolent conflict," Ackerman and Kruegler write, "fighting organizations must have or develop certain capabilities. They must be able to respond to the challenges and unique circumstances of an evolving situation. They need to be capable, at various points, of concealment (of persons, goods, information, money),

dispersion (of critical resources and of nonviolent sanctions themselves), and surprise (by conducting operations that seize the initiative and throw the opponents off balance)."¹⁷

In my opinion, it's not arrogant and presumptuous to contend that the Catholic Church could do a lot for the development of "fighting organizations" in the case of a nonviolent struggle. There is the structure of the Catholic Church that is both hierarchical and based on the local communities. The hierarchical side supports the solidarity and unity of the Church all over the world. The concentration on the local communities empowers the people on the local basis.¹⁸ Unfortunately, the doctrine that the whole church is also represented in the local church is not as well established as the hierarchical doctrine. This principle of decentralized power gives the local communities the power to act on their own and, for instance, to engage in nonviolent struggles as independent yet united entities.

Looking at the Catholic Church, we see a huge network with hundreds of thousands of small networks that are tied strongly together. Ackerman and Kruegler note that "Churches often have protected space in which resistance forces can mobilize."¹⁹

Wouldn't there be an immense advantage to civilian-based defense if the ideas of nonviolent struggle are seen as part of the Church's teaching, are taught in its schools, religious education efforts, and parish activities? The U.S. bishops themselves repeatedly pledged to use their own institutions for higher education for the research of peace issues. Wouldn't there be millions of people ready to defend their countries with nonviolent means if they were encouraged and trained by their Church to do so? Yet, for too many centuries up to today, the Catholic Church in general showed its approval of military defense systems. This is a position and attitude that is changing too slowly.

FINAL REMARKS

First, I am fully aware that I was very optimistic and idealistic in my answer on the question of how the Church could contribute to a civilian-based defense. I do know about the great contradictions and differences relating to questions of war and peace, violence and nonviolence in the Church. Looking at the highest levels of the Church's hierarchy, I sometimes doubt that the Church will abandon at least implicit support

for the military defense systems in the foreseeable future.²⁰ I know that so many of the official Church declarations on the morality of war are full of platitudes or contradictions. Many of them try to reconcile the just war tradition and the pacifist tradition. However, the point that I made here, is theoretical. Looking at the fundamental philosophical, theological, and structural foundations of the Church, we see that Catholics and all their institutions and communities—and not only Catholic pacifists—should be clearly committed to nonviolent strategies and methods. My hope is that more and more the pacifist tradition of the Church will prevail and make the whole Church more committed to nonviolent strategies. Scholars have repeatedly strengthened my hope in this regard.²¹

Second, I must concede that civilian-based defense is only one of many nonviolent strategies. In my opinion, it's a concept that needs careful scrutiny by Catholics living in their specific circumstances. Civilian-based defense is not by itself morally or politically good. It could be perverted to support unjust systems and it could be utilized for the stabilization of an order that oppresses people, etc. I think that it's more in the nature of the Church to engage in nonviolent struggles that have the characteristics of social defense than in civilian-based defense.²²

The first argument for this lies in the necessary separation of Church and state. Because civilian-based defense is in its strict meaning a defense orchestrated by the state, the Church has to keep a kind of critical distance. History as well as the present time show us how fateful too close relationships between state and Church have been for the Church as well as for the state. In some of the most important nonviolent struggles of the twentieth century, however, the Church was involved in actions that were directed against the authorities of the state in a very positive way. Such was the case in the Polish resistance movement against the communist authorities from the fifties to the end of the eighties or the nonviolent uprising in the Philippines against the Marcos regime in 1986. Thus, I prefer that the Church opt for nonviolent strategies that are not necessarily dependent on state bodies.

Third and finally, quite often I experience a difference between the approaches used by theoreticians and protagonists of a civilian-based defense on the one hand and Catholic pacifists on the other hand that may hinder

the latter from working for civilian-based defense.

Gene Sharp and Christopher Kruegler, for instance, draw a very clear line between a pacifist approach and theirs. They see nonviolent methods in a very mechanistic and utilitarian way. One should opt for nonviolent sanctions not because they are ethical but because they promise success. Sharp's or Kruegler's concepts are in some basic ideas and values very much the same as military concepts—although they do not include weapons and violent measures. For instance, goals of a nonviolent struggle for Sharp or Kruegler are to exert power, to win a conflict by compelling an opponent to surrender, etc. However, the central aim is not to convert the enemies.²³

Pacifists, on the other side, choose nonviolent means because they are seen as the only ethically justifiable way. Moreover, nonviolent actions are not separated from a nonviolent spirituality. For pacifists, spirituality shapes a nonviolent struggle by requiring a nonviolent strategy. In Catholic pacifism, the nonviolent protagonist does not aim to dominate the opponent, but to win the opponent over, that is, to help the opponent accept a changed situation that will satisfy the genuine needs of both sides in the conflict. The nonviolent person consistently refrains from harming opponents. Those who act nonviolently demonstrate a willingness to learn from those who oppose them. Such principles emanate from the core of any Christian peace policy, that is loving the enemy. Furthermore, in Christian pacifism, one acts nonviolently even if there is no immediate or obvious chance of success. One does not think in terms of success and failure, victory and defeat, but in processes. The paradox is understood that weakness can be strength that can overcome violence and poverty.

This brief comparison between a pacifist approach to nonviolent struggle and a purely mechanistic and realpolitik approach of civilian-based defense should not end in a rivalry between them. In the contrary, both approaches need to be brought together. Pacifists have to consider more the strategies and political analyses that are brought forward by theoreticians of a civilian-based defense. They, on the other hand, have to be challenged by the ethical and radical approaches of pacifists. Maybe, and this is my hope, in the framework of the Church, such learning from each other and a mutual completion may take place. A civilian-based

defense that integrates pacifist standpoints and does not try to exclude them, a pacifist policy that is not shy about thinking of political success. This is something we need.

Notes

1. The New Oxford Annotated Bible, New Revised Standard Version, 1991.
2. See, for instance, works on the time of Jesus and the interpretation of the new Testament by the German Protestant theologian Luise Schottroff. I am referring here to her article "Der doppelte Begriff vom Frieden," in *Christen im Streit um den Frieden* (ed. Brinkel et al., 1982).
3. Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action. 1973.
4. "Governments cannot be denied the right to lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed." Confer *Gaudium et Spes*, "Church in the Modern World". Pastoral Constitution of the Second Vatican Council, number 79.
5. Gordon Zahn, "Reflections on an Unanswered Challenge," in Brian Wicker, ed., *Studying War—No More?* 1993.
6. *Gaudium et Spes*, number 78.
7. Ibid.
8. An often quoted editorial in *La Civiltà Cattolica*, one of the leading organs of the Vatican magisterium, says, "The theory of the just war is untenable and needs to be abandoned." The editorial of July 6, 1991, was on the issue of "Christian Conscience and Modern Warfare."
9. Ernst Nagel, an outstanding conservative German Catholic theoretician of the just war theory, puts it like this: "Here the criterion *ultima ratio* [last resort] may require a dynamic new interpretation; this criterion may oblige one to develop nonviolent strategies for resolving conflict in order thereby to forestall any escalation of conflict to the point of war." Ernst J. Nagel, "After the End of the East-West Conflict: Perspectives on the Church's Thinking on Peace," in Brian Wicker, ed., *Studying War—No More?* 1993.
10. Christian Mellon, "Just War—How Should It be Viewed Today?," in Brian Wicker, ed., *Studying War—No More?* 1993.
11. Jean-Yves Calvez, "Just War/Just Defence Today," in Brian Wicker, ed., *Studying War—No More?* 1993.
12. See one of the first issues of *Civilian-based Defense*, vol. 1, July 1983, no. 3.

13. Published in: *Origins, CNS Documentary Service*, December 9, 1993.

14. Eileen Egan, "Peacemaking in the Post-Just War Age," in: Brian Wicker, ed., *Studying War—No More?*

15. *Developing Nonviolence, Theory & Practice*, published by Pax Christi International, Antwerp, Belgium: 1988.

16. Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 1994, p.26.

17. Ibid.

18. Theoreticians of civilian-based defense speak on the one hand of the need for good leadership. That is provided in the Church by the hierarchical structure. On the other hand, they speak about the problem of decapitation. Again, the structure of the Church with the many decentralized elements is a good way to avoid the dangers of weakening a nonviolent struggle by attacking the leaders.

19. Ibid., p. 29.

20. Especially if I look at the 1992 *Catechism of the Catholic Church*.

21. To mention another example I add the following appraisal of the present teaching of the Church: "It is certainly the case that modern Catholic thought has become increasingly sceptical as to the possibility of any just war in the modern world. From *Pacem in Terris* in 1963 ('It no longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of justice') through many intervening stages to the recent June 1991 editorial in *Civiltà Cattolica* ('the theory of the "just war" is untenable and needs to be abandoned') there runs a consistent, if somewhat wayward course of development in favor of a practical pacifism." Brian Wicker, "After Kuwait the Deluge," in Brian Wicker, ed., *Studying War—Nor More?* 1993, p. 189.

22. Concerning the differences between civilian-based defense and social defense, confer my article in *Civilian-based Defense*, fall 1993. The most important ones are these: Social defense can have the kind of a social offense that may be targeted also against the legal bodies of a state. It needs not be a national defense but can be a method chosen by a group.

23. Sharp makes the distinction between conversion, accommodation, and nonviolent coercion. Cf. Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 707-733. Reading Sharp's books it becomes evident that he concentrates on changes by accommodation

and nonviolent coercion. Kruegler and Ackermann emphasize even more the change by nonviolent coercion by putting the main focus on nonviolent sanctions: "It is important to note at this point what our definition leaves out. As behavioral phenomena, nonviolent sanctions are not equivalent to or synonymous with any of the philosophies of principled nonviolence, such as pacifism or satyagraha. In fact, in the overwhelming majority of known cases of nonviolent conflict, there is no evidence that concepts of principled nonviolence were either present or contributed in a significant way to the outcome." Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p. 4. ■

Association News

Labor and Literary Notes

Philip Helms

Civilian-based Defense Association (CBDA) board member Philip Helms is an official of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and editor of Michigan AFSCME News and Minas Tirith Evening-Star; Journal of the American Tolkien Society. His address: 331 Willow Lane, White Lake, Michigan.

• The Michigan AFSCME convention was in October. I put together a rather ambitious resolution for the convention which called for a ten percent reduction in Pentagon spending each year for the next five and shutting down the Selective Service System entirely, support for the Peace Tax Fund Bill, and redirection of the resulting freed-up revenues to a variety of excellent purposes, such as economic conversion, education, worker retraining, housing, health care, infrastructure restoration and enhancement, etc., and CBD research and development. Spiritually, it was very similar to the one I got introduced two years ago; however, two years ago, I focused solely on CBD, and this time I put it into a package with other, possibly related issues selected for their potential appeal to the delegates. (Bear in mind these are all public workers; many of the programs to benefit by the redirected funds would mean jobs for public workers, rather than cutbacks and layoffs. In addition, AFSCME is 60 percent or more women, and tends less toward the hard-hat, flag-waving

style of patriotism. . .)

As I may have mentioned last time, certain groups within the union seemed particularly receptive, especially to the images from the abortive August coup in 1991, in the then-U.S.S.R. Bus drivers, for example, looked at those blue-and-white municipal buses blocking the tanks and began to smile, thinking (I imagine) about the mess they could make of traffic generally in a city if they did so deliberately.

In any case, this resolution made its way quietly to the convention floor; the Resolutions Committee recommended adoption, and it came up for a vote without debate from the floor. On the first (voice) vote, the president ruled it had failed. Supporters (as it chances, women bus drivers) appealed; the president ruled the resolution defeated on the second vote (a show of hands). Again, the supporters appealed, calling for a division of the house (standing vote, with an actual count by the sergeants-at-arms). The resolution failed by 14 votes, with more than 400 delegates on the convention floor. (It is possible it would have passed on a roll call vote; the less formal votes are one delegate/one vote, while a roll call is based on the number of members a delegate represents; thus, one delegate might represent 35-40 members, while another represented 1,500...)

This is encouraging for a couple of reasons: 1) I find there are some very determined supporters out there, even though time did not permit me to make an educational drive this year; and 2) We are getting very close to a majority. On a vote this close (margin of 3.5 percent), the most realistic assessment is that we are divided. This is a relatively positive feeling when contrasted to being the only conscientious objector in a town of 10,000—a distinction I enjoyed (?) in my youth.

• I managed to hand out 100 or so copies of the revised CBDA brochure at the Peacemakers Congress in Chicago over New Year's. The gathering was primarily Mennonite, I think, and in any case, entirely religious. I am not sure how many are actually likely to join.

• In 1991 I published an article on elements of CBD in *The Lord of the Rings* in *Minas Tirith Evening-Star: Journal of the American Tolkien Society*. The discussion arising from this article and theme has continued for two years, in succeeding articles, letters, and

so forth. The American Tolkien Society (ATS) has printed one article which was written as a term paper for a literature class by a high school student—building on the theme of CBD in Tolkien's work. There has been some interest in CBD and in Gandhi as a result from readers in Romania, Poland, Russia, and even Iran. The discussion and articles have drifted a bit from the precise focus on CBD, but I am still rather pleased with the mess I stirred up there. A number of people are now thinking about these themes in the work, who had largely failed to notice them before.

In addition, the ATS has also collected some of the papers and letters on the subject as a chapbook; a librarian board member is urging a second collection. Perhaps I can manage to add the library list as a bibliography of sorts to the second and/or a reprint of the first collection.

• I have the intention of writing a short article on introducing CBD to other groups, as I have done with the union and the ATS, focusing on those which may not seem obvious choices and the potential for commonality of interest. ■

Other News

• Wilhelm Nolte, a member of the the International Advisory Committee of CBDA, has left the German Armed Forces, where he directed the Information and Documentation Unit of the Officers' Academy. He has founded a private consulting firm called "DRAFT." Among other things it works on alternative defense and civilian-based defense.
Klaus Heidegger

• CBDA member Daniel G. Clark, a great friend of the Association, has left his position as program officer at the Stanley Foundation. He wrote in February, "I am leaving to make my way as a home-based freelancer in a venture I am calling 'Friendly Work.' You can reach me at **Clark & Associates, 1221 Mulberry Avenue, Muscatine, IA 52761; phone/fax 319-264-5990; e-mail d.clark@igc.apc.org**. What will I do? I'm planning for a mix of projects and partners that draws on my last 20 years' contacts and experiences in international exchange, dispute resolution and peacemaking...Right now my top concern is Russia. I've been deeply involved there for ten years, especially with Iowa's 'sister state' Stavropol. My first attention now

goes to projects that strengthen and deepen those bonds in practical ways.”

- Lucy Parsons Center Books now sells our magazine in its store in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

- Board member Caridad Inda has been recruiting members for the CBDA advisory committee.

- Member Joy Warner (Ontario, Canada) has become president of Voice of Women for Peace.

- Board chairman Melvin Beckman has been handling many aspects of the Association's effort, e.g., our library outreach project and a monthly letter to board members.

Paul Anders ■

Books

Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century, by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler.

ISBN 0-275-93916-2. Praeger, 1994. Paper, \$22.95, 366 pp. To order, toll free: 800-225-5800.

Reviewed by Melvin G. Beckman

Melvin G. Beckman is chairman of the Civilian-based Defense Association and a consulting editor of this magazine.

In *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, Ackerman and Kruegler call attention to the frequent use of nonviolent struggle by civilian populations during the 1980s and 1990s. "People power" played a part in Ferdinand Marcos's fall from power in the Philippines in 1986. "The people" played a role also in the revolutions throughout East Central Europe a few years ago, in the Chinese student uprising of 1989, in resistance to the attempt to overthrow Gorbachev in 1991, in the Palestinian Intifadeh, and in the South African struggle against apartheid.

The authors contend that people power conflicts have become a regular part of our national and international life. They take it as a given that nonviolent action "works." The question they pose to their readers is "how can nonviolent struggle be improved?"

Small, localized people power struggles occur daily throughout the world. Through nonviolent protests, sit-ins, strikes, and boycotts, groups of people who feel they are being wronged in their societies (or who feel their governments are doing wrong) exercise their collective power to set things right

when dialogue and conflict resolution have failed. While activists who plan local nonviolent struggles are not the primary focus of the book, they will, nonetheless, find it useful.

The authors are clearly most concerned about the use of nonviolent sanctions on the national and international level. They state that "an important audience for this study are leaders of social and political groups who are challenged by adversaries with opposing interests who are prepared to use military force." These leaders, they write, often face a dilemma: they are unwilling to surrender their group's vital interests, but they see no obvious way to mount a viable military campaign. Such leaders might choose to attempt a nonviolent campaign if they see a reasonable chance to succeed.

The authors use six historical conflicts as case studies—all major conflicts for the societies involved, and all conflicts in which at least one of the sides made significant use of nonviolent methods as sanctions. The conflicts chosen are the first Russian revolution, 1904-1906; the German defense against Franco-Belgian occupation in 1923; the Indian independence movement, 1930-1931; Danish resistance to the Nazis, 1940-1945; the civic strike in El Salvador in 1944; and the struggle of Solidarity against the Polish Communist Party, 1980-1981. The authors provide a substantial description of each of these conflicts.

From these case studies, and from the overall history of nonviolent action, Kruegler and Ackerman draw twelve principles for the effective planning and conduct of a major nonviolent campaign. After each of the six historical accounts they analyze whether, and with what results, the twelve principles were or were not adhered to by the nonviolent protagonists.

The publication of *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* represents a new stage in exploring the use of nonviolent sanctions. Previous authors have focused on the reality of the political power available to groups, and even nations, should they choose to use nonviolent sanctions for conflict and defense. Ackerman and Kruegler take the next step and ask whether this power might be wielded more effectively if it is done with premeditation, in conformity with strategic principles for its use which have been demonstrated to be relevant.

Strategic Nonviolent Conflict receives high praise from Gene Sharp, long-time author, lecturer, and researcher in the field

of nonviolent sanctions. In his foreword to the book, Sharp writes that "Ackerman and Kruegler have thrown the door wide open for the expanded strategic development of nonviolent conflict...a new standard for studies of strategy in nonviolent struggle has been established."

Wherever in the world the normal political process has broken down and a military struggle is being contemplated, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* deserves a careful reading. Ackerman and Kruegler bring to the world's "war rooms" a nonviolent alternative for conducting struggle.

Peter Ackerman is managing director of Rockport Financial Ltd. and Rockport Partners, Inc. in London. He was a visiting scholar at the International Institute of Strategic Studies until 1992. Christopher Kruegler is president of The Albert Einstein Institution, Inc. in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is editor-in-chief of the forthcoming *Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action*. ■

Book Review Essay: The Need for Civilian-based Defense in Canada

- Floyd W. Rudmin, *Bordering on Aggression: Evidence of US Military Preparations Against Canada* (Hull, Quebec: Voyageur Publishing, 1993), 192 pages, Can. \$14.95.

- David Orchard, *The Fight for Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American Expansionism* (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1993), 292 pages, Can. \$17.95.

Reviewed by George H. Crowell

George H. Crowell teaches in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada. His specialty is social ethics. His articles "Nonviolent National Defense—Canada" and "Prospects for Civilian-based Defense in Canada: Continuing the Discussion from the 1991 CBDA Conference" appeared in the September 1989 and December 1992 issues of this magazine respectively.

Although neither of these books was written for the purpose of advocating civilian-based defense (CBD), together they go a long way toward presenting a potent case for promoting CBD in Canada. They make it clear that Canada urgently needs CBD. Floyd Rudmin has provided a carefully documented study of the military threat against Canada from the nation most interested in dominating Canada, that is, the United States. This

study could become very helpful not only for promoting CBD, but also for indicating some of the preparations required for organizing an effective Canadian system of CBD. David Orchard's book, treated here more briefly, supports the conclusions of Rudmin, by chronicling the history of U.S. attempts to dominate Canada.

Rudmin's richly documented book, *Bordering on Aggression*, presents striking evidence for the conclusion that the United States has developed and maintains extensive plans and preparations for invading Canada. Probably most Americans, and Canadians as well—likely a smaller proportion of Canadians—would reject this conclusion as preposterous. The prevailing assumption is that our two nations have a long-standing friendship and close cooperative relationships, vividly expressed by our undefended border of some 6000 kilometers. There is no official proclamation or statement or even a leaked government memo supporting the claim that the United States has plans or preparations at present for military action against Canada. Nevertheless Rudmin has marshalled an astonishing array of evidence pointing in that direction. The evidence is of three basic types: (1) current U.S. military capabilities, and (2) long-standing U.S. interest in dominating or annexing Canada, and (3) past government documents revealing elaborate plans for U.S. invasion of Canada.

No one can seriously dispute the fact that the United States has the military capability quickly to overwhelm Canada at any time. Rudmin points out, however, that one U.S. military base appears especially well adapted for quick seizure of the nerve centers of Canada at strategic points between the English and French populations. This is Fort Drum, located in northern New York State, just south of the border with Canada. Stationed at Fort Drum is the U.S. Army's 10th Division, a light infantry force, trained and equipped not for prolonged fighting against heavy resistance, but for rapid incursion into urban areas, at night if necessary, and in severe winter weather. Transported by light vehicles and helicopters, the 10th Division could quickly interdict east-west road, rail, and seaway connections between Montreal and Toronto, seize the Canadian military communications center at Kingston, and take over key federal government facilities in Ottawa. In the unlikely event the 10th Division encountered determined military resistance, it could be quickly supported by the 50th Armored Division, also based at Fort Drum, and tactical air support from Rome, Syracuse, and Plattsburgh, N.Y.

U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that Fort Drum's 10th Division is intended for other missions. They say, for example, that it is intended for rapid deployment overseas, including possible trouble spots in the Third World. But Fort Drum's airstrips are too short to accommodate aircraft essential for this purpose, and there are no plans to lengthen them. Moreover, the Fort Drum area is subject to some of the worst winter weather

in the eastern United States, with average annual snowfall of ten feet, and with frequent stormy weather year round, often unpredicted from regional weather patterns. For deployment overseas, the 10th Division would have to be transported 90 kilometers by road to Griffiss Air Force Base at Rome, New York or 120 kilometers to Hancock Field in Syracuse. As Rudmin puts it: "For a Division intended for rapid deployment to Third World countries to be placed at a base which has severe, often unpredictable winter weather and which lacks an adjacent air base is too blatant and serious an inconsistency to be mere oversight" (p. 42).

Winter training at Fort Drum is hardly compatible with missions in Third World trouble spots, most of which are located in tropical or sub-tropical climates. Moreover, light infantry divisions are not suitable for sustained counterinsurgency warfare against guerrilla forces, nor can they hope to prevail against armored forces such as might be encountered in the Middle East or in the former Soviet Union.

From 1985 to 1989 Fort Drum was refurbished and expanded in the largest U.S. military construction project since World War II, costing some \$1.2 billion, just when numerous other military bases were being closed, and it has survived additional closings. On June 1, 1991, a carefully selected panel of nonpartisan military experts, serving on the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, included Fort Drum and Griffiss Air Force Base on a published list of military installations with insufficient military value to warrant retention. A week later, without any public explanation, both were removed from the list.

From the time when this area was leased for army exercises in 1906, military experts have repeatedly seen the area's miserable weather, inadequate training space, and lack of transportation as rendering it unfit to serve as a military base. The 1908 maneuvers held there, simulating a U.S. invasion of Canada, were cancelled because of a sudden violent storm. Nevertheless, the property was purchased in 1909 for a permanent military base (named Pine Camp until 1951, Camp Drum until 1971, and Fort Drum since). Any justification for the huge investment in Fort Drum except as preparation for the invasion of Canada appears absurd. But how about the motive and the intentions?

Throughout the history of our two countries, many prominent Americans have openly recommended that the U.S. annex Canada. The independence of Canada was most directly threatened when the United States fought for independence from Great Britain, and during the War of 1812. But the concept of Manifest Destiny is deeply rooted in the American psyche, and this has long included the dream of incorporating Canada into the U.S. political system. In recent years Patrick Buchanan, candidate for the Republican party presidential nomination in 1992, has frequently expressed considerable enthusiasm for the full inclusion of Canada

within the U.S. political system. Other prominent Americans, such as George Ball, a former undersecretary of state, have written about the power of the U.S. economy and culture to draw Canada irresistibly into the U.S. orbit.

It may well be that present U.S. policymakers have no intention of invading Canada. But especially through its forces based at Fort Drum, the United States has a well prepared capability to do so. As Rudmin points out, intentions can change quickly. Canadians need to be concerned about the dangers posed by the objective realities of American military capabilities, and especially about those best adapted for operations against Canada. Indeed, all people concerned about a just world order, including Americans, should be concerned about this potential threat.

While there is no publicly available proof that the United States presently has military plans for the invasion of Canada, there is unmistakable proof that there were such plans in the past. U.S. government documents, now in the public domain, reveal beyond doubt that the U.S. military developed a series of secret plans, and carried out preparations to invade Canada not only when the British maintained military forces in Canada, but also from the time those forces departed in 1871 on through the 1930s.

The plans consistently called for the primary invasion of Canada to be launched across the St. Lawrence River between Kingston and Cornwall in the area of the present Fort Drum. Constantly the plans were reviewed, revised, and formulated anew during times publicly characterized by mutual cooperation. There was a brief pause only during the time of U.S. participation in World War I. In 1919 planning and preparations resumed, including military intelligence operations. Planning culminated in *War Plan Red*, approved as official U.S. military policy in May 1930. It was declassified in 1974 and can be obtained from the U.S. National Archives.

This plan posited that war would begin as a result of trade disputes with the British Commonwealth, originating from aggressive expansion of U.S. trade in hard times. It assumed that the United States would probably initiate hostilities through a surprise attack on Canada. According to an official 1934 revision of the plan, the possibility for first use of chemical weapons against Canadians was admitted. The goal of the invasion plan was the military occupation of Canada. This was to be accomplished by seizing key centers, such as the Ottawa and St. Lawrence Valleys, Halifax, Montreal, Quebec, Winnipeg (with its "rail bottleneck"), and Vancouver. The Atlantic provinces would be isolated from the rest of Canada, and central Canada from the west. The invaders would seek "unrestricted access" to Canadian natural resources including Sudbury nickel, Niagara hydroelectric power, and, remarkably, even the James Bay area, with its potential for hydroelectric

power, which was not under development until the 1970s.

In the summer of 1935 the U.S. Army organized the largest peacetime maneuvers in U.S. history. More than 36,000 troops gathered at the Fort Drum site, some rushed in via 269 New York City taxis! Another 15,000 were mobilized in Pennsylvania as a "strategic reserve." Press coverage overlooked a key feature mentioned in the souvenir pamphlet for the occasion. The maneuvers simulated the *War Plan Red* scenario of U.S. forces invading Canada! Immediately afterward, despite the fact that the exercises were washed out by torrential rains, the U.S. government enlarged its base at the Fort Drum site by purchasing an additional 9,000 acres of land!

A bill put before Congress in 1935 called for construction of an air base on the Canadian border, which, according to secret testimony before Congress, was for the purpose of preemptive strikes against Canada, although it was to be ostensibly for civilian use. This information was inadvertently released and published in the May 1 *New York Times*, but was not taken seriously by the Canadian government or media. In response to the publicity, however, President Roosevelt denied that the United States had any plans to invade Canada or to construct an air base on the border. But one month later the United States was considering construction of just such a base at the present site of Plattsburgh Air Force Base. Information now available makes it clear that the President was lying. It would be naive to assume that the truth is any more likely to prevail today.

While documentary evidence of U.S. military preparations against Canada since the 1930s is not publicly available, Rudmin mentions evidence of specific actions during the last three decades. Especially fascinating is some testimony, officially denied, that during a Canadian crisis in October 1970, the United States concentrated armored forces and troops somewhere along the border south of Quebec and threatened to invade if Canada failed to control the emergency. Rudmin has found no news reports of troop movements to verify the claim but says that such actions are not always reported. The most likely site for the mobilization appears to have been Camp Drum. Further evidence on this episode may yet be forthcoming. But such a mobilization would not be needed today, because it already exists at Fort Drum.

The above summary barely indicates the rich documentation or the painstaking attention to detail of Rudmin's analysis. Nor does it mention his thorough treatment of the denials, alternative explanations, and ridicule which his analysis has evoked. He argues convincingly that the conclusions he draws from the evidence deserve serious consideration.

Those who have never encountered evidence which seriously challenges the prevailing self-image of the United States as the global advocate of democracy and benefactor of the weak, propagated and

supported by the mainline media, are unlikely to find Rudmin's conclusions credible. Those, however, who are well acquainted with the history of the U.S. projection of power throughout this hemisphere and beyond, largely through support of U.S.-based corporations, as well as through hundreds of military and CIA interventions, as documented for example, in the voluminous writings of Noam Chomsky, are not likely to be surprised by Rudmin's conclusions. On the contrary, they are likely to be grateful, as I am, to have confirmation of their suspicions. It would be surprising if Canada were immune from the sort of interventions which many other nations have experienced.

The long story of Canada's constant struggle against United States domination is not widely known in North America. It has been vividly presented by David Orchard in his book, *The Fight for Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American Expansionism*, which documents a relentless succession of pressures from the United States to gain control over Canadian resources and territory. Orchard's book recounts numerous episodes revealing the arrogance of U.S. power in relation to Canada.

The failure of the United States to conquer Canada in the War of 1812 diverted its expansionist drive toward the Spanish and Mexican territories of the continent. Nevertheless, war almost broke out in 1825 as a result of the Maine-New Brunswick border clash, which was later settled by negotiations. In 1866 several thousand Fenians, an Irish nationalist group, having planned the invasion of Canada with open assistance and encouragement from the U.S. government, made three raids into Canadian territory, but were beaten back each time.

While the blatant attempts at military conquest of 1812-14, 1825, and 1866 evoked immediate and intense Canadian resistance, more subtle economic pressures eventually proved to be more effective. In this approach the Americans consistently had as allies wealthy Canadian business interests. When 1500 prominent Canadian businessmen failed to gain public support for annexation of Canada by the United States, they succeeded in quietly inducing the British government to negotiate the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, providing for free trade with the United States. Under the treaty Canadian forest and fishery resources were rapidly depleted. The United States opted out of the treaty in 1866, largely in the expectation that Canadians, having become dependent on the American economy, would beg for annexation.

Much to the displeasure of the annexationists, Canadian and American, however, Canada, largely under the leadership of John A. Macdonald, negotiated dominion status in 1867 from Great Britain. As Prime Minister, Macdonald, recognizing that Canada's political independence could not be separated from economic independence, enabled Canadian businesses to flourish behind a

tariff wall protecting them from the competition of U.S. products. He also pushed through the construction of a transcontinental railroad, economically linking the far-flung parts of the nation.

Macdonald's last great battle was to defend Canada successfully, although by a narrow margin, against renewed pressures for free trade with the United States in the election of 1891. The issue arose again in the election of 1911, and again Canadians voted to maintain independence from the United States by defeating the proponents of free trade. In 1935, however, the newly elected Prime Minister King, who had spent five years working for the Rockefeller enterprises, signed the Canada-U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreement. This lowered many tariffs, enabled U.S. business to invest more readily in Canada, and increased exports of Canadian raw materials to the United States while also increasing imports of U.S. finished goods into Canada. In this process, Canada steadily lost much of its economic independence.

Under Prime Minister Trudeau, attempts were made to reverse this trend. In 1980 his government created the National Energy Program, whose goal was to establish 50% federal government ownership in the oil and gas industry by 1990, in order to conserve the resources and give priority to Canadian needs. It established a 25% Canadian interest in all energy industry development on Crown (government-owned) lands. Furthermore, the Foreign Investment Review Agency was granted increased power to assure that new foreign investment benefited Canada. By the standards of many nations, this was a very modest requirement. But it aroused a storm of protest from U.S. politicians and business interests.

When Brian Mulroney became Prime Minister in 1984, he immediately began dismantling these programs. By the time he left office in 1993, his government, despite the dismay and disapproval of the majority of Canadians, had almost totally surrendered Canadian economic independence. Now, under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada has lost, among other things, the vital power to control its own natural resources, and the right to insist that corporations selling in the Canadian market must also provide jobs in Canada. Short of annexation, the U.S. power elites have gained virtually every concession from Canada that they could have desired. This incredible sellout was made possible by the collusion of the wealthy business interests in Canada who have finally managed to get their way.

Orchard's book does much to provide credibility to Rudmin's claims. The shocking, ongoing history of U.S. arrogance toward Canada, expressed in unceasing efforts to control, to exploit, and to annex Canada, all of which Orchard presents in considerable detail, is entirely consistent with Rudmin's evidence concerning U.S. military preparations against Canada.

Under what conditions might the United States be tempted actually to carry out an invasion of Canada? If Canadians, recognizing the need to regain control over their own economy, should elect a government committed to withdrawing from FTA and NAFTA, the United States would be very concerned about losing economic advantages they had come to assume as rightfully theirs. When other nations have tried to regain control from U.S. corporations of their own economic resources, the United States has engineered or supported military coups, as in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973. The United States has also carried out or financed invasions of nations attempting to establish their own independent economies, as in the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and of Nicaragua in the 1980s.

The Canadian military is obviously incapable of defending Canada from a U.S. invasion. The only way that Canada could hope to defend itself against invasion from the United States would be through CBD. Rudmin recognizes the potential power and effectiveness of CBD, but rightly points out that Canadians are not ready to give it serious consideration. They are too accustomed to giving in to the United States, and have come to assume that their national defense depends upon subordination of the Canadian military to that of the United States. Before Canadians could be prepared to develop CBD, they would first need to face the question whether they are willing to struggle to regain control over their own economy. They might even need considerable experience in the use of nonviolent action to resist the impact of FTA and NAFTA. If they should then elect a government committed to economic independence, which would inevitably require withdrawal from the free trade agreements, that government would do well first to make the necessary preparations for an effective CBD. Rudmin's book could provide a useful indication of the strategies of the invasion forces for which the defenders would need to be prepared. The Canadian military might make especially useful contributions in anticipating and analyzing the probable strategies to be employed by U.S. invaders and in helping to develop sophisticated CBD strategies.

Having recognized through CBD training their own power to create enormous difficulties for the invaders and to prevent them from achieving their goals, Canadians would have developed a new level of self-confidence. This could provide them with strength and determination to pursue economic independence, despite the risks involved. If the fateful step of withdrawing from the free trade agreements were taken, Canadians could, therefore, be prepared first to resist the onslaught of economic pressures, sanctions, and intense propaganda which would certainly precede any invasion attempt.

There is the possibility that the CBD preparations, combined with firm resistance against economic pressures, might even deter invasion. But Canadians would need to be

ready actually to face well trained invasion forces. Rudmin has made it clear that the U.S. military is well prepared. Orchard has made it clear that the U.S. decision-makers could well be willing to initiate such action. It remains to be seen whether Canadians will allow their economy to continue to deteriorate or will take on the burden of such a confrontation. If they choose confrontation, people of many nations who have been suffering from U.S. exploitation, including many Americans, could be encouraged. ■

Souad Dajani on Palestinian Strategy *Paul E. Anders*

I recently attended a seminar by Souad R. Dajani, "Strategic Considerations in the Palestinian Struggle for Liberation" in which she explicitly mentioned civilian-based defense as a strategy for Palestinians. The seminar was sponsored by Harvard University's Program on Non-violent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense and the Center for International Affairs. She authored the recently published *Eyes Without Country: Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of Liberation*. A brochure for the book states the following:

Since Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the quest for just and lasting peace has been a fountainhead of debate, negotiation, and violent friction. Souad Dajani traces the Palestinians' struggle and argues for a strategy of nonviolent civilian resistance based on deterrence and defense. This strategy would defeat Israel's political will to maintain their occupation and prepare Palestinians for a time beyond the interim period of self-rule agreed upon by Israel and the PLO in September 1993.

Dajani is assistant professor of sociology at Antioch College, Ohio, USA. Her book is published by Temple University Press; toll free: 1-800-447-1656. ■

Around the World

Continued from page 20.

Former Yugoslavia: Nonviolent Defense Projects on a Small Scale.

Nonviolent defense and nonviolent resistance are not only theoretical concepts but are practiced by people and groups all over the world. However, nonviolent initiatives and projects are sometimes small; most of the times they are on a small budget, operate mainly with volunteers, and are overlooked by the mainstream media. Here is one example from the Former Yugoslavia that was reported in the April 1994 issue of *Peace News*. The project is called "Open Eyes" and is supported by the German *Bund für*

Sozialverteidigung. It is a four-member international team of observers that has begun work in Zagreb as part of a project which aims to assist groups working both for postwar reconstruction and conflict prevention in the Former Yugoslavia. It consists of two volunteers from the United States, one from Britain, and one from Norway. An exploratory group is also visiting Kosova and Belgrade to determine whether or not it is possible to establish a team in Kosova. Each team will have several functions: to be a preventive or inhibiting presence in the face of threats and harassment; generally to network, relaying information and requests as appropriate; to seek opportunities for dialogue.

Klaus Heidegger

• **United States.** Last October I heard a talk by Randall Forsberg, "Collective Security for the Post-Cold War Era." She touched on civilian resistance:

The book *Winning Peace* (Crane Russak & Company, 1989) by Dietrich Fischer... Wilhelm Nolte and Jan Oberg has a proposal for an alternative security system... It includes a component developed by Wilhelm Nolte, a German peace researcher, which suggests that people in a country as national service should be allowed to work for peace in a way that they think will be most constructive, choosing among three alternatives. One of them is civilian resistance, which is organized but unarmed opposition to aggression. It could also be intervention in civil wars. The second is civil defense... The third is non-offensive military defense. This has always seemed to me to be the most democratic proposal, perhaps the one most likely to succeed in making a transition from the world that we're in to a world in which most people and most governments consider the use of force wrong and unnecessary. In this transition some people would work for that future only by nonviolent means and others would work through non-offensive defense, through police type actions to stop, prevent and end violence. As one of the advocates of non-offensive defense, I would welcome participation in such a system. I am not sure that the people who are exclusively committed to nonviolence feel the same way. I think that as a practical transition, this is the kind of system we need to be working within.

An originator of the nuclear weapons freeze campaign, Forsberg is executive director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. Her talk was recently published in *New Contexts • New Dangers: Preventing Nuclear*

War in the Post-Cold War Age, Transcripts from the October 29-31, 1993 Conference. This publication is available for \$2.50 from American Friends Service Committee, 2161 Mass. Ave., Cambridge, MA 02140, USA. Her presentation on preventing nuclear war is also available on video (\$10—rental; \$25—sale) from the same address.
Paul E. Anders

• **Panama.** Panama, which disbanded its army after the defeat of General Noriega, has elected Ernest Perez Balladares as president. He opposes military influence on the government.
Paul E. Anders ■

Recently Received

Compiled by Kenneth Haynes and Paul E. Anders

• Bleiker, Roland. Review of Brian Martin's *Social Defense, Social Change* (London: Freedom Press, 1993, £4.95) in *Pacific Research*, vol. 7, no. 1 (Feb. 1994), p. 44.

• Kruegler, Christopher. "The Development of Civilian-Based Defense." *Nonviolent Sanctions: News from the Albert Einstein Institution*, fall 1993/winter 1994, p. 4.

• Niezing, Johan. *Niezing's Sociale verdediging als logisch alternatief. Van utopie naar optie* (Antwerpen - Assen/ Maastricht, 1987) has been translated into Russian: *Obshchestvennaya oborona kak logicheskaya al'ternativa. Ot utopii k vyboru* (Moscow: 1993).

• Sharp, Gene. "Consulting on Nonviolent Action: Learning from the Past Ten Years." *Nonviolent Sanctions: News from the Albert Einstein Institution*, fall 1993/winter 1994.

Publishers' Addresses

• Freedom Press, 84b Whitechapel High St., London E1 7QX, U.K.. Telephone: 01-247-9249.

• *Nonviolent Sanctions*, Albert Einstein Institution, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Telephone: 617-876-0311.

• *Pacific Research*, Coombs Building, Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia. Telephone: 61 (0)6 249 3098; FAX: 61 (0)6 249 0174. ■

BOOKS FOR SALE ON CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

John Mecartney

What can be done to spread the great idea of civilian-based defense (CBD)? Because war may not end until people see an alternative defense system, it is very urgent that our idea spread. At a recent meeting with the Civilian-based Defense Association (CBDA) board, Gene Sharp suggested our members read more about CBD, get books about CBD into libraries, organize discussion groups in homes, etc., and that we review books on CBD in this magazine. Where can we secure books? John Mecartney, who has sold books on CBD for over ten years, will sell them to you. The retail price to be charged will mean that CBDA will make the profit.

THE BOOKS LISTED BELOW ARE FOR SALE. Make a check out to NANDI or Nonviolent Action for National Defense Institute and send it to NANDI, PO Box 19900, Detroit, MI 48219-0900. NANDI, which promotes CBD, will remit profits to CBDA. All books are paperbacks except Sharp's *Civilian-based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System*.

• Olgerts Eglitis. *Nonviolent Action in the Liberation of Latvia*, 1993, 72 pp. How Latvians used nonviolent action (1987-1991) to gain independence. \$4.00.

• Harvard University's Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense. *Transforming Struggle*, 1992, 141 large pages. Mostly one-page reports on nine years of the program's Wednesday seminars at Harvard. Includes Gene Sharp, Christopher Kruegler, Mubarak Awad and many others who make a real contribution to

nonviolent theory and practice. A valuable resource. \$10.00.

• Gene Sharp, with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins. *Civilian-based Defense: a Post-military Weapons System*, 1990, 166 pp. Hardcover only. Updated material, good summary of previous works, plus lots of new information and strategies. \$20.00.

• Gene Sharp. "Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal," 16 pp. pamphlet, 1980. The best short introduction to CBD, though in light of the strength of the former Soviet Union. (I have sold 5000 of these.) \$2.00.

• Gene Sharp. *National Security through Civilian-based Defense*, 55 pp., \$4.95. 1970, revised 1985. A general overview with 46 pages of research topics. \$4.95.

• Gene Sharp. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 1973. A revision and expansion of Sharp's Oxford doctoral dissertation. Best seller of Sharp's books. Its 3 parts are available separately:

Part 1: *Power and Struggle*, 105 pp. Examines the nature and control of political power and gives past instances of nonviolent action. \$3.95.

Part 2: *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 349 pp. How political jiu-jitsu works, communications, methods of nonviolent actions, plus several hundred fascinating examples. \$4.95.

Part 3: *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, 450 pp. How to lay the groundwork, what to do when repression occurs, ways to succeed, and how power can be redistributed. \$5.95.

• Gene Sharp with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins. *Self-reliant Defense without Bankruptcy or War*, 1992, 73 pp. An updated statement in light of changes in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union, along with strategies. \$4.00.

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Around the World

• **Latvia.** On April 30 Russia agreed to remove the remaining 10,500 Soviet troops from Latvia. In June 1992 defense ministry representatives from Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden gathered for a conference in Lithuania cosponsored by the Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania and the Albert Einstein Institution. A statement adopted at the end of the conference said in part, "The strategy of civilian-based defense can and should be used successfully to guarantee the security of the Baltic states and, in particular, to have Russia withdraw its troops." Russia removed its last soldiers from Lithuania in August 1993. It would be interesting to know how Baltic interest in civilian-base defense might have influenced the Russian pullouts. (The conference statement was reported by Roger S. Powers, "Baltic Defense Officials Consider Civilian-based Defense at Vilnius Conference," *Civilian-based Defense: News & Opinion*, August 1992, p. 1.)
 Paul E. Anders

• **United States: Materials on Nonviolent Defense and Nonviolent Struggle.** *Seeds of Peace, Harvest for Life: An International Consultation on the Global Peace Service*, by

EDITOR AND LAYOUT Paul E. Anders
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 Philip D. Bogdonoff
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 SUBSCRIPTION: \$15.00 for one year year; \$25 for two years.
 Readers are invited to send news, articles, and other material for publication. ■

Mary Evelyn Jegen, SND. This is the definitive report on the gathering that was documented in the last issue of *Civilian-based Defense*. About 100 pages, \$3.00 including postage. Available from Sr. Mary Evelyn Jegen, Mount Notre Dame, 701 East Columbia Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio, 45215.
 Klaus Heidegger

• **Norway.** Johan Jørgen Holst, Norway's defense minister, died in January at the age of 56. In his *Civilian-Based Defense in a New Era*, published in 1990 by the Albert Einstein Institution, he wrote, "Civilian-based defense has the potential of constituting an important complement to traditional military forms of defense." His readers may be pleasantly surprised by his frequent excursions into figurative language.
 Paul E. Anders

Continued on page 18.

Editor's Note

Paul E. Anders

• This is a combined issue: spring and summer 1994. With the next issue, it will enable us to finally publish at the beginning of the season rather than the end. This will not reduce the number of issues you will receive on your current membership or subscription.

• Special thanks to Klaus Heidegger as he prepares to return to his native Austria. Since last summer he has been working very diligently, creatively, and generously to improve this magazine with his well thought out articles. ■

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August 1, 1994

DEAR MEMBERS & FRIENDS,

This letter is to invite you to our first-ever joint meeting of the membership and directors of the Civilian-Based Defense Association! In order to prepare for the meeting we would like you to register as soon as possible, but no later than September 12th.

You will notice immediately that this is a business meeting and not a conference. During the first evening an update will be given on what has transpired world-wide regarding civilian-based defense and also a status report on the condition of our organization. With that, the presentation part of the meeting will be over and the rest of the time will be devoted to discussion and planning.

If you have a serious interest in civilian-based defense and have wanted to do more to promote its consideration, this is the time to come forward. Your ideas and involvement are needed. Members who would like to serve on the board of directors for a three year term will have opportunity to offer their services and possibly be elected at the meeting.

The September meeting, then, is to help us decide what we can do together to further promote consideration of this defense policy - wherever we think we can do it geographically, and at whatever levels of society we might be able to have an impact. At the end of the meeting we won't ask a staff to implement what we have planned. We don't have a paid staff. We want each participant to make a commitment to a specific piece of the work to be done and then go home and do it. This is a working meeting, for working members and directors.

Please let us have your registration for the meeting as soon as possible and begin to think about what proposals you would like to submit for consideration at the meeting. If you cannot attend we would appreciate your written suggestions and/or financial support.

Sincerely,



Melvin G. Beckman
Chairman
402-558-2085