

Civilian-based Defense

EXPLORING A NONVIOLENT STRATEGY FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

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PREPARING LITHUANIAN OFFICIALS FOR CIVILIAN- BASED DEFENSE

Commodore Dr. E. Nazelskis

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To understand our Lithuanian experience and ideas about organizing civilian-based defense in teaching centers of our civil security system, it will be helpful to explain how we understand civil security in Lithuania and its relation to civilian-based defense.

Because the terms *civil security* and *civilian-based defense* are sometimes confused, I would like to explain how we understand them in Lithuania.

We have not chosen the usual terms to indicate *civil defense* or *civil security*, which would be *civiline gynyba* or *orcivilinis saugumas* in Lithuanian. We chose the term *sauga* instead of words for *defense*, *security*, or *protection* because it is less passive than those words, and it therefore indicates better the basis of our approach. A person cannot be protected without conscious participation in defense. If someone remains passive, does not fulfill certain responsibilities, and does not know how to protect himself or herself from danger, then there is no defense. Defense depends on active participation.

In Lithuania we are aiming to make civil defense as universal and as effective as possible. It should serve our population's needs both in peacetime and during times of external aggression.

The Geneva Convention (1949) treats civil defense as a complex of humanitarian tasks. These tasks provide for defense of the

population against war or some natural calamity. In the event of war or natural disaster, it provides assistance and creates the conditions for survival.

Civil security in Lithuania is an inseparable part of defensive activities and includes protection of the civil population in both peacetime and wartime. Civil security can be described as all the means and actions designated to save the population, property, and cultural values in extreme situations with the help of the active participation of the population, in addition to a constant set of various precautionary actions.

Extreme emergencies—accidents, disasters, natural calamities, and the like—can occur both in peacetime and during times of foreign aggression. Since Lithuania became independent and regained its political, economic, and cultural status, two general types of dangers confront us:

- The deliberate use of violence against our country, whether international military aggression or by international or internal terrorist acts:

- Dangers from technological accidents, natural disasters, and calamities.

Here in Vilnius, about 20 kilometers from the geographical center of Europe, we are in a very dangerous location. In Lithuania there are 247 chemically dangerous enterprises and 24.33% of our population live within the possible zones of pollution from them. We have the Ignalina nuclear power station, which is 150% more powerful than the one at Chernobyl. We also have the hydrostation in Kaunas, oil conduits, gas pipes, and insecure railroads through which dangerous materials are constantly transported. For example, 80% of chlorine is transported to Neman alone (in the Kaliningrad region, a separated enclave which is part of Russia but which is reached through Lithuania). The transport of Russian troops through Lithuania also has dangers.

All these are sources of potential danger, and in case of a calamity, the lives and health of thousands of people would be in danger. In certain cases the danger would extend to the populations of the neighboring countries, such as Poland, Latvia, Belarus,

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and Russia, and under some conditions even to the countries of Western Europe.

To reliably protect the population, a large system is being created which can successfully be used for civilian-based defense.

We inherited from the Soviet Union a large civil defense system. Now we are working to adapt it to the changing needs of our country. The system includes:

- Means for warning and informing the population and administrative staff about arising dangers
- Specific means of protection
- Air raid shelters and radiation protection locations.

At the same time, we are working intensively to create our own system. This includes:

- Maintenance of material and technical provisions (collection, allocation, and storage of vitally important items, such as food, fuel, and medicine)
- Rendering medical aid to the population
- Inspecting and indicating the danger zones
- Planning appropriate actions in extreme situations
- Preliminary training of administrative leaders and the population about how to behave in extreme situations
- Forecasting the behavior of various sections of the population.

All these systems can successfully serve to advance the purposes of civilian-based defense. For example, in case radio and television are not functioning, warning systems of civil security can help to inform the population of an emergency, to rally them to some action, or, on the contrary, to instruct them how to behave. Decentralization, which we have introduced, makes this system very mobile and important. In creating plans for civil defense in extreme situations, it is possible to anticipate certain sequences of civilian-based defense actions.

Considering the problem creatively and rationally, every component of civil security can be successfully used as a separate system for the purposes of civilian-based defense.

This is all relevant to the main problem of preparing the population, officials, and administration staff for civilian-based defense in the civil security system. We have created a full training program so that the general population and these officials will be able to act properly in extreme

situations.

In the largest Lithuanian cities—Vilnius, Kaunas, Siauliai, Utena Panevezys, Marijampole, and Alytus—teaching centers for civil security are either already established or are being established. In these, educational activities for officers and the population have already started or will soon do so. The educational activities will vary according to the nature of work and occupation, raw materials used in production, and geographical location.

This helps to explain why Government decision N151, issued March 9, 1992 included, in addition to other tasks for the Department of Civil Security, the responsibility "to teach citizens to apply civilian-based defense in case of the occupation of a foreign army."

Personnel to be Taught and Duration of the Studies

The Lithuanian government policy statement "about teaching civil security" designated the personnel to be taught and the duration of the studies for the near future. A special course and a course credit test is compulsory for heads of ministries, municipalities, state departments, enterprises, and offices as well as for leaders of lower echelons (such as dispatch managers and teachers). In all there are twenty categories of studies. The course of studies is also defined in the government policy statement as 35 hours every four years. Within the 35 hours of the civil security course, two to four hours are allocated for the problems of civilian-based defense, according to the category of the students. Eight thousand people are to take this course every year.

Content of Civilian-Based Defense Studies

The civilian-based defense studies could be divided into three levels. On the first level, the students could be acquainted with the basic concept of civilian-based defense, basic terms, and the general experience of Lithuania and foreign countries in this field. At the same time, we shall try to make listeners think about possible future applications of civilian-based defense and to encourage them to take an active part in this process.

On the second level, it would be expedient to introduce possible ways to adapt the system of civil security to civilian-based defense. In this case, students will be better acquainted with the forms, methods, strategy, and tactics of defense.

On the third level, we should try to encourage students to take up civilian-based defense while preparing plans for civil security in case of aggression. Students will be supplied with literature and recommendations which help to increase knowledge of this field.

Problems of Teaching Civilian-Based Defense

First, a very short time is devoted to civilian-based defense problems in the course. This is why it is necessary to improve as soon as possible the self-training methods of social information and to find additional time to study the available literature.

Second, it is obvious that civilian-based defense is one component in the total defense system. It is a part of a complex. Therefore, this kind of defense should be based on empirical evidence. However, we are short of information, including literature, data, methods of investigation, and the like.

Third, we lack qualified staff. It would therefore be very useful to cooperate with other countries in exchanging teaching staff, methods of investigation, and so on.

Conclusion

Civil security and civilian-based defense are very closely connected. The infrastructure of the civil security system and its educational centers can be successfully used for preparing the population for civilian-based defense. ■

IMPRESSIONS OF THE DUTCH SOCIAL DEFENCE NETWORK

Brian Martin

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Brian Martin's defines social defense as "nonviolent community resistance to aggression as an alternative to military

defense. It is based on widespread protest, persuasion, noncooperation and intervention in order to oppose military aggression or political repression. It uses methods such as boycotts, acts of disobedience, strikes, demonstrations and setting up alternative institutions" (Social Defense, Social Change, London: Freedom Press, 1993, p. 4).

I first heard about the Dutch social defence network in 1984 when I received a letter from Lineke Schakenbos, international contact for the network. In Australia at the time there was only limited awareness of social defence: just one group (Canberra Peacemakers) and a few other individuals took an active interest. The Dutch operation was much grander, with a network of ten groups on different topic areas.

Nearly a decade later, in April and May 1993, I took a trip to the Netherlands to find out more about Dutch activities to promote social defence. I was able to speak with several of the leading figures in the Dutch network and to gain a better understanding of the history and organisation of activity there. This is a report of my impressions of the network. It can be no more than impressions since I have not carried out an in-depth study. Nor could I, not knowing the Dutch language. While spoken language is not a barrier-most Dutch people speak English excellently-many important books and other documents have not been translated into English.

Before proceeding further, it is important to distinguish between social defence and nonviolent action. Social defence means organised nonviolent action-rallies, strikes, boycotts, noncooperation, alternative institutions, fraternisation, etc.-as a method of resisting military invasions or coups. Social defence would be either a full replacement for the army or a supplement to it. Nonviolent action, by contrast, is a more general category: it can refer to action against police, corporations, racism, male violence, etc., as well as against military threats. In practice, different people in the Dutch network have different ways of defining social defence. Some prefer a broader conception, bringing it closer to nonviolent action generally, whereas some see it exclusively as an alternative or supplement to military defence.

In the Netherlands, as in Australia, it is possible to distinguish the following:

- The peace movement, which is not

necessarily committed to nonviolence

- The nonviolence movement, interested in promoting awareness of and use of nonviolent action, and specifically in running workshops on nonviolent action
- The social defence movement.

Support in the Netherlands for the peace movement is impressive. Although activity is far less now than in the mid 1980s, membership in groups remains high. Churches play an important role in the peace movement as they do elsewhere in Dutch society. Pax Christi has some 16,000 members, mostly Catholics. It includes many articulate people but is organised hierarchically, and at the top there is some resistance to nonviolence because it is seen to have a low political impact. Then there is the Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV), which covers nine churches (Pax Christi officially represents the Roman Catholic Church), has 2000 paying members and 15,000 on its mailing list. Also important is Women for Peace (Vrouwen voor Vrede or VVV). It produces a newsletter of forty pages six times per year, which goes to 3000 members. This is not to mention other groups.

The nonviolent action training network seems similar in activity to Australia, with perhaps five to ten active trainers in the country. This, at least, is my impression, which would have to be verified by closer study in both the Netherlands and Australia! There is a national network of nonviolence organisations.

A national network is much easier to organise in the Netherlands than in Australia, simply because of size of the country. With a population nearly as large as Australia's, the Netherlands has an area only half that of Tasmania. Furthermore, the rail network is dense and efficient compared to Australian cities. That means that a group on a particular topic can be formed with members from all around the country, with as much ease as bringing people together from across Sydney or across Melbourne.

The social defence network was set up with a series of theme groups: women, research, the military, civil servants, churches, trade unions and others.

The women's group, with 5 or 6 active members, is the most active. It has had most success in promoting the idea of social defence and nonviolence among members of Women for Peace. For example, this year 80 women attended a one-day workshop on violence in daily life.

The research group has 4 to 5 active members. As its name implies, the group pursues research into social defence. It meets every two months or so, typically to discuss an article written by one of the members. A few of the articles by members have been published.

The military group has 3 to 4 active members. Its aim is to promote the idea of social defence in the Dutch military.

The civil servants group aimed to encourage civil servants to be prepared to resist a hostile power that has taken over the government. (The memory of the Nazi occupation from 1940-45 remains fresh.) The main outcome of the group was some papers on the issue. The group has not been active for the past couple of years. The groups dealing with churches, trade unions and other topics never really got off the ground.

Social Defence Research

Before commenting further on the network, it is worthwhile mentioning research on social defence in the Netherlands, which has a fascinating history. A key figure is Johan Niezing, Professor of Peace Research at the Free University of Brussels for the past 20 years. He has long been committed to social defence, not for idealistic reasons but because it seems to him to be the most pragmatic alternative to the horrors of military methods. Although Niezing works in Belgium, he is Dutch by origin and his book on social defence is in Dutch.

In the late 1970s, a small radical party was part of a coalition government in the Netherlands. (Dutch governments are always coalitions, partly due to the voting system with proportional representation.) A member of this party was made science minister, and Niezing was his chief scientific adviser. As a result, the acceptance of proposals to fund ten social defence research projects was set as a condition for continuing the coalition. A committee, chaired by Niezing, was set up to oversee the ten projects. But then there was a change of government. Funding was dramatically reduced so that there was enough for just one project. (One way that this cutback was justified was on the basis of a critique of the Niezing committee proposals by social scientist Koen Koch.)

The one project was a study coordinated by Alex Schmid of Leiden University. Schmid's book, resulting from the study, argued that an invasion by a determined military power (specifically, the Soviet

Union) could not be stopped by nonviolent means. (In retrospect, now that the Soviet threat to western Europe has collapsed in the wake of the largely nonviolent 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, this analysis seems quite shortsighted.) Thus ended a promising possibility for sustained research on social defence.

(Schmid went on to set up the Interdisciplinary Research Project on Root Causes of Gross Human Rights Violations, with the Dutch acronym PIOOM, at the University of Leiden. This is a vitally important social science enterprise, whose core funding remains precarious.)

Although the Niezing committee was disbanded in 1987, it took until 1993 before its original proposals, having been updated and augmented by Giliam de Valk, were published in English. Niezing himself played a key role in ensuring that this publication took place.

The civil servants group also had trouble in raising money. They had done some interviews in Rotterdam and prepared for training civil servants for social defence. Rotterdam officials then organised a meeting to inform civil servants about training, but gave it so little publicity that hardly anyone attended. The lack of attendance was then used by the officials as an excuse to avoid providing any further support for the project.

The Background to the Network

How exactly did the network get started? There appear to be several roots. In the 1970s at the Technical University of Twente, there was a group, mainly composed of students, working on social defence. There were two subgroups. One focussed on research, doing summaries of articles. The other decided to learn how to do social defence in a practical fashion, so they did interviews with civil servants in the city of Hengelo. After the members of this group dispersed (most received degrees in 1980 and left to work elsewhere), the group was reconstituted as a national one, involving some people who had been involved for a long time. Indeed, there has been interest in social defence in the Netherlands since the 1920s. Some of those people were still active after World War II, and this has contributed to the current strength of the Dutch network.

Another group, the Centre for Nonviolent Response, had been active since the 1970s. They organised a meeting on social defence in the early 1980s and had more

people than they could cope with. Afterwards there was a meeting in September 1983 with the other group (which had interviewed civil servants), along with other interested people (especially from Women for Peace) and the network was formally established in 1984. It really just formalised connections between groups that were already active.

Another important organisation is Stichting Voorlichting Actieve Geweldloosheid (SVAG), or in other words the Foundation for Information on Active Nonviolence. Headed by Evert Huisman, it has been active for nearly 30 years and has a mailing list of 2,500 people. Among other things, it has published a large amount of material on nonviolence, both original works and Dutch translations from other languages, and has provided an invaluable service in circulating ideas about social defence.

Comments

The Dutch social defence network has some dedicated activists, and Dutch social defence researchers have produced a considerable body of literature. But there is also a pessimistic side. With the collapse of the Soviet threat, interest in peace issues is in decline in the Netherlands (as in most western countries), and this includes social defence.

On the research side, things do not look bright. Peace studies programmes are being closed down in several universities. Johan Niezing retires this year and there is no one of comparable prominence in the social defence field to take his place. Social defence researchers such as Giliam de Valk and Joep Creyghton are currently unemployed. It is difficult to obtain funds for social defence research, so it is tempting to move into other fields, as Alex Schmid did. One of the few established researchers still interested in social defence is Professor Hylke Tromp of the University of Groningen.

The network groups are not tied so much to funding, but they do require commitment from their members. The groups on research and civil servants seem mainly to have remained at the level of discussion, producing some valuable writings but not otherwise taking the message to wider constituencies. It might also be mentioned that these groups have always been almost entirely male. By contrast, the women's group remains the most active and has continued to bring social

defence to new people.

A highlight of my visit was a workshop on social defence at the Centre for Nonviolent Change in Amersfoort, organised by Abel Hertzberger and Lineke Schakenbos, at which I was a featured speaker. I described some of the projects that we had done in Canberra and Wollongong, such as producing a slide show and interviewing telecommunications experts. Those attending seemed to appreciate the practical nature of our projects. In addition, they were surprised to hear that the groups carrying out these projects were so small. It was nice to find that our efforts in Australia could provide some insight and stimulation to Dutch social defence activists, since for many years the activities of the Dutch network and, indeed, the very existence of the network have provided encouragement to us in Australia.

Promoting social defence can be a lonely task. The resources devoted to military methods remain vast, and most people still believe that military forces are needed. Furthermore, there is no guaranteed path to social defence. That's why every small project is important. We need to try out different approaches, see what works in each situation, and communicate our experiences openly and honestly. I thank all those who talked to me about social defence in the Netherlands, including Joep Creyghton, Piet Dijkstra, Anton Heering, Evert Huisman, Johan Niezing, Herman Stegehuis, and especially Giliam de Valk and Lineke Schakenbos.

Recent Dutch Books on Social Defence

- J. P. Feddema, A. H. Heering and E. A. Huisman, *Verdediging met een menselijk gezicht: grondslagen en praktijk van sociale verdediging* (Amersfoort: De Horstink, 1982).
- Evert A. Huisman, *Van geweld bevrijd: overleven door democratisering en ontwapening* (Zwolle: Stichting Voorlichting Actieve Geweldloosheid, 1987). An abridgement and translation of 7 chapters has been published as *Freed from violence: a nonviolent defence* (Zwolle: SVAG, 1989).
- A. A. Klumper, *Sociale verdediging en Nederlands '40-'45* (Tilburg: H. Gianotten B.V., 1983).
- Johan Niezing, *Sociale verdediging als logisch alternatief: van utopie naar optie* (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1987).
- Alex P. Schmid, in collaboration with Ellen Berends and Luuk Zonneveld, *Social*

defence and Soviet military power: an inquiry into the relevance of an alternative defence concept (Leiden: Center for the Study of Social Conflict, State University of Leiden, 1985).

- Hylke Tromp, editor, *Sociale verdediging: theorieën over niet-militaire verdediging als alternatief voor geweldpolitiek en nucleaire afschrikking* (Groningen: Xeno, 1979).
- Giliam de Valk, *Strategie en sociale verdediging: een exploratieve literatuurstudie naar de fundamenten van de strategie van sociale verdediging* (Zwolle: Stichting Voorlichting Actieve Geweldloosheid, 1988 [Masters thesis, University of Leiden]).
- Giliam de Valk in cooperation with Johan Niezing, *Research on civilian-based defence* (Amsterdam: SISWO, 1993).

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GLOBAL PEACE SERVICE: NEW VISION OR REINVENTING THE WHEEL? INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATION ON THE GLOBAL PEACE SERVICE 1993

Klaus Heidegger

Dr. Klaus Heidegger was responsible for the educational program of Pax Christi Vienna and taught Roman Catholic religion in Vienna. He works for an antimilitaristic Austrian magazine (ZAM). This year he is

in Somerville, Massachusetts. He volunteers for the Civilian-based Defense Association and is the father of a sixteen-month old girl.

Three and a half years ago, at an international Conference on Social Defense in England, I met Margareta Ingelstam. She spoke enthusiastically about the idea of a Global Peace Service (GPS). Mrs. Ingelstam and a handful of other people have devoted themselves to this idea, met periodically, and organized the consultation in New York City from November 18 to 20, 1993, which I attended. This gathering provided a good chance to analyze the concepts of GPS and to think about their possible development.

There are several obvious connections between GPS and civilian-based defense. The relevance of GPS to civilian-based defense has already been outlined by Phillips Moulton in the December 1992 issue of *Civilian-based Defense*. Over the past few years, Mrs. Ingelstam worked with the Albert Einstein Institution on issues concerning the Baltic states, where there has been official interest in civilian-based defense. Mary Link, a board member of the Civilian-based Defense Association, and Philip Bogdonoff, consulting editor of this magazine, attended the Consultation on GPS in New York. So the words of Philip Moulton are taken seriously: "Although GPS is still in its nascent stage, advocates of civilian-based defense should be aware of it as an idea whose time appears to have come. In the years ahead, the two movements may find areas of mutual support in bringing nonviolent methods to bear on violent situations." True, but what does GPS look like? What lies behind the words?

THE INVITATION

We can find information about GPS in the invitation brochure. The three-day consultation was called "Seeds of Peace, Harvest for Life." The name gives some of the spiritual background of the steering group.

In the brochure, thirty-four peace groups are listed that endorsed the consultation and the principle of a GPS. Almost all are American organizations with a clear commitment to nonviolence. They reflect the diversity of peace efforts in the United States. Among the international endorsers are Pax Christi International, Peace Brigades International, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, UN Volunteers, and the UN

Committee for the University for Peace.

The list of the organizations that gave financial support for the consultation is another key for understanding GPS. Almost all of the sponsors are Christian organizations, especially from the Protestant side. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America gave the most financial help. GPS is promoted in Christian institutions, at least in the principal offices and committees. Nevertheless, GPS is not a Christian or religious institution.

Important programmatic declarations were announced beforehand in the brochure. It gives the following short description of GPS: "Global Peace Service is a movement towards international groups of women and men committed and trained in large numbers for nonviolent service in struggles for justice and human rights, in situations of severe social tensions, civil strife and war, and in places of environmental conflicts." This description is general. It doesn't say anything about organizational questions, such as What is or can be the organizational framework for a GPS and Who will decide how to use a GPS? The inviting group stresses that components of GPS have long existed, but that it should differ from other voluntary services. It should be an internationally recognized alternative to military service. GPS aims to receive recognition and support from governments as soon as possible.

In the invitation brochure, eleven fields of activities for GPS members are listed:

promote human rights and protect the environment; aid the cause of children's rights; teach methods and strategies of active nonviolence; stand by those threatened with kidnapping, torture and murder; assist in the resettlement of refugees; monitor democratic processes including elections; mediate in conflict situations; serve in situations where a country's independence is threatened; be part of a country's civilian-based defense; serve where there are large-scale catastrophes; document and report on situations in which they serve.

This list makes clear again that the

Steering Group avoided a narrow definition of GPS. The possible tasks were described broadly. In the course of the consultation, it became evident that this broad description of GPS impedes the actual implementation of GPS.

THE CONSULTATION

The consultation convened at The Church Center for the United Nations at 777 UN Plaza. This was not an accident. It was meant to symbolize and promote the incorporation of GPS in the United Nations as well as the churches. Sister Mary Evelyn Jegen, representative of Pax Christi International and one of the four members of the steering group that prepared the consultation, expressed it emphatically in her introductory statement: "We are the people of the United Nations!"

There were more than a hundred participants, coming from all over the United States. International representation was only symbolic. There were four participants from Europe (Sweden, England, Russia, Austria), and only one person came from a country of the Third World (El Salvador). Can we therefore conclude that GPS is mainly an American project?

Presentations

During the three days, there were about thirty presentations. I can only mention some of them to suggest the diversity of discussions. First, though, I would like to point out one weakness of the consultation's format. Due to the large number of presentations, there was little opportunity to collectively discuss or to develop ideas. Maybe that's why the hundred participants still had a hundred different conceptions of GPS when the consultation was over.

1. The goal of the **keynote-address** by **Margareta Ingelstam** was to answer the question: What is the Global Peace Service? Like many others, Mrs. Ingelstam started to define GPS by presenting two examples. First, she spoke about a peace monitoring project in South Africa which is mainly supported by the Swedish Ecumenical Council. Soon, the first 60 Swedish volunteers will be trained and sent for their mission in South Africa. Second, Ingelstam described the nonviolent peace work of a group in Osijek, Croatia. Last summer, she spent some time with them and experienced

again that many components of GPS are already being realized by many groups and people. After these concrete examples, Ingelstam reiterated the four principles of GPS: (1) international teams of men and women, (2) in large numbers, (3) committed to nonviolent service, (4) and trained for nonviolent conflict resolution and peace-making.

2. **Robert Muller**, Chancellor of the United Nations University for Peace, remained abstract in his lecture. His pleading for general disarmament, his vision of a group of totally demilitarized states inside the UN framework, his praise that after Costa Rica now also Panama has abolished the army in its constitution—all of this was music to the ears of the predominantly pacifist audience. But it had little to do with GPS, and it lacked a certain seriousness. Some elements of Muller's remarks contradicted others. For instance, he demanded that each country should give up its army, but at the same time he proposed peaceful uses of the armies and of military infrastructure. Muller's suggestion to make the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies responsible for GPS was, in my opinion, not only naive but also counterproductive.

At least for many peace organizations in Europe, because of the close relationship and cooperation between the national armies and the national Red Cross organizations, the latter can hardly be seen as a body for doing active nonviolence work. Furthermore, the main tasks of the Red Cross in situations of armed conflicts is to help the wounded, to observe the fair treatment of the captured, and the like. To be able to carry out those ends, the Red Cross has to stay neutral and to refrain from political mediation efforts.

3. **Frank O'Donnell** came from Geneva to give an important talk on the **United Nations Volunteers (UNV)**. Set up by the UN General Assembly in 1970, UNV is administered by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). It serves as an operational partner in developmental, humanitarian, and peace operations at the request of any UN member state or UN System Agency. UNV specialists comprise more than a hundred nationalities. Their average age is thirty-nine. They serve in 115 developing countries, two thirds of them in those designated as "least developed." UNV specialists have helped in recent years with

many aspects of peace-building and democratization, from demilitarization and census taking to the organization of elections and the protection of human rights. UNV's roster contains offers of service from five thousand men and women from around the world, including many with the specializations required for these kinds of work.

The existence of this little known organization confronts us with some important questions if we think of the relationship of UNV and GPS. What are the differences between GPS and UNV? Can both be brought together? Is GPS a parallel and therefore maybe a superfluous institution? Unfortunately, such questions were not discussed during the consultation. Frank O'Donnell said very clearly: "We need a GPS." Yet he did not say anything about how to organize it or how it is related to UNV.

4. During the conference, many speakers approached the topic of GPS by presenting **existing national or international peace services**. However, how these are related to GPS was not worked out. Tina Heino told of a program where Swedish conscientious objectors are educated in nonviolence. Leigh Carter, director of Witness for Peace, discussed the missions of her organization in Central America. The contributions of Daniel Alejandro and Carl Upchurch were highly personal and very impressive. They were the only speakers from minorities in the United States. Daniel Alejandro is a Latino from Santa Cruz, California, working for Barrios Unidos, an inner city organization that works with youth in the Los Angeles area. Carl Upchurch is an African-American working on the Gang Summits, an initiative to bring together members of different hostile gangs. Comments by participants made it obvious that there is a great deal of concern about the amount of violence in urban America and that a GPS is needed to deal with it.

"Cry for Justice" was mentioned several times as another example of a kind of GPS or as a model for it. The goal of "Cry for Justice" is to provide a nonviolent presence in Haiti. It is prepared to stand in solidarity with the Haitian people during the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the transition back to democracy. In this initiative various peace organizations such as Christian Peacemaker Teams, Global Exchange, Haiti Communications Project, Washington Office on Haiti, Pax Christi USA, Peace Brigades International, Sojourn-

ers, and World Peacemakers work together. As of November 1993, twenty-five people had been trained and sent to Haiti.

Finally, attention was given to the practical knowledge of accompaniment in areas of conflict done by Peace Brigades International.

There are many experiences which could help us consider how to develop GPS. The proponents of GPS so far may have preferred a visionary approach and left aside analysis of the status quo and the search for radical but realistic steps.

5. **Doug Hostetter** of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation was the only speaker who expressed some of my concerns. He didn't believe that the consultation was international, multiracial, or interfaith enough to meet the goals of a GPS. He was concerned that GPS could take away some of the limited resources needed by similar organizations. In this way GPS could weaken grassroots initiatives. He also observed that "it is much harder to do the work in practice than in theory," and that "to move from theory to practice you have to start small." Finally, he warned: "Be careful about a dream of what we are already doing!"

6. **David Hartsough**, from San Francisco, is with the organization Peaceworkers. He came with concrete proposals for "International Nonviolent Peacemaking Teams." This was the only attempt during the consultation to be specific about GPS. I was grateful for this but concerned about the details.

Hartsough's goal is to realize the vision of International Nonviolent Peacemaking Teams on a large scale. He hopes that within two years there will be hundreds and within four years a thousand well trained team members going into conflict areas of the world as peacemakers and actively using and sharing their conflict resolution and peacemaking skills. This initiative is supposed to work to encourage the United Nations to sponsor nonviolent peacemaking and unarmed peacekeeping teams as part of UN work. One of the first steps would be to identify those groups and individuals who want to help realize the vision of International Nonviolent Peacemaking Teams. Hartsough brought a document which people can already sign now if they wish to join a team and want to know about opportunities for serving within the next year.

It is good if some people try to push along faster in reaching GPS. However,

wouldn't it be better to come to a consensus first about how GPS would affect the different organizations?

ANALYSIS AND OUTLOOK

My impressions and insights from the consultation are summarized below.

Longing for a Peace Service

Peace service has become a focal point for thousands of peace activists all over the world. Church institutions in particular have become advocates for peace services. This longing for comprehensive peace services is nourished by our daily media exposure to the horrors of war in many parts of the world and by an increasing realization that today's conflicts can't be solved by military force. There is a good chance that nonviolent alternatives will take hold. We have to consider GPS within this broader context.

Nonviolent Peace Services Are Not New National and international peace services, even in situations of armed conflicts, are nothing new. Since the founding of Mahatma Gandhi's Shanti Sena (Peace Army) in India in 1922, similar efforts have been undertaken by churches, organizations, and individuals from different parts of the world. The initiatives have had different names, e.g., nonviolent peacemaking forces, Christian Peacemaking Teams, shalom ministries, etc. In the 1960s Martin Luther King, Jr. and James M. Lawson drew up plans for a "ten thousand person nonviolent army" for service in the struggle for civil rights in the United States. Many organizations, such as Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Servicio Paz y Justicia, the Society of Friends, as well as a number of other churches have developed various forms of nonmilitary intervention, conflict resolution, mediation, and methods of active nonviolence

That's why advocates of GPS must very clearly define what its new and special elements are. What is its specific purpose? Should it be a network for the different international peace services? Should it be an organization that creates peace services on its own? Or is it just a theoretical concept to unite all the different peace services under one single term?

Specific Ideas for the GPS

Is it already justified to speak of the GPS, as the title of the consultation did? Or wouldn't it be better to speak of a GPS? After the conference, I think we can still only speak of a GPS that may develop in very different directions.

But some useful elements are already being promoted which may become the specific elements of the GPS: large numbers of international teams that are educated and trained for nonviolent services in different conflict areas with governmental approval and support.

GPS as Part of a Country's Policies

Most of the nonviolent peace services have been carried out by nongovernmental or grassroots initiatives, often in opposition to the foreign policies of their governments (e.g., Witness for Peace in Nicaragua) which often favored military intervention. Therefore, GPS would mean a shift in the behavior of most governments. GPS would become the official foreign and security policy of a state or the policy of international state bodies, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the UN.

This is the same approach as the concept of a civilian-based defense, i.e., official sponsorship. However, even if there is a relationship between civilian-based defense and GPS, I do not suggest making GPS a part of civilian-based defense. Both share the same nonviolent methods and tactics, so training for GPS would be helpful for the development of a civilian-based defense. But GPS and civilian-based defense have different goals. Whereas the latter is mainly a defense of a nation against external aggression or internal coups, GPS should not—at least not primarily—be seen as a nation's own defense. The term "global" indicates expressly that GPS should always have an international character and orientation.

GPS as Nonviolent Peacekeeping and Peace building by the United Nations

There are many reasons why we should promote GPS as a component of the peacekeeping and peace building programs of the UN.

First, the main task of the UN is to replace war and violent social conflicts with cooperation and positive action. Furthermore, in "Agenda for Peace," the secretary

general of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, called for the establishment of regional training centers to provide training for functions beyond the traditional military ones, such as preventive diplomacy and civilian peacekeeping and peace building.

Second, if GPS became a component of governmental policies and thereby also of UN policies, it would open many possibilities. It's not enough to dream of a GPS. Large numbers of international teams and many educational programs on nonviolence require financial resources. "Organization is the test of nonviolence," Gandhi said. Today there are almost one hundred thousand UN military peacekeepers in many conflict areas of the world. Governments and the UN spend huge amounts of money for these missions. A nonmilitary peacekeeping would be less expensive. Why not use some of the money that is now spent for military peacekeeping for a civilian and nonviolent peacekeeping? There are resources and money for a GPS if we can only divert the money from the military peacekeeping. We could call it a GPS dividend.

Third, this is not mere vision. There is an encouraging initiative. The Austrian government has commissioned the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) to establish a training program for experts involved in the civilian operations of the UN and other international organizations, such as the CSCE or international nongovernmental organizations. These specially trained practitioners will be available on a standby basis for the civilian component of peacekeeping and peace building missions, like the "blue helmets" for the military component. In September 1993 a pilot course for that program started.

Fourth, in proposing to make GPS a distinctive part of UN peacekeeping (and of course also of regional bodies, such as CSCE, ASEAN, OAU, or OAS), I am aware that the UN has to become less an instrument for the interests of some strong nations of the North. Yet initiatives like GPS can help to change the UN.

International Peace Services Depend on NGOs

We do not have to wait and should not wait for the fulfillment of all components of GPS that I have mentioned. Citizens and citizens' groups do not rely on enlightened leaders to build international teams of well trained men and women to provide nonviolent services in zones of conflict. Maybe it will be years

before some governments and the UN begin to change their peacekeeping and peace building policies. We cannot wait because people are dying now in armed conflicts. Thousands of people are killed, tortured, maimed, or oppressed today. That's why in the near future it will be the task of peace activists and peace organizations to strengthen their efforts to make more nonviolent interventions. I think this is the only way to convince governments that nonviolent interventions are more adequate, effective, and less expensive in solving conflicts. But do we have to call each of these services a Global Peace Service? ■

DEFENSE EXPENSES: CIVILIAN-BASED VERSUS MILITARY

Paul E. Anders

Whether a particular country adopts civilian-based defense (CBD) depends not only on the public's views and information about CBD. It also depends on its information about other defense options, especially the military.

A particularly relevant piece of information about any option is its cost. A survey by the organization FAIR during the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign helps us gauge voters' information about the cost of defense.

FAIR surveyed 601 citizens at random who indicated that they would probably or definitely vote. On the average they tended to have more years of education than the average American.

Justin Morgan and Michael Morgan, who conducted the survey, wrote:

We asked respondents what the federal government spent more on in 1992: foreign aid, the military or welfare. The most popular answer, given by 42 percent, was foreign aid. In fact foreign aid consumes a tiny proportion of the budget—just 1 percent, according to the Senate Budget Office. (Of the developed countries, the U.S. spends among the least on foreign aid, per capita.)

The second most popular answer, at 30 percent, was welfare,

which consumes just 5 percent of the federal budget, while military spending was named by only 22 percent of our respondents—even though, at 21 percent of the budget, it is by far the largest of these three items, more than four times larger than welfare spending.

Apparently most voters think that a military defense costs only a tiny fraction of what it actually costs. CBD would be relatively inexpensive. Supporters of CBD need to make the public aware of its potential advantage. ■

CHIVALRY OR HUMANITY? A Response to Carol Paulson on International Law and Civilian-based Defense

Klaus Heidegger

(See the other article by Heidegger in this issue for the author's biographical note.)

In the last issue of *Civilian-based Defense*, Carol Paulson started a very important discussion on the relationship between civilian-based defense and international law. Like her, I am not a professional in international law. However, it is in the very nature of civilian-based defense that it should be studied, discussed, prepared, and carried out not mainly by professionals but by those wrongly defined as "laypersons." The experts on civilian-based defense are found not only among privileged, well paid politicians and influential professors. While we need as many supporters in these ranks as possible, the skills and knowledge needed for civilian-based defense are not limited to them.

After reading Paulson's informative and interesting article, my basic question was: Should we work to change the conventions of war so that they can support civilian-based defense? To put it another way, can there ever be a place for civilian-based defense in the framework of a *jus ad bellum* and a *jus in bello* (i.e., laws to start a war and to fight a war), as described in Paulson's article? My first answer is negative. In my

opinion, the existing laws of war can never be a basis for civilian-based defense. But there is also a positive answer: Instead of referring to the questionable rules and regulations of the war conventions, we can look at many other ways to incorporate the rights and duties for a civilian-based defense in international law.

Laws of War and Civilian-based Defense

To begin with, international law is much more than the laws of war and belligerent occupation. Thus, the title of Paulson's article ("International Law and Civilian-Based Defense: Questions and Observations") is misleading. Because she only examines the Hague and Geneva conventions, it would be more precise to say "Laws of War and Civilian-based Defense." It is often in the interest of belligerents and occupiers to reduce applicable international law to the laws of war and occupation.

There are many reasons why I think that we should not try to modify the conventions of war to accommodate a civilian-based defense. What good would it do to define civilian-based resistance forces as "irregular forces" according to the laws of war? Advocates of a nonviolent defense should promote abolition of regulations that at least indirectly justify war as "the last resort of policy." Such regulations should be replaced by international laws that totally prohibit armed conflicts and promote nonviolent peacekeeping and peacemaking.

First, we must clearly reject the basic principles of the laws of war. The first principle is that once war has begun soldiers are subject to attack at any time. This would contradict the nonviolent approach of civilian-based defense. In the theory of nonviolent defense, enemy soldiers are not seen as having lost their basic right to live. Above all else, the methods and means of civilian-based defense involve understanding, persuading, convincing, or even making friends with the enemy.

The second principle is that noncombatants cannot be attacked at any time. But is that more than a fig leaf to hide the hellishness of war? If we look at the history of wars from ancient times until today, we clearly notice that noncombatants or civilians are not adequately protected during warfare. And new techniques of warfare, which have been more and more designed to save the lives of soldiers, tend to kill more and more civilians indiscriminately and in great numbers and destroy all that they have. It's

naive to believe it is possible to distinguish between soldiers and civilians in any kind of modern warfare, be it nuclear, chemical, or conventional. As an example, we only have to look at the way the armed forces of the United States waged the wars in Korea, in Vietnam, or in the Persian Gulf.

The principle of giving noncombatants protection in the conduct of an armed conflict is subordinated to a *third* principle. It is called "military necessity." It is the right of the belligerents to kill civilians if it is necessary for them to win the war. Through the application of this principle, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the bombing and shelling of Vietnamese villages, and the massive bombardment of Iraq were justified as being in accordance with the war conventions.

Because the principles of the laws of war are subject to such disastrous interpretations, we should not even indirectly give the war conventions any legitimacy in defining what is wrong or right. We must recognize the great gap between the roots of the law of war and the concept of civilian-based defense.

I will just add one more point to this critique of Paulson's argument. In my view, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants fundamentally contradicts civilian-based defense. In theory, civilian-based defense does not know a two-class system of defense. There are not, like in the laws of war, combatants who are free to shoot and civilians who stay out of the fighting. The entire population is supposed to defend itself against aggression. Even if there is a mixed defense that combines nonviolent and civilian elements with armed elements the nonarmed population takes part in the defense.

That's why Paulson wants civilian and nonviolent defenders to be legal in the framework of the laws of war. She tries to better the situation of people using civilian resistance and enhance the possibilities of a civilian-based defense. So far, as Paulson argues, there is little room for nonmilitary defense in the laws of war and most of the time the civilian defenders would be regarded as outlaws and would have little protection if they engaged in civilian resistance.

We have to question the very basis of the laws of war. They are based on the principle of chivalry, meaning that there is some honor in fighting with special honorable means, honorable expedients, and

honorable conduct during armed conflict. The laws of war try to exclude dishonorable means, dishonorable expedients, and dishonorable conduct. However, shouldn't we ask whether there is ever any honor in fighting a war? Shouldn't we reject just war theories? The honor for civilian-based defense is to defend the country without arms.

I agree with Paulson's final remark that we must question the "faulty assumptions evident in current international law—that war is a rationally ordered process." So the conclusion should be: we have to get rid of the international conventions of war. Every war is a crime against humanity. As long as there are wars and armed conflicts, we have better international regulations based on human rights than on the existing war conventions.

The Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an Example

My experiences while studying at Birzeit University/West Bank have strengthened my disinclination for the laws of war. The case of the territories which are occupied by the Israeli Defense Forces can help us to understand what the laws of war and belligerent occupation mean in practice and theory. Moreover, the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) is in my view the best current example of an effective civilian resistance.

First, the laws of war may not have diminished the suffering of the oppressed Palestinians or helped lead to a peaceful settlement. Over the past decades, both Palestinians and Israelis have tried to legitimize their acts by appealing to the laws of war. On the one side, they have been used as a tool against the Palestinians. They have been told that according to the laws of war they must obey the rules of the occupier. The Israeli occupation forces have justified the killings, deportations, and mass arrests by appealing to the rights of the occupier and the duties of the occupied according to the law of belligerent occupation. The Palestinian side, on the other hand, has constantly charged the Israeli side with violation of the rules set up in the conventions of the law of belligerent occupation and has appealed to the duties of the occupier. This quarreling about the interpretation of the laws of war and belligerent occupation has helped to prolong the conflict and even to justify terrible deeds.

At the same time, however, the United Nations, the Palestinian Liberation Organi-

zation, and many human rights organizations have appealed to other international laws which are directly the result of human rights, e.g., the right of self-determination for peoples. UN resolutions referring to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially 242, have the character of international law. To achieve peace, it's lost time, if not counter-productive, to think about the application of the laws of war in this case. However, the civilian resistance of the Palestinians as well as opposition inside Israel—for instance by different organizations of the Israeli peace movements, such as Peace Now, Women in Black, Yesh Gvul, and others—can both be justified by the UN declarations.

Thus, in my opinion, it's useless to discuss whether the Intifada has been in accordance with or in contradiction to the law of belligerent occupation. It is likewise useless to make rules for civilian-based defense within the framework of the war conventions.

Human Rights: The Legal Basis for a Civilian-based Defense

Today, the most important standard of moral conduct for international relations and the organization of societies is human rights. The United Nations and the International Court of Justice are the advocates for human rights and have to take care that they are granted and respected all over the world.

Over the past few years, inside the international community, the conventions of war have been cited less and less. However, there is continuous discussion about the meaning of human rights. The war crimes in former Yugoslavia, for instance, are scarcely being judged by the rules of the Hague or Geneva conventions, but by the standards of human rights. This is a positive development.

Many texts that have the character of international law and are useful for civilian-based defense could be cited. To mention only one: In Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, there is a list of means for the resolution of conflict. All of these are "peaceful" means and are seen in all the basic texts of the United Nations. From there, it is not difficult to draw a line to civilian-based defense. Hence, the task of supporters of civilian-based defense is to present it as a peaceful way of engaging in conflict. We should consider how the concept of civilian-based defense can be used in the main tasks of the United Nations which are—according to "*An Agenda for*

Peace" by Boutros Boutros-Ghali—preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, and postconflict peace building.

Conclusion

I'll finish with a comparison. People inside the conscientious objectors' movement do not try to incorporate the right of conscientious objection or desertion into the conventions of war. However, there have been many efforts to protect these rights through international declarations within the framework of the United Nations or, for instance, the Council of Europe or other international bodies. Similarly, as advocates of a civilian-based defense, we must ground our ideas in the framework of international declarations that are based on human rights.

FURTHER READING

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REBELLIOUS OCCUPIED

POPULATIONS A review of *Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe 1939-1943*. Jacques Semelin, translated by Suzan

Husserl-Kapit. Published by Praeger, Westport, Connecticut. 1993.
Mary Cawte

Mary Cawte is a research assistant in the Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia. She is working with Brian Martin on the project "Science and technology for nonviolent struggle", funded by the Australian Research Council.

For students of civilian-based defence and philosophers of nonviolence, this readable, thoroughly researched book is essential. While many military and diplomatic histories of World War II have been written, there have been few systematic and analytic accounts of the unarmed resistance to Nazi occupation. Semelin's work is even more specific, restricted to "civilian resistance" which he defines as "the spontaneous process of resistance by civilian society using unarmed means, and mobilising either its principal institutions or its people—or both at the same time" and "oriented toward goals that were explicitly 'civilian'" (p.2). Of course in occupied Europe not only was there much overlapping of armed and unarmed resistance, but unarmed action itself intelligence gathering, support of the *maquis* (draft resisters living in the woods), or sabotage of the German war effort, for example—often served military or paramilitary goals. Semelin deliberately limits his field of investigation to autonomous, collective civilian resistance with nonmilitary goals—to preserve the collective identity and fundamental values of the occupied society. It involved both populations and institutions (either state bodies such as the courts or the political administration, or organisations such as churches or unions). Examples of its goals include keeping various institutions beyond the control of the occupying power, protecting people being chased, and so on. (This restriction of the study explains why the historic cases are drawn principally from the period from 1939 to 1943, when armed opposition was still more or less undeveloped.)

In Norway in February 1941, for example, when Hitler's Reichskommissar Terboven authorised the Norwegian Nazi party (led by Quisling) to create an organisation to which all public service professions were to belong, there were protests by unions, groups and other concerned citizens. When Terboven also

attempted to create a New Order in sport, there was a total sports strike, and athletic competition ceased until the end of the war. In May 1941 such protests culminated in a common declaration by 43 professional, cultural, athletic, religious, union, and other associations, protesting against attempts by the Nazi party to control public life. Five of the signatories were arrested at once, some organisations were dissolved by decree, and Nazi members were placed at the head of others. Mass resignations followed, the new leaders found themselves in charge of paper organisations, and the former leaders organised an underground committee (Sivorg) which became the leading civilian resistance organisation, the counterpart of the military resistance (Milorg). As the lawyer editor of one illegal newspaper *Norsk Front* wrote: "The front line is to be found in the mind of every woman and man, in their unquenchable hatred for injustice and in the demand that life shall be lived in accordance with the voice of conscience. It is a front line which ... exists independently of German or English victory" (Gjelsvik, 1979, p. 38).

Although that quotation is not taken from Semelin's book, it epitomises his concept of civilian resistance. His book is replete with similar examples of institutional and popular resistance, and on that count alone would make fascinating reading. But Semelin, in his own words, was "not motivated by historical curiosity alone"; he was "inspired by a profound ethical and strategic questioning about society's capacity for unarmed resistance against aggression from a military occupation or a totalitarian power" (p.1). He wanted "to understand *why* and *how* men and women can accept and engage in unarmed combat against a heavily armed adversary devoid of morality" (p.2).

Most of the research for the book was done while the author was completing a doctorate in contemporary history at the Sorbonne. The work was developed into a book during a postdoctoral fellowship in the Program of Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense in the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, during the directorship of Gene Sharp.

Although Semelin does not see his study as a work of history per se, but rather as historical sociology or political science (p.186), he has some interesting comments on particular historiographic problems, related to knowledge of the facts and the possibility of comparing them. In the first

place, all historians of the resistance have difficulty in getting reliable documents; resisters who survived had soon learnt not to keep journals or make records. Historians of unarmed resistance have a further problem: emphasis on military or paramilitary resistance has resulted in a "bibliographic imbalance", and cases of civilian resistance are mentioned but rarely explored. Secondly, in developing comparative studies, historians walk a fine line between analyses that are either too general or too particular. While each occupied country has a unique history, events must be abstracted from their national context to assess their general relevance. While aware of these methodological problems, Semelin has been able to show the relevance of several key concepts—legitimacy, social cohesion and opinion—which make the bases of civilian resistance more understandable.

According to Semelin, civilian resistance was a "means to dig a trench between military domination, which was the actual state of affairs, and political submission, which was a state of mind" (p.3). In other words, the goal of civilian resistance was to preserve the collective identity and fundamental values of the occupied societies, and finally Semelin invites his reader to examine the values and collective identities of contemporary societies and the implications for their defence.

German objectives in the occupied countries were economic, political and ideological. Despite rhetoric about a new order in Europe and despite racist obsessions, Hitler's prime objective was to win the war, and his immediate concern in the occupied countries was to maintain order and security with minimum interference with the war effort. Usually, help was required from the local administration, either in maintaining civilian life or in repressing opposition. Also of course, industrial resources were pillaged. Either the conquered populations were forced to work for the German war effort, or raw materials, industrial equipment, food and workers were forcibly transferred to Germany.

At the same time, extreme racism was a cornerstone of Nazi policy. In October 1939 the office of "Race and Population", established in 1935, was attached to an Office for the Reinforcement of Germanity directed by Himmler. In Western Europe, ethnic groups like the Scandinavians, perceived as racially close to the Germanic peoples, were to be "reeducated". In Eastern

Europe, the inhabitants, labelled in 1941 as "untermenschen" (subhuman), were to be destroyed or driven out to provide "lebensraum" (living space) for the Aryan master race. An even more sinister racial obsession of the Nazis was the "contamination" of Europe by "international Jewry", and the war eventually enabled earlier threats to eliminate the Jewish race in Europe to become a reality. The systematic extermination of the Jews began in Eastern Europe in 1941 and in Western Europe in 1942. Semelin sees this "industrial plan to eliminate certain categories of civilian populations, principally Jews" as the "defining trait" of Nazism (p.8).

Granted that Nazism was an ideology and not just a political regime, many Nazi partisans and admirers in occupied countries were disappointed to find that they were relegated to minor roles such as organising the propaganda press and hunting out Jews and resisters. In order to exploit the resources of occupied countries, Hitler's immediate goals were to maintain order and public peace with minimal disruption of his overall war effort, and it was not in his interests to place local pro-Nazi political leaders in power.

Sometimes German officials were in direct command of the national administration, as in Norway after King Haakon VII and his government departed for London. Here Reichskommissar Terboven directed an administration containing many pro-Nazi sympathisers. The Netherlands government also fled to London, but in this case the Nazi Dr Seyss-Inquart directed a team of permanent heads of departments remaining in Holland who were recognised by the government in exile. In Denmark the continued presence of a government which (until August 1943) had the support of the administration and of the general population offered propaganda and practical advantages for the Germans. The Danish "policy of negotiation" aimed to avoid active participation in the war and to prevent or delay the introduction of Nazi rule, but it involved a slippery slope of concessions. According to Danish historian Henrik Nissen (1983:p.126), it was neither resistance nor collaboration, nor neutrality in the strict sense of the term. But while the Danish government struggled to preserve independence and integrity, in France the collaborating Vichy government was concerned less with the defence of the national interest than with political conflicts as old as the Dreyfus

affair. Before 1942, the national interest could well be seen as acknowledgement of German supremacy in Europe, in any case.

As Semelin points out in his second chapter, "Which Resistance?", the resistance is a misnomer. Semelin asks further: "Which history of the resistance?". One line of interpretation sees it in the context of the whole war, emphasises sabotage and intelligence, and interprets unarmed demonstrations, for example, as subversion or psychological warfare. Other researchers focus on "institutional resistance", political parties, governments and leaders in exile, and difficulties of administration. Others stress moral and spiritual aspects. These limited approaches are in fact complementary, and are best analysed as "social shifts" through which resistance movements arise, grow and change. The Norwegian writer Tore Gjelsvik, for example, describes the initial confusion and pessimism in Oslo, the King's firm and well founded refusal to abdicate, which was stencilled and circulated, the weakness of the political negotiators and the first stirrings of an organised resistance movement. Meanwhile in the coastal districts of the west and south, intelligence groups were active, and fishing boats and other small vessels sailed to and from Britain, ferrying volunteers, weapons, radio transmitters and so on (Gjelsvik 1979: pp.7-11). Later, Quisling's efforts to form a national government which would make peace with Germany were resisted on many fronts—open resistance in organisations and institutions, illegal establishment of a free press, maintenance funds for public servants, and symbolic actions to isolate the Nazis and Quisling's supporters (Gjelsvik 1979: pp.14-15, and *passim*).

If war is "the pursuit of politics by other means", in the famous words of von Clausewitz, then, as Semelin reminds us, "war is only one of the means of politics" (p. 47). After occupation or military defeat came the struggle for political legitimacy. When Quisling attempted to assume government powers, for example, civil servants in various ministries closed their doors. Furthermore King Haakon refused to recognise Quisling's government. Denied legitimacy by his compatriots, Quisling was dismissed by the Germans. Civilian resistance was based on refusal to collaborate with the occupying power, even though a certain amount of accommodation was necessary. Administrators had to manage, people had to survive; but although the occupier might retain its power, it struggled to keep its legitimacy and authority. Eventually, two societies existed, interwoven with each other, one official and one underground. Daily life provided a series of ditches of noncooperation and bridges of collaboration separating or connecting these two societies.

The struggle for legitimacy was waged within the organisations and institutions of the occupied country. When the Norwegian Nazi

party, trying to secure a political foothold, demanded that teachers give active support to the new authorities and educate their pupils "in the spirit of the new era", the teachers countered with a pledge for teachers throughout the country to take to "remain true to my teaching vocation and my conscience, and ... carry out the decisions relating to my work which are lawfully given by my superiors" (Gjelsvik 1979, p.31).

This declaration provided a pattern for other public servants, and was the first of many nationwide directives (instructions for a definite common attitude in a particular situation), which were to become an effective weapon in the resistance to nazification. "They broke down the isolation of the individual, the dread of standing all alone which was the most important weapon of the Nazi terror" (Gjelsvik 1979, p.32). Semelin devotes a complete chapter to social cohesion, first pointing out that this should not be confused with "ideological control" nor with "political unanimity" and "absence of conflict" (p.64). He uses the concepts of social cohesion and social division to describe "the relative solidity of ties that bind individuals and groups to the heart of a given society" (p.64). Where social consensus was weak, civilian resistance was initially less likely. In France, for example, long-standing internal conflicts before the war led to collaboration and little organised resistance at first. Time was needed for people with common values to "reclaim an identity that transcended the expression of their political divisions" (p.73).

Resistance was always a dynamic phenomenon, and the conduct of the occupying regime itself could increase the cohesion of the occupied society. There was also a close relationship between resistance and "opinion", which Semelin defines as "a society's state of mind" (p.89), in order to distinguish it from normal public opinion, better described in circumstances of occupation as "authorised" or "directed" opinion (p.90). Semelin distinguishes three "circles" of social mobilisation: a narrow circle of organised resistance, a wider circle of occasional accomplices or helping hands, and the much wider circle of opinion favouring resistance and approving or financially supporting its actions. Opinion and resistance were complementary. Without supporting opinion, resistance was doomed to fail; without a resistance movement, opinion could not change the course of events.

Semelin illustrates and develops these concepts of legitimacy, social cohesion and opinion, and systematically applies them in a comprehensive analysis of occupied Europe, including the daunting areas of repression and genocide. For many reasons, collaboration and social dissension were ultimately more dangerous to resistance than violent repression, which could destroy the legitimacy of the occupation, foster social cohesion and fundamentally alter the population's state of mind. In Poland, for

example, the Germans and the Soviets developed very different policies of occupation. In the General Government territories where the Germans did not want collaboration and applied terror indiscriminately, resistance was no more dangerous than obedience. The repression increased social cohesion among the Poles, and mass noncooperation followed. In Soviet occupied Eastern Poland, where there had already been fierce divisions, the Soviets simultaneously encouraged collaboration and played on the region's internal divisions to create a context of suspicion, so that large-scale resistance was impossible (Semelin pp. 124-126).

Violence needs to justify itself, and unarmed struggle provided the occupier with less purchase on the situation. The logic of the resistance was the logic of survival, and nonviolent tactics led to less harsh reprisals than did sabotage or armed attacks on German soldiers. When repression occurred, opinion could undermine the political unity of the occupier, magnifying the internal contradictions in their camp.

Semelin's chapter on genocide, "the most serious syndrome of the worst disease of mankind: violence" (p.154), asks why the "final solution" was limited and even prevented in certain countries. Thus in Denmark 5% of the Jews were killed, and in Norway and Belgium 50%. Semelin identifies three protective screens between the persecutors and their victims: the screen of state, the screen of opinion and the screen of social networks. In Denmark, for example, these three protective screens were present at the same time, and the rescue of the Danish Jews became one of the most remarkable events of the war.

In his final chapters Semelin moves from resistance to defence, via a consideration of the effectiveness of the European resistance movements. "Which role for which results?" he asks, and warns against attempts to "militarise" the resistance phenomenon. The logic of civilian resistance was not the logic of war; it was the logic of survival. It aimed not to defeat the occupier—this was not possible—but to preserve values and to thwart the occupier, while awaiting the final outcome of the war. Semelin provides a wealth of examples in his classification of effectiveness as direct, indirect and dissuasive. And while charting its ebb and flow, outlining its limitations and avoiding exaggerated claims, this history demonstrates that noncooperation and civilian resistance played a key role in making the life of the Nazis more difficult, blocking many of Hitler's objectives, hampering his war effort and protecting his victims.

And resistance had to start from scratch. In March 1941, one and a half years after the invasion of Poland, when the head of the underground Polish state and deputy of the government, went to London, he explained that

"the people simply did not know how to behave toward the occupier. Members of all professions—whether doctors, artists, railway employees, city bureaucrats, and others asked how far they should accommodate the occupier and what would be the best ways to resist at their level. They were all on their own... neither in Poland nor elsewhere had civilian resistance ever been thought out as such." (Semelin 1993,p.175) The Dutch government had in 1937 worked out instructions for civil servants in the case of invasion, so that they could best serve the population. Very few copies were distributed, however, possibly because the instructions were too vague to be of much use (Semelin 1993, pp.58-59).

Civilian defence is not a territorial defence; it is a social defence, with the potential to be effective against political domination, economic exploitation or ideological influence. It could deter a potential invader or thwart an actual invader. Governments, having first determined their political and strategic choices, should organise an appropriate defence based on the two principles of paralysing sectors strategic to the invader and protecting sectors vital to the invaded. Defence cannot be limited to tactical options and technical measures, however. Successful mobilisation for social defence requires social cohesion, as Semelin's historical research demonstrates. From the perspective of social defence, struggles against inequalities and injustices and efforts to develop solidarity among social and ethnic groups—worthwhile goals in themselves help to create a "social and political consensus that allows societies to defend themselves" (p.179).

In his foreword, Stanley Hoffmann refers to the margin of manoeuvre available to today's "aggressors, ethnic cleansers and expansionists", and the urgent need to narrow this margin. If the upper limit is the risk of nuclear war, the lower limit is the risk of "having to control a rebellious occupied population, especially when it receives external support" (p.xii). Organised civilian resistance, or social defence, could raise this lower limit and prove a powerful deterrent. Thus Semelin's book is very relevant to current security studies.

References

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- Henrik Nissen 1983 (ed.) *Scandinavia during the Second World War*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Jacques Semelin 1993 *Unarmed Against Hitler*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers ■.

BOOKS FOR SALE ON CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

John Mecartney

What can be done to spread the great idea of civilian-based defense (CBD)? Because war may not end until people see an alternative defense system, it is very urgent that our idea spread. At a recent meeting with the Civilian-based Defense Association (CBDA) board, Gene Sharp suggested our members read more about CBD, get books about CBD into libraries, organize discussion groups in homes, etc., and that we review books on CBD in this magazine. Where can we secure books? John Mecartney, who has sold books on CBD for over ten years, will sell them to you. The retail price to be charged will mean that CBDA will make the profit.

THE BOOKS LISTED BELOW ARE FOR SALE. Make a check out to NANDI or Nonviolent Action for National Defense Institute and send it to NANDI, PO Box 19900, Detroit, MI 48219-0900. NANDI, which promotes CBD, will remit profits to CBDA. All books are paperbacks except Sharp's *Civilian-based Defense: a Post-Military Weapons System*.

- Olgerts Eglitis. *Nonviolent Action in the Liberation of Latvia*, 1993, 72 pp. How Latvians used nonviolent action (1987-1991) to gain independence. \$4.00.
- Harvard University's Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense. *Transforming Struggle*, 1992, 141 large pages. Mostly one-page reports on nine years of the program's Wednesday seminars at Harvard. Includes Gene Sharp, Christopher Kruegler, Mubarak Awad and many others who make a real contribution to

nonviolent theory and practice. A valuable resource. \$10.00.

- Gene Sharp, with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins. *Civilian-based Defense: a Post-military Weapons System*, 1990, 166 pp. Hardcover only. Updated material, good summary of previous works, plus lots of new information and strategies. \$20.00.
- Gene Sharp. "Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal," 16 pp. pamphlet, 1980. The best short introduction to CBD, though in light of the strength of the former Soviet Union. (I have sold 5000 of these.) \$2.00.
- Gene Sharp. *National Security through Civilian-based Defense*, 55 pp., \$4.95. 1970, revised 1985. A general overview with 46 pages of research topics. \$4.95.
- Gene Sharp. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 1973. A revision and expansion of Sharp's Oxford doctoral dissertation. Best seller of Sharp's books. Its 3 parts are available separately:
 - Part 1: *Power and Struggle*, 105 pp. Examines the nature and control of political power and gives past instances of nonviolent action. \$3.95.
 - Part 2: *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 349 pp. How political jiu-jitsu works, communications, methods of nonviolent actions, plus several hundred fascinating examples. \$4.95.
 - Part 3. *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, 450 pp. How to lay the groundwork, what to do when repression occurs, ways to succeed, and how power can be redistributed. \$5.95.
- Gene Sharp with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins. *Self-reliant Defense without Bankruptcy or War*, 1992, 73 pp. An updated statement in light of changes in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union, along with strategies. \$4.00.

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ASSOCIATION NEWS

Paul E. Anders

• Peter Ackerman and CBDA member Christopher Kruegler wrote *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, published by Praeger (Westport, Connecticut: 1994); \$22.95 (paper) and \$55 (cloth). To order toll-free: 800-225-5800. We will publish a review of this important book in our next issue.

• CBDA member and volunteer staff person Klaus Heidegger has written three articles in *ZAM (Zeitschrift für Antimilitarismus)* (journal for antimilitarism), no. 7, 1993: "Von der Pflicht, sich ge5gen die Wehrpflicht zu Wehren, oder: Eine neue Diskussion über Kriegsdienstzwang?" "Abstruses zum Zivildienst zur laufenden Zivildienstdiskussion," and "Fasslabends Wünsche"; publisher's address: ZAM, Schotteng 3a/1/59, 1010 Vienna, Austria.

• CBDA member Roger S. Powers has written "Nonviolent Philosophy/Nonviolent Action: An Appeal for Conceptual Precision," in *Nonviolent Sanctions: News from the Albert Einstein Institution*, Summer 1993, which is published by the Albert Einstein Institution, 50 Church St., Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA.

• Dutch member Giliam de Valk visited the Civilian-based Defense Association when he was in the United States to do research on intelligence needs for civilian-based defense. I was very pleased to hear of his research on the subject in Washington at the National Archives and the National Security Archive.

• The University of Queensland in Australia has accepted member Robert Burrowes's thesis: *The Strategic Theory of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach*, 1993, 435 pp. The author was a member of the Gulf Peace Team, which was camped on the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia during the outbreak of the Gulf War. He is writing a book about the political and strategic lessons the team learned. (Robert J. Burrowes, P.O. Box 167, North Carlton, Victoria 3054, Australia; Email: burrowes@peg.apc.org; telephone: + 61 3 387 3398).

• I gave a three-hour workshop on civilian-based defense (CBD) at Radford University on February 5, attended by twenty-five students and faculty. I spoke briefly about CBD, then organized a simulation on an invasion of Germany in the year 2010 in which Germany was defended by CBD. Three participants played the part of journalists and judges who gave a verdict on who won. The rest split into two groups, attackers and defenders. The inspiration for this type of presentation was David Yaskulka, who conducted many such simulations. (See his article in our August 1993 issue). The university's Spring '94 Honors Program, "The Search for Peace," sponsored the workshop. Professor Glen T. Martin, the

program's faculty coordinator, later wrote, "Everyone that I have heard from since is enthusiastic about the workshop as a learning and thought provoking experience, and about civilian based defense as a new alternative in the search for peace." ■

RECENTLY RECEIVED

Compiled by Paul E. Anders

• Collectif dissuasion civile. *Un vocabulaire pour la Défense Civile (DC)*. Chambéry, France: 1993, pp. 18. Evaluates various terms for civilian resistance, including what seems to be the French term for *civilian-based defense*, i.e., *défense basée sur les civils*.

• De Villeneuve, Bertrand. "Une résistance non-violente face à Milosevic." *Non-violence Actualité*, no. 174, Nov. 1993, pp. 4-5.

• Drago, Antonino. "Le projet national italien pour la défense populaire non-violent." *Alternative Non Violentes*, no. 87 (summer 1993), pp. 61-65.

• "Kosovo Heute." *ZAM (Zeitschrift für Antimilitarismus)*, no. 6, 1993, p. 21.

• Le Meut, Christian. "Ibrahim Rugova." *Non-violence Actualité*, no. 174, Nov. 1993, pp. 6-7.

• "Urgence Kosovo: Un peu d'histoire-géo." *Non-violence Actualité*, no. 174, Nov. 1993, pp. 8-9.

Publishers' Adresses

• Alternative Non Violentes; 16, rue Paul Appell; 42000 Saint-Etienne, France.

• Collectif dissuasion civile, BP 73 017 Chambéry cedex, France.

• *Non-violence Actualité*; 20, rue de Devidet; 45200 Montargis; France. Telephone: 38 93 67 22 FAX: 38 93 74 72

• *ZAM (Zeitschrift für Antimilitarismus)*, Schotteng. 3a/1/59; 1010 Vienna. Telephone: 0222/5359109. FAX: 0222/532 74 16. ■

SCHINDLER AND CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE (A review of the movie Schindler's List)

Paul E. Anders

If civilian-based defense (CBD) does not at first succeed in countering an invasion and an occupation follows, even a brutal and genocidal one, survival tactics could help maintain morale and undermine the opponent. Steven Spielberg's film *Schindler's List* holds lessons for such a

situation. The film is based on a novel by Thomas Keneally.

Seeing this movie was an anguishing experience. The story centers on Oscar Schindler, a historical person. (I have not delved into Schindler's biography and do not know the movie or novel's accuracy.)

Schindler—bon vivant, womanizer, wheeler-dealer industrialist, and Nazi Party member from Czechoslovakia—sets up a factory during World War II in Kraków using Jewish workers provided by the Nazis. Schindler wants to make a lot of money, but as he gets to know his workers and the Nazi atrocities, he has a change of heart. He increasingly helps the Jews and has at his disposal great skills in the way of the world. To this noble enterprise are also dedicated the great mind of his Jewish bookkeeper and the workers' tenacity, courage, and astuteness.

The bulk of the film is set in Poland. When the Nazis decide to transport to Auschwitz the Jews at the camp where Schindler's workers are housed, Schindler engineers their transfer to a facility at his hometown in Czechoslovakia.

This film dramatizes various tactics for those dealing with invaders, especially for pseudocollaborators with invaders. If collaborators have a change of heart, should they consider remaining in their position and using it to undermine the invader? Schindler saved about a thousand Jews by using his contacts to safeguard his workers. What was done against the Holocaust was not CBD, but some of the peaceful means of opposition could be used in CBD.

• Psychology. Schindler may have briefly succeeded in curtailing summary executions of Plaszow labor camp prisoners by the psychopathic commandant Amon Goeth. Schindler told him a little story about how the emperor had shown a superior form of power by pardoning a malefactor. Schindler's consummate persuasiveness would not of course be available to all resisters.

• Threats. Schindler used masterful threats to get his bookkeeper off a train deporting Jews from Cracow. If two soldiers supervising the embarkation onto the train didn't do Schindler's bidding, they would soon find themselves fighting on the Russian front. When an official at Auschwitz threatened Schindler after Schindler offered him a bribe, Schindler refers to his own powerful friends. (The bribe was ultimately accepted and Schindler's female employees were saved from Auschwitz.)

• Religion. Practicing their religion helped some Jews maintain morale. After the slaughter of some work camp inmates, Jewish women held a religious ceremony for them in their barracks.

• Bribery and Gifts. Schindler undermined the Nazi bureaucracy with a prolonged series of bribes to key officials. Schindler cleverly dispensed money, diamonds, and liquor as needed to gain influence. He danced at their parties and schmoozed with them. When Schindler is briefly imprisoned for kissing a Jewish girl who handed him a birthday cake on behalf of his workers, the Nazi commandant defends him. In his review of the movie,

Terrance Rafferty remarks, "The people who work for Schindler are lucky to be under the protection of a man who combines the recklessness of a pirate and the oily mendacity of a confidence man...A Gandhi couldn't have served them nearly so well."

(As a preplanned strategy, I doubt bribes would have a place in CBD. A policy of using bribes might encourage repression to force the oppressed to give bribes.)

• Sabotage. Another tactic is sabotaging production. At a factory Schindler later organized in occupied Czechoslovakia near the end of the war, he and his workers deliberately produced bad munitions for the Germans. This might not be suitable for CBD, which could get more mileage out of fostering trust among the invaders.

For fostering discussion of the tactics for CBD, this fine dramatization has valuable insights. High school and college classes, for example, could well use the film to begin a discussion of such tactics. Another work that comes to mind here is Ira French's *The Eleventh Mayor, A Peace Play* (revised by Mary Eldridge and Dr. John Mecartney), which is more directly educational. The film and play could be advantageously used in tandem. The film could be used to explore how shady dealing might or might not be pragmatically useful in CBD.

Liam Neeson plays the suave Schindler. Ben Kingsley, who played Gandhi in an earlier film, is the adroit bookkeeper; and Ralph Fiennes, the cold blooded Nazi commandant. All are convincing. This three-hour plus film takes its place besides *The Killing Fields* in helping us to glean some wisdom from history's terrible years.

Source: quotation from Terrance Rafferty: "A Man of Transactions." *New Yorker*, Dec. 20, 1993, p. 132. ■

EDITOR'S NOTES

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• It is reported that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has told the Clinton administration that North Korea probably has one or two nuclear bombs (*Boston Globe*, Dec. 27, 1993). Should this be so, nuclear proliferation continues. And if countries continue to pursue a military defense, there will be a tendency for additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons. As a long-term possible solution, countries could explore alternatives to the military such as CBD.

Although some commentators feel that the nuclear weapons threat has receded in the last few years, it may in fact have increased. The growing number of countries that can use nuclear weapons may outweigh the decrease in the total number of nuclear weapons and the ending of the superpower confrontation. Several countries in the former Soviet Union have nuclear weapons, so there are more nuclear buttons with nervous thumbs poised above. And now we may have to add North Korea and its intransigent regime into the equation.

Defense leaders should assess CBD in conjunction with a sober look at the long-term problems of military defense. With enough time

and enough nuclear buttons, the prospects for military defense are not rosy. To end potentially catastrophic nuclear brinkmanship, we need to replace the military with CBD. In particular countries CBD would probably coexist with a military defense until the populations had sufficient confidence in CBD to end reliance on the military. ■

BURUNDI

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overcrowded camps.

Ndadaye, the first Hutu to be elected President, had formed a unity government which included Tutsi members and a woman prime minister, Sylvie Kinigi. Ndadaye said that his election was "the start of an era of a culture of human rights, including political rights, the right to live, and economic and social rights...The true promotion of these rights will cement the unity among the sons and daughters of this nation."

The UN sent James Jonah, special delegate of the Secretary General to Burundi, but in November refused Burundi's urgent appeal to send a peacekeeping mission. The Organization of African Unity has attempted to play a role and humanitarian relief agencies including Medecins sans Frontieres, Oxfam, and the British Actionaid have all been active; but as of late January, Amnesty International accused the world's governments of turning their back on Burundi and called on them to take "urgent action."

Beaudet, who is coordinator of activities at the Centre de Ressources sur la Non-violence in Montreal, was invited to go to Burundi by Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, special representative of the UN Secretary General and long-time diplomat from Mauritius, to participate in a "peace building" effort, organized through the UN Development Program (UNDP). A national conference was held in the capital, Bujumbura, which brought together all significant parties, including four different opposition parties, former President Buyoya (who preceded Ndadaye), the prime minister, most deputies, most NGOs, the embassies, the church and the Burundi human rights organization Iteka. There Beaudet presented his views on the dynamics of the Burundi political situation, the need for stability so that the country can evolve, and the delicate issue of how to prevent another coup. He saw it as a priority for the newly nominated President and the prime minister to establish clear procedures for how the population should behave if there are serious rumors of a coup. If there is a constant threat of a coup in people's minds, it paralyzes them. He put forth the principle

that the only support a legitimate government can rely on is the support of the population. He also focused on the concept and role of nonviolent power.

Beaudet believes that a constructive process of communication has begun, and that it would not have been appropriate to bring in peacekeeping troops or soldiers from the Organization of African Unity. Any intervening party would do best by showing confidence that opponents can solve their conflict. This is not done with weapons. The point now is to prevent violence. Any resort to violence only reinforces polarization, raising peoples' level of fear and feeling of powerlessness. In Burundi the resort to violence has been counterproductive, setting the country back 25 years.

Another consultant invited with Beaudet was Thomas Shaub from the Harvard Program on Negotiation, who focused on the negotiation process. He had lived in Zaire for a number of years.

Beaudet was impressed with this unique UN response, intended perhaps to serve as a pilot project in the prevention of violent conflict and prevention of the kind of situation where "peacemaking" troops would be called for (the last resort). This is also a relatively new situation for UN intervention since the conflict is internal to Burundi (notwithstanding the flow of refugees to neighboring countries). Beaudet sees a serious role for CBD thinking in preventing coups in many African countries.

In the long term, he sees a role for ground-up nonviolent struggle, but right now, in the short term, it is important to prevent excuses for new massacres. There will be continuing visits and efforts. Since reporting on Burundi in the mainstream press has been minimal, we will have to hear more from Normand Beaudet in Montreal, from Amnesty International and other NGOs, and from the UN as to whether this project has proved to be an effective alternative to intervention as we have come to know it in Somalia, Bosnia, and other disaster zones.

Note. My source for Ndadaye's quotation is from an article "Burundi, a Democracy Gone Awry: Is the Power Struggle in Burundi Really about 'Tribalism'?" by Ezekial Pajibo of the Africa Faith and Justice Network (on PeaceNet conference Africa.news). ■

EDITOR'S NOTES

Paul E. Anders

• A current rationale for the military is that it is needed for peacekeeping operations in places like Bosnia, Somalia, and Cambodia. If a nation uses the military for such endeavors rather than nonviolent tactics, the same forces can be used to defend their own country. Such a regimen does not promote civilian-based defense (CBD). Why bother with CBD if we can leave defense issues to the military? A plan for dealing with the Somalias and Bosnias without the military thus fosters a regimen conducive to CBD. Besides, if institutions were in place to deal nonviolently with such foreign conflicts, they could serve their own countries if there was an invasion or coup. I am thus pleased to have in this issue an article by Klaus Heidegger on Global Peace Service. As Phillips Moulton wrote in a previous issue regard Global Peace Service and advocates of CBD, "the two movements may find areas of mutual support in bring nonviolent methods to bear on violent situations" (Dec. 1992, p. 2).

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BURUNDI: PREVENTING ANOTHER COUP

Suzanne Pearce

Suzanne Pearce is coordinator of the Massachusetts chapter of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security and a member of the board of directors of the Civilian-based Defense Association. She interviewed Normand Beaudet in early February

When do principles of civilian-based defense become useful in an urgent political and humanitarian crisis? CBDA's board member Normand Beaudet returned from Burundi in late January, where he may have played a very beneficial role.

On October 21, 1993, Burundi's first President to be democratically elected since independence in 1962, Melchior Ndadaye, was overthrown and executed in an army-led coup d'état, which subsequently failed. It is difficult for humanitarian organizations to evaluate the scale of the killings and dislocation of people since then, but according to Beaudet an estimated fifty to a hundred thousand people have been killed in the ensuing fighting between two ethnic groups—the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi, who have traditionally held greater political and economic power. According to an Amnesty International report, an estimated one million people have been dislocated—three-quarters of them, mostly Hutus, fleeing into neighboring Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania. There is a massive crisis of disease and starvation in the

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