

Civilian-based Defense

AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE DETERRENT

Volume 8 • December 1992 • Number 2 • \$3.00 Single Issue

IN THIS ISSUE

Editor's Note	1
Global Peace Service and Civilian-based Defense <i>Phillips P. Moulton</i>	1
An Anti-coup Defense: Prerequisite for a Lasting Democracy <i>Gene Sharp</i>	1
Prospects for Civilian-based Defense for Canada: Continuing the Discussion from the 1991 CBDA Conference <i>George H. Crowell</i>	2
Could Nonviolent Action Have Prevented the Nazi Holocaust? A review of "Dissent in Nazi Germany" by <i>Nathan Stoltzfus</i> <i>John Mecartney</i>	6
Around the World • Belgium • Ecuador • North America	8
Events	9
Association News	11
Recently Received	12

EDITOR'S NOTE

Thanks to all who responded to our August appeal. We are extremely grateful to Alta Hier of Imperial, Nebraska, from whose estate the Association has received a generous bequest. Special thanks to CBDA directors Melvin Beckman and John Mecartney, who have assisted with fund raising.

- Please send us new books and articles that deal at least in part with civilian-based defense. We'll put a notice about them in our "Recently Received" section.
- Need a New Years resolution? Write an article about civilian-based defense and send it to us. Include photographs if possible.

GLOBAL PEACE SERVICE AND CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

Phillips P. Moulton

Mass slaughter is an integral part of modern war. The only way to avoid the slaughter is to abolish war. Nations do not abolish war because they perceived that it has certain valued functions. It follows that war can be abolished only when credible alternatives are available to perform those functions.

The major function of the armed forces is generally seen to be defending the nation. In small vulnerable countries like Lithuania, the need for defense is obvious; but sooner or later leaders of practically every country feel threatened by an aggressor. Therein lies the value of civilian-based defense. As Gene Sharp has declared: "It is now clear that societies can be defended successfully...by nonviolent noncooperation and defiance."

Although national defense is generally considered paramount, the war system also performs other functions. The best way to render war obsolete would be to identify those of its functions that are not harmful per se and adopt alternative methods of fulfilling them. Hence advocates of civilian-based defense should welcome and cooperate with groups seeking to do this. The more a climate conducive to peace is created—in education, business, scientific research, international law, and world trade—the likelier it is that civilian-based defense will be adopted and effective.

Two functions of the war system with some positive aspects are that it provides employment in armed forces and defense industries, and opportunities for peak experiences involving courage, endurance, and self-sacrifice. The need for alternative ways to experience such values was stressed in 1910 by William James in his classic essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War." In 1982 Gene Keyes published an excellent survey of the types of unarmed service military forces perform (in "Force Without Firepower," 28 pp., World Without War Council).

To provide a vehicle for this type of action, twenty people from ten countries formed the nucleus of the Global Peace Service in 1989. It has begun to train international teams for nonviolent service in such fields as education, struggle for justice and human rights, resettlement of refugees, situations of social tension, and areas of natural disaster.

The relevance of Global Peace Service to the current scene in the United States is highlighted by the priority President Clinton is giving to a National Service Program. The Ford Foundation estimates that some 3,500,000 job slots could be filled by program participants. Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, strongly endorses the program, stressing its potential in education, health care, and child day care.

One goal of Global Peace Service is to participate in national civilian-based defense efforts. A founder of the movement, Margareta Ingelstam, has several times visited Lithuania, by invitation of the defense minister, to explore its relevance there. She worked with representatives of the Albert Einstein Institution at the conference "The Relevance of Civilian-based Defense for the Baltic States" in Vilnius in June 1992. As an

Phillips P. Moulton, author of Ammunition for Peacemakers, was recently a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan, where he was a member of the Military Study Group.

Editor's note: To contact the World Without War Council, phone (312) 663-4250. For details on the Baltic Civilian-based Defense Mutual Aid Treaty, see Roger S. Powers, "Baltic Defense Officials Consider Civilian-based Defense at Vilnius Conference," *Civilian-based Defense: News and Opinion*, August 1992, p. 1.

international project, Global Peace Service is in a position to assist in developing the Baltic Civilian-Based Defense Mutual Aid Treaty.

Although Global Peace Service is still in its nascent stage, advocates of civilian-based defense should be aware of it as an idea whose time appears to have come. In the years ahead, the two movements may find areas of mutual support in bringing nonviolent methods to bear on violent situations. (Further details on Global Peace Service can be secured from Mary Evelyn Jegen, SND, Mount Notre Dame, 701 E. Columbia Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio 45215, USA.) ■

AN ANTI-COUP DEFENSE: PREREQUISITE FOR A LASTING DEMOCRACY

*A lecture in the Faculty of
Political Science at Thammasat
University, Bangkok, Thailand,
5 November 1992*

Gene Sharp

INTRODUCTION

Supporters of political democracy and social justice have good reasons to be alarmed about coups d'état. Coups have overthrown established constitutional democratic systems of government, halted movements toward greater democracy, and stopped progress toward social justice. Coups d'état are one of the main ways in which new dictatorships are established. Coups are a major unsolved defense problem.

Coups d'état have taken place in dozens of countries in nearly every region of the world in recent decades. Coups have been most often conducted by sections of the military forces, often acting alone or in alliance with other groups. Sometimes coups have been executive usurpations: an established president or prime minister, for example, falsely claiming an emergency, acts to

Gene Sharp is Senior Scholar in Residence, Albert Einstein Institution. Copyright by Gene Sharp 1992. He is grateful for the assistance of Bruce Jenkins in the preparation of this text. All requests for permission to reprint or translate this lecture should be addressed to Gene Sharp, Albert Einstein Institution, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA.

establish a dictatorship. Sometimes coups have been made by a dictatorial political party, with or without its own paramilitary forces.

When coups have occurred, supporters of political freedom have often been silent and have passively submitted. They often did not know what else to do, as the usual constitutional procedures are useless against those prepared to violate them. The possibility of launching a civil war against the military forces and their allies—a war which democrats would certainly lose—has inspired few.

Without serious anti-coup preparations, a lasting democratic system is very doubtful, especially in countries with a history of coups. This is true regardless of the current political situation and public statements of innocent intentions by the groups which are able to attempt a coup.

COUPS HAVE BEEN DEFEATED, AND THEREFORE CAN BE DEFEATED

Despite devastating conditions, civilians have at times been able to block illegal seizures of state power.

The defeat of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 is the most recent case. Prominent earlier similar cases of successful anti-coup defense occurred in Germany in 1920 against the Kapp Putsch (which threatened the new Weimar Republic) and in France in 1961 against the Algiers generals' revolt (which aimed to keep Algeria French by ousting the de Gaulle-Debré government). In these three cases, and a few others, the coups were blocked by internal nonviolent resistance. Only occasionally has serious supportive international diplomatic and economic action been threatened or taken. However, as the current case in Haiti suggests, successful defense against coups primarily depends on noncooperation and defiance within the attacked country, not on foreign opposition.

These examples of successful anti-coup defense *prove that coups can be defeated*—without civil war. Anti-coup defense can be waged by the attacked society itself.

ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL CAN BE BLOCKED

In a coup d'état, the seizure of government buildings, transportation and communication centers, and key geographical points, and even the arrest and execution of government officials, are not done for their own sake. Rather, the purpose of those seizures is to

control the state apparatus, and hence the country as a whole.

The putschists must secure that broad control if the coup is to be successful.

A coup does not immediately give the putschists the control they need, however. They will not initially control the population, political, economic, or social organizations, or governmental structures, nor even all of the military forces and the police. The need to consolidate control—and the time it takes to effect this—makes an effective defense by the society possible.

THE PUTSCHISTS REQUIRE...

Immediately after the coup is started, the putschists require legitimacy, that is, acceptance of their moral and political right, or authority, to rule. Endorsements by moral and religious leaders, respected political personages, and in some cases royalty or past officials, will help them to gain that acceptance.

The first basic principle of anti-coup defense is therefore to deny legitimacy to the putschists.

The putschists also require that the civilian leaders and population be either supportive, confused, or just passive.

The putschists require the cooperation of specialists and advisors, bureaucrats and civil servants, administrators and judges to consolidate their control over the affected society. Journalists and broadcasters, printers and technicians, will be required to do as they are told.

Police, prison officials, and soldiers will be required to follow orders to make arrests, jail protesters, impose repression, and execute people as commanded. The putschists also require that a multitude of people who operate the political system, the society's institutions, and the economy will passively submit and carry out their usual functions as modified by the putschists' orders and policies. The putschists require that their control of the state apparatus be accepted by the persons and institutions of the society and government in whom moral and legitimate political authority reside, whether they be elected officials, unofficial moral leaders, or royalty.

THE PUTSCHISTS' REQUIREMENTS MAY BE DENIED

Legitimacy and cooperation are, however, not automatic. They may be jeopardized by repudiation, noncooperation, and defiance.

Even moderate opposition may force the

attackers to make significant efforts to seek the needed acceptance, cooperation, and support. Strong, determined, and widespread rejection of the coup d'état by the society can block the putschists' objectives and thereby defeat the coup.

The second basic principle of anti-coup defense is to resist the putschists with noncooperation and defiance. If both legitimacy and cooperation are denied, the putsch may die of political starvation.

Anti-coup defense by an assertive citizenry can be greatly strengthened by specific preparations and guidelines. These guidelines would aim to prepare the citizenry and social institutions to offer collective resistance to any coup.

What steps can be taken in this direction? Among them are:

- Governments and other societal institutions can adopt a "civilian-based defense" policy to deter and defeat coups d'état, that is, prepared noncooperation and defiance against such attacks.
- Laws can be enacted making it a legal obligation of all citizens to refuse to obey, serve, or collaborate with any unconstitutional seizure of the state apparatus. This should be accompanied by a national campaign to educate the whole population on this principle.
- Legal and constitutional provisions can be adopted making it an obligation of all elected, appointed, and hereditary government personnel to refuse to recognize all persons and groups which have attempted to seize control of the government by a coup d'état.
- Specific obligations and guidelines for anti-coup resistance would be developed for and by civil servants, media staff, communications operators, police, military forces, and employees of local, regional, and provincial governments.

THE CIVILIAN DEFENDERS' AIMS:

In a powerful anti-coup defense, the population would prevent the attackers' control of the state apparatus and the country by massive and selective noncooperation, while maintaining their support for the legal government and its call to resist.

Under such a policy the civilian defenders will aim to:

- Repudiate the putschists as illegitimate with no rightful claim to become the government
- Make the attacked society unrulable by the attackers

- Block the imposition of viable government by the putschists
- Maintain control and self-direction of their own society
- Make the institutions of the society into omnipresent resistance organizations against a coup
- Deny to the putschists any additional objective beyond political control
- Make the costs of the attack and attempted domination unacceptable
- Subvert the reliability and loyalty of the putschists' troops and functionaries and induce them to desert their mutinous officers
- Encourage dissension and opposition among the putschists' supporters
- Stimulate international opposition to the coup by diplomatic, economic, and public opinion pressures against the attackers
- Achieve international support in communications, finances, food, diplomacy, and other resources.

DIRECT DEFENSE OF THE SOCIETY, NOT BUILDINGS

This anti-coup policy, it should be noted, is focused on defense of the society by the society itself, not on defense of points of geography or even governmental buildings. Those points of geography or buildings are ultimately important to coup leaders only when possession of them is accompanied by the assistance of related people and institutions. Control of a parliament building itself gives no control over the actual members of parliament or over the population as a whole that believes in parliamentary government.

The priorities of action here are crucial. Insistence on abiding by constitutional procedures or the maintenance of a free press, for example, are of more direct importance to democracy than possession of a given street intersection or building.

It is of course true that on occasion certain sites and buildings have a special symbolic importance. In 1991, for example, both the Lithuanian parliament building and the Russian "White House" were so protected by people power. One should not generalize too widely from these two cases, however.

If the putschists are uncertain of their own intentions and methods, or if their troops are unwilling to kill many of the defenders, then a defense by human barricades may be successful. However, a serious danger exists in attempts to defend key buildings or other sites by human barricades. If, despite the

defenders' efforts, the building is successfully seized by the putschists, the defenders and general population may become unjustifiably demoralized. The defenders may then believe, not that only the parliament *building* has been seized, but that *parliament itself* has been destroyed. The defenders and population may believe that the mere physical occupation of the former government headquarters has put the putschists in control. Such a situation must be avoided.

TRANSPARTISAN ACCEPTANCE AND PARTICIPATION

Both prior to and following adoption of the civilian-based anti-coup policy, a widespread education program and public discussions should take place about the potential of the policy and the broad guidelines for its implementation.

While support for anti-coup defense should not be expected from the clique intent on conducting a coup, the consideration and adoption of an anti-coup defense policy will be strengthened if it receives widespread consideration, support, and participation from persons and groups with various political opinions. They need only agree that changes of government should take place by constitutionally determined procedures and not by coups d'état backed by threat or use of military might. Given that type of support, the anti-coup policy will likely be stronger and more united.

RESISTANCE: GENERAL AND ORGANIZED

Strategies of anti-coup defense might be grouped initially into two broad categories, *general* and *organized*.

Well in advance of an attack, a number of key points would be selected and identified to the general population as points at which the population should resist, even in the absence of any specific instructions from a leadership group. This type of resistance is called *general resistance*.

These points might include, for example, attempts to replace constitutional officials with new personnel or to turn elected officials into dictatorial usurpers, efforts to promote the attackers' regime as legitimate, attempts to remake or abolish the elected legislature, measures to remake the courts or impose a new constitution, abridgements of the freedom of speech and religion, and efforts to control the society's independent institutions.

Infringement by the attackers on any of

these points would be the population's signal to resist, even if communications from the legitimate officials or the initial defense leaders have been blocked or they have been arrested or executed.

In *organized resistance* the defenders act in accordance with specific instructions from a leadership group, such as officials of the legitimate government or representatives of voluntary organizations (educational, civic, labor, religious, political, and others).

Organized resistance would supplement, not replace, general resistance. Often, organized resistance would consist of acts which focus on a specific event or occur in a specific place or at a designated time. Such resistance may take the form of specific acts of symbolic protests or resistance, of which there are dozens of possible types.

THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGY

The general technique which has been most effective in anti-coup defense is nonviolent struggle. This avoids fighting the putschists with military weapons, with which the usurpers usually have the advantage. The nonviolent technique also maximizes the power of the defenders, vastly increases the possible number of resisters over those able and willing to use violence, and very importantly helps to undermine the morale and reliability of the putschists' soldiers.

The weapons, or methods, of nonviolent struggle applied in civilian-based defense—such as strikes, boycotts, types of political noncooperation, and mutiny—are not to be applied randomly. These methods should not be selected in accordance with the whims of individuals or in response to incidental events, nor should they be applied in a hodgepodge, improvised, or intuitive way. These methods instead will be most effective if they are applied as component parts of a comprehensive, carefully chosen strategy of anti-coup defense.

Strategies for anti-coup defense need to be planned with much thought and extreme care. The strategies need to draw upon the best available resources about strategic principles. They also need to be based on knowledge of nonviolent struggle, the dynamics of coups, the particular conflict situation, and the strengths and weaknesses of both the defending population and the putschists.

GUIDELINES FOR ANTI-COUP DEFENSE

Specific guidelines for anti-coup general

resistance against coups can be formulated which would constitute basic elements for an effective anti-coup strategy and would also be specific instructions on how to resist.

They could include the following:

- Repudiate the coup and denounce its leaders as illegitimate, meriting only rejection as a government.
- Moral, political, and religious leaders; officials; and members in all of the society's institutions (including education, the media, and communications) should denounce the putschists.
- Refuse to give any legitimacy to the putschists by any means, including efforts to negotiate a compromise between them and the legitimate political leaders.
- Regard all decrees and orders from the putschists contradicting established law as illegal, and disobey them.
- Keep all resistance strictly nonviolent in order to make the anti-coup defense the most effective possible.
- Refuse to be provoked into violent or otherwise imprudent action.
- Refuse and disobey all attempts by the putschists to establish and extend controls over the governmental apparatus and society.
- Noncooperate with the putschists in all ways. This would apply to the general population; all political leaders and all branches of the central (or federal), state, regional, and local governments, including civil servants and bureaucrats; key occupational and professional groups; media and communications workers; all staff of transportation systems; the police; members and units of the military forces; all judges and employees of the judicial system; the staffs of all financial institutions, both governmental and private; and officers and members of all other institutions of the society.
- Persist in maintaining the pre-coup operations of the society in accordance with the pre-attack constitution, laws, and policies. This should be continued until and unless the defenders are physically removed from their work places, offices, and activity centers. Even then as far as possible, continue normal operations from other locations. This would apply especially to officials and employees of all branches, departments and levels of government.
- Preserve the functioning of legitimate

political and social organizations.

Create backup organizations which may need to assume the functions of organizations attacked or closed down by the putschists.

- Refuse to supply vital information to the putschists and their helpers. Remove road signs, street names, traffic signs, house numbers, etc., when appropriate to stall the putschists' activities and protect people from arrest.
- Refuse to supply the putschists with needed supplies and equipment, hiding them when appropriate.
- Engage in friendly "creative communication" with the functionaries and troops serving the putschists while continuing resistance. Explain to them the reasons for the defense struggle, affirm the absence of any intended violence against them, seek to undermine their reliability, and try to induce them to be helpful to the defenders or even to desert the putschists and join the defenders nonviolent defense. Both de Gaulle's appeal to French soldiers in 1961 and the appeals of the popular resisters in Moscow in 1991 to soldiers and tank crews were of this type.
- Refuse to assist the putschists in propaganda dissemination.
- Document in writing, sound, and film the putschists' activities and repression. Preserve the documentation and also distribute the information widely to the defenders, internationally, and to the putschists' supporters.

OTHER TYPES OF PREPARATIONS

Besides preparation and dissemination of such general guidelines for anti-coup resistance, several other types of preparations for defense are possible. Provisions and equipment would be required for communications after the putschists had occupied key centers and seized facilities of established newspapers and radio and television stations. Publishing and broadcasting equipment for underground newspapers, resistance leaflets, and underground radio could be obtained and hidden for use in emergencies.

TREATMENT OF THE USURPERS' TROOPS AND FUNCTIONARIES

In response to the initial putsch, the defenders would attempt to communicate with and to warn the putschists, their functionaries, and their troops about the population's hostility to the attack. Words and symbolic actions

would be used to communicate the will to resist, to show the type of defense which would be waged, and to urge the putschists to withdraw.

Efforts would be made at all phases of the putsch to undermine the loyalty of the putschists' individual soldiers and functionaries. The soldiers would initially be informed that there will be resistance but that the resistance will be of a special type. In this resistance, the defense would indeed be directed against the putschists' attempt to seize control but would be conducted without harming them as individuals. Strong resistance without personal threat or violence may, at least among some soldiers, create or aggravate morale problems.

There can be no guarantee, however, that the putschists' troops will be favorably affected, especially in the short run. They may still perpetrate brutalities and kill non-violent resisters. Such tragedies do not, however, mean the failure of the resistance. Instead, given continued, disciplined resistance, brutalities can weaken the putschists and strengthen the defense struggle. The shock effect of the brutalities can at times increase the numbers of resisters and strengthen their determination, sow doubts and reservations in the minds of the putschists' troops and other supporters, and arouse stronger international opposition to the coup.

FACING ATTACK: A FIRST STRATEGY OF REPUDIATION AND REJECTION

In the first hours, days, and weeks after a coup d'état is attempted, it is extremely important to take quick and solid action to block the putschists from establishing effective control over the state apparatus and the society. That strategy would combine repudiation of claims to legitimacy and refusal of cooperation and total or near total noncooperation with the putschists. An early defeat of the coup would make unnecessary a later long-term struggle with an entrenched and therefore much stronger oppressive regime.

Because coup attempts are generally at their weakest point in the first hours and days, it is vital that anti-coup defenders undertake immediate and resolute action against the attackers. The defense must be broad and deep enough in the society to constitute a resolute repudiation of the putschists. The attackers' appeals for national unity (supporting them) and to allow

them time to prove their good intentions must be dismissed.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Sometimes international support can be influential in assisting anti-coup struggles. Some of it can be planned in advance. By advance international arrangements or independent decisions, other governments could refuse diplomatic recognition of the putschists and declare a prohibition on economic aid, as the United States and other countries did in reaction to the 1991 Soviet coup attempt. Such governments and societies could also provide technical and economic assistance; publishing, radio, and television services; and telecommunications support to the civilian defenders.

The nonviolent and defiant character of the "people power" resistance may stimulate much international publicity and sympathy. At times that may lead to diplomatic and international economic pressures against the putschists.

However, there should be no romanticism that international public opinion or even international diplomatic and economic pressure can defeat a coup without determined and strong defense by the attacked society itself.

DEFYING REPRESSION AND INTIMIDATION

Putschists facing strong and well prepared anti-coup defense are likely to be seriously threatened and therefore may respond with repression. However, *in themselves* the repressive measures are not decisive unless they invoke fear and submissiveness in the defenders. In fact, the opponents' repression is evidence of the power of the nonviolent struggle and is no more reason for despair than if, in a military war, the enemy shoots back, wounding and killing one's own soldiers.

Nonviolent defiance often risks serious casualties, but it seems to produce *far fewer* casualties than when both sides use violence. At the same time, persistence in nonviolent struggle contributes to much greater chance for success than if the resisters had chosen to fight a militarily prepared opponent with violence.

THE IMPORTANCE OF NONVIOLENT DISCIPLINE

Recognizing that violence undermines the dynamics and strength of nonviolent resistance, the putschists may often deliberately

seek to provoke the resisters to use violence. Violence or violent intentions may be falsely attributed to resisters. Repression, particularly brutal repression, may be intended to provoke the resisters into a violent response. At other times, *agents provocateurs* are placed within resistance groups to instigate or even commit acts of violence in order to support the charge that the resisters are using violence. All these provocations must be resisted if the defenders do not want to undermine their own defense.

Maintenance of *nonviolent* resistant behavior by the anti-coup defenders is likely to contribute to (1) winning sympathy and support, (2) reducing casualties, (3) inducing disaffection and mutiny of the opponent's troops, and (4) attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle. Nonviolent discipline is a key factor in achieving these aims.

A DURABLE VICTORY

Victory with this anti-coup policy will come only to those who have developed it into a refined and powerful political tool operating with a wise strategy. Defeat of the civilian defenders is always possible, just as defeat occurs in traditional war. However, there are strong signs that a determined people will have far greater chances of achieving success with this type of a civilian-based anti-coup policy than with a military struggle, and that with fewer casualties and less destruction. Great care will then be needed in the transition back to the constitutional system, especially if former political leaders have been killed by the putschists.

If the civilian defenders maintain their discipline and persist despite repression, and if they involve significant sections of the populace, the putschists' drive to achieve their aims can be frustrated and finally blocked.

When a society is known to have a well prepared anti-coup defense, would-be usurpers anticipating at best a very hard struggle and at worst an ignominious defeat may well never even attempt a coup. The civilian-based anti-coup defense thereby can have a deterrent effect.

This policy is a creative defense based on the power of people even in grave crises to become, and remain, the masters of their own destinies. The consequences of this could be profound for Thailand and for the world. ■

PROSPECTS FOR CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE IN CANADA: CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION FROM THE 1991 CBDA CONFERENCE

George H. Crowell

The conference on civilian-based defense (CBD) which took place in Windsor, Ontario, September 6-8, 1991, was, as far as we know, the first major conference on this topic to be held in Canada. We who planned the conference hoped that it might help to stimulate further discussion, exploration, and perhaps even some initial steps toward implementation of CBD here in Canada. We chose Gene Sharp as our keynote speaker because he is, in the judgment of many, the world's leading scholar of CBD. We chose as respondents prominent Canadians who have played key roles in the Canadian defense system and in the debate concerning defense policy.

While we do not know to what extent the conference has stimulated consideration of CBD for Canada, publication in the October 1992 issue of *Civilian-based Defense* of Gene Sharp's keynote address along with the comments of the respondents offers an opportunity for extending the discussion.

It was gratifying to note that each of the respondents saw considerable promise in CBD. Even Gwynne Dyer, the Canadian journalist, who stressed his view of the limitations of CBD, saw the relevance and effectiveness of nonviolent struggle against military coups, an integral dimension of CBD. There are numerous points raised by the respondents which invite comment, but there is one in particular that I shall address, and in light of which I shall refer to others.

John Brewin, a member of the Canadian Parliament, appeared to affirm strongly the value of CBD when he said "Of course we should turn to the ideas of civilian-based defense." But the impact of this comment was essentially nullified by the context in which he placed it. Here are his remarks in context: "I do not believe our country ought to spend time preparing even a civilian-based defense against a hypothetical American invasion. If ever our policy makers reach the

conclusion there is a serious threat from the United States, then of course we should turn to the ideas of civilian-based defense. Meanwhile I think our relations with the United States are such that it is not a relevant consideration." The implication, if not the intent, of Brewin's remarks is that there is no need for Canada to develop a capacity for CBD at this time, although he acknowledged that there might be a need some time in the future.

One of the key characteristics of CBD, however, is that it involves thorough advance preparation. Past experiences of nonviolent struggle against external invasion, notably the resistance by German people against the French and Belgian invasion of the Ruhr area of Germany in 1923, have sprung up spontaneously with no advance preparation, and therefore are not really cases of CBD, although they indicate something of the impressive potentiality for CBD. Supporters of CBD are confident that thorough advance preparations can greatly enhance the probability of success in nonviolent struggles against external invasion.

History is unfortunately full of nasty surprises, including unexpected invasions and military coups. Once an invasion or a military coup has occurred, it is obviously rather late for preparations. There is no defense which can assure immunity from injuries and suffering in case an invasion should occur or in case of a military coup. But it is the view of the Civilian-based Defense Association that CBD offers Canada the possibility for a more effective and less expensive defense against these disasters, with likelihood of fewer injuries and fatalities, than its present military system, which offers little or no protection against military coups and only very limited protection in case of invasion.

It is certainly not possible to deal fully with such far-reaching claims here. But we can attempt to deal with the question whether Canada might benefit from beginning to explore the possibility of developing a capacity for CBD. First, however, it might be useful to consider how CBD might be initiated here in Canada. With some conception of this process, we would be in a better position to conceive the prospect that CBD could modify Canada's defense system to

make it more effective in meeting the nation's security needs.

INITIATING CBD IN CANADA

The first steps in developing CBD for Canada, or any other nation, can be quite modest. No advance commitment to the full development of CBD is necessary. All that is required initially is a commitment to *explore* the possibility of CBD, preferably with some modest support from the government. Among the key participants in this initial decision should be the nation's military command structure. Judging by General Don Macnamara's remarks, top military officers, who presently bear extremely heavy responsibility for national defense, might welcome the prospect of sharing this burden with the civilian population, as would be the case with CBD.

It should be recognized that the concept of CBD, which is based on realistic recognition of the extraordinary power of nonviolent struggle, is not widely understood. It runs counter to prevailing assumptions regarding the necessity for violence which have become deeply rooted in human cultures virtually all over the world. If the prospects for CBD are not to be rejected summarily, and if they are to have a fair chance to be considered seriously, people need to become aware of the impressive history of nonviolent action, not only in the area of national defense, but also in other areas of human conflict. They need to learn about the realistic theory of power on which nonviolent action is based, and they need to see evidence of its validity. They need information about the enormous variety of creative, nonviolent actions that human beings have devised in widely differing types of conflict situations. They need to become aware of the amazing ability of ordinary people to overcome their fears in the face of brutal repression, drawing upon little-known resources of courage. They need the knowledge that the power of nonviolent action has been demonstrated on numerous occasions even in the face of ruthless brutality. They need access to such information, along with awareness of cases where nonviolent struggle has been used effectively against invasions, occupations, and military coups. They need

George H. Crowell teaches in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada. His specialty is social ethics. His article "Nonviolent National Defense—Canada" appeared in the September 1989 issue of this magazine.

to know that a number of nations, notably and most recently the Baltic states and Thailand, have taken significant steps toward incorporating CBD into their official preparations for defense.

With adequate government support, such information could, over the course of several years, become widely disseminated and discussed throughout the military and police establishments, as well as in universities, colleges, and schools. The media could be enlisted in the effort to make information available, and to accommodate debate concerning the issue. Handbooks could be prepared providing essential information on CBD for every household. The effort to disseminate information should be integrally connected with the development of a capacity for research concerning CBD.

It is unlikely at present that such a process providing for evaluation of the prospects for CBD could move ahead rapidly. Indeed it should not be moved ahead until sufficiently competent personnel to spearhead the effort had been enlisted. But the Canadian government, as a minimal first step toward serious consideration and possible development of a capacity for CBD, could, with a small investment, establish a modest research and information center which could begin to make the concept known in Canada, especially in governmental circles which would ultimately be responsible for implementing any decision to establish CBD.

POTENTIALITIES FOR CBD TO ENHANCE CANADA'S SECURITY

Just as communities maintain fire departments to be prepared for the emergencies created by fire, so nations maintain military systems to be prepared to cope with the emergencies created by invasions. It is difficult for Canadians to imagine that our nation might be in danger of invasion. Since few Canadians are worried, few pay close attention to the nation's military policy. But, especially in this time of reductions in government spending to meet social needs, we should be asking whether Canada is getting good security value for its defense spending.

The current year's defense budget of \$12.856 billion, which is about the same in constant dollars as it has been since 1987-88, more than 40% higher than in 1980-81, and more than 50% higher than in 1970-71, is not small. It ranks ninth in the world. The Canadian military has been using its funding largely to remain prepared to support NATO

actions in Europe and to develop an "Expeditionary Brigade Group" capable of military interventions in distant parts of the world. Canada continues to subordinate its military system largely to that of the United States, even in this post-Cold War period. It is on the verge of spending \$4.4 billion to acquire 50 submarine-hunting helicopters. It is difficult to conceive how these activities contribute to Canadian security.

While the Canadian military has sophisticated, modern equipment, its small force, which will decline to 75,000 by 1996, is woefully inadequate to repel a major invasion. If this is not its primary purpose, why do we maintain it? What has our expenditure of more than \$12 billion per year to do with our security? Few Canadians would object to maintaining peacekeeping forces, capability for coastal and air patrol, and search-and-rescue missions. But why should we invest so much in a military system which cannot really defend us? This practice only makes sense if we assume that the United States would intervene to defend us, and that we need to maintain a military system prepared to serve the interests of the United States in order to keep this assurance.

But suppose Canadians conclude that United States military and foreign policies do not promote our security, or that they endanger global common security. What freedom does Canada reserve to challenge the United States? In this post-Cold War period, there is only one superpower left, and it is our neighbor, our very closest neighbor, the only neighbor with whom we share a land border, which extends for thousands of miles. Common sense, if not specific historical information, should tell us that concentration of power, such as that exercised by the U.S. military, is subject to abuse. Can Canadians rest secure in the certainty that U.S. military power will never be used against Canada?

The United States and Canada have long enjoyed a cordial, friendly relationship. Canadians certainly do not want it to be anything but friendly. It is a relationship, however, which has customarily been dominated by the United States, whose corporations have long been able to invest in Canada with few restrictions, while Canadian resources have been readily available to the United States. Most Canadians have prospered under this arrangement, but recently, as the United States-sponsored free-trade agenda has been pushed forward, Canadians have been hit with thousands of job losses, with diminishing control over their own

natural resources, and with erosion of highly valued social programs. There may come a time in the not-too-distant future when Canadians might want to assert through their government a greater degree of control over their own economy, as any sovereign nation has the right and responsibility to do. Pressure against such action exerted by the United States and by the transnational corporations, which the United States generally supports, would probably be intense. We would not expect such pressure to escalate to military action, but if Canada refused to yield, could this be confidently ruled out? As John Brewin indicated, such thoughts do occasionally cross the minds of Canadians. Invasion may be only a remote possibility, but the engineering of a military coup is probably less remote. CBD is designed to confront both of those contingencies, however remote.

Nations spend vast sums of money on military systems to prepare for remote contingencies and, through deterrence, to render those contingencies even more remote. For Canada, military defense against the possibility of U.S. military action would be utterly absurd. The United States is hardly likely to permit Canada even to begin to move in that direction. But the United States could hardly object, at least publicly, to Canada's developing such a non-threatening defense as CBD.

If Canada is to take a more independent stance in its economic, foreign, and military policy—which could benefit not only its own people, but also the wider world, and the United States as well—it needs the strength, self-confidence, and determination provided by a capacity for CBD. Make no mistake. There is enormous strength in CBD, as readers of this journal are aware. When people in all sectors of a society are prepared in advance and determined to employ courageously, even in the face of repression, an endless variety of nonviolent tactics to prevent an invader or usurper from gaining control over their institutions, they can mount a formidable defense.

It would not be sufficient for an invader to knock out pockets of military resistance: it would be necessary to deal endlessly with many forms of ongoing resistance from people all over the country. Having developed a capacity for CBD, Canadians would be enormously strengthened to resist the economic and political pressures which inevitably come from their powerful neighbor.

While space does not permit me to elaborate much further on the ways in which CBD can strengthen peoples, details of which are familiar to supporters of CBD, I can attempt to bolster the case I am making by responding to key objections against CBD mentioned by Gwynne Dyer. He expressed the view that Israelis are unlikely to find CBD an adequate source of security against potential Arab invaders. I acknowledge that CBD is inappropriate for Israel at present. Israel's aggressive, expansionist policy requires a strong military prepared to move quickly and violently against any resistance. Israel would have to adopt and entrench a policy of accommodation with its neighbors before CBD could be relevant. Canada does not face this obstacle to the development of CBD.

He also commented: "resistance actions of the Palestinians called for by their leadership remain nonviolent." I might add the speculation that if the Palestinians had kept their actions entirely nonviolent, repudiating even stone-throwing, the political jiu jitsu which Gene Sharp describes might have worked much more to their advantage. Exclusively nonviolent action might well have enabled the Intifada to be considerably more successful.

It would be useful for Canadians to learn how this and other nonviolent struggles have infused people with determination to resist unjust actions against them. Could Canadians at this time move ahead with development of CBD? No one knows. But the need is present. At the least, Canadians could begin to explore this strikingly promising possibility. ■

John M. Mecartney, Ph.D., is of the University of Detroit, Mercy.

Anyone who wishes to obtain a free copy of Stoltzfus's article and bibliography should mail a 52-cent stamped self-addressed envelope to Dr. John M. Mecartney, Coordinator, Nonviolent Action for National Defense Institute, PO Box 19900, Detroit, Michigan 48219-0900, USA (our thanks to Nathan Stoltzfus and The Atlantic).

COULD NONVIOLENT ACTION HAVE PREVENTED THE NAZI HOLOCAUST?

A REVIEW OF "DISSENT IN NAZI GERMANY"

BY NATHAN STOLTZFUS

(HARVARD UNIVERSITY HISTORY DEPT.) IN THE ATLANTIC, SEPTEMBER 1992.

John M. Mecartney, Ph.D.

Talk to many people about nonviolent action and civilian-based defense (CBD) and they will say it is a good theory, but it would not work against people like Hitler in his extermination of six million Jews. Stoltzfus' article, based on years of historical research, shows nonviolent struggle does work against ruthless dictators.

Stoltzfus elaborates on Gene Sharp's account of the 1943 protest in Berlin (*The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 89, 90). In early 1943 Hitler ended his policy of exempting Jews married to Aryans from being sent to concentration camps, and two thousand of them were locked up in an administrative center in the middle of Berlin. Many of their Aryan spouses—mostly women—went to the gate and shouted, "Give us back our husbands!" The guards threatened them. They scattered but came back day and night for a week. Gestapo headquarters was close by and could have shot or arrested the protestors. But Joseph Goebbels, the local Nazi leader, ordered the Jews freed. His action was made permanent by Reichsführer—SS Heinrich Himmler.

Stoltzfus gives two other illustrations of nonviolent protest forcing the Nazis government to back down. In 1936 Hitler wanted Nazis symbols to replace Catholic symbols in schools. Massive protests broke out and spread even to Nazi Party circles. The government gave in.

By 1941-42, 70,000 mentally ill and deformed people had been killed in gas chambers. Catholic bishop Von Galen preached blistering sermons on the subject. One high-ranking Nazi said the bishop should be hanged, but Goebbels said that such an action would undermine the war effort. The plan for euthanasia was ordered ended, and hospitals stopped officially, though local medical people were quietly encouraged to continue.

Why did the Nazi government give in to public protests? Stoltzfus points to Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* as outlining mass popular support as the character of the Nazi Party. Stoltzfus said that the party kept power partly

by giving in to the will of the people, though the people were often not told what was going on.

Hitler's statement on how to rule the people of the conquered regions shows how he understood the nature of power.

One cannot rule by force alone.

True, force is decisive, but it is equally important to have this psychological something which the animal trainer also needs to be master of his beast.

They must be convinced that we are the victors.

— quoted in Gene Sharp,

The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 43

The key point of nonviolent struggle and civilian based defense is that power comes from the people. Dictatorships are fragile if people know how to take back power.

Stoltzfus correctly points out that the protests his article describes were successful because (1) they were "undertaken collectively, by an integral part of society, rather than demonstrating isolated disaffection", (2) they were nonviolent, which avoided the appearance of treason and did not give the opportunity for Nazi violence to crush the resistance; and (3) the overt action exposed secret programs and showed a powerful means for dissent.

Stoltzfus points to a limitation of the action of the spouses. They were willing to take dangerous actions because of someone to whom they were married, but they did not protest further after their spouse was released. Primo Levi, who survived Nazi persecution, says this is "selfishness extended to the person closest to you . . . us-ism."

However, there are numerous illustrations outside of Germany where nonrelatives worked hard to protect Jews. There was Nazi-allied Bulgaria, where not a Jew was taken out of the country. Bishop Kiril of the Orthodox Church there said he would lay down on the railroad tracks with his people if any Jews were deported (Ronald Sider and Richard Taylor, *Nuclear Holocaust and Christian Hope*, 244, 245).

Both Sharp and Sider and Taylor tell of

the stalling and opposition tactics of officials in Vichy France and Mussolini's Italy to prevent many Jews from being taken to the camps (*The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 326, 327; *Nuclear Holocaust*, 244). The latter work recounts the famous story of Le Chambon, France, where Jews were smuggled out of the country. (See also Philip Hallie's *Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed*; the story has been made into a movie.)

Most know that people in Denmark helped 97 percent of the Jews escape their country to neutral Sweden when Hitler ordered them to be interned. Though Finland was allied with Germany, it also refused to deport its Jews, even though Himmler threatened to cut off Finnish food. And Holland, using mostly nonviolent resistance, saved 45,000 Jews (*Nuclear Holocaust*, 242,243).

Helen Fein—who wrote the classic book on genocide, *Accounting for Genocide*, and heads the Institute for the Study of Genocide—has pointed out that for genocide to be successful there needs to be little internal or external resistance (Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, *Transforming Struggle*, 72). Whenever there was resistance from the community or nation, fewer or no Jews were taken to the camps by Hitler's troops. Unfortunately, there were too many bystanders.

We come now to the question of this article: "Could nonviolent action have prevented the Nazi holocaust?"

Martin Luther King, Jr. has said:

Perhaps if there had been a broader understanding of the use of nonviolent direct action in Germany when Hitler was rising and consolidating his power, the brutal extermination of six million Jews and millions of other war dead might have been averted and Germany might never have become totalitarian.

If Protestants and Catholics had engaged in nonviolent direct action and made the oppression of the Jews their very own oppression and had come into the streets beside the Jew to scrub the sidewalks and had Gentiles worn the stigmatizing yellow armbands by the millions a unique form of mass resistance to the Nazi regime might have developed.

— from a recorded speech on a Mercury record album, "The Sound of Dissent"

Stoltzfus, quoting two writers, offers an affirmative answer:

According to the writer Conor Cruise O'Brien, Hitler backed away

from confrontation with the German churches "because he thought this was bad for the morale of Germany's armed forces." O'Brien concluded that the churches "might well have" forced the Nazi regime to stop the Holocaust if they had "spoken out against the persecution of the Jews with the same vigor as they had shown in the case of euthanasia."

The scholar J.P. Stern agrees. He writes that it "seems beyond any reasonable doubt that if the Churches had opposed the persecution of the Jews as they opposed the killing of the congenitally insane and sick, there would have been no "final solution."

This answer "beyond any reasonable doubt" calls all of us to empower people with nonviolent action and CBD not only to prevent war and dictatorship but also to make genocide impossible. ■

REFERENCES

- Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, *Transforming Struggle: Strategy and the Global Experience of Nonviolent Direct Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1992).
- Hallie, Philip. *Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed: The Story of the Village of Le Chambon and How Goodness Happened There* (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1979).
- Sider, Ronald J. and Richard K. Taylor. *Nuclear Holocaust & Christian Hope* (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1982).
- Sharp, Gene. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargeant, 1973).

AROUND THE WORLD

Belgium. A group of Members of the National Parliament (mainly Volksunie [Flemish nationalists] and ECOLO/AGALEV [Green Party]) decided to promote the idea of CBD by asking attention for the diverse aspects of CBD within the parliamentary debates. Aspects like training and peace education, rules for non-collaboration of the administration in case of occupation or coup d'état, boycotts, administrative decentralization, etc. could be easily connected with the debating of "standard" parliamentary issues, according to the group. By doing so, one might not only get some political results, but also raise—at least—the curiosity of other parliamentarians. As a first result, the minister of justice, at the request of M. Winkel (ECOLO) agreed to reorganize the State personnel records so they could be easily destroyed in case of occupation and promised to present appropriate legislation.

The joint Flemish Peace Movement (six organizations) decided to set up an Annual Peace Award in honor of those persons or organizations that contributed to the realization of a peaceful world. On September 23, 1992, this award was granted for the first time. Johan Niezing, the author of the book "Sociale Verdediging als logisch alternatief" (Social Defense as a logical alternative) received the award during a meeting at the Antwerp Peace House. The Jury Report mentioned CBD as an idea "of primordial significance for the future."

Ecuador. (The information, including quotations, in this article, is based on the bulletin *Urgent Action*, October 1992). On October 9, 1992, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) launched a general nonviolent uprising in Ecuador. The uprising sought "a recognition of indigenous land claims throughout the country, increased bilingual education, and a constitutional amendment to officially acknowledge that Ecuadorean society is made up of many different nationalities."

The eleven indigenous nations in Ecuador, which make up 40 percent of the country's people, have been engaged in a long struggle "for the survival of their cultures, their peoples and their environment." "In June, 1990, this struggle led indigenous communities to undertake a nonviolent uprising which paralyzed the country and led to negotiations with the government." As we reported in the last issue, "In April, 1992,

thousands of indigenous people of the Amazon region, where U.S. oil companies are drastically impacting Indian land and culture, led an historic march to Quito." After the march, the government partially acceded to the indigenous people's demands, conceding surface land rights to about half of the lands they claimed.

The uprising of October 9 was in response to a call from CONAIE "for direct action in the days surrounding the 500th anniversary of Columbus' arrival to the Americas." During the uprising, the Indians used tree trunks and large rocks to block roads, which prevented farm produce from reaching the cities. "In Imbabura province, the armed forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing one and injuring at least six others." In Lago Agrio, a section of the Amazon region exploited by multinational oil companies, "drivers associated with the oil companies rammed demonstrators. In one incident, a girl was killed and nine others injured when a car hit them at full speed." In spite of these actions, "the base organizations which make up CONAIE have decided to continue the indigenous uprising and, at the same time, reject the use of violence."

Source: "Indian Uprising in Ecuador Meets Violent Repression But Actions Continue," *Urgent Action*, Santa Cruz, California: Urgent Action Network, 10/92). *Sara Elkin*

Kosovo. Albanians in Kosovo comprise 90 percent of the population. Although currently under Serbian control, most desire independence and eventual union with Albania and Albanians in adjacent Macedonia. Although "ethnic cleansing" has not yet begun in earnest in Kosovo, life is very hard for many Albanians in Kosovo, and according to Fehmi Agani, a leader of the largest Albanian political party there, over 200,000 of Kosovo's two million people have already left. Torture is widespread. Schools have been shut down.

On May 27, the Peace Institute in Ljubljana, Slovenia, launched an appeal for solidarity with the Albanians of Kosovo. The Albanians there are using nonviolent methods of struggle against Serbian power to obtain recognition of their rights. The Peace Institute asks especially that the legitimate representatives of that people, elected on May 24 in a clandestine election, be recognized by the international community; that there be negotiations on the future of Kosovo under the auspices of the United Nations; that there

be international sanctions in cases where the rights of non-Serb minorities in Serbia are not respected; and that international observers be sent to Kosovo.

Sources: Paragraph 1: Dusko Doder, "New Target Seen for Serbia's Ambition," *Boston Globe*, Nov. 8, 1992; paragraph 2: *Non-Violence Actualité* (September 1992, p. 16, which cites Marko Hren of the Peace Institute, Mestni trg 23, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia). *Paul Anders*

North America

- We received the following bulletin from the Western Shoshone Defense Project: Crescent Valley, Nevada Nov. 19, 1992 The U.S. Bureau of Land Management began today an illegal roundup of Western Shoshone Nationalized livestock formerly belonging to Carrie and Mary Dann.

The Western Shoshone Defense Project is calling for supporters to immediately join in peaceful resistance at the Dann Ranch. Supporters are also urged to immediately contact key officials by telephone and fax and demand an end to the roundup. The U.S. should begin immediate negotiations with the Western Shoshone Nation. For more information on what you can do, call (702) 468-0230.

- CBDA recently received a brochure published by the League of Indigenous Sovereign Nations of the Western Hemisphere (LISN). It states in part that LISN "was created on May 27, 1991 by representatives of various Indian Nations from South, Central and North America on Piscataway Nation land in Tayac Territory in Southern Maryland...The goals of LISN are to: (a) unite all indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere together into one great Confederation; (b) establish world recognition of LISN as an instrument that will affect the political empowerment of our nations as one people; (c) represent our people to the international community." The brochure calls for "establishing a Plan for Indigenous Self-Defense by creating Treaty Alliance Gatherings of all potential and existing Warrior Societies." Information is available from LISN, c/o Piscataway Indian Nation, PO Box 312, Port Tobacco, Maryland 20677, USA and Sovereign Peoples Council, PO Box 610, Bowling Green Station, New York, New

York 10274-0610, USA.

Paul Anders

- Nonviolence International is seeking nonviolence trainers to respond to the urgent requests from people all over the world who are struggling to create a more just and peaceful world in which the human and civil rights of all are protected. Many are unaware of the alternatives to violence and the success of nonviolence. This is one of a number of services Nonviolence International provides to make nonviolent methods readily accessible to those in need. Please call or write, fax or e-mail, to request the trainers' information form: Nonviolence International, P.O. Box 39127, Friendship Station, N.W., Washington DC 20016, USA. Phone: (202) 244-0951. Fax: (202) 224-6396. E-mail: Peace Net: Nonviolence. Attention: Philip Bogdonoff or Jane Meleney Coe. ■

EVENTS

The organization Nonviolent Alternatives will present three programs in 1993:

1. The Wholistic Alternative: Gandhian Nonviolence in Theory and Practice. March 29-April 28 (also offered in October 1993). Location: India
2. Learning Harmony with the Lakota: Unlearning the Dis-Harmony of Racism. June. Location: Brookings, South Dakota; Rosebud, Pine Ridge, and Cheyenne River Reservations; and the Black Hills—all in the United States.
3. Alternatives to Violence: The Gandhian Experiment. July 17-August 28. Location: India.

For price and other information and application, contact Carl Kline, Nonviolent Alternatives, 825 4th St., Brookings, South Dakota 57006, USA; phone: (605) 692-8465.

Second Training Workshop for Nonviolence Trainers. February 19-21, 1993. in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. Led by George Lakey; co-sponsored by Nonviolence International and Peace Brigades International. Telephone or send for application to Training Center Workshops, 4719 Springfield Ave., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19143, USA. Phone: (215) 729-7458. ■

ASSOCIATION NEWS

Paul Anders

- I asked Suzanne Pearce, our new CBDA board member, to introduce herself:

I have had a checkered career, including magazine work, teaching English and special education, world travel, music, and most recently in the "decade" of 1980-1992, have worked with several organizations to stop the arms race—BENS (Business Executives for National Security); the Council for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze in Cambridge, Massachusetts; and the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (formerly the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control). I have also volunteered much time with the Interhelp network and the Cambridge-Yerevan Sister City Association. I am married to a psychiatrist and have two daughters in college. I have been interested in civilian-based defense (CBD) ever since encountering the literature in a wonderful seminar on "Interdependence" taught by Carolyn Stephenson.

- Suzanne Pearce and Paul Anders conducted a workshop in CBD at the annual Massachusetts SANE/FREEZE conference, Nov. 7, 1992. Those who attended participated in a simulated CBD of Germany against an invasion.
- CBDA member Jack Ross has published *Nonviolence for Elfin Spirits*. He says:

This book is about the wonderful human tendency to resort to creative, light activity in the face of severe conflict and danger, ranging from simple symbolic acts like giving a soldier a flower, to clowning before police and other grim people. Some of this is my own story, some from others, including Canadian aboriginals I know.

I call these people elfin spirits. I describe what they do and describe a nonviolence training program for elves.

I am a nonviolence activist, a bit of a clown, a retired sociologist.

The cost of the book (103 pages) is \$8.00 plus \$1.00 for postage and handling, from Jack Ross, Publisher, General delivery, Argenta, British Columbia VOG 1B0, Canada. Phone: (604) 366-4307.
- I was greatly saddened by the tragic, violent deaths of CBDA advisory board members Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian. Petra Kelly was a founder of the German Greens. This magazine (May 1990) published an address that Kelly gave in 1990, "Why Haven't Disarmament Movements Taken Social Defence Seriously? Why Should They?" She said in part, "A nonviolent strategy to prepare societies to become unrulable by aggressors, from within or without, must become a key goal of the peace movement" (page 5). Kelly and her companion, Bastian, were elected to the German Parliament in 1983 and served until 1990.

Bastian was a former major general in the West German Army. Ferdinand Protzman notes that "Bastian joined the Green Party in 1980, after being involuntarily retired from the army in 1980 for opposing the deployment by NATO of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Although he embraced pacifism, Mr. Bastian never quite lost the bearing of a military officer. He is credited with forging the party's security and defense policies."

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE: NEWS & OPINION, ISSN 0886-6015, is published by the Civilian-based Defense Association to provide information about CBD as a possible alternative policy for national defense and to provide a vehicle for the exchange of international news, opinion and research relating to CBD.

CO-EDITORS: Melvin G. Beckman
Philip D. Bogdonoff
Robert Holmes

Address: 154 Auburn Street,
Cambridge, MA 02139-3969, USA.
Telephone (617) 868-6058

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: \$15.00 per year.
PUBLISHED January, March, May, July, September and November. Readers are invited to send news, articles and other material for publication. Submission deadlines are the first day of February, April, June, August, October and December.

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE ASSOCIATION is a non-profit membership organization founded in 1982 to promote more widespread consideration of a civilian-based defense as a possible alternative policy for national defense.

SUBSCRIPTION, MEMBERSHIP, CONTRIBUTION

Civilian-based Defense Association
154 Auburn St., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02139-3969, USA

Name _____ Date _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Postal Zone _____ Nation _____

Telephone _____ Occupation _____

I want to BEGIN RENEW MEMBERSHIP (magazine included).

- \$25 Basic \$10 Student or low income
 \$50 Supporting \$100 Sustaining \$500 Lifetime

I want to CONTRIBUTE \$ _____ to further the association's work.

I do not want to be a member but wish to SUBSCRIBE to the magazine.

\$15 One year \$25 Two years \$30 Three years

Please send an acknowledgement I do not need an acknowledgement.

Helmut Otto, chief of the Bonn Police, said, "We must assume, based on evidence and expert opinion, that Kelly was shot and Bastian shot himself afterwards." However, Protzman notes that Eva Quisdorp, a co-founder of the Green Party, "said she last saw them at a conference in Berlin in late September. 'In all the years I knew them, there was never any indication of suicidal tendencies,' Miss Quisdorp said. 'They did not seem depressed in Berlin.'"

Gene Sharp said, "We have lost two ardent and dedicated colleagues; all who strive to advance the causes of justice, freedom, and peace will suffer their ab-

sence. I wish Petra and Gert could have lived out their lives with less stress, more rest, and fewer difficulties. I do hope that other people will now develop their abilities, strengths, and determination to act courageously to advance the causes for which Petra and Gert lived so intensely."

Sources on Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian: Gene Sharp in *Nonviolence Today*, no. 29, November/December 1992, p. 15; background and other quotations in Ferdinand Protzman, "Companion Killed Greens' Founder, Bonn Police Say," *New York Times*, Wednesday, Oct. 21, 1992. ■



Suzanne Pearce, new CBDA board member

RECENTLY RECEIVED

Compiled by Paul E. Anders

Slim pickings this month. Please send us items for this section.

"Baltikumsfahrt." *Rundbrief: Bund für Soziale Verteidigung*. Third quarter, 1992, 4-5.

Marchand, François. "Défense et non-violence: À quoi sert l'IRNC." *Non-violence Actualité*. No. 164 (Dec. 1992), 4-6.

Publishers' Addresses

Bund für Soziale Verteidigung, Friedensplatz 1a, 4950 Minden, Germany.

Non-violence Actualité, 20, rue de Devidet, 45200 Montargis, France. ■

Civilian-based Defense

154 AUBURN STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139-3969 USA

FIRST CLASS MAIL
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
COLUMBIA, SC
Permit No. 332

ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED

PLEASE CHECK YOUR MAILING LABEL

The top line of the mailing label on this newsletter will tell you when your membership or subscription is/was renewable.

