

Civilian-based Defense

EXPLORING A NONVIOLENT STRATEGY FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

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SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

Normand Beaudet

I worked with national defense in Canada, as a training officer for mountain climbers in the Yukon. This was the beginning of my questioning about national defense and national security. I noted that in military operations soldiers must meet certain specific criteria. For example, those going on a four-day mission need to have their weapons clean and functional; they need training; they need to know the strategy, the technique of defense. They must also carry a

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very heavy load of material—food, water, and clothing and shelter against cold and heat. They must also have all that material for themselves and not rely on any of their peers, who might die in the mission. An officer will often have the duty of dispersing the soldiers in the field so that they do not all blow up on the same mine.

There are obvious criteria used by the military to determine how vulnerable the soldiers are who are performing a mission. It occurred to me that we might by analogous criteria determine how vulnerable a society is. I think that in our current discussion of nonviolent means of defense—how to improve it, how to replace military means of defense, how to make civilian-based defense into an operational system—something is missing. We do not consider the nonmilitary infrastructure of society, the nonmilitary planning and development of society to meet the basic preconditions to implement the civilian-based defense policy.

The infrastructure that would be needed in such a nonmilitary security system has certain similarities to the material a soldier must carry to accomplish a mission. The soldier must be able to sustain himself, and he must be self-sufficient in case someone else is killed in the field. Something must be added to current research on the techniques of civilian-based defense. How do we plan society to make it less vulnerable? How do we provide the preconditions to facilitate the implementation of civilian-based defense?

Let's take a simple example. I will talk about Quebec because I know the situation there best. The province has a certain degree of sufficiency in food and energy. We have a good level of sufficiency in building material (we have a lot of wood). However, self-sufficiency is only one component of

EDITOR'S NOTE

Paul E. Anders

The directors of the Civilian-based Defense Association have shortened the name of this magazine from *Civilian-based Defense: News and Opinion* to simply *Civilian-based Defense*. We took this step because the magazine has analytical articles and other articles that go beyond news or opinion.

With this issue we bring you—among other things—more of the presentations from our conference last year in Windsor, Ontario, Canada, *i.e.*, Gene Sharp's keynote address, responses to it by three Canadians, Normand Beaudet's article on self-sufficiency and CBD, and Leonard Desroches's critique of the conference.

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security. I couldn't say that Quebec is safe because it is self-sufficient. Because the systems are so centralized, Quebec is vulnerable. We rely, for example, for most of our electricity in Quebec on dams in the James Bay and the Manicouagan areas. There are three or four major sources of supply that provide probably close to 90% of the energy in the province. That infrastructure is highly vulnerable. People were scared during the Oka crisis when a warrior threatened to blow up a dam. If a small minority within the province is able to frighten people by a simple threat that could be accomplished by four commandos, the security of our society is highly questionable. Because the food supply is also centralized, it is similarly vulnerable. We have a level of self-sufficiency in Quebec, but it is far too centralized to be secure. It is no wonder that politicians want to orient defense policy toward preventing invaders from getting into a country with so vulnerable an infrastructure.

Professor Alex P. Schmidt of Leiden University has criticized some current discussion of civilian-based defense for ignoring the conditions necessary to implement it. I do not believe that all his conditions are necessary because most of the

historical examples of civilian-based defense occurred without some of them. But I agree that if all the conditions were met, we would expect a very high level of efficiency from the civilian-based defense system in a country. He identifies ten conditions which include the presence of a well trained nonviolent core group; the existence of the self-reliance and resources required to meet defense needs; the capacity to communicate with resisters, the aggressor's social base, and other parties; recognition that the defending social system is legitimate; social cohesion among the defenders; great dependence of the aggressor on the defender's (or an ally's) economic, social, or administrative system; and human contact between resisters and aggressors.

I am not suggesting that all these conditions must be met for a civilian-based defense to function. Perhaps some should be removed, others added. Nonetheless, I believe a focus on such conditions and on the nonmilitary security policy underlying a possible civilian-based defense policy is important for the success of a nonviolent defense policy.

We are not asking defense planners to stop spending on security; rather we are offering them a new security system that

would reduce the vulnerability of society through decentralized means of the production of energy, of communication, etc. Armies know very well what the basic criteria are for a group of soldiers to survive in a combat situation, namely decentralization and self-sufficiency. The centralized and dependent Western economic infrastructures are the key motive for the general feeling of insecurity in the population, and a key factor in the escalation of the arms race. Such an escalation required that people feel vulnerable.

How is it possible to implement this idea of nonmilitary security, of creating a less vulnerable infrastructure? How willing is society to move in this direction? We would be opposing most of the current social and economic tendencies around us. Economic conversion has been a topic for discussion in the peace movement for a number of years, but the real question is what we ought to convert to. Perhaps the focus on conversion ought to include as its goal increasing decentralization and increasing self-reliance in energy and food, which would lower Canadian (and the United States') vulnerability. □

THE RELEVANCE OF CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE FOR THE 1990S

Gene Sharp

Albert Einstein Institution

The idea that societies can be successfully defended, fully or at least partially, from internal takeovers and foreign aggression by nonviolent noncooperation and defiance was once thought to be a notion of kooks and naive romantics. While some of these detractors, as well as the naive romantics, are still present, this conception of defense has in recent years been taken much more seriously.

In the past decade, the concept has been discussed in prominent publications, like the *New York Review of Books* and *The New York Times Book Review*; explored and supported by defense ministers and ministries in Sweden, Lithuania, and Norway; assessed and encouraged by influential ecclesiastical bodies such as the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church; adopted (at least par-

tially) by parliaments, as in Sweden and Lithuania; and the broad principles of the policy have been practiced in improvised struggles by masses of people facing crises—as when the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia uprooted a fifty-year occupation. The dramatic defeat of the August 1991 Stalinist coup in the Soviet Union is yet another potent example of the improvised use of nonviolent struggle for defense.

In recent years the world has witnessed a series of dramatic protests, uprisings, resistance, and revolutions which have differed in character from much of modern politics, with its elite controls, repressive governments, dictatorships, manipulations, and brutalities. These cases of nonviolent struggle (not civilian-based defense) have grown in political importance and occurred in diverse parts of the world.

Among the most recent cases are the Iranian undermining of the oppressive regime of the Shah in 1979, the Polish Solidarity movement from 1980 to 1990, the 1986 Filipino uprising, the Burmese uprising against the military dictatorship in 1988, the Chinese student prodemocracy demonstrations of 1989, the various Eastern European revolutions against Communist rule in 1989 and 1990, the 1991 Madagascar prodemocracy struggle, the antiapartheid struggles in South Africa, student movements in South Korea, much of the Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Baltic struggles for independence, and, as mentioned, the Soviet peoples' resistance which defeated the August 1991 neo-Stalinist coup d'état.

These conflicts have been waged by

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“people power.” Though the term came to prominence with the defeat of Marcos in the Philippines, the phenomenon, of course, is much older. Through nonviolent defiance and noncooperation “ordinary” people have confronted violently repressive regimes.

Clearly, not all these cases succeeded in the short run, as the Burmese and Chinese cases show. Not all were followed by an ideal political system, as the Iranian and Filipino cases show. Yet all revealed power sufficient to challenge or defeat the oppressive regimes. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany the old regimes simply disintegrated in face of the people’s defiance; no one was left to surrender. The resistance to the Soviet coup was triumphant, and moreover the world could see hour by hour the people’s challenge to the coup and the gradual disintegration of what once was presumed to be the omnipotent combined power of the military forces, the KGB secret police, and the Communist Party. In all these cases, even the unsuccessful ones, nonviolent struggle, despite lack of advance planning and preparations, demonstrated significant power capacity, more than comparable improvised violent resistance could have produced.

Without these struggles the world would be a very different place. What if Polish workers and intellectuals had organized, instead of Solidarity, a terrorist campaign against the Communists? Suppose that the people power uprisings in East Germany, and Czechoslovakia in 1989 had been violent ones and consequently crushed by Soviet troops. Suppose that the Stalinists had succeeded in the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union!

With such widespread growth of the phenomenon of people power, with such explicit examples of its power potential, one must ask why there is not wider recognition and acceptance of the concept of people power applied to the problems of national defense.

One reason is the ghastly distortions of our media in reporting and “analyzing” cases of people power. The recent events in the Soviet Union provide a good case in point. In reporting on the defeat of the coup, our “experts” quickly found explanations and excuses and causes, all of which ignored people power as the dominant factor, the *sine qua non* of the victory. Yeltsin did it “almost single handedly” said Barbara Walters naively, as though he would have had a crowd to address or a tank with a

friendly crew on which to stand if the people’s resistance was not already strong. (Yeltsin himself denied the “white knight” role, responsibly crediting “people power” with the victory.) Or, victory came simply because the coup was ill-planned and “doomed from the start,” although it was backed by such powerful bodies as the military forces, the KGB, and the Communist Party. In the absence of powerful resistance the coup would clearly have triumphed. Coup leaders are always powerful enough to impose what the democrats are too cowardly or weak to resist. Other commentators have stated that the leaders “were not brutal enough” and did not kill key officials; it is now known that a KGB unit was sent to arrest and if necessary kill Yeltsin and his key supporters but that its courageous officers and men brazenly refused to obey. Similarly, troops flown in from Odessa to put down the street resistance, by shooting if need be, on being told in the Moscow airport of their mission, sat down and refused to proceed to the city. Would these groups have refused had there been no popular resistance?

Such excuses and distortions serve to prevent both the speaker and the listener from confronting the shattering truth that dictatorial practices and political violence can be defeated by the massive resistance of the people employing nonviolent weapons. It must be recognized that people power challenges not only the forces of dictatorship but also the assumptions about power and defense made by most governments, military establishments, media representatives, and others.

Excuses and distorting “explanations” communicate the message that nonviolent struggle did not really win the victory and that violence is still decisive if only enough is used. People power movements, it is assumed, only win by default and accident.

That distortion strongly weakens the potential appeal of civilian-based defense and other nonviolent options. But despite such distortions, the truth is spreading that people without guns but with courage and nonviolent weapons can sometimes be more powerful than military and police forces armed with guns, tanks, planes, and other military weapons.

Another reason for the lack of recognition which the concept of civilian-based defense deserves has been the past (unfortunately still present) association of nonviolent forms of defense with doctrines of pacifism

and radical social change, which some have regarded as harebrained, romantic, or ideologically doctrinaire. It is still common to associate these ideas with weakness, passivity, and submission.

An effective role for civilian-based defense in the 1990s requires a clear separation of this policy from the claims of both the naive utopians and moralists and also of the ideological imperialists. Numerous groups and individuals today would like to drag civilian-based defense back into the quagmire of doctrinal imperatives and ideological sterility. Many see civilian-based defense as intrinsically linked to their own doctrinal or political agenda.

The sincerity, hard work, and sacrifice of the romantics and ideologues must not blind us to reality. We must not fail to recognize that instead of simply witnessing and protesting, effective steps can indeed be taken to move our societies and the world toward a drastic reduction, and eventual elimination, of major political violence, including war, simply by providing effective substitute means of waging the conflict in place of violence.

Civilian-based defense will play an absolutely essential role in this shift. This is because the compelling argument of those who support the theory of the just war and favor preparations for war has been that an effective defense against great evil is morally right and politically required. Civilian-based defense provides a practical alternative to war to provide that defense, using civilian means of struggle in place of military ones. If civilian-based defense can be made effective for all to see, then the road is opened for its wide acceptance and for the weapons of military war to fall away as relics of the past.

Perhaps I should clarify what it is I am talking about. What is civilian-based defense? By “civilian-based defense” is meant defense by civilians using civilian means of struggle with the intent of deterring and defeating foreign military invasions, occupations, and internal usurpations. Deterrence and defense are to be accomplished by reliance on social, economic, political, and psychological weapons. These are used to wage widespread noncooperation and to offer public defiance. The aim is both to deny the attackers their objectives and to make impossible the consolidation of their rule, whether in the form of foreign

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administration, a puppet regime, or a government of usurpers. This noncooperation and defiance is also combined with other forms of action intended to subvert the loyalty of the attackers' troops and functionaries, to promote their unreliability in carrying out orders and repression, and even to incite them to mutiny.

Civilian-based defense is meant to be waged by the population and its institutions on the basis of advance preparation, planning, and training. These in turn would be based upon the findings of basic research into nonviolent resistance, upon in-depth analysis of the political system of the attackers, and upon intensive problem-solving research.

I am deeply indebted to the peoples of Russia and the other nations which comprised the Soviet Union. For years, in making presentations on civilian-based defense, I have cited the "gang of four"—four most researched cases of improvised nonviolent struggle for defense. Perhaps most of you are familiar with the two prominent cases against foreign invasions and occupations: the 1923 Ruhrkampf in Germany against the Franco-Belgian occupation and the 1968-1969 Czech and Slovak resistance against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. You may also know the two cases of successful resistance against coups d'état: the defeat of the 1920 Kapp putsch in Berlin and the defeat of the 1961 Algerian generals' revolt that sought to bring down the de Gaulle-Debré government in order to keep Algeria French. Once we have the data, we can add the defeat of the Stalinist coup attempt in the Soviet Union to these cases.

Similar, but less thoroughly researched, defeats of coups d'état have occurred in Bolivia and Haiti. There are many cases of nonviolent struggle waged against foreign occupation, against regimes that were established years, decades, or even centuries earlier. There are cases of this type of struggle dating back centuries: the Dutch resistance against Spanish rule in the sixteenth century, much of the Irish resistance to English rule, the Hungarian resistance to Austrian rule 1850-1867, the Finnish resistance to Russian rule 1898-1905, and the Indian campaigns against British occupation in the first half of the twentieth century.

All these cases, however, are only primitive prototypes of what a researched, planned, prepared, and trained civilian-based

defense can offer. This distinction between the past historical record and a developed civilian-based defense policy is of great importance.

As we can see, civilian-based defense is fundamentally distinct from various versions of pacifism, peace movements, antimilitarism, and ideological doctrines. None of the cases of improvised nonviolent struggle for defense was predicated on a particular belief system regarding violence. This separation of policy from belief and doctrine has increased the relevance of civilian-based defense in our time.

The interest of governments in civilian-based defense is no longer a novelty. Since 1970, various governmental bodies and officials in such countries as the Netherlands, Austria, France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, New Zealand, Austria, and Lithuania have examined one aspect or another of civilian-based defense. Although Switzerland and Yugoslavia are supposed to have official components of nonviolent resistance in their defense policies, no new developments in those countries have come to our attention in recent years.

In 1986, the Swedish parliament unanimously voted to include a nonmilitary resistance component in their "total defense" policy. We were recently told that the Swedish Commission on Nonmilitary Resistance is conducting regional seminars on nonmilitary resistance for educators and hopes to issue information about nonmilitary resistance to all Swedish households next year.

In February 1991, the Lithuanian Supreme Council (parliament) voted to make nonviolent noncooperation their first line of defense against an intensified Soviet occupation.

Governmental consideration of civilian-based defense is certainly not the sole factor in making this form of defense relevant for our times; however, it is vital because defense policy at the movement level is not the defense policy of the whole country.

What makes civilian-based defense relevant to the world in which we live? First, in examining past improvised cases of nonviolent struggle for defense, we see a vast potential of power available in various crises.

Second, crises will continue to occur in our world. Vast social, economic, and political changes are sweeping through the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union; poverty and oppression characterize the daily life of a majority of the people on the planet; brutal dictatorships continue to be supplied with the latest military hardware; borders are disputed: These and many other factors may lead to coup attempts and military aggression against neighboring countries. Civilian-based defense has a role to play in such events.

Third, we must continue to seek a substitute for the vast destructive potential of our military war system. Although reductions of nuclear forces are a welcome development, the changes envisaged by our leaders will not significantly reduce the current military dilemma: how to defend the society without destroying it in the process of defending it. Civilian-based defense may prove to be a viable, and even superior, form of defense.

In the 1990s opportunities and responsibilities are available for those who wish to advance the knowledge about civilian-based defense and to promote its serious consideration and incremental adoption in various parts of the world. These steps are predicated on the assumption that this policy must be kept distinct from ideological movements or positions. Of course that does not mean that people of various beliefs should steer clear of this policy or deny its compatibility with their own long-standing beliefs. But they ought never to claim it as their own policy, the acceptance of which requires acceptance of their beliefs or political positions.

There are several national and international fronts where the policy of civilian-based defense can be increasingly adopted in the coming decade. These are:

Civilian-based resistance components within predominantly military defense policies. In most countries with powerful military establishments, this is the only way that the nonmilitary type of defense can be introduced. The civilian-based resistance component is a part of a partially or predominantly military policy in which popular nonviolent noncooperation and defiance are to be applied for specific national defense purposes. These may be for specific situations (perhaps the military means are judged doomed to defeat or have already been defeated), or for particular purposes (for example, against coups d'état, which is considered separately here).

These components already exist in a

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few European countries; they are not new. The acceptance of a limited component provides countries the opportunity to develop plans for implementing the policy, to examine contingencies for its use, and to educate the public about it. With sufficient sound groundwork the number of these countries adopting civilian-based resistance components may grow significantly. Over time, if confidence in this form of defense increases, the contingencies for which the civilian-based resistance component is designed may be increased, and the actual and proportional size of these components may be expanded.

Full adoption of civilian-based defense. For countries that have no serious military options, civilian-based defense is their only way to build a powerful deterrence and defense capacity against powerful neighbors. Countries that seem likely candidates for this position include Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, but for various reasons they are unlikely to adopt this policy as their only means of defense. Costa Rica and Iceland should be in this group, but it is not clear that there is at present sufficient new thinking about defense in those countries to stimulate consideration of a civilian-based defense option. Other republics leaving the Soviet Union, and newly liberated countries of East Central Europe, ought to give serious attention to this policy, but whether they will do so is not yet known.

Civilian-based defense against coups d'état can provide reasonably democratic countries with a defense option where otherwise none exists. Coups d'état are a serious threat to security for which, with rare exceptions, there has been no powerful means available to deter or defeat the usurpation short of civil war, an option few people would choose. Coups often have drastic internal and even international consequences. They often disrupt years of growth in parliamentary democracy, are a prelude to decades of dictatorship, and sometimes initiate an internal crisis of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Certain coups may aggravate international hostilities and be followed by external military action.

The Soviet Union's experience with the coup in August 1991 and the defense by people power, which proved so effective, may well bring attention to the civilian-based option for deterring and defeating this type of attack.

Civilian-based defense treaty organi-

zations. When this idea was proposed in 1958 by Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall in the form of a European Treaty Organization for the countries that had already transarmed to the policy, it was deemed, politely, futuristic.

However, such a treaty for appropriate mutual aid to countries with either a civilian-based resistance component or a full policy of civilian-based defense now appears to be a more realistic and desirable option. Such aid might include provisions for treaty members of (1) access to printing and broadcasting facilities for the attacked country; (2) provision of food and medical supplies; (3) transmission to the outside world of news about the defense struggle and the aggressors' actions; (4) mobilization of international economic and diplomatic sanctions against the attackers; and (5) communication to the attackers' troops, functionaries, and population of information about the attack (such as the issues at stake, the nature of the resistance and repression, and news of dissent among the attackers' usual supporters).

Several of these types of actions and threats were employed by the United States and European governments during the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union and despite their limitations and lack of preparation seem to have had some helpful influence. The types of assistance outlined here can help significantly, but the brunt of the defense must be borne by the population of the attacked society itself. There is no substitute for self-reliance, sound preparation, and genuine strength in civilian-based defense.

Nonviolent struggle for liberation from dictatorships. Though not specifically an application of civilian-based defense, nonviolent struggle for national liberation from foreign oppression, for ending unjust oppression, and for extending civil liberties and democratic structures are important companions to civilian-based defense. Successful struggles for those objectives may increase the seriousness with which civilian-based defense would be considered and adopted by those and other societies. The struggles in China, Burma, Tibet, Madagascar, Taiwan, and Armenia are among those which come high on the list of cases of this type. However, there is not yet evidence that a country liberated through nonviolent struggle will necessarily be inclined to adopt civilian-based defense.

Among the kinds of activities that

might be conducted to facilitate these struggles are strategic studies on nonviolent struggle against dictatorships; attention to detailed historical studies of related cases; general and specific studies of the weaknesses of dictatorships against which resistance might be most effectively directed; dissemination in appropriate circumstances and languages of introductory and advanced material on nonviolent struggle; intensive educational outreach for persons from those societies who wish to become experts in nonviolent struggle; the preparation and dissemination in appropriate languages of study programs for use either in the country itself or by people temporarily in exile; and analyses and provisional strategic outlines of the types of resistance that might be most appropriate in that specific situation.

The world of the 1990s, in spite of the dramatic changes since 1989, remains a dangerous place. As the August 1991 right-wing coup d'état in the Soviet Union demonstrated, threats may arise when one least expects them (such as when you're on vacation!). As the heroic stance of the citizens of Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities in the Soviet Union shows, people power is very relevant in addressing those threats.

It is vital for us to combat the distortions and misperceptions of this phenomenon in our media and educational systems. False interpretations and glib assumptions which relegate people power to at best a secondary role need to be challenged.

The further promotion of civilian-based defense requires that the policy remain distinct from specific doctrinal orientations. It can only be advanced by the honest examination of its merits.

We stand at an important stage in the development of civilian-based defense. There are no certainties, and serious disappointments may lie ahead. But we are now at a point when societies and governments have begun to look seriously at the possibility that they might be best defended by the prepared struggle capacity of their people and their free institutions. This is a new point in history.

The initial tentative moves which have brought us to this point may be followed by more deliberate and greater advances. Whether that occurs depends largely on the seriousness with which the problems of this

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policy are tackled; on the realism and responsibility with which the nature, requirements, and the potential of civilian-based defense are presented; and on the coupling of determination with intellectual honesty in seeking answers to questions that once were asked only by a very few.

It is now clear that societies can be successfully defended from internal take-overs and foreign aggression by nonviolent noncooperation and defiance. That insight is now increasingly recognized, not by kooks and naive romantics, but by hard-headed strategists. Those people have much important work to do in increasing our capacity for such defense, in combining the known capacity of civilian-based defense

with wise strategy to produce a greater potential for defense with lower casualties.

But the truth that such defense is possible has already been demonstrated by the women and youth and men of Gdansk, Leningrad, Vilnius, La Paz, the Ruhr, Prague, Paris, Port-au-Prince, Tallinn, and elsewhere.

We have a responsibility to use our resources to help make the tasks of future so-called "ordinary" people acting in comparable crises more effective and less difficult and dangerous. In the process we shall help build an effective political equivalent of war and a system of defense based upon the power of people, their power to act courageously, wisely, and responsibly

to gain and defend their own freedom from all would-be aggressors and tyrants. □

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RESPONSES TO GENE SHARP

After Gene Sharp's speech "The Relevance of Civilian-based Defense for the 1990s," three Canadians gave responses.

1. Don Macnamara

It may seem odd to have a representative of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and a retired general officer talk on the subject of civilian-based defense, but perhaps that is due to the misconception that we are exclusively concerned with fighting. In fact, particularly in the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, we consider not only the military component of national security but also the economic, social, and political components. We study war in order to understand its causes so that it may be prevented. Shortly after the end of the Second World War the British economist Harold Laswell said that the professional military officer would become a manager of violence; that is, the military would use whatever level of violence is necessary but ought to avoid violence where possible. Bernard Brodie, the famous American nuclear strategist, said at the dawn of the nuclear age that the entire role of the military had changed as a result of the advent of nuclear weapons. No longer was it the responsibility of the military to wage

war; on the contrary it was to prevent war.

Also very early in the nuclear age it became apparent to Canadian policy planners that Canada was not in danger of being invaded or overwhelmed by another country. However, they knew that Canada would be destroyed in a nuclear war. This was not because someone would attack us directly, but because we were in the line of fire between the United States and the Soviet Union. It therefore became the overriding concern to find ways to prevent nuclear war. Reflecting this aim, Canadian security policy attempted to stabilize conflict in the world where possible by essentially nonviolent intervention. Lester Pearson, the Canadian prime minister from 1963 to 1968, won the Nobel peace prize for initiating the use of peacekeeping forces in the Suez in 1956.

It is arguable that armed forces in peacekeeping operations do not qualify as nonviolent; in reality, however, with the exception of the Congo and more recently in Lebanon (where the United Nations forces suffered severe casualties under circumstances that prevented their fighting back) no United Nations peace force had to fight its way into a situation. So to a large degree the peacekeeping operations have been nonvio-

lent intervention. The aim of these operations were sometimes with the naive or fond hope of creating the conditions for peace, of providing a pause in which to try to create the social, economic, and political conditions that may lead to a lasting peace in places that had not known peace for several generations. That was at least the intent; it is not my purpose now to argue whether or not they were effective.

Canadian Forces (others as well, but I am concentrating on Canada) have also been involved in global humanitarian missions. Tonight (September 6, 1991) two or three Hercules aircraft are bringing tons of grain into Ethiopia to try to feed hundreds of thousands of starving people. Canadians have been involved before in this kind of operation, previously in Ethiopia and also in Zambia and Peru, as well as other places. The use of *military* forces should be considered from a broad point of view that includes nonviolent and humanitarian actions.

In the course of Dr Sharp's remarks, and in his books, he referred to Costa Rica as a prime candidate for civilian-based

Brig. General Don Macnamara (ret. Canadian Armed Forces) is president of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

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defense because it had such a low proportion of the population involved in the armed forces. I have found in other contexts that Costa Rica is said by definition to have no armed forces because only 0.4% of the population is involved in the armed forces. Coincidentally, that is exactly the same proportion of the Canadian population serving in the Canadian armed forces. So perhaps we are already in the stage of what Dr Sharp calls *transarmament* and in a position to experiment. Our democratic system and the fact that our borders are unthreatened make civilian-based defense in Canada an important option. The possibility of an organized civilian-based defense in Canada to provide the kind of defense that is difficult in a huge, sparsely populated land is very attractive. The north of Canada, that is, north of 60°, is a big place and very empty. It represents 40% of the Canadian land mass, and only 0.4% of the Canadian population is scattered around there. Civilian-based defense is perhaps particularly relevant there.

I find the ideas of civilian-based defense in application to Canada particularly attractive because only a very small proportion of our population is now active in the defense of the country. I believe that it is the responsibility of every citizen in a democratic society to help sustain that society and

to defend it from assaults that threaten it. As Dr Sharp has stated, civilian-based defense is not an easy concept. It may sound easy, but it is not; it requires commitment, dedication, organization, and education. If these requirements are met, civilian-based defense could contribute not only to the defense of our vital assets in this country but also to our own national unity. It may already have done so among the Inuit who serve in the Canadian Rangers, a branch of the Canadian Forces reserve.

I applaud some of the words that Dr Sharp used in his proposals. He distinguishes between fully and partially civilian-based defense and recognizes that changes do not occur overnight. He called for various strategic studies, and analyses and discussions. I second that kind of proposal. Case studies must be made of civilian-based defense, not only of the type he has done so far, but also, for example, in the Persian Gulf. What if we had had civilian-based defense in Kuwait? What role could civilian-based defense alliances have now in assisting the Kurds and the Shiites whom Saddam Hussein seeks to destroy? We should also consider questions about the relation of some apparent threats to security with larger police responsibilities. Is there a model for civilian-based defense in a coast guard activity? Is there a model or a means

by which civilian-based defense could be applied to things like the protection of sovereignty, to prevent the theft of national natural resources? All of these are very important areas for research and discussion; by no means would I reject civilian-based defense as an idealistic proposal. It should be seriously discussed, analyzed and integrated into any Canadian defense policy when possible. By means of it, more Canadians would be involved in the security of the country, and the security of the country may be assured at a lower cost once we have studies pointing toward the best kind of application of civilian-based defense in Canada.

I would urge one caution. We are a very different country from the European countries in which civilian-based defense is currently practiced, at least partially, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Austria. Dr Sharp mentioned that Switzerland and Yugoslavia are different cases. I've talked with people in all these countries, and the people who were the most forthright and most adamant about their total defense, that is integration of civilian- and military-based defense, were from Yugoslavia. So I would underline that the concept is not simple. It is challenging, it is worthy of study, and I thank Dr Sharp for his eloquent presentation. □

2. John Brewin

I have found Dr Sharp's ideas timely and stimulating. Although he is too modest to have done it, I would like to quote some of his prescient observations in his 1990 book *Civilian-Based Defense*. Discussing the application of civilian-based defense to the superpowers, he writes, "What then of the Soviet Union? If the peoples and political leaders of the Soviet Union genuinely wish to democratize and decentralize, then civilian-based defense could be highly relevant to meeting its own security needs." He goes on to write:

The Soviet Union, as most states, is vulnerable to internal usurpation, especially because of the high degree of centralization of

the present system. This type of attack might be launched by neo-Stalinists opposed to glasnost and perestroika and intent on restoring strong central controls or by military or political groups wishing to re-impose an authoritarian system of some other type. In case of a coup, the civilian-based defense capacity could be the only effective deterrence and defense that a democratized Soviet Union would have.

His ideas and those of the Association are therefore entirely relevant and very important as we enter into the post-Cold War period.

My remarks will be in contrast to the tone of Don Macnamara's comments because I believe that we are now entering into a period when all the countries of the world and in particular the Western nations

must undertake a fundamental review of defense policies. This is urgent. The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union completely undercut the assumptions on which our military and defense policies have been based since 1948, and probably since 1938, when we began to arm in response to the threat of Nazi Germany. Our governments and the defense establishment have based their thinking on the assumption that a military response is the correct reaction to the threats posed by foreign powers. I believe that the situation has completely changed and that we must therefore quickly and dramatically rethink our defense policies.

You may have been inadvertently misled by Don Macnamara's comparison of Costa Rica and Canada. Except for the percentage of the population that serves in

John Brewin is a member of the Canadian Parliament (representing Victoria, British Columbia) and defense critic for the New Democratic Party of Canada.

Continued on next page

the armed forces, our military establishments cannot be compared. We are the tenth largest military power in the world in spending. We spend over twelve billion dollars per year on the military directly, and there are other indirect expenditures. Most of what we spend is aimed at the perceived or alleged threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We spend over a billion dollars a year on the maintenance of forces in Europe, who are instructed to prepare for a conventional Soviet and Warsaw pact invasion of Western Europe. Our government has responded to changes in Eastern Europe with only very modest cuts. NATO ministers continue to meet and to try to find justifications for that spending and for the maintenance of NATO.

Much of the rest of the military budget, even within Canada, is spent in anticipation of that kind of threat. For example, our navy is being equipped, at the cost of nine billion dollars, with frigates whose purpose it is to defend against submarine assaults on shipping across the North Atlantic during a conventional war in Europe. There is talk about equipping much of our air force and acquiring conventional submarines for that purpose. Our whole defense thinking and virtually all our defense budget is oriented in that direction. In my response to the ideas offered by Dr Sharp, I would like to reflect on the relevance of civilian-based defense to the rethinking that I say is necessary in Canadian policy.

I would like to put the idea of civilian-based defense in the context of a few other considerations. The first is understanding that our security and what threatens it must be defined more broadly. We have an undefended border. We are not in danger of an invasion. The problems we face to our security are acid rain, the pollution of the Great Lakes, economic aggression, cultural aggression. We must take a broader understanding of the threats to our security and put the military threats to our security in that context.

The second relevant consideration is that of common security. We will feel secure when our neighbors do. Arms limitation, disarmament, arms control policies must be central in seeking security in this age. If we have ever had an opportunity in the West to dismantle the nuclear threat, it is now, when the Soviet Union needs our help.

This is the context in which I wish to approach civilian-based defense and to see how it fits into Canadian policy. First of all,

it pushes us to analyze what the military threats to Canada are and how we must structure our own defense against external attacks. I mentioned briefly the nuclear threat. The fact is, as General Macnamara said, that there is no conventional military threat to Canada. We face occasional intrusions into our space, and we need to have some patrol and surveillance capacity to detect them. But even when intrusions are detected, a military response would be inappropriate except in a police sense, in the sense that we could ask and encourage someone to leave. When the Soviets had a submarine within Swedish territory, the Swedes had to respond diplomatically. We will have to respond diplomatically to unwanted intrusions into our space.

Since no Canadian would argue that we should spend any money preparing to defend against an invasion by the United States, we are left with the need for some patrol capacity. Civilian-based defense is not of much assistance to us because I do not believe our country ought to spend time preparing even a civilian-based defense against a hypothetical American invasion. If ever our policy makers reach the conclusion there is a serious threat from the United States, then of course we should turn to the ideas of civilian-based defense. Meanwhile I think our relations with the United States are such that it is not a relevant consideration.

The ideas of civilian-based defense are relevant to Canada in our response to the international situation. We misspend billions of dollars in Europe on an obsolete defense policy. We ought to encourage more rational security arrangements in Europe and throughout the world. We have the vehicle of the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which Canada is a member, and we should use that vehicle to encourage the development of these ideas in that forum.

We should be prepared to use the United Nations to promote understanding of and reaction to the ideas of civilian-based defense. In appropriate circumstances, we should be ready to respond bilaterally to particular situations in the world. I will cite a few examples. The international community is right in responding to the Indonesian aggression in East Timor with international communication of the problem, support for the indigenous population, and sanctions against the country that breaks international law, as Indonesia has done.

If the response of the world community

to the crisis in the Gulf had been guided by the logic of Dr Sharp's arguments, then we could have anticipated that the military response would be excessively costly compared to what would be gained, as we know now. The environmental devastation, the fact that Saddam Hussein remains and is likely to continue to remain in power, the loss of human life, the material loss, the diplomatic disaster—all are too costly compared to what could have been achieved had we known of this analysis and been willing to use other techniques than strictly military ones.

So I see a number of ways in which these ideas can be entirely relevant to our country and to others as each pursues the development of new policies in a post-Cold War era. I can think of a number of constructive suggestions I might make to our American friends, but I will leave them and the rest of this conference to work some of that out.

In conclusion I would like to echo a point that Dr Sharp made—not to underestimate the difficulties of implementing civilian-based defense. Not only does it involve severe sacrifice as conventional wars have done, but the resistance of the status quo to change is very powerful. President Bush opposes deep cuts in military spending despite the changes in Europe. In Canada we have seen overwhelmingly the reluctance to respond to that change. We know how pervasive violence is in our society and how difficult it will be to alter the instinct to respond immediately to a crisis with violence. But it is an important challenge that has been put in front of us both for my country and for the world community, and one to which I hope that we will rise. □

3. Gwynne Dyer

I found Gene Sharp's address very interesting, and I am pleased that he has shared his thoughts with us. I find, however, that almost all his evidence for the success of civilian-based defense is derived from its success against coups, against military uprisings, and by extension, against repressive regimes by the oppressed nationals. There is very little evidence, at least so far, that civilian-based defense techniques would be equally effective, or effective at all, against most cases of foreign invasion. I regret to note this because it is an extremely attractive notion that matters of security and violence in the world can be handled without violence by those on the side of right and good. However, I am not fully persuaded that it is the case.

It is true that civilian-based defense would have been perhaps an effective, certainly a sensible defense policy for Canadians in the last century against the occasional real threat of an American invasion. However, that was mainly because we could not have done anything else effectively, and we might have shamed them into leaving, or at least denied them a profit from staying. However, I think you would have a great deal of difficulty in persuading anybody who now lives in Palestine, or the land that was Palestine, that civilian-based defense is a promising solution to their security problems. Nor do I think many Israelis would be persuaded that there is a reasonable prospect of ensuring their security by preparing to refuse all collaboration to Arab invaders. After three years of the Intifada, which is an attempt to use primarily nonviolent techniques to force an invader to leave, most Palestinians do not regard nonviolence as a promising tool. They may be wrong in the sense that there clearly is fallout in terms of foreign pressure on Israel from the use of this technique for attempting to force the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories. But it is at least, as Gene Sharp recognizes, a risky, difficult, and uncertain business to attempt to use nonviolent resistance against even the kind of invasion and occupation that the Israelis have imposed upon the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

I agree that nonviolent resistance, or

civilian-based resistance, the withdrawal of cooperation, has been used extensively to overcome foreign invasion and occupation in the case of the colonial empires, who once occupied two thirds of the world and were forced to withdraw during the 1950s and 1960s. Gandhi, of course, is the leading proponent of nonviolent resistance to foreign invasion and occupation of India, and his example is at the root of many subsequent attempts to use civilian-based resistance means to oppose and even overthrow violent, illegal, or illegitimate regimes either imposed from outside or drawn from elements within one's own country. But I must add that violent means worked equally well in getting rid of foreign invaders in the colonial case, and in many instances were probably the only appropriate means to use to drive out, for example, the Portuguese from Angola or the French from Algeria. I do not really think that nonviolent means alone would have been sufficient. Moreover, the colonial context was one in which, at least theoretically, the imperial power attempted to make a profit out of the colony. All that was necessary was to raise the cost of the occupation, either by nonviolent or by violent means, above a certain fairly low level and it became logical and indeed inevitable that the occupying power would cut its costs and go home. This is how decolonization happened. The empire ceased to be profitable—too many troops were needed, political costs were posed at home—and so they withdrew.

Very little war today in the industrialized societies of the world is driven by that kind of motive. Wars are not generally fought, and certainly not in the industrialized world, because a country wants to possess the resources of its neighbor or to take over the territory and exploit the productive capacity of its neighbors. It is cheaper to buy what is needed. War destroys what one might seek to possess when it is fought with modern weapons. War and the threat of war in most of the world today does not come from the desire to occupy and exploit a territory, and therefore will not be deterred by the withdrawal of cooperation and the resistance of the domestic population. It is driven by so-called strategic considerations; that is, by the paranoid fear for one's own security which leads one to strike preemptively or by the desire to distract one's own population by foreign war or by the need

simply to save face. These are the reasons governments go to war—not to make a profit, because war is unprofitable. Selling arms is profitable, war is not.

The problem this poses for the entire concept of civilian-based defense has to be addressed head on. If the motive of an aggressor who sends armored divisions into another's territory is not to turn a profit or exploit its population and resources, but is rather to get to the next country beyond it where the enemy is or to occupy this territory before it is used against him or to save face having made a threat he will not back down from or to distract his home population with a foreign war, then he will not be deterred or driven out by the withdrawal of cooperation by the conquered population. Moreover, foreign occupiers can be very brutal. They are not constrained by the same considerations that they would face when dealing with their own population. So I am dubious about the likelihood of subverting an invader's troops. It is much easier to subvert local troops when a government tries to use them against its own population (because they all speak the same language and are drawn from the same population) than it is to subvert a foreigner's troops when they arrive unbidden in a country.

If a war is linked in the invader's mind with the survival of his own regime, because of consideration of security and face, he is very unlikely to withdraw unless the cost becomes absolutely prohibitive. It is difficult to see how it could become so simply through the use of civilian-based defense techniques. Even when the invasion is the traditional occupation of territory for profit, the sort of thing that Iraq did to Kuwait, it is difficult to see how civilian-based defense would either have deterred or subsequently have expelled the Iraqi invaders without the resort to other means. I will deal below with the question of those other means.

So civilian-based defense as an anticoup technique is effective, but then it is working within a civil society where there is a certain recognition of mutual rights and duties. When we know what is legitimate politically, we will not accept what is undemocratic and illegitimate. For that very reason, in one democratic society after another coups have become unthinkable.

Continued on next page

Gwynne Dyer is a journalist and military historian; he wrote and narrated the National Film Board of Canada series War.

Even Russia has recently joined that steadily expanding fraternity of countries, though it cannot yet consider itself safe. However, until these kinds of assumptions about what is legitimate, about how politics ought to work domestically (including the rule that violence has no place in politics) extend across borders, there will still be a large role for international force.

Without an international civil society with common assumptions about what is appropriate and acceptable behavior and what is not, such as domestic civil society has, only superior force will be able to constrain unlawful force. The main method that people of goodwill have pursued for the past three generations to overcome this problem has been the creation of a system of international law and of international law enforcement through first the League of Nations and then the United Nations. It is unromantic, it will not deliver instant results, and sometimes it involves the use of military

violence. But it has been for a long time the principal approach that people concerned with peace and the prevention of war have pursued in a world of sovereign states. I would urge you not to disregard it. In fact, I regard it as a far more important avenue still for the pursuit of international peace and justice than civilian-based defense because it is more than a technique; it is an edifice of law. Civilian-based defense has its role, certainly, but I do not believe that it will supplant the attempt to build an international system of law and justice. I accept that this will from time to time involve the use of the police forces of the United Nations.

But be of good heart. The new thinking in the Soviet Union that made the revival of the United Nations possible in the last few years comes from the spread of democratic ideas and values. The fact that we do not fear invasion by the United States, that no democratic industrial state fears invasion by other such states, that there is a large stable

zone of peace in the world where it is inconceivable that neighboring countries would go to war against each other suggests that there is a close connection between the spread of democracy and the spread of peace. In fact, democratic ideas helped to create the concept of a civil society that extends across international borders, and no fully democratic countries have fought wars against each other.

Which brings us full circle, to the fundamental democratic ideas that make civilian-based defense so important in the anticoup role, in the domestic role. As democracy spreads in the world, and it is spreading fast, so I think civil society, the idea of a shared fate and of legitimate democratic means as the only means for settling disputes, will also spread. But I regret to say that we're not there yet, and I would urge that the United Nations and the attempt to build an international system of justice not be neglected. □

A WORLD WITHOUT ARMIES: MORE THAN TECHNIQUES

Leonard Desroches

This article is a critique of the international conference on civilian-based defense in Windsor, Ontario, September 6-8, 1991.

Ideologies and Doctrines Versus Spirituality

During the conference there was some confusion of language. Ideologies and creeds were confused with the much broader reality of spirituality (some would say "philosophy"). I would like to propose a way of looking at spirituality that might be helpful in the context of CBD.

When I was invited, along with a few others, to join some of the Mohawk Indians at Kanasatake and Kanahwake to explore nonviolent training, two words I heard over and over were "respect" and "trust." Respect and trust are spiritual realities. Imagine ten or ten thousand people spending months relentlessly training themselves in civilian-based defense until they were highly proficient at all the techniques. Imagine there was no trust and respect among them. Would any one of us seriously suggest that their techniques of civilian-based defense

would work?

We need to have the strongest possible intellectual discipline in researching and organizing the techniques of civilian-based defense. I am suggesting that it is equally crucial for us to acknowledge the positive and negative spiritual realities of life, such as trust, respect, and greed. I propose that it is not good enough to simply grudgingly acknowledge that, in our collective efforts toward the development of CBD, we all come from different spiritual (some would say "philosophical") perspectives. Beyond mere acknowledgement, we have to engage one another, respectfully, in a full exploration of such realities. We might be afraid to do so, just as some are afraid to be intellectually rigorous. But it is vital.

Differentiating Between the Promotion and the Development of CBD

It seems to me very helpful to distinguish between the promotion and the internal development of CBD by a group. In the promotion of CBD, it is especially crucial that it be presented free of doctrines or ideologies. But groups and individuals who are attempting to develop CBD internally need to be aware of all the spiritual roots that have taken them where they are and that

continue to sustain them. For example, a group of pacifists would simply diminish the rational dimension of their work for CBD if they divorced it from the inspiration derived from others who have also made a choice of total noncooperation with all war. It is when such a group is promoting CBD that they need to be clear that CBD should not (and need not) be appropriated by pacifists. We simply need to respect and learn from one another's spirituality as being the places where the strategies and tactics *come from*—whether that be native American spirituality or Gandhi's "satyagraha" or women's sense of "power with versus power over" or Martin Luther King's "agape" (a love that includes the enemy) or the "relentless persistence" of Latin Americans.

In Conclusion

A world without armies will come about by much more than mere techniques—essential though they are. We need to develop both the practice and the spirituality of "people power": how to put in motion the best sanctions, how to nurture respect, and how to face fear or anger. To study and develop a lasting civilian-based defense is to study and develop both dimensions. □

Leonard Desroches does nonviolence training for many groups.

BALTICS CONTINUE EXAMINING CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

Bruce Jenkins

The consideration of civilian-based defense (CBD) in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has recently received much attention in these pages. As has been previously reported, all three Baltic States are currently developing concepts of "total defense"; in Lithuania and Latvia, these plans include the official adoption of CBD alongside military defense structures.

In a lecture at Harvard University this past July, Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Audrius Butkevicius stated, "It is our intention to make civilian-based defense part of our defense policy." Formal parliamentary consideration of the Defense Ministry's proposals is not likely to take place until after the October 25 general elections. One recent development, however, should ease the pressure surrounding consideration of Lithuanian defense options: in September, Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis and Russian President Boris Yeltsin approved the terms of Russian troop withdrawal (to be completed by August 31, 1993) from Lithuania. The final agreement

Bruce Jenkins is a special assistant at the Albert Einstein Institution.

is expected to be signed in early October.

The Latvian Ministry of Defense has been revising its "Defense Concept," which includes provisions for "nonmilitary resistance" in the event of an occupation or a coup attempt. At a conference on "The Relevance of Civilian-Based Defense for the Baltic States" in Vilnius, Lithuania, this past June, representatives of the Latvian Popular Front put forward their own proposed "Nonmilitary Resistance Concept of the Republic of Latvia." The document states:

The purpose of nonmilitary resistance is to mobilize all the civilian population of the State to active resistance against the aggressors (either foreign invaders or perpetrators of a coup d'état) with the aim to help the National Defense Forces to beat off the enemy attack, to preserve Latvia's freedom and independence, the legal order and the Government. In case of a considerable armed superiority of the aggressor, the nonmilitary resistance turns into the main

defense policy of the State.

The nonmilitary resistance employs political, economic, social and psychological means of struggle: various protest actions, total disobedience, noncooperation with the enemy, strikes, sabotage, economic shutdown or cessation of particular functions of the economy, disruption of economic activities, and other activities with the aim to preclude the aggressors from achieving their goals and to make them retreat.

The Latvian Supreme Council is expected to discuss both the Ministry of Defense's proposal and the Popular Front's plan in the coming months.

As with its neighbors to the south, Estonia is developing a "total defense" policy with an eye on Finnish and other Nordic models of defense. At this time it is unclear whether and to what extent CBD will be officially incorporated into Estonian defense policy. □

AROUND THE WORLD

Ecuador: Multinational? From April 11 to April 23, twelve hundred Ecuadorean Indians marched from Ecuador's Amazon jungle to Quito. Jennifer Collins has stated:

Many see this as the most significant event undertaken by Ecuador's indigenous people since June 1990 when CONAIE [the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador] organized the "National Uprising of Indigenous Peoples," occupying public buildings, blocking access and cutting off food supplies.

A delegation of these Indians met with President Rodrigo Borja in Quito to press their demands for legal recognition of their territories and for a constitutional reform recognizing Ecuador as a multicultural and multinational state. Until now, the Indians have not been able to get legal recognition

of their lands, which are being threatened by the ecological destruction of the Amazon. This time in Quito, President Borja announced that he would give the marchers title to their lands within two weeks. As part of normal procedure, he referred the demand for constitutional reform to the Congress. The land titles that the Indians received represent a major achievement for them in their perpetual struggles.

During their march, the Ecuadorean Indians were harassed by military authorities. Yet the Indians proceeded peacefully. (Sources: Philip McManus, "Ecuadorean Indians March for Land and Life," *Nonviolent Sanctions*, vol. 3, no. 4/vol. 4, no. 1 [Spring/Summer, 1992], pp. 3, 12. Jennifer Collins, "Ecuadorean Indians March to Capital," *Latinamerica Press*, vol. 24, no. 16 [April 30, 1992]).

Sara Elkin

Canada: Feminist Alternative. In Canada, the National Action Committee (NAC) on the Status of Women voted at its 1991 Annual General Meeting to adopt a comprehensive feminist alternative to the conservative economic and social agenda of Canada. NAC has in place a series of policies, including nonmilitary security. NAC's draft women's charter says, "There must be global demilitarization and an end to international weapons trade and to war exercises...We want Canada to withdraw from all military alliances...Canada's military budget should be reallocated to education and social services, economic development and environmental programs. Its military installations and military production facilities must be converted to socially productive uses." (Source: Marion Mathieson, "The 52% Solution: A Compre-

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hensive Feminist Alternative to the Conservative Political Agenda," *Peace Magazine*, vol. 8, no. 4 [July/August 1992], p. 14).
Paul E. Anders

United States? Western Shoshone Update.

In the last issue, we published the article, "Native Americans' Sovereignty," which discussed the question of Native Americans' sovereignty and defense, including that of the Western Shoshone. We later received the following notice from the Western Shoshone Defense Council:

BLM Gives Notice: Will Take Western Shoshone Livestock Anytime
Monday, August 3, 1992
Crescent Valley, Newe Segobia
— The U.S. Bureau of Land Management sent a "Notice of Intent to Impound" nationalized Western Shoshone livestock of Carrie and Mary Dann on July 29, 1992. The BLM says it may come in anytime after five days from delivery of the notice and within a period of 12 months to take the livestock. The letter includes the phrases "unauthorized livestock" and "property of the United States."

The U.S. government took Western Shoshone land in the last century and continues to this day to attempt to take away the Western Shoshone livelihood. Five hundred years after Columbus, the oppression continues. And five hundred years later, the resistance to oppression will continue.

WHAT YOU CAN DO.

Come to the Base Camp. Help watch over Western Shoshone land and livestock. Help prepare for and to support peaceful resistance. Be on Standby Alert. Be ready to come to Western Shoshone land if the U.S. government moves in. Help support the Base Camp and organizing efforts with your donations. Immediately contact: U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye, Chair, Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20515, Tel. (202) 224-3934, Fax (202) 224-6747. Thank him for his recent efforts towards initiating negotiations between the Western Shoshone people and the U.S. government. Be clear

with him: The Western Shoshone National Council, the traditional governing body that is not controlled by the U.S. under the Bureau of Indian Affairs, must be included in the negotiations. The BLM must halt its threat of a roundup while negotiations get underway. Also contact your Congressperson.

Paul E. Anders

Italy: Nonmilitary Defense. The main political work of the Movimento Internazionale della Riconciliazione (MIR) is for the National War Tax Resistance Campaign, which is also supported by other organizations. Begun about 12 years ago, the campaign is supported by about 5,000 war tax resisters. Among other projects, the campaign finances one on civilian-based defense. The Italian Parliament has been asked to give people the choice between financing a military or a nonviolent defense. (Source: Alberto Zangheri, "Movimento Internazionale della Riconciliazione [MIR], Italy," *Reconciliation International*, vol. 7, no. 3 [autumn 1992], p. 13). Address of MIR: Via Cornaro 1/a, 35128 Padova—PD, Italy. Phone: +39-49-26 977 and 39 304.
Paul E. Anders □

LETTERS

Tribute to Melvin Beckman

To the Board and Members of the Civilian-Based Defense Association:

The four of us would like to pay tribute to Mel Beckman who has been chief editor and steward of *Civilian-Based Defense: News Opinion* over the decade since it was first launched in 1982.

Mel was instrumental in helping the Metro Omaha Peace Association transform itself from a local peace organization into the Association for Transarmament Studies (later renamed the Civilian-based Defense Association), a national organization promoting a specific idea: that the concept of "civilian-based defense" offered an exciting nonviolent alternative to defense by conventional and nuclear means.

At Gene Sharp's suggestion, he took on Philip Bogdonoff and Julia Kittross as

assistant editors for the Association's newsletter. Over the years the configuration of assistants changed but Mel remained steadfastly at the helm until just recently when family needs pulled him away.

As his associates we have learned much from his example: about working with all varieties of people, about working with modest means, about the progress that comes from steady commitment to a vision.

He has been persistently intent on letting people in his community, nation, and world know about civilian-based defense in a variety of ways—through launching and editing *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion*, writing to authors and soliciting articles from all corners of the earth, going to conferences to promote the Civilian-based defense Association and to report on the

proceedings, even spurring the board to sponsor its own conferences.

As an author and editor his language is clear and direct. He is consistently receptive to other people's ideas and a master at synthesizing. When his judgment on an issue differs, he listens to the others, then, if necessary, presents his case clearly and, usually, convincingly. He has been doggedly unselfish in doing a lot more than his share.

Mel's thoroughness and attention to detail make him a pleasure to work with; and, more than that, give one an appreciation of what it means to be involved in a genuinely respectful and cooperative enterprise. One might say that Mel embodies the Taoist

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ideal of leading and loving people without trying to impose his will. He leads by example.

He is a powerful man, albeit quiet and modest, exemplifying nonviolent strength. Both in his leadership of the Civilian-Based Defense Association and in his editorial capacities, he's been so open and kind to other people, so imaginative in seeing how people could contribute, and generous in providing them the space in which to do it.

Mel, thank you for your immense contribution to CBDA and to those of us whose lives you have touched!

With best wishes,

Phil Bogdonoff

Robert Holmes

Julia Kittross

Liane Norman

Responses to Steven Huxley

To the Editor:

Steven Huxley's piece in your August issue, "Nonviolence Misconceived? A Critique of Civilian-based Defense," perpetuates the false and tired old dichotomy that there are two approaches to nonviolence, one principled and the other narrowly pragmatic, and the notion that one of them (preferably the one he likes) must be judged superior. Huxley tells us that his argument is "straightforward," but it is nothing of the kind. It compares apples with oranges to arrive at a confused and elitist conclusion.

The appropriate distinction that should be made is not between two supposedly antithetical approaches to nonviolence, but a valid recognition of two radically different phenomena. On the one hand, there are *ideas* about nonviolence and nonviolent action (Huxley's and Sharp's included) and, on the other hand, there is the actual performance of nonviolent action by real people in the real world with real consequences. The challenge of Sharp's perspective is that it forces us to deal with the truth of that distinction and to consider its implications for policy.

It is a matter of fact rather than of opinion or preference that the vast majority of people who trust their lives and aspirations to campaigns of

nonviolent action year after year do not subscribe to Huxley's (or anybody's) transformationalist politics. Nor do they report their basic motivation to be a desire to eradicate the root causes of conflict. Nonviolent action is used, like it or not, on behalf of narrowly conceived interests all the time, and the world is arguably better off than if the same people had turned to ineffectual and destructive violence.

Is mass nonviolent action, in South Africa, for example, an inferior alternative to surrender, premature accommodation, or violent struggle, just because its leaders do not profess anything like Huxley's world view? Is the active consideration of civilian-based defense by Baltic governments less likely to make a contribution to stability, security, and de-escalation in that region just because most Balts care more about national autonomy than the ultimate transformation of Europe?

The real difference between Huxley and Sharp is not the difference between a comprehensive versus a reductionist approach, but between a utopian scheme divorced from the practice of nonviolent action and an incremental approach that pays better attention to historical realities. The effect of siding with Huxley's utopian view is to deny access to, and consideration of, a desperately needed (albeit limited) alternative to violence to anyone who is not prepared to swallow his ideology whole.

*Christopher Kruegler, President
The Albert Einstein Institution*

To the Editor:

It is unfortunate that Steven Huxley's two articles in your August 1992 issue may not only contribute to some confusion but also may lead some readers to think that he is less capable of clear analysis and scholarly research than is in fact the case.

In "Nonviolence Misconceived?" he postulates a single phenomenon, "nonviolence", which is then subject to interpretation in at least two ways: as "a comprehensive transformation of the individual and society" and "more narrowly" as "nonviolent struggle" by means which "stop short of direct physical violence."

Let there be no initial conceptual confusion here. Principled nonviolence and nonviolent struggle are distinct phenomena which only occasionally are intertwined. If one says they are both facets of a single phenomenon, "nonviolence," one is not simply mixing different phenomena, but is ignoring much historical and political practice. (See "Types of Principled Nonviolence" and *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*.)*

Of course there are various—and often appropriate—views about the role of believers in principled nonviolence in the development, use, and promotion of the technique of nonviolent struggle. The distinction between the two phenomena, however, must be very clear.

Huxley calls for his first variant of "nonviolence"—"a comprehensive transformation of the individual and society"—stating it is the only way for communities to reduce or abolish reliance on violent sanctions.

Yet the conceptual fog sets thick around the means he advocates to achieve this end. For example, instead of seeking to develop civilian-based defense by nonviolent struggle as a primary means to provide security, he prefers "the more comprehensive proposals put forth, for example, by European peace researchers, social activists and defense experts (for example, Fischer, Nolte, Øberg 1989) which include significant military and paramilitary elements.

Huxley postulates that the end of military systems will not come through the development of practical systems of non-military defense. Instead, he indicates that military systems will be eradicated through a long process of undermining the forces which have caused and supported such systems, culminating in "something as momentous as the Revolution of 1989."

The desirability of steps to contribute to social, political, and economic transformation is clear, but the expectation of war being abolished by a momentous revolution is naïve and romantic to the extreme. That is a great leap of unfounded faith and ignores some important aspects of society and history. There is no precedent of societies repudiating their own military

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*Editor's note. References are given at the end of the article.

systems in such a way. Civilian-based defense is much closer to the mark because we can analyze actual cases of the application of nonviolent struggle against specific acts of aggression.

Conceptually, Huxley fuzzes up the level of analysis in his article. He compares in scope his comprehensive view of domestic and international transformation with civilian-based defense, which is only a defense policy. Not surprisingly, he finds the defense policy very limited as compared to his wide conception.

He then attacks me personally for supposedly having no wider conception than civilian-based defense. I have written of my ideas of needed societal transformation elsewhere. (See "Rethinking Politics," "The Problem of Political Technique in Radical Politics," "The Societal Imperative," and "Popular Empowerment.")

Yet, one must remain realistic: there is no panacea to all our problems. I have focussed so much of my work on civilian-based defense because of a view that it is necessary both to eliminate war and to provide defense, and also because without removing war all visions of social, political, and international transformation will fail.

The test of a valid program of change is not the sweep of words, expressions of condemnation, or of dreams. Rather, the test of visions of social change is whether a viable program to achieve the desired better system can be formulated. A policy of defense to replace war is one part of this.

By implication at least, Huxley further misrepresents my views, making them appear naïve concerning the role and consequences of violence in political systems, both in terms of the various functions of war (including attack and domination) and in terms of the structural consequences of military systems. I have addressed those issues elsewhere and there should be no confusion. (See "Seeking a Solution to the Problem of War" and "The Societal Imperative.")

Of course, as I have discussed, there is often a variety of motives for possessing military capacities. Where the motive is genuinely defense or prevention of attack, serious consideration of civilian-based defense is possible, provided that it is seen to be viable. Steps can then be taken towards its incremental adoption. Support for this is possible from military personnel as well as others.

Where the motives for possessing

military capacities are something other than defense, the known availability of a credible nonmilitary way to provide defense and deterrence would cause people to ask why the leaders nevertheless wanted the more dangerous and more expensive military weaponry. The availability of the civilian-based defense policy could thus rip away the mask of "defense" (hiding the demands for military weaponry behind false claims of necessary defense) and expose the true motives of those advocating a strong military capacity for other purposes.

Of course it is desirable for all countries to renounce military intervention in other countries. Such intervention can now be "justified" by claims that the action is to defend some weaker country from aggression or to liberate the people from their own government. The capacity for self-reliant defense and self-liberation by nonmilitary means would help expose such false claims. Under those conditions the military intervention would then be seen to be outright aggression. Furthermore, when the motive for military might is internal oppression or external aggression, organized "people power" could then be used to oust that government without undermining the actual defense capacity of their country.

The sellers of military weaponry of course merit major blame. Systems of profit and structural economic dependence on military weaponry do often account for the proliferation of military weapons. However, in many countries—not all—the motive of the buyers is to develop a defense capacity.

Like it or not, many countries are not situated in the "relatively peaceful" Nordic area and do face potential military aggression from neighboring states. International relations and political regimes can change rapidly, unleashing aggression where it was not generally expected. Civilian-based defense potentially offers to those countries a defense capacity which is economically far more sensible than expensive military hardware.

The assumption that considerations of defense play no role in support for military systems, as well as in many people's persistent opposition to disarmament or demilitarization, accounts in large degree for the failure of the peace and pacifist movements to abolish war. Repeating that assumption merely promises continued failure of peace and antimilitary activities based upon it.

Huxley belittles the extremely impor-

tant current policy consideration of civilian-based resistance components for the developing defense policies of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. (See Bruce Jenkins, "Civilian-Based Defense Discussed in Moscow and Baltics" and Roger Powers, "Baltic Defense Officials Consider Relevance of Civilian-Based Defense at Vilnius Conference.") Huxley argues that because these countries have yet decided to adopt full civilian-based defense policies, full transarmament anywhere is impossible at any time.

If the objective is an effective defense and deterrence capacity through civilian-based defense, then the issue is how to reach that objective. Full immediate adoption is simply not going to happen, probably not anywhere. Even partial adoption through the addition of civilian-based resistance components will have to come in stages. Belittling the incremental approach may make some people feel good, but far more important is taking the steps that are possible. At times, those steps may remain very limited. They need not remain so, however, if the effectiveness and credibility of civilian-based resistance components can be further developed.

Just as civilian-based resistance components can be developed while military systems are in place, so also these components can be used in association with various regional or United Nations security arrangements which exist or might be developed. Each proposed combination would merit careful consideration in terms of its usefulness and viability.

Huxley concludes that we advocates of civilian-based defense should abandon our work and join the "peace and democracy movement"—as though the work on nonviolent struggle and its defense application is irrelevant to the causes of peace and democracy, and as though the policy accomplishments of the "peace movement" over many decades toward the abolition of war have been impressive!

Lacking patience with the significant steps forward which the incremental approach to transarmament has made in a short time, Huxley instead opts for a long course of continuing and repeating essentially the same modes of action practiced unsuccessfully in the past in efforts to achieve a better world.

There are people who will respond favorably to Huxley's rejection of military

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terminology and of efforts to persuade military personnel of the merits of civilian-based defense and nonviolent struggle. He claims that these practices will only lead to the subordination of these means to military force. Hence, we who work in this field are supposed to admit that our endeavor is only "a minor branch of military research and development" (emphasis added).

It is necessary to reject such groundless assertions. If they are believed, against significant evidence, such resignation will most certainly help relegate civilian-based defense to an insignificant, minor status.

It is amazing how little confidence in the power of nonviolent struggle is possessed by some peace advocates! The limited steps already taken in consideration and adoption of civilian-based resistance components are real and significant moves toward replacing military systems.

What is really involved here is the distinction between policy and ideology, between civilian-based defense and the assertion of a societal vision without a credible comprehensive program to achieve either the abandonment of military systems or the desired social, political, and economic transformation.

Civilian-based defense is not an ideological vision nor is it a comprehensive program for full societal change. The developers of this policy have never claimed that it is either of these. Civilian-based defense is not a panacea. It does not address many crucial issues, some of which Huxley identifies, that of course merit serious concern and solutions.

Civilian-based defense is proposed simply as a way to provide effective defense against international aggression and the imposition of internal dictatorships. Historical experience has demonstrated that the basic modes of its operation can be applied

and be effective in societies which are highly imperfect.

However, without a viable system of defense against both external aggression and internal usurpations, there is virtually no chance of any society abandoning its military options, however limited and irrational they may in fact be. This applies even to societies that have attempted major social revolutions.

I stand by the assumption of the *Civilian-Based Defense* book (I invite readers to examine it for themselves), which Huxley quotes, "that no country will permanently relinquish its military options unless and until it has a deserved confidence in a viable, developed civilian-based defense policy."

Steven Huxley has chosen to oppose the development of civilian-based defense and civilian-based resistance components. Fine. That is his prerogative, and he should now be expected to pursue his own approach in his own separate way. I wish his scholarly research well.

It is time for the rest of us who support development of civilian-based defense to become very clear about this approach, to engage in self-education, to subject it to nonideological analysis, and to promote its serious consideration.

Gene Sharp

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