

Civilian-based Defense: News & Opinion

EXPLORING A NONVIOLENT STRATEGY
FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE

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EDITOR.....Paul Anders
CONSULTING EDITORS.....Melvin G. Beckman
Philip D. Bogdonoff
ASSOCIATE EDITOR.....Kenneth Haynes
LAYOUT.....Wendy Brinker

Civilian-based Defense Association
154 Auburn Street

Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139-3969, USA
Telephone (617)868-6058 • E-mail cbda@igc.org

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BALTIC DEFENSE OFFICIALS CONSIDER CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE AT VILNIUS CONFERENCE

Roger S. Powers

Official consideration of civilian-based defense received a boost this June, when about fifty political leaders, defense specialists, and scholars of nonviolent action from nine countries gathered in Vilnius, Lithuania for a conference on "The Relevance of Civilian-Based Defense for the Baltic States."

It was the first time that defense ministry representatives from four different countries—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Sweden—have come together to consider the potential of civilian-based defense (CBD) for their countries. Other conference participants came from Australia, England, Poland, Russia, and the United States.

The three-day conference was cosponsored by the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Lithuania and the Albert Einstein Institution in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It was organized with the assistance of the Nonviolent Action Center in Vilnius.

Among the topics discussed during the conference were the recent experiences of the Baltic states with improvised civilian resistance, various strategies of CBD, alternative models of adopting CBD, planning and organization in CBD, and international assistance to countries using CBD.

Lithuania and Latvia are in the process of drafting their defense policies and plan to include civilian-based defense as a component of their overall policies. Estonia is considering that option, but is not as far along in the defense planning process as the other two Baltic states are.

Of immediate concern to the Baltic states is the continued presence of some 120,000 Russian troops on their territory. As one Estonian put it: "World War II is not over for us. We are still occupied and colonized." Getting the Russian troops to withdraw is of critical importance to them.

A statement adopted at the conclusion of the conference said, in part:

The strategy of civilian-based defense can and should be used successfully to guarantee the security of the Baltic states and, in particular, to have Russia withdraw its troops.

The success of civilian-based defense in the Baltic states depends to a great extent on the support of international organizations, individual governmental and nongovernmental organizations. One step in this direction is the development of a Baltic Civilian-Based Defense Mutual Aid Treaty to state concrete ways in which such international support would be supplied by signatory nations to any attacked member using civilian-based defense measures.

The author is publications and special projects coordinator at the Albert Einstein Institution and editor of Nonviolent Sanctions.

CHANGING EDITORS, AGAIN

Paul E. Anders

Apologies to all for the lateness of this issue. It is much larger than usual, and in the United States is being sent by first class mail, if that's any consolation. Several factors have contributed to our being behind schedule. First, my mother died in June and my family obligations that month greatly reduced time available for the magazine. Second, although our last issue noted that Philip Bogdonoff would be the volunteer interim editor of *Civilian-Based Defense: News and Opinion*, it became apparent by early May that his other responsibilities would prevent him from serving. Because I had hoped to devote myself to administrative aspects of our work, I assumed the job of editor with mixed feelings. However, as editor I can more easily keep tabs on what is happening with CBD worldwide and indulge my stylistic proclivities. Philip Bogdonoff and Melvin Beckman continue as consulting editors. They will peruse the magazine before it goes to the printer, so if you don't like our diction or syntax, you can blame them too. Thanks to Robert Holmes who served as one of our consulting editors for several years and now takes leave of that position.

All correspondence for *Civilian-based Defense: News and Opinion* should be sent to me at Civilian-based Defense Association, 154 Auburn St., Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139.

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW AND THE BALTICS

Bruce Jenkins

In light of the severe economic, social, and political upheavals in the territories of the former Soviet Union, there is obvious fear of future attempts to reassert authoritarian rule. Policy makers, scholars, and activists in Moscow and the Baltic states are examining civilian-based defense as a possible option to head off future hard-line coups or military takeovers. The improvised "people power" victory over the August 1991 putsch attempt serves as a powerful example of how civilians can protect their democratic structures.

From November 14 to December 7, 1991, Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins of the Albert Einstein Institution visited Moscow, Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn in response to invitations to discuss the potential of organized civilian forms of resistance to block attempted coups and foreign invasions. Dr. Sharp's writings on the subject have become well known among certain policy makers in these countries.

MOSCOW

In Moscow, the "Living Ring," a popular organization born out of the August 1991 anti-coup actions, invited Dr. Sharp to present his findings on civilian forms of anti-coup defense. One of the main goals of the Living Ring is to develop plans to block future coup attempts. In two papers translated into Russian for the visit, Dr. Sharp outlined the basic premises of civilian resistance to coups: through massive noncooperation and the denial of legitimacy, populations can deny putschists the social, economic, and political resources needed to consolidate rule. Coups, he said, can be defeated through political starvation.

While in Moscow, Dr. Sharp and Mr. Jenkins also met with three members of the Russian Parliamentary Commission on Investigations of the Circumstances of the Coup d'État. The Commission's mandate is to investigate the attempted August 1991 putsch and to make legislative recommendations designed to help prevent future coups. In a meeting at the Russian "White House," a member of the Commission raised the idea of adding to the Russian constitution a noncooperation clause that would require citizens to refuse cooperation with putschists. He also suggested including in the military induction oath a clause forbidding cooperation with usurpers.

Dr. Sharp discussed the main outlines of his anti-coup papers with the parliamentarians, emphasizing that strategy, planning, and preparation are just as important in civilian resistance as in military combat. The Commission members expressed great interest in Dr. Sharp's book *Civilian-Based Defense*, which will be published in Russian later this year.

LITHUANIA

In formulating its defense policy, Lithuania has devoted much attention to civilian-based defense (see *Nonviolent Sanctions*, Spring 1991). The republic gained important experience with improvised forms of civilian defense during its independence struggle. In January 1991, for example, the government mobilized citizens to form human barricades around the parliament building when Soviet forces attacked and occupied the Vilnius TV and radio stations. In February 1991, the Supreme Council declared nonviolent resistance to be the primary means of struggle in the event of a Soviet occupation.

In a recent meeting in Vilnius, Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius stated that *Civilian-Based Defense* served as a basis for much of his planning of nonviolent resistance over the past year and a half. In mid-1990 Dr. Butkevicius had an early draft of the book translated into Lithuanian for use by government officials.

Lithuania is currently adopting a "mix" of military and civilian forms of defense. The republic has established a professional army. In a meeting with the Einstein Institution representatives, then Deputy Defense Minister Stankovicus outlined three purposes of the army: (1) to counter terrorist attacks, (2) to engage an enemy, thus signaling to the international community that Lithuania had been attacked, and (3) to perform an unspecified role in some future European collective security system.

In the event of an attack by a well armed, clearly superior enemy, Mr. Stankovicus said Lithuania would rely on some form of civilian-based defense: "When we see our rival is well organized and prepared to use massive force, in this case we will use nonviolence." In separate meetings, Defense Minister Butkevicius and Lithuanian Vice-President Bronislovas Kusmickas also expressed this position.

A newly established non-governmental Nonviolent Action Center will be given tasks in analyzing and implementing civilian-based defense in Lithuania. The Ministry of Defense plans to contract out various research and publication projects to the center. In addition, the Volunteers (National Guard) will perform roles in instituting civilian-based defense as a part of Lithuanian national defense policy.

LATVIA

Latvia has also experience in improvised nonviolent resistance for defense. For example, in mid-December 1990, the Latvian Popular Front issued an "Appeal for the Hour X." The document called for total noncooperation of the civilian population with the attackers in the event of a large-scale attack by the Soviet Army. Among other things, it advised citizens to comply only with the laws of the Supreme Council of Latvia, to ignore the attackers' orders, not to participate in any elections or referendums, and to document all crimes perpetrated by the attackers. At the same time members of the Supreme Council's Commission on Defense and Home Affairs devised plans to use chains of unarmed people to protect important public buildings.

In January 1991, aspects of this plan went into effect. Radio appeals drew people to protect the parliament building after the attack in Vilnius. Barricades were set up around the parliament, volunteers were organized to feed people and provide medical services. On January 20, five people were killed and 14 were wounded by what appeared to be Soviet "Black Beret" troops. But Latvians maintained their vigil to protect their independent government.

While Latvia is still formulating a national defense policy, the republic has established a two-part military system, conscription-based "Border Guards," Navy and Air-Defense Forces, and a volunteer "Home Guard." In a meeting in the Latvian parliament, Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis outlined the main purposes of these forces: to protect Latvia's borders and to counter terrorist acts and renegade military units (over 50,000 foreign troops are still stationed in Latvia).

Mr. Jundzis and other members of the Supreme Council's Commission on Defense and Home Affairs affirmed Latvia's intention to employ organized civilian resistance in the event of a large-scale attack. Mr. Jundzis stated, "An important component of our defense policy will be nonviolent resistance. Obviously we have no way to win militarily over large invaders."

The task now facing Latvian defense planners, a member of the Defense Commission said, is defining what proportion of the overall defense system will be civilian-based defense.

In June 1991, the Latvian Supreme Council voted to establish a Center for Nonviolent Resistance. The concept paper for

NONVIOLENCE MISCONCEIVED? A CRITIQUE OF CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

Steven Huxley, Ph.D.

Nonviolence as an alternative to armed conflict can be interpreted in at least two ways (two is enough for present purposes). It can refer to a comprehensive transformation of the individual and society which would result in the reduction and ultimate eradication of armed conflict (for a recent example of this approach, see Rajsamand Declaration). This may include any of the many piecemeal approaches, both governmental and nongovernmental, to promote an equitable global common security (see Fischer, Nolte, Oberg 1989).

More narrowly, nonviolence can refer specifically to nonviolent struggle aimed at defeating an enemy by using various means of force and coercion which can sometimes differ from violent means of conflict only in that they stop short of direct physical violence.

Sometimes nonviolence in the narrow second sense, in the form of social or civilian-based defense (*i.e.*, a functional replacement of the military) is seen as the key to the decisive reduction and even elimination of the military from society and the establishment of nonviolence in the first and broader sense. I hold that this is mistaken and that even those who only see social defense as one ingredient of nonviolence in the broad sense may exaggerate its importance.

My argument is straightforward. First, in conflict there are certain interests which cannot be pursued, or are best not pursued, violently. Secondly, there are a wide range of interests which can be pursued through either nonviolent or violent means, or through a combination of both. The choice between them will depend on intertwined practical, moral, and other considerations. Finally, in acute struggle there exist goals, both offensive and defensive, which can be obtained only by violent means; in such circumstances, there is no replacement for violence. Thus the only way to reduce significantly or abolish the ultimate dependence of communities on violent sanctions is to eliminate the pursuit of goals for which they are necessary. This can be achieved only through nonviolence in the broad sense.

To be sure, this is not to undervalue the role of nonviolent action in the multifarious activities involved in the broad sense of nonviolence. Moreover, civilian-based defense scholars continue to make outstanding contributions to the understanding of

the center states:

Civilian-based defense in Latvia ought to be a constant supplement to its military defenses, in order to compensate for its comparative military weakness, to enhance self-esteem of its citizens and serve as a possible deterrent in case of a possible aggression...

Civilian-based defense in Latvia ought to be used in such cases: 1) as a basic means of defense in case the aggressor's military might largely surpasses that of Latvian military units, as straight military defense is useless and can even serve as a pretext for violent repressions against civilians; 2) as an additional means of defense—if Latvia is endangered by an aggressor whose forces are approximately equal to the Latvian army; 3) as additional means of defense in case of a coup. [As translated by Olgerts Eglitis, letter, November 1991.]

Prior to the August 1991 coup attempt, the center prepared and published instruction pamphlets on noncooperation, one each for government bodies, social institutions, and individuals. The pamphlets outlined rules of behavior for denying cooperation and legitimacy to attackers. The authors stated that their instructions for noncooperation were largely derived from Dr. Sharp's book *Civilian-Based Defense*. As in Lithuania, a quick Latvian translation had been prepared for governmental use.

After the August coup attempt and subsequent independence of Latvia, some legislators dropped their initial support for the center. To date, no funds have been allocated. It remains to be seen what role civilian-based defense will be ascribed in Latvia's national defense policy. A recent draft "Defense Concept" paper for the Republic of Latvia does include provisions for "non-military resistance" in the event of an occupation or a coup.

ESTONIA

Like the other Baltic states, Estonia has improvised "people power" to defend its independent government. On May 15, 1990, Prime Minister Savisaar appealed to the population to defend the parliament against a hostile demonstration by the pro-Moscow Interfront organization. Estonians formed a human barrier and overwhelmed the demonstrators by sheer number. Just prior to the January 13, 1991, attack in Vilnius, Estonian government officials and Popular Front members devised a resistance plan entitled "Civilian Disobedience." In the event of a Soviet attack, the plan advised people to treat all commands contradicting Estonian law as illegitimate; to carry out strict disobedience to and noncooperation with all Soviet attempts to strengthen control; to refuse to supply vital information to Soviet authorities and when appropriate to remove street names, traffic signs, house numbers, etc.; to not be provoked into imprudent action; to document through writing and film Soviet activities and use all possible channels to preserve and internationally distribute such documentation; to preserve the functioning of Estonia's political and social organizations, e.g. by creating backup organizations and hiding essential equipment; to implement mass action when appropriate; and to undertake creative communication with potentially hostile forces. [As outlined by Steven Huxley, "'Civilian-Disobedience' and the Defense of Estonia," unpublished article (February 21, 1991) p.3.]

In a series of meetings with Estonian defense officials, it became apparent that an intense debate is underway over the future role and structure of Estonian military forces. Most officials want to retain Estonia's current system of "Border Guards" and "Home Guards" (National Guard), but several defense planners are calling for the establishment of a professional army as well.

Whatever the outcome of this debate, there are strong indications that Estonia would employ nonviolent resistance in the event of a large-scale attack. In a meeting in Toompea Castle, then Minister of State Raivo Vare (deputy prime minister and acting defense minister) expressed his view of nonviolent resistance as a part of a "total defense" system and as a "second stage" in a defense struggle. The Estonian military Chief of Staff, Mr. Ants Laaneots, agreed that nonviolent resistance was necessary in the event of a massive attack, but felt that it should be combined with types of guerrilla warfare.

During the August 1991 coup attempt, Mr. Vare issued verbal instructions to national and regional government bodies to use any "peaceful means" to resist the

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MISCONCEIVED?

nonviolent action in conflict in general.

Because it is presently the most advanced concise synthesis in the field, an analysis of Gene Sharp's *Civilian-Based Defense* (1990) is a convenient way of providing a critique of the subject in general. For several decades Sharp, through his own work and as a project director, has promoted and explored the potential of nonviolent sanctions in conflict and defense. Indeed, anywhere in the world where nonviolent action is studied seriously by scholars or activists, Sharp's works will be found.

Civilian-Based Defense essentially reworks the author's earlier studies on the subject. However, it contains a more thorough consideration of the conditions for nonviolent defense, a subject that critics had previously accused Sharp of neglecting.

Sharp argues that viable schemes of demilitarization must recognize the necessity of deterrence and defense; those that do not he dismisses as utopian. Sharp demurely suggests that of the alternative defense proposals currently advocated, such as the European "nonoffensive defense" or "defensive defense," the nonmilitary approach of transarmament to civilian-based defense (henceforth CBD) may well prove to be the superior option. Further on he abandons this modest statement and claims that a strong society's "most effective response to attempts at internal usurpation and foreign aggression" is through a defense organized around nonviolent social power.

He argues that CBD would be as effective as, or even superior to, military war in defeating a military aggressor. His obsessive emphasis on the preeminence of CBD in relation to other means, military and nonmilitary, contrasts strikingly with the more comprehensive proposals put forth, for example, by European peace researchers, social activists and defense experts (for example, Fischer, Nolte, Oberg 1989). In this book and elsewhere, Sharp caricatures other approaches or combinations of approaches to peace, including disarmament and social change, in order to bolster his one-sided emphasis on CBD.

In his facile dismissal of what he calls the "impressive-sounding reasons" used by "various intellectuals" to explain the formidable obstacles to the acceptance of CBD, Sharp reveals his own naiveté. By denying that "changing over from military to civilian-based defense" requires a "prior transformation of the international system" or the "social system," Sharp neglects the significant opposition of the military powers and arms producers to a comprehensive general disarmament or demilitarization. To assume that they are motivated primarily by considerations of defense is blindness.

"This book," Sharp emphasizes with italics, "is based on the assumption that no country will permanently relinquish its military options unless and until it has a deserved confidence in a viable, developed civilian-based defense policy." This assumption may be noteworthy, but it is certainly not of paramount importance since many countries would not want to make this switch even if it were incontrovertibly viable. A relinquishment in favor of CBD or some other nonmilitary solution can only occur when countries are willing to renounce military interventionism and their economic dependence on the arms trade. Such a change would undeniably require a major transformation in international political and economic practices. Moreover, even in nations such as Finland, Sweden, and Norway, which do not intervene militarily and are oriented toward defense, the elimination or even reduction of the military will require more than the development of a pragmatic nonmilitary replacement. This is because the universal conscription-based military is an almost inextricable part of the identities and cultures of these peoples. To neglect this condition is to display a lack of historical and anthropological insight.

Relations among Nordic countries challenge further the claim that states will not relinquish military capacity unless they have a well developed CBD system. The defense forces of the Nordic countries are not maintained for fear of one another; armed encounters, much less war, among the Nordic states are hardly conceivable. This is certainly not due to the existence of anything like CBD. The Nordic countries have evolved social, cultural, and

international relationships that have decisively reduced the significance of the military. The Nordic case, and other comparable cases of relatively peaceful international relations like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), are empirically so weighty that they cannot be dismissed like the strawmen alternatives devised and rejected by some advocates of CBD.

Sharp is indeed correct in pointing out that such countries have either seriously considered CBD or already integrated a civilian resistance component into their national defense. But such a component is not intended to replace any of the functions of military defense, to which it is completely subordinated; it therefore cannot be seen as part of the change over or transarmament to CBD which Sharp envisions. The idea of transarmament is particularly utopian in relation to the interventionist and arms-dealing powers, such as the United States, who might speak not of a transformation to nonviolent defense, but rather of the incorporation of "low intensity warfare" into their comprehensive strategies of global politico-military control (Klare 1988).

The traditional models of civilian resistance as a component of, or primary foundation for, a polity's defense are mainly based on studies of cases of nonmilitary or nonviolent struggle throughout history. Nonviolent struggle has been understood as a technique ranging from protest and persuasion to economic, social and political noncooperation and even to radical nonmilitary intervention; it is seen as having a potential reserve of hundreds of methods. Sharp has done his most valuable work in the study of nonviolent action as such although his conceptual framework is flawed in resting on a simplistic dichotomy between social power and violence that is insensitive to the complex relationship between the two. Drawing upon the long established canon of nonviolent struggles, Sharp emphasizes certain cases (Czechoslovakia, 1968-69; the Kapp Putsch, Germany, 1920; Ruhr, Germany, 1923; the French generals' coup, Algiers, 1961) which he believes may provide lessons for the systematic development of CBD.

However, the defense organization intended to replace the military that he derives from these examples is misconceived. Historically, nonviolent collective action has been employed in circumstances of long-term military domination. Nonviolent struggles have certainly often confronted violent military power, but nonviolent action has never been, and will never be, a replacement for warfare against all-out warfare. This is because, in spite of the effectiveness of nonviolent sanctions in certain conditions, there exists a range of destructive functions in regard to which nonviolence cannot compete with organized violence.

Instead of trying to force nonviolent action into an ill-fitting mold designed to compete with the military, I suggest that we concentrate on developing nonviolent struggle for what it has always done best: resistance to and liberation from domination in certain circumstances. Even in this sense, however, we must not be naive. As Noam Chomsky wrote (*The Nation*, January 29, 1990) in reflecting on the events in Europe in 1989, "Throughout modern history, popular forces motivated by radical democratic ideals have sought to combat structures of hierarchy and domination. Sometimes they have succeeded in expanding the realm of freedom and justice...Often they are simply crushed."

Post-war Eastern Europe clearly shows how the resources and conditions for outright struggle can be controlled and how masses of people can be coerced and manipulated. Decades of indirect noncooperation, punctuated by uprisings, were necessary to undermine the social cohesion and economic power that maintained domination. Thus although nonviolent mass movements catalyzed change in 1989, they certainly could have been suppressed, and it was the preceding long-term, sustained, mostly diffuse and indirect, resistance—not nonviolent combat against military forces—that made the price of a military crackdown too high (cf. Ash 1990; Holst 1990).

The reduction of our dependence on military organizations and their eventual replacement by some kind of nonmilitary protection system may require something as momentous as the Revolution

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of 1989 and the long process upon which it was founded. This could mean, for instance, that people will have to be effectively mobilized in the United States to force the government to renounce violent intervention and the offensive manipulation of the global security environment and to struggle against those who finance such activities (cf. Martin 1991). This may sound naive, to say the least, but without the real collective renunciation of offensive violence and the arms trade, any talk of transarmament to CBD as a way to reduce our dependence on the military is a delusion. Perhaps the most realistic way for the role of the military to be decreased decisively is by the development of the sort of international relations cited above in the case of the Nordic countries and the CSCE process. These could be bolstered by grassroots efforts for nonviolence in the broad sense.

Without these vital first steps, efforts to translate the language of civilian struggle into military terms and to persuade military personnel to adopt CBD will only lead to its subordination to armed force. It would be more realistic for the advocates of CBD to join in revitalizing the peace and democracy movement (cf. Farinella and Spreafico 1991) and to admit that their endeavor is a minor branch of military research and development.

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- Rajsamand declaration on training in nonviolence. 1991. Adopted by the Second International Conference on Peace and Nonviolent Action, Steven Huxley, Ph.D., is a history teacher, an independent researcher, and translator. He is the author of *Constitutionalist Insurgency in Finland: Finnish "Passive Resistance" against Russification as a Case of Nonmilitary Struggle in the European Resistance Tradition*, published in 1990 in Helsinki by the Finnish Historical Society. During the last year he has organized the centenary conference of the International Peace Bureau.

LESSONS FROM THE BALTICS

Steven Huxley

Theorists of civilian-based defense (CBD) have understandably focused a great deal of attention on events in the newly independent Baltic states. Developments in the field of Baltic security policy may seem to challenge my critique in this issue "Nonviolence Misconceived?" However, the present defense policy in the Baltic states subordinates CBD to the overall security arrangements; it will not replace either military defense or international agreements.

Nonviolent struggle played a prominent role in the Baltic political and cultural liberation process. Throughout Eastern Europe massive popular defiance of the old regime was the major catalyst of the Revolution of 1989. The civilian struggle in the Baltic republics was of the same spirit as, and an integral part of, the primarily nonviolent European revolution. But the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania did not share in the constitutional transformations that occurred elsewhere. It was in 1991 that the long-term indirect and diffuse resistance and the consequent erosion and final collapse of Soviet power provided the prime conditions for Baltic liberation. Without nonviolent struggle the Balts would not have been able to take advantage of these conditions.

Decades of Soviet rule, including economic domination, socially destructive

collectivization, mass deportation, forced military conscription, environmental devastation, Russification, and in general the brutalization of civil society all but destroyed the conditions for popular struggle and democracy. The resulting legacy of ethnic conflict is no doubt one of the most imposing obstacles to the future of nonviolence in Baltic societies. In spite of disadvantageous conditions, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, with a combined population of 8.8 million, were at the forefront of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the Soviet Union, taking these projects well beyond the boundaries envisioned by Gorbachev.

The Balts were able to move beyond the preceding era of stagnation in 1987 when the credibility of the old leadership broke down and the many demonstrations mobilized the people. In Estonia, for example, popular protest against plans for the massive expansion of open-pit phosphorite mining and the accompanying influx of 30,000 non-Estonian workers led to the unprecedented ousting of Estonian Communist Party First Secretary Karl Vaino in June 1988, and early the next year the supremacy of the party was ended, resulting in the splintering of the Communists.

The breakdown of monolithic party rule led in all three countries to the formation in the latter part of 1988 of umbrella popular front organizations and to the

emergence of numerous other groups, including incipient political parties, advocating independence and democratization. Early in 1990 the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic states underwent a democratic transformation with free elections. In Lithuania the popular front Sajudis won an overwhelming victory. In Latvia too, Popular Front-backed groups took the leadership of the Supreme Soviet. In Estonia, however, the election was not so decisive, and in the resulting divided parliament the Popular Front held 49 of the 105 seats, while 29 seats went to the Estonian Communist Party and 27 to the opponents of independence. Nevertheless, the Supreme Soviet soon chose Popular Front leader Edgar Savisaar as the new prime minister of Estonia.

Fundamental to the Baltic republics' struggle was the construction or re-creation of civil society and the re-evaluation of their history. More and more assertively the popular fronts of these countries rejected in unison the legitimacy of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939) and all other acts by which the Baltic states were annexed to the Soviet Union. The creation of elaborate programs for freeing the Baltic economies from dependence on and control by Moscow were followed by increasingly forthright declarations of the intention to achieve complete political independence.

The agitation of pro-Moscow international fronts in all three republics, along with the fears expressed by minority groups concerning their human rights, led to uncertainty about the justice and popular

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backing of the Popular Front-led independence movements. In January 1991, seeking to take advantage of this uncertainty in the shadow of the Western coalition's preoccupation with the Kuwait crisis, Moscow and the Soviet military mobilized for a violent crackdown and coup d'état in the Baltic republics.

In spite of the bloody takeover of the television tower in Vilnius and the Interior Ministry in Riga, the crackdown failed in the face of massive nonviolent defiance by the local populations. Apparently Moscow decisively miscalculated how much local support it could muster. It should also be mentioned that months earlier, on May 15, 1990, Estonians displayed impressive people power when the radical pro-Moscow Inter-Movement group attempted to take over the Estonian Parliament. They were warded off by tens of thousands of civilians who were summoned through a radio broadcast by the Estonian prime minister, Edgar Savisaar.

Many believe that the Soviet crackdown backfired and delivered many of those who had hitherto vacillated into the pro-independence camp. In a nationwide referendum and opinion poll held in Lithuania on February 9, 90% of the voters favored the establishment of a democratic and independent Lithuania. On March 3 similar referendums were held in Latvia and Estonia, with 73.68% and 77.83% respectively voting in favor of a democratic republic independent of the Soviet Union.

Experiences such as these gave rise to what might be called proto-CBD. During the crisis in January, programs of noncooperation were issued in anticipation of a Soviet crackdown and declaration of martial law. In Estonia some people associated with the government and Popular Front devised a program entitled "Civilian Disobedience" (Kodanikuallumatusesest). This program was made known to the public at large (see, for example, "Kodanikuallumatusesest" 1991) on January 13, just before the Soviet takeover of the telecommunications complex in Vilnius. It offered the Estonians ten points to follow in case their own political institutions and laws are suppressed.

In essence people are advised to treat all commands contradicting Estonian law as illegitimate; to carry out strict disobedience to and noncooperation with all Soviet attempts to strengthen control; to refuse to supply vital information to Soviet authorities and when appropriate to remove street names, traffic signs, house numbers etc.; to resist being provoked into imprudent action; to document through writing and film Soviet activities and use all possible channels to preserve and distribute internationally such documentation; to preserve the functioning of Estonia's political and social organizations, e.g., by creating backup organizations and hiding essential equipment; to implement mass action when appropriate; and to undertake creative communication with potentially hostile forces.

This program was not officially issued by the Estonian government. In Lithuania, however, a corresponding program was promulgated by the parliament or Supreme Council (see "Text..." 1991).

A significant section of the population of the Baltic states has through direct experience become convinced of the importance of popular nonviolent struggle in certain circumstances. Moreover, perhaps to an unprecedented degree people in key decision-making positions have been thinking about models, and preparing programs, of nonviolent defense. Christopher Kruegler, an American CBD expert, commenting on the official Lithuanian stance on nonviolent defense, writes: "Not since the Franco-Belgian occupation of Germany's Ruhr region in 1923 has a government taken this stance, but the current policy is vastly more sophisticated at the outset than was the Weimar Republic's" (Kruegler 1991).

Nevertheless, the careful observer of Baltic politics can already see that defense in these states will certainly not be exclusively civilian-based. In fact most people concerned with the subject do not see any incompatibility among conventional military, guerrilla, and nonviolent civilian struggle. Defense leaders who understand civilian struggle, such as the Estonian Home Guard Director and the Lithuanian Minister of Defense are already working on incorporating it into a larger security system.

In all three Baltic countries national military institutions are being recreated. Although the designers of these national armies are so far realistically modest in their goals, they are all looking to their neighbors in Scandinavia and western Europe for military models. Lithuania, for instance, has already made high-level contacts in at least Great Britain, Germany and Norway to acquire military know-how now and military equipment later. The structure of the military in Finland has been a prominent model among Estonians. Moreover, all three countries have seriously explored the possibility of a close relationship to NATO. On October 21, 1991 they were all offered associate status in the North Atlantic Assembly.

These developments tend to support the thesis that CBD, even when its capacity is highly regarded, will not be accepted by communities as a complete replacement for military defense. To reiterate the conclusion of the previous article, the only way to reduce significantly, or even eliminate, the role of the military is to implement nonviolence in a broad sense involving the transformation of international and national systems. In the case of the Baltic countries this means the furthering of international common security through, for example, close participation in the UN and the CSCE, close cooperation with other international bodies such as the Nordic Council and the Council of Europe, the establishment of peaceful relations with Russia, and the creative resolution of the legacy of ethnic strife.

This paper is partially based on a research report (Huxley 1991) I wrote for an international study of the state of democracy in the world today, edited by Andreas Gross, Wiss. Institut für Demokratie, Zürich. I also draw on the press of the Baltic countries and on conversations and interviews I conducted with people directly involved in the liberation of the Baltic states.

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BALTICS: SELF-DEFENSE OR U.S. UMBRELLA

Paul E. Anders

Security for the Baltics currently attracts much attention. Although proponents of civilian-based defense (CBD) may cheer its progress there (see the reports of Bruce Jenkins and Roger Powers in this issue), others plan a more traditional defense. Across the Atlantic, United States Department of Defense planners have come up with a scenario in which the U.S. military would help defend Lithuania from a hypothetical Russian invasion. From Germany comes an effort to demilitarize the whole Baltic area.

Another option has become a reality. Estonians have attacked Russian forces. In July, Estonian troops fired on Russian military trucks. An Estonian officer explained that the troops were trying to control "unlicensed movements by Russian army units in Estonia." In a later incident (July 27), a Russian officer and civilian employee were wounded in Tallinn when shooting erupted as Estonian troops tried to take over a Russian navy building. Estonia claims Russian military property in Estonia. And nongovernmental "freedom fighters" called the Defense Union has reportedly increased attacks and ambushes to force out the Russian
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

A Report by Schweik Action Wollongong

Telecommunications can play a vital role in nonviolent resistance to aggression or repression, as numerous historical examples have shown. However, there has been no systematic development of telecommunications research, policy, or training for this purpose.

We interviewed a number of experts in telecommunications to learn how these technologies could be used in nonviolent struggle. We report our general findings and list recommendations for use and design of telecommunications in

nonviolent struggle. This pilot project reveals the radical implications of orienting telecommunications for nonviolent rather than violent struggle.

EXAMPLES

Communications are crucial to nonviolent struggle against aggression and repression. The following cases illustrate some of the roles of telecommunications.

• In April 1961, there was a military coup in Algeria, then a part of

France, by generals who opposed de Gaulle's willingness to negotiate with Algerian rebels. Popular opposition in France to the coup led de Gaulle to make a media announcement calling for resistance. In Algeria, many pilots opposed to the coup simply flew their aircraft out of the country. Many soldiers hindered operations, for example by "misplacing" orders and communications; others simply stayed in their barracks. The coup collapsed within four days without a shot being fired against it (Roberts 1975).

REPORT FROM NONVIOLENCE TRAINING IN MOSCOW

David Hartsough

From mid-November to mid-December 1991, a four-member team sponsored by Nonviolence International gave training in nonviolence to members of the Living Ring, an organization that grew out of the successful defense of the Russian parliament by the ten thousand men and women who surrounded the parliamentary building. The team comprised Philip Bogdonoff of the Civilian-Based Defense Association and Nonviolence International, Diana Glasgow of the Earthstewards Network, David Hartsough of the Civilian-Based Defense Association and the American Friends Service Committee, and Peter Woodrow of the American Friends Service Committee, who developed a two-day training workshop in nonviolent defense. A large part of the training was to prepare the participants to repeat the success they had in opposing the coup attempted in August 1991.

Training in nonviolence in Russia is crucial because of the dangers facing the country. Much that had held the society together and made it work is gone. People receive almost no money for jobs — from two to six dollars a month at the official rate of exchange. Stores are almost empty. There is a severe lack of food, medical care, clothes, furniture, heat and security. Ominously, tens of thousands of soldiers and military officers have been laid off with no pension—a source of great unrest.

Moreover, because the people in the Soviet Union had not been allowed to form independent organizations (or risk imprisonment or death if they tried) for seventy years, they have little experience in organizing for change or making democracy work. Our two-day workshops in nonviolence were useful in imparting some of these skills. The focus now is on food and hunger. The Living Ring

has organized a nonviolent campaign around the question "What is keeping food from getting to the people in Moscow?" They have sent trucks to the countryside to buy food from small farmers and to bring it into Moscow, sometimes confronting the guns of organized crime.

In addition to the Living Ring, there are several other organizations in Russia devoted to nonviolence. Golubka ("dove" in Russian) offers nonviolent training and has worked with the team from Nonviolence International on defense.

The Afgantsy are Soviet veterans who fought in the war in Afghanistan. Some have organized initiatives to stop violence. For example, the Afgantsy from Ossetia and Georgia recently placed themselves as a nonviolent interpositionary force between the soldiers and the national guard who were shooting each other in Georgia.

The Russian Peace Society, the Tolstoy societies, and the Dukhobors are committed to nonviolence; they are developing a Center for Nonviolence in Tula (near Tolstoy's home) and are organizing an international conference on nonviolence in August, on the first anniversary of the defeat of the attempted coup.

David Hartsough's earlier trip to Russia was reported in the December 1991 issue of Civilian-based Defense: News & Opinion. His latest trip to Russia for nonviolent training extends from June 25, 1992 to September 15, 1992. Tax-deductible donations for his return trip can be made out to the Pacific Yearly Meeting East-West Committee and sent to David Hartsough at 721 Shrader St., San Francisco, CA 94117, USA.

• In August 1968, Czechoslovakia was invaded by troops from the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact states. The reason was the liberalization of communist rule in Czechoslovakia, which threatened ruling elites in Moscow. There was no resistance to the invasion from Czechoslovak military forces, nor from the West, but there was an amazing spontaneous nonviolent resistance (Windsor and Roberts 1969).

Many of the invading soldiers had been told that they were there to smash a capitalist takeover. When told the truth by Czechoslovak people, many became unreliable and were transferred out of the country within a few days. They were replaced by troops from the Soviet far east who did not speak Russian. This shows the crucial importance of knowing the language of the aggressor troops.

The radio network was crucial to the resistance (Hutchinson 1969). The network permitted simultaneous broadcasting from the same frequency from different locations. This meant that when Soviet troops tracked down and closed one transmitter, another immediately took over. The radio announcers announced strikes, recommended using nonviolent methods only, and provided information about troop movements, impending arrests, and license numbers of KGB cars. The arrival of jamming equipment being brought in by the Soviet military was delayed by railway workers. The radio broadcasts made this the first European invasion exposed to intense publicity.

In the circumstances, the resistance was remarkably effective in frustrating the Soviet political aim of setting up a puppet government within a short time. The active phase of the resistance lasted just a week, but it was not until April 1969 that a puppet government was installed.

• Indonesian military forces invaded the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1975. Their occupation led to the deaths of perhaps a third of the popula-

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tion through killings and starvation. Cutting off communications to the outside world minimized outrage over this repression. The Australian government aided in this communications blockade by shutting down a short-wave transmitter in the Northern Territory.

In November 1991, a massacre of nonviolent protesters in Dili, the capital of East Timor, rekindled international concern over the Indonesian occupation. This killing attracted attention because foreign observers were present and the killings were videotaped..

- In Fiji in 1987 there were two military coups. Because Fiji has numerous small islands, short-wave radios are a standard means of communication. Therefore, it was impossible to cut off communication with the outside world. Wide publicity about the coups led to international protest, bans by some trade unions on goods shipments, and a dramatic decline in tourism, a major export earner for Fiji (Martin 1988).

- In 1989, Chinese troops massacred hundreds of prodemocracy protesters in Beijing. In the aftermath, the Chinese government tried to cut off telecommunications to other countries. But fax machines continued to operate, providing information to outsiders and enabling informed overseas protests. When the Chinese government publicized a telephone number for reporting of "dissident elements," this information was leaked overseas, and people from around the world jammed the number by making continual calls, preventing it from being used for its original purpose.

- The Soviet coup in August 1991 failed, in part, due to lack of control over telecommunications. Yeltsin's supporters got out their basic message—refuse to cooperate with the coup leaders and defend the Russian parliament—using radio, faxes, computer networks and leaflets.

These examples show the importance of communications in nonviolent resistance to aggression and repression. Killings of unarmed civilians can generate enormous outrage, both in local populations and around the world. By contrast, killing of guerrilla fighters gains relatively little attention—violence against violence is seen as legitimate, even when the sides are very unbalanced.

But killing or beating of civilians has to be publicized. If repression is carried out in secret, there is little impact. Communications and publicity are vital. Communication of accurate information is a key to the effective work of Amnesty International.

SOCIAL DEFENSE

Social defense is nonviolent community resistance to aggression as an alternative to military defense. Instead of having an army, a community would oppose aggression using demonstrations, fasts, refusals to obey, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, and other types of nonviolent action. This form of defense also goes by the names nonviolent defense, civilian defense and civilian-based defense.

At first glance, it seems implausible that social defense could possibly work against a well armed aggressor. As some of the above examples show, the use of only nonviolent methods can be very effective in undermining the commitment of soldiers. Most soldiers under military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes are conscripts who don't want to go to war. When they encounter an "enemy" who doesn't use violence, it becomes much more difficult for them to use violence, and armies can succeed only if soldiers are willing to follow orders.

There is not enough space here to begin to discuss the arguments for and against social defense. (Some good sources are Boserup and Mack 1974; Galtung 1976; Roberts 1967; Sharp 1990). Suffice it to say that we believe social defense is worthy of further investigation and testing. Our project is part of that process.

THE PROJECT

Schweik Action Wollongong is a small voluntary group of people who work on projects relating to social defense. The group is named after Hasek's fictional character, the good soldier Schweik, who created havoc in the Austrian army during World War One by pretending to be extremely stupid (Hasek 1974). Various members of the group are also active in other social movements and hold down regular jobs. We keep in regular contact with like-minded individuals and groups throughout Australia and overseas.

Our project on telecommunications and social defense commenced in mid-1990 and followed a preliminary investigation into the Australian postal system. We have focused on this area because the connection between communication and social defense is vital.

We interviewed people from the areas of satellite communications, computer engineering, ham radio, computer systems development, and community radio. We started by interviewing people we knew and branched out as we asked the people interviewed who else we should be contacting. The interviews were usually conducted by two members of our group, one of whom took notes. The notes were written up and circulated amongst members of the group. Care was taken to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees.

For us the interviews served two purposes. They were a valuable and interesting source of information on telecommunications capabilities, and they allowed us to talk to other people about social defense. In this way the interviews were a goal in themselves, namely raising the issue of nonviolent struggle, as well as a method for gaining information about telecommunications.

MAIN RESULTS

We describe some of our main findings according to the type of technology used.

The telephone system is a wonderful means for mobilizing against repression. It is readily available to nearly everyone, requires very little knowledge or training to use, and can be used to contact virtually any part of the world. Most important, it is a network means for communication. Anyone can contact almost anyone, and there is no central control or censorship over what people say on the phone.

There are two important limitations to the telephone. First, it can readily be tapped, and individuals usually don't know when this is happening. Tapping can do little to stop a large-scale opposition, because if there are enough people in the resistance, the regime can listen to only a small fraction of relevant calls. Tapping in this situation is effective through its psychological intimidation of callers who think someone is listening to their calls.

A simple way to get around tapping is to use public telephones or simply a friend's telephone. For answering of phones, some of the systems that forward a call to another number are useful: the location of the person answering the phone is not readily known to the caller (or someone listening in). Also worth considering, as preparation for emergency situations, are machines that change the pitch and vocal quality of a voice, and encryption technology (which puts the message into code).

The second important limitation of the telephone system is that it can be cut off selectively or entirely. This can be used against the regime or the resistance, depending on loyalties of technicians on the inside. Generally, the resistance would be wise to keep the telephone system operating. For that matter, any modern industrial society depends on telephones for everyday functioning, so it is unlikely that the entire system would be cut off except for short times, such as the aftermath of a coup or massacre. Resisters should build links with technical workers to ensure that the chance

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of this is minimized.

As telephone systems become more computerized, the possibilities for central authorities to monitor calls or cut off certain numbers increases. These developments are making telephones less valuable for nonviolent struggle.

Fax is an extension of the telephone system to printed documents. All the same considerations apply, except that documents received are often available to anyone who happens to be around. (This is similar to the lack of security in telephone answering machines.) Faxes with security codes overcome this problem. Fax machines are much less common than telephones and require a bit of training, but they are easy to use. Faxes are much better when lengthy or complex information needs to be sent out.

Computer networks are excellent for person-to-person communication but can also be used to send messages to several addresses at once or to put material on a computer bulletin board for all to read. Like the telephone system they can be monitored or cut off by a master user (a person who controls the system and knows all the passwords).

Unlike telephones, computers are not so easy to use and are available to only a small fraction of the population. Computers are becoming cheaper, more widely available, and more user-friendly each year and will undoubtedly play an increasing role in communication in crisis situations.

In an emergency, it would be advantageous to be able to run computer networks on a different basis. For example, the master user's power to shut down or monitor accounts could be terminated. Such a change could be programmed to occur, for example, whenever a specified number of users inserted a special command within a certain time interval. Methods for doing this, and their implications, remain to be studied.

Many computer networks could be disrupted by turning off a single key machine. To reduce this vulnerability, there could be a duplicate site as a backup.

Computers can store vast quantities of information, and this leads to new considerations. Some databases—for example, containing information on social critics—would be sought by a regime. One possibility would be to have plans to hide, encrypt, or destroy sensitive information in case of emergency.

Short-wave radio is another excellent network form of telecommunications. It can be used to talk person-to-person across the globe. Furthermore, it operates as a stand-alone system, so that the plug cannot be pulled from any central location.

Calls on short-wave can be overheard by others with suitable equipment; as in the case of telephone, the more people who use the medium, the less the risk to any one. The location of short-wave transmitters can be pinpointed, but the transmission site can readily be moved. An ideal way to ensure continued international communications in a crisis would be to have a short-wave system in every home, plus many additional public systems for anyone's use.

A combination of short-wave transmission and computer data produces packet radio, in which packets of data are transmitted. These transmissions cannot be listened in on, though they can be deciphered with special equipment. Packet transmissions can be sent up to amateur radio satellites and broadcast down to receivers later, even halfway around the world. Combined with encryption, this provides an extremely safe and secure method of sending masses of information.

The main disadvantage of short-wave radio is the limited availability of the technology and knowledge of how to use it.

CB radio is similar to short-wave radio, except it has a much more restricted range.

Television and mainstream radio are much less useful against a repressive regime. Indeed, they are prime targets for takeover. The main reason is that a few people control the content and the transmissions; everyone else consumes the message. In this situation, the loyalty of both technicians and broadcasters is crucial.

If stations are taken over, perhaps the best countermeasure would be for technicians to cause faults hindering transmission. But this cannot be the basis for a program of resistance, since immense pressures can be brought against recalcitrant workers, or new compliant ones brought in.

With some advance planning, a takeover could be delayed and hindered for days or weeks, if not resisted indefinitely. But often the threat is not immediately recognized by all workers, so it can be difficult to obtain agreement for such action.

Community radio stations, in which community groups control program content and participate in making station policy, are much better placed to continue speaking out. Preparations for emergencies at such stations have the added advantage of making many groups aware of the necessity for action in a crisis.

Illegal political radio broadcasts are also possible, and indeed clandestine radio is a regular feature of resistance movements. Complications arise because many clandestine broadcasters are run by government spy agencies, which sometimes pose as resistance stations (Soley and Nichols 1987).

In the longer term, it would be desirable to reduce dependence on the broadcast technologies of television and mainstream radio and increase the use of network technologies such as telephone.

It is important to remember that other forms of communications are important besides telecommunications. This includes talking face-to-face, pamphlets, graffiti, posters, and the mail. Telecommunications can aid resistance to aggression and repression, but they are not essential.

It is also important to remember that technology is useless unless people are willing to act. In this sense, politics, not technology, is the key to resistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Even with the present state of technology and people's awareness, telecommunications can be an important part of nonviolent resistance to aggression and repression. But there are also many things which can improve the effectiveness of telecommunications for this purpose. We list them here under five categories.

1. Realizing present capabilities. Right now, people are quite capable of using existing telecommunications to oppose a repressive regime. People need to be made aware of their own capabilities.

If the mass media of television and mainstream radio, plus large-circulation newspapers, are taken over, there are still plenty of avenues for independent communication. The telephone system is the most obvious. Only a small fraction of phones can be effectively monitored, so most people can use them without risk; they need to realize this. Those who are at risk can use other phones.

Those who have access to computer networks should be made aware of the potential for communication. This includes people working for banks, universities and large companies. Similarly, short-wave operators should be made aware of the crucial importance of their technology.

Technicians in vital areas—such as television broadcasting or computer networks—need to be aware of how they can help maintain communications among those resisting repression.

2. Learning to use existing technology. Most people know how to use telephones. Many more can learn how to use fax machines and computer networks. Run a practice session with friends.

An even greater commitment is needed to learn to use

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short-wave radio or packet radio. It is important for these skills to be more widely shared in the community.

3. Preparing. Knowing how to use telecommunications is one thing; being prepared to use them in a crisis is another.

Having a procedure for telephoning people in an organization or network is important. The system should work even when some people are not available or some telephone lines are interrupted.

Developing lists of fax numbers is another useful step. On a computer network, lists of important contacts could be kept ready for an emergency and perhaps hidden in a coded group so that others cannot inspect the list.

Another important part of preparation is simulations. A group of people can run a drill, testing their communication systems in the face of a few disrupters and comparing the strengths and weaknesses of different systems. Simulations also accustom people to acting promptly and sensibly in a crisis situation.

4. Designing technology. Telecommunications systems should be designed to provide maximum support to a popular, nonviolent resistance, and minimal help to a repressive regime. This seems never to have been a consideration in system design, so it is difficult to be precise about what is required.

Is it possible to design a telephone system so that a speaker is warned if another party is listening in on a call? Is it possible to design a telephone system in which every phone can become—at least in emergencies—as non-traceable as a public phone? Is it possible to design a telephone system so that user-specified encryption is standard? Or in which encryption is introduced across the system whenever a specified fraction of technicians (or users) signal that this is warranted? Is “public key encryption,” or some other system, the best way to support popular nonviolent struggles?

Is it possible to design a computer network so that the master user’s control over accounts is overridden when a certain fraction of users demand this within a specified period? Is it possible to design a computer system in which encryption or hiding of data bases is automatic when there is unauthorized entry?

There are many other such questions. Perhaps, too, these are not the appropriate questions. The most effective design of a telecommunications system to operate against a repressive regime will depend on practical tests which cannot all be specified in advance. There is a host of difficult and fascinating design problems.

The design is not simply a technical issue, because effective design depends on accurately assessing people’s skills, commitment, and behavior in a crisis. Good design will discourage aggressors and encourage resistance. In this context, being seen to be effective is part of what makes a system effective in practice.

5. Organizing society. Telecommunications is only one part of nonviolent resistance to aggression. Other areas are important too. A decentralized, self-reliant energy system—rather than dependence on supplies generated at a few central facilities—will make a community much more capable of resisting threats from an aggressor. Similarly, greater self-reliance in transport and agriculture would help a community defend itself. Workers should be able to take control of their workplaces and resist demands of a repressive regime.

All this implies considerable changes in the organization of society: production and distribution of goods, services, transport,

etc. In each case, there are implications for communication. For example, if a regime tried to repress dissent by interrupting deliveries of food, it would be vital to have reliable communication about available supplies, local gardens, needy people, etc.

All of this requires preparation, organization, commitment and training.

CONCLUSION

The development of telecommunications for nonviolent resistance to aggression and repression depends on participation by many people to deal with local situations. This is a preliminary report of our project. We welcome comments, corrections and suggestions for future investigation, and hope to hear about the ideas and experiences of others.

Schweik Action Wollongong
PO Box 492, Wollongong East
NSW 2520, Australia

Phone: +61-42-287860. Fax: +61-42-213452.

E-mail: B.Martin@uow.edu.au

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Schweik Action Wollongong is a small voluntary group of people in Australia who work on projects relating to social defense. This article was sent to us in April, and in the interim it has appeared in Nonviolence Today, published in Australia. We publish it here in the belief that our mailing lists do not overlap much.

PROMOTING CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE: Lessons from the History of Development of the Policy

Gene Sharp
Albert Einstein Institution

The choice of how to promote civilian-based defense is far from a simple matter of choosing and using effectively such means as advertisements, speeches, pamphlets, books, television and radio interviews, articles, conversations, and other methods. Even more important than these specific instruments are the perspectives and assumptions that underlie the presentation of the policy of civilian-based defense.

Current advocates of this policy hold a variety of perspectives and convictions. These can have widely differing consequences on the efforts that are used to promote it.

The present policy of civilian-based defense did not happen by chance or arrive ready-made by heavenly messengers or political seers. This policy is based on years of analysis, discussions, and development. It is not a policy which can be simply grafted onto a dominant ideology which then uses it to gain acceptance of the beliefs and movements of the ideology, without resulting in grave negative consequences. Instead, the civilian-based defense policy needs to be promoted by means and approaches compatible with the assumptions and insights which underlie the policy itself.

Some current approaches to civilian-based defense do not have their roots in the analyses on which the policy has been developed since 1964. These more doctrinal approaches often have their origins in perspectives which have little or no intrinsic connection with this policy. If that association grows, the results may prove disastrous. It may therefore be helpful to look at the thinking which has contributed significantly to the development and refinement of the policy, especially since 1964.

The civilian-based defense policy historically emerged out of the interplay of several originally separate influences: (1) the improvised practice of nonviolent resistance against foreign occupations and coups d'état; (2) the thinking of certain military strategists, such as Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall, about nonmilitary ways of providing defense; (3) the writings, especially in the 1930s, of various antimilitarist social radicals, such as Henrietta Holst and Bart. de Ligt in the Netherlands; (4) the thinking of various Western pacifists, such as Cecil Hinshaw and Jessie Wallace Hughan, on how to provide defense without violating pacifist principles; (5) Gandhi's thinking in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s about how defense could be provided against interna-

tional threats by the extension of the practice of satyagraha to this problem (including such interpreters of Gandhi as Krishnalal Shridharani); and (6) a small group of scholars, activists, and strategists, primarily in England, Norway, the United States, and Germany, who in the early 1960s began to address the problems associated with making such a defense policy both credible and viable.

Underlying the development of the policy of civilian-based defense and its separation from doctrinal and ideological associations are several insights into the nature of the dual problems of war and defense:

First, that the objective is not to witness to the truth of a particular conviction, or to propound an encompassing doctrine or program of comprehensive social change. Instead, the objective is actually to achieve a fundamental change in defense policy, from a military to a civilian one.

Second, that comprehensive and deep social change that includes a change in defense policy does not come in an instant but requires time and must be achieved in steps. Therefore, replacement of military-based defense with civilian-based defense is likely, in most situations at least, to take place in stages.

Third, war and the military establishment capable of conducting it cannot be simply abolished without a substitute. Defense is a legitimate need. (By defense I do not mean retaliation, destruction, and slaughter, but rather protection, preservation, and warding off danger.) As long as war is believed to be the only available means for providing defense, the society will continue to support military preparations for that function. Therefore, prior development of civilian-based defense policy as a viable substitute is required if military defense is to be reduced significantly or abandoned.

Therefore although many of us were driven in the 1960s to find a way to abolish war, we nonetheless were required to acknowledge the concern of other people for an effective defense. We came to recognize strongly that defense is a legitimate need, even though traditional military means of providing defense were inadequate. Therefore, a need existed for a nonmilitary defense.

Fourth, the overwhelming part of the past practice of nonviolent struggle (including improvised cases for defense) had been made pragmatically, without conviction in ethical or religious nonviolence or

other doctrinal repudiation of violent means. (This is argued and documented elsewhere in detail.) Therefore, it was obviously possible consciously to choose nonviolent means of struggle to be applied in place of military means to provide defense. Switching to civilian-based defense could therefore occur in the world in which we live.

Fifth, there is no historical evidence that the military institutions will be abolished as an indirect consequence of social change or political revolution. In fact, past revolutions have often resulted not in the abandonment of military means of defense but rather in their expansion. Furthermore, there is no evidence that nonviolent struggles, for independence or some other goal, lead logically to the abandonment of military means of defense. Direct attention to the issue of defense is therefore clearly required.

Sixth, there is no historical evidence that the quest for converts to personal pacifism or principled nonviolence has ever led to a whole society's abandonment of military means of defense. There is, however, abundant evidence that nonpacifists can, for particular conflicts, abandon violence in favor of use of nonviolent struggle.

The history of the development of the concept of prepared nonviolent struggle for defense against international aggression and internal coups d'état may be divided into two time periods, before and after 1964. That year marked the publication in London of the booklet *Civilian Defence* by Adam Roberts, Arne Næss, Jerome D. Frank, and Gene Sharp. More importantly, it was also the year of the Civilian Defence Study Conference held at St. Hilda's College, Oxford, and attended by a select invited group of military strategists, historians, and specialists in the study of nonviolent struggle.

In the 1964 booklet and conference the need was recognized to separate the rough idea of "civilian defence" from the various ideological perspectives and doctrines which had been linked to that very broad concept previously. The goal in 1964 was to look at the policy on its merits, to examine how such a policy might actually operate. In that, the conference organizers were building on the similar, but less rigorous, efforts of Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall whose book in 1958 *Defence in the Nuclear Age* addressed the efficacy of defense by nonviolent resistance for Britain.

While still relatively elementary, the efforts of 1964 marked a watershed in the development of the idea of defending a society by prepared nonviolent noncooperation and defiance by a trained population.

The discussion in 1964 concerned the defense not of imaginary ideal societies but actual imperfect, relatively democratic political systems. Defense would be undertaken by ordinary people, not only believers in pacifism or some type of

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principled nonviolence.

In bypassing various ethical or ideological arguments, conference participants could focus instead on practical problems: How would civilian-based defense operate? What historical experiences provided evidence of the viability of such a defense? What leverages and power could this policy wield? How could people using nonviolent struggle withstand brutal repression? How could people and institutions mobilize to defend their societies by wielding nonmilitary social, economic, psychological, and political weapons?

Behind these questions stood the following premise: If the policy could be made viable, then a shift to this policy by "imperfect" people in "imperfect" societies was possible. If demonstrated to be a superior form of defense, civilian-based defense would be more readily accepted, opening the way for its adoption on its merits. The arguments for keeping a military capacity to wage modern war would then collapse. (If, as some are convinced, "defense" was really a guise promoted by a military industrial complex for other motives, then the development of a nonmilitary type of defense would reveal the disingenuousness of that excuse for military build-ups.)

Irrelevant to these considerations of viability of the policy were the ethical, religious, or political principles and judgements which condemned war.

The terminology of this concept of defense also underwent various changes which reflect the separation of policy from belief. The 1964 conference organizers rejected the term "nonviolent defense" as too reminiscent of religious nonviolence or pacifism and "unarmed defense" and "nonmilitary defense" as too vague, in the former case implying weakness and in the latter case indicating only what it was not. The conference organizers used the term "civilian defense" to indicate that it was defense of the civilian society conducted by civilians using civilian weapons. Several years later, it became apparent that communication could be improved if we modified the term slightly to "civilian-based defense." Other terminological changes were also introduced. Theodor Ebert, for example, applied the term "transarmament" to indicate the changeover from a military to a civilian-based policy, instead of "disarmament" which outside of pacifist and peace groups had a negative connotation associated with weakness and helplessness.

Changeover to a civilian-based defense policy would not require any individual, much less millions of people, to adopt a new set of social, religious, or political beliefs. The recognition of this fact marked an important departure from other approaches to defense by nonviolent resistance and remains crucial for those promoting this policy today. No one would be required to become a personal pacifist, to repent of past support for war or participation in

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NATIVE AMERICANS' SOVEREIGNTY

Paul E. Anders

Some Native Americans are instituting what seems to be civilian-based defense (CBD) as they resist what they regard as U.S. government threats to their sovereignty.

Literature received from the Western Shoshone Nation, located in Nevada in the United States, indicates that the Western Shoshone National Council has asserted the sovereignty of the Western Shoshone Nation. This move was occasioned by a dispute over grazing rights involving the Western Shoshone sisters Mary and Carrie Dann and an attempt by the Bureau of Land Management to round up the Dann herd.

A flyer dated April 3, 1992 reports that "on March 31, a 'Notice and Declaration of External Sovereignty of the Western Shoshone Nation' was sent to the U.S. government through its State Department. Regarding this livestock and all other issues affecting the Western Shoshone, the United States must now deal directly with the Western Shoshone on a basis of mutual sovereignty."

The Western Shoshone Defense Project is calling for "immediate and sustained peaceful resistance." A flyer from the project says, "Peaceful resistance will involve nonviolent actionists taking direct action to stop the roundup. Nonviolent guidelines must be followed, and actionists must participate in nonviolence training." The flyer also calls on the United Nations to recognize the sovereignty of the Western Shoshone Nation. Contributions are requested by Western Shoshone Defense Project, General Delivery, Crescent Valley, Nevada 89821, USA; (702) 468-0230.

The Western Shoshone National Council is also active in opposing nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. With the Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance, it is sponsoring "Healing Global Wounds: Indigenous Forum and Ceremony," October 2-12 at the Nevada Test Site and in Las Vegas. The Nuclear Resister reports that "Two International peace walks across the Untied States will be arriving in time for the Indigenous People's Forum in Las Vegas, October 2-4. This will be followed by a demonstration at the Test Site Operations Office, October 5; a walk to the Test Site, October 5-9; Native-led Healing Ceremony, October 10; mass nonviolent action, October 11; and 500 Years commemoration, October 12...For more information, contact the Western Shoshone National Council, P.O. Box 140115, Duckwater, NV 89314."

Claims to sovereignty are common among Native Americans, and in conflicts with the U.S. government, their strategy often involves the conscious use of nonviolent techniques. In a dispute involving claims to sovereignty by the Abenaki Nation of the Missisquoi, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled June 15 that their aboriginal rights had been extinguished "by the increasing weight of history," primarily the settlement by whites, "appropriation to the exclusion of other competing claims, and ratification by Congress when it admitted Vermont to the union." A "fish-in" in 1987 on the Missisquoi River, organized by Abenaki Chief Homer St. Francis is the basis for the case. The fish-in was organized to show that the Abenaki, as a sovereign nation, need not obey Vermont game and fish laws.

Jeffrey Amestoy, Vermont's Attorney General, and Howard Van Benthuyzen, Franklin County's State's Attorney, said the state can now proceed with roughly 160 cases, mostly alleged game and traffic violations and a few felony cases pending since 1987. Abenaki Chief St. Francis plans an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and the UN Treaty Council. He says, "We're a sovereign nation and the state has no jurisdiction over us."

In May at Fort McDowell Indian Reservation in Arizona, Native Americans drove cars, pickups, and earth movers to block U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents at a casino. They were protesting raids against reservation casinos in which video gambling machines were seized. Officials agreed to leave the gambling machines temporarily in trucks on a reservation parking lot. On May 19 about two hundred Native Americans and supporters from the reservation marched on the state capital to protest the raid.

Sources: Western Shoshone: various flyers; "The Nuclear Resister," June 19, 1992, p. 7. Abenakis: Yvonne Daley, "Vt. Court Upsets Abenakis' Claims," *Boston Globe*, June 21, 1992.; Judith Gaines, "Vt. High Court Rules Against Tribe," *Boston Globe*, June 16, 1992. Fort McDowell Indian Reservation: William F. Rawson (Associated Press), "Arizona Indians Try to Block Raid on Casino," *Boston Globe*, May 1992; "Protesting Crackdown," *Boston Globe*, May 20, 1992.

it, to become a supporter of a new system of social transformation, or to pledge never to use violence again in the remainder of his or her life, as a precondition for supporting or participating in civilian-based defense.

A misunderstanding must be avoided here. The separation, discussed above, of the civilian-based defense policy from doctrines and ideologies was not made, as is occasionally assumed, out of a view that principles, beliefs, ethics, and the like have no merit and should be rejected. Quite to the contrary: the focus was and is on the social and political applications of such ideals and principles and how they can be accomplished. Indeed, this is a task which proponents of principled nonviolence sometimes believe they have a responsibility to help achieve, although it appears that many have little confidence that such a change can actually be accomplished.

Indeed, persons with a comprehensive philosophy of life which includes a type of principled nonviolence may play important roles in promoting and developing civilian-based defense provided that they can focus only on civilian-based defense when that is appropriate and not feel a compulsion to inflict their full personal beliefs on the policy.

Furthermore, it is incorrect to assume that those of us who pressed for the separation of policy from belief were unsympathetic to the goals of the peace and pacifist groups. Indeed, all, or almost all, of us had significant roots in those groups. Some of them, especially myself, had become convinced that in their goal of abolishing war (as distinct from protesting against it) the peace and pacifist movements had failed, and that they had done so to a significant degree precisely because they had not offered a satisfactory substitute means of defense.

Indeed, it was the separation of the technique of nonviolent struggle on the one hand, and the policy of civilian-based defense on the other, from the creeds of principled nonviolence and doctrines of political ideologies that strengthened the policy. It was the rejection of the conception that such a defense was only possible in a utopian society in the distant future, and the insistence that this policy could be made not only possible but extremely powerful in the present highly imperfect world, which helped to give this policy its potential and make possible an understanding of its relevance to the real world.

Since 1964, this nondoctrinal approach to civilian-based defense has continued essentially intact. Several countries have become quite interested in this approach to civilian-based defense. In 1986, for example, the Swedish parliament unanimously voted for the inclusion of a small nonviolent resistance component in their "total defense" policy. In February 1991 the Lithuanian Supreme Council (parliament) voted to make nonviolent noncooperation their first line of defense in case of an intensified Soviet occupation. The consequences of this incremental and nondoctrinal approach to civilian-based defense for its promotion are significant.

Civilian-based defense can be supported by people with widely differing philosophies of life and views about the ideal social and political system. The presentation of civilian-based defense should therefore be made in a "transpartisan" manner. All efforts to identify the policy with particular beliefs and views should be strongly rejected.

Those who in 1964 took hold of this prototypical conception of civilian-based defense ("civilian defence" as we called it then) generally accepted that a basic change of defense policy would most likely come in steps. A series of steps could lead to transarmament to civilian-based defense, which itself might well lead to wider change. But this policy was not a panacea and should not be expected to avoid major problems. Civilian-based defense would have major social, political, and perhaps economic consequences that might come as corollaries or indirect results but are in no way prerequisites.

There might even be, as I understood later, consequences for political ethics and even moral theology. It might become understood that by providing a nonviolent means of defense it would not be necessary any longer to choose between pacifist and just war positions—there would be a third alternative. But all that followed

from the intended development of a viable and effective substitute system of defense against external and internal aggression as a limited specific policy.

Once the idea of civilian-based defense as a policy began to receive some respectful attention, various persons saw it as a natural consequence of their own existing beliefs; some even argued that their beliefs and ideological programs were prerequisites for the policy. These other beliefs, programs, and ideologies have often been labeled as pacifist, antimilitarist, socialist, anarchist, or some other type.

Two examples of these influences may illustrate the harm these associations can do. In Sweden in the late 1960s and early 1970s some social radicals tied their programs to the early political and governmental interest in civilian-based defense. This was done very strongly in one book, which the defense minister at the time, Sven Anderson, told me in 1972 had set back consideration of the policy by ten years. Interest in that specific approach, however, lessened and by April 1986 it was possible to get unanimous parliamentary support for adding a nonmilitary resistance component to Sweden's "total defense" policy.

In Germany, the policy (soziale Verteidigung, or "social defense") never fully escaped from its identification with pacifists, peace groups, and social radicals, especially the Greens. It was, and is still, widespread for the policy to be advocated as relevant only after a neo-Marxist or neo-anarchist revolution. A great deal of effort was put into connecting the proposed defense policy with ideological outlooks and positions, whether antimilitary, pacifist, or prorevolutionary. In one Bundestag hearing on the subject a leading spokesman spent much of his time talking about the rights of conscientious objectors instead of civilian-based defense. Many of the Greens neither understood nor supported the policy and helped to spread misconceptions. This was despite the more informed efforts of Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian. As a result, although the term soziale Verteidigung is known, the kind of civilian-based defense which emerged from the 1964 Oxford conference and which has since developed is not really understood or widely known in Germany.

The consequences of this have often been, in my view, highly negative and if continued are likely to stultify the development of the policy. If those associations grow, the civilian-based defense policy tainted with doctrinalism is likely to become relegated to the role of a strange conception of defense associated only with political sectarians, when it could have grown to be a serious defense option.

These intrusions of doctrine and ideology into a nondoctrinal nonviolent defense policy which developed since 1964 reconnected a defense policy by prepared nonviolent struggle to doctrinal and ideological conceptions and groups from which we had long struggled to free it, so that it could actually be adopted. Similar strains have appeared at certain points in other countries.

These variants have sometimes used the terminology of social defense to describe what in some cases is not primarily a defense policy but a grand conception of social change. Such a conception of social change often has its own merits, but it is a grave disservice to attempt to tie it to civilian-based defense.

Civilian-based defense is not the domain of a particular political program. To be adopted, civilian-based defense requires widespread acceptance and support far beyond the reaches of any one political grouping or adherents to any one doctrine or political ideology.

Efforts to consider all types of nonviolent action (including a subordinated attention to civilian-based defense) as the various parts of one good thing should also be resisted. Whatever the merits of those other causes and the nonviolent struggle being used in them, the issues need to be kept separate. Civilian-based defense needs to be presented as a distinct policy meriting attention and support regardless of people's views on other issues.

Apart from research and policy development, the main

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important activity in the promotion of civilian-based defense lies in education. The standard means of promotion presented in 1985 in my *National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense* (pp. 42-44) still are highly important. Summarized briefly, these include:

1. Self-education and thought by individuals and groups. This step is basic. How many have read the basic literature in the field before going out to promote the policy?
2. Informal public educational efforts, including books, pamphlets, videotapes, publication of articles, book reviews, and op-ed articles; arranging radio, television, and newspaper interviews for appropriate persons; discussion meetings and study groups; special public and campus lectures; conferences for more in-depth presentations.
3. Personal development of skills, like writing, speaking, and so forth for promoting civilian-based defense.
4. Formal educational courses and programs for all ages and levels, either full courses or parts of broader ones.
5. Securing of money to finance research and education on the policy.
6. Establishment of special committees or commissions in local, state, and national organizations (political, religious, professional, business, trade union, and others) to recommend to the overall organization what attention, if any, it should give to the policy.

Special efforts can often be successful in getting local libraries to receive, distribute, and display books on the policy.

All these simple steps would, along with other activities, contribute to a growing recognition that nonviolent means of fighting injustice and oppression exist and can be powerful. Furthermore, all those activities help people realize that there exists an alternative civilian-based defense policy which has great potential and lower economic costs, which can help make the world safer both for freedom and for survival.

We now understand more about nonviolent struggle than in 1964. The broad outlines of how a civilian-based defense policy can operate are much clearer. Important research topics and problems in policy studies have been identified, and institutions for assisting research and policy studies have been established. Many more people are now aware that such an option exists. The growth of movements of people power which from time to time fill our television screens are bringing awareness to masses of people of the existence of alternatives. The status of our literature is much improved, and the number of languages in which civilian-based defense is discussed has multiplied.

We are now in a much stronger position than only two or three decades ago. The future holds great promise, especially if we can avoid serious mistakes and if we proceed with care, wisdom, and confidence.

We can contribute to changing the course of history so that it will no longer be possible to oppress human beings and so that major political violence can be defeated by people power, so that war will be replaced by the nonviolent power of human beings and their institutions through which they can be masters of their own destinies.

Emphasis needs to be placed where it is valid, on the significance of past and current practice of nonviolent struggle, or people power, as evidence of the practicality and effectiveness of a prepared civilian-based defense policy. Genuine defense needs should be candidly and calmly addressed, with serious explorations of the potential of this policy for dealing with them.

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AN ITALIAN STRATEGY FOR PEOPLE'S NONVIOLENT DEFENSE

Antonino Drago

Department of Physical Sciences, University of Naples and Italian Peace Research Institute

The Italian campaign for conscientious objection to military expenditures began in 1981. (See *Civilian-based Defense: News and Opinion*, January/March 1990.) Since 1985 it has asked the Italian government to change the structure of national defense. It has sought the formation of a primary institution devoted to people's nonviolent defense, combining past institutions like Civil Protection, the Red Cross, etc. Italian supporters of the measure constitute a large (and illegal) movement; in fact, a campaign for civil disobedience. They have addressed their proposals to the president of the Italian Republic and to Parliament.

Italian research on people's nonviolent defense has focused on legal and administrative projects rather than defense scenarios. A recent booklet (Quad DPN no. 16, *La Meridiana*, 1990) covers the legislation suggested between 1979 and 1989; it was presented in Parliament by the deputy Guerzoni and then undersigned by eighty deputies. One such project would enable a citizen to choose to pay either for armed or for unarmed defense. The percentage of the Defense Ministry budget devoted to unarmed defense would reflect the percentage of citizens choosing unarmed defense.

This sort of research contrasts with past attempts to create general plans for the use of nonviolent defense. A scenario was fixed (land invasion by conventional troops, coup d'état, nuclear exchange) and an effective nonviolent defense was described in order to persuade one of its plausibility and reasonableness. However, the number of possible situations in which people's nonviolent defense may be applied is so high (ranging from the use of popular diplomacy in an international crisis to defense against an invasion) that one might doubt whether we could foresee, much less prepare for them. One may doubt that any such preparation would be correct in detail and therefore that the citizenry could be trained for them.

Moreover, the successful demonstration of people's power in self-defense without arms in 1989 changed public opinion about people's national defense, and so now there is less need for imagining scenarios in which nonviolent defense would be effective to demonstrate to people that it is a reasonable option. We ought to be concerned now with institutions for managing nonviolent defense rather than with plans of action; and with processes, rather than ideals. Consequently, research on civilian-based defense ought to analyze the role of relevant institutions (churches, civil protection, police, the Red Cross, nonviolent groups, conscientious objectors, etc.) to determine the most effective kind of new institution for people's nonviolent defense.

This is just the goal of the Italian Campaign for Fiscal Conscientious Objection. In 1987 it promoted a three-point initiative, signed by twenty thousand people, to create a fiscal option about taxes for defense; to found an institute for research on people's nonviolent defense (there is no official peace research in Italian universities); and to introduce into a municipality people's nonviolent defense. Although the last two points were legally impractical, the municipality of Cossato, near Vercelli in Piedmont, nonetheless started a service for people's national defense in 1990.

In 1986 a committee of the Campaign for Fiscal Conscientious Objection (Segreteria DPN) articulated the campaign's goals in eight points. First, the fiscal option. Second, a structural change in national defense, including a partial disarmament. Third, the demilitarization of professionals like fire fighters, frontier guards,

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AROUND THE WORLD

Paul E. Anders

CANADA

Citizens' Inquiry. Dave Cursons and George Crowell testified on civilian-based defense before Canada's Citizens' Inquiry into Peace and Security. Cursons, of the Penticton Peace Group of Penticton, British Columbia, noted "[We propose] that Canada develop a Civilian-Based Defence program which relies upon corps of citizens who are educated and trained in non-violent resolution of conflict and non-violent civil disobedience and non-cooperation as a method of dealing with foreign invasion or insurrection by non-democratic and non-constitutional forces." University of Windsor professor George Crowell said, "We have to make sure we have a secure food system, and we need to support the family farm and establish close connections to it." This would help to "make society ungovernable by the invader." (Crowell quoted in the inquiry's report, *Transformation Moment: A Canadian Vision of Common Security* and in an article by Lisa Priest in the *Toronto Star* [see "Publications Received"].)

GERMANY

"The German regional peace group Demilitarization Community (Interessengemeinschaft EntRüstung), based in Rostock, is informing that its *Appeal for a Military-free Baltic*, launched by 47 generals, admirals and officers of the former GDR army and the Bundeswehr last September, has enjoyed remarkable response: the German President, the Parliament's Defense committee, Prime Ministers of several German Federal States, as well as numerous peace organizations reacted positively to the Appeal, which calls for the demilitarization of the Baltic by the next century, and has been signed by 2,000 people so far. In three chapters—the reduction of the military in the Baltic; confidence building measures; creation of examples for disarmament and conversion—the Appeal provides detailed, expert-based first-step suggestions of how to create 'a Baltic-based example for consequent disarmament and conversion.' It is also proposed to hold a conference of the countries neighbouring the Baltic to consider these suggestions and steps to their implementation.

"The initiators, who are particularly aiming at cooperating with government authorities, are feeling optimistic with regard to the Baltic Council initiated by the Danish and German foreign ministers, and its collaboration with the Nordic Council" (from *World Peace Council's Peace News Bulletin*, No. 8/92, April 3, 1992, pp. 3-4).

LITHUANIA

Reconciliation International reports that "five IFOR [International Fellowship of Reconciliation] representatives spent March 16-24 as guests of the Center for Nonviolent Action (CNA) in Lithuania. CNA is an 'independent, non-profit research and educational institution, devoted to the promotion of a humanist, nonviolent culture in Lithuania.' William Anderson and Richard Deats of FOR/US, Bede Smith of FOR/England, IFOR President Diana Francis and IFOR Steering Committee member Margareta Ingelstam were invited by CNA to teach nonviolence and reconciliation techniques.

"The training began with a two-day international conference on 'Lithuania's Nonviolent Road to Independence', which included workshops on nonviolence. The IFOR delegation met afterwards with various authorities, including the Vice-President and the Minister of Defense. Workshops were held with core CNA leaders which focused on listening exercises as part of conflict resolution and nonviolence training.

"An IFOR follow-up visit was discussed, including the need for more training and materials. CNA has been asked by the Ministry of Defense to conduct 12 hours of nonviolence training for the military. As Lithuania is debating a move to civilian-based defense, this work could have a tremendous impact on the country's future. CNA would also like to be an IFOR contact group" (from Reconciliation International, summer 1992, p. 27, published by IFOR, 1815 BK Alkmaar, The Netherlands).

UNITED STATES

On July 20 Audrius Butkevicius, minister of national defense of the Republic of Lithuania, gave a talk at Harvard University on Lithuanian national defense, including civilian-based defense. The Albert Einstein Institution and the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions sponsored the talk.

forest rangers. Fourth, the right to be recognized as a conscientious objector. Fifth, educating civil servants about people's national defense. Sixth, giving organizations which receive conscientious objectors who do civil service as an alternative to military service the option to be engaged in people's national defense. Seventh, 1% of the Defense Ministry's budget spent on people's nonviolent defense. Eighth, international initiatives by people's nonviolent defense during international crises.

Independently of the Campaign for Fiscal Conscientious Objection, the national committee of organizations which receive conscientious objectors doing civil service (CNESC) lobbied the deputies for a new law on conscientious objectors; at present it has been approved by the Low Chamber. It accepts the fourth, fifth and half of the seventh point, and allows "experiments with a civil, nonarmed, nonviolent defense." The second point is already partially realized as a result of the collapse of the Communist bloc. Only the first, third and eighth are unfulfilled.

The eighth point might be realized by an international nonviolent corps under the responsibility of the United Nations. Professor Papisca of Padua is researching this subject. Progress may be made in the third point by introducing the conscientious objectors into unarmed sections of the various professional corps.

I suggested in May 1990 that the new law on conscientious objectors include a three-month period of educating the objectors on general subjects, including people's nonviolent defense. This would require almost 250 teachers. An important goal would be to obtain public financing for a national school for teachers of conscientious objectors, to be managed by CNESC. It may be even more relevant than an institution for research on nonviolent defense, because of its wider audience. Such a school may also be a step in the conversion of military academies to nonviolent defense. Research is needed to suggest an appropriate curriculum.

ASSOCIATION NEWS

Paul E. Anders, Executive Director

• Grant. Thanks to the Albert Einstein Institution for a generous grant supporting *Civilian-Based Defense: News and Opinion*. Thanks also to Caridad Inda, chair of CBDA, for prodding me to apply for it.

•Peace Workers. The Civilian-Based Defense Association welcomes volunteers and interns (unpaid, unfortunately) in its Cambridge, Massachusetts, office. CBDA publishes and distributes literature, including this magazine; organizes conferences; and maintains a speakers bureau. Those who wish to help in their own locality can do organizing, fundraising, research, translating, and transcription.

William Holuby, from Kosice, Czechoslovakia and Mikkel Lunding-Smith, from Valby, Denmark volunteered some time to work at the Cambridge office while they were participating in a Peace Camp during July sponsored by the Cambridge Peace Commission.

• Spoken Word

• Cambridge, Massachusetts. On March 11 consulting editor and advisory board member Philip Bogdonoff gave a talk "Civilian-based Defense in Russia."

• Washington, D.C. On February 3 and March 2, Philip Bogdonoff spoke to Mubarak Awad's class on nonviolence at American University on the basic concepts underlying CBD.

• Washington, D.C. On May 1-3 Mubarak Awad, a member of the CBDA board of directors, and George Lakey, author and organizer, led on workshop on campaign building in which CBD was featured as one of the applications of nonviolent methods of change.

• Ann Arbor, Michigan. On May 7 CBDA directors John Mecartney and George Crowell were interviewed by Hal Brokaw on public access cable TV in Ann Arbor. They presented the case for CBD.

• Hanover, New Hampshire. On May 18 Paul Anders gave a talk on civilian-based defense at Dartmouth College. The presentation was organized by Dartmouth student Janis Hall with support from the Tucker Foundation.

SEMINAR

The seminar "Dimensions of People Power: Domination, Collective Action, Liberation and Defense" will be held in conjunction with the International Peace Bureau Centenary Conference, August 25-30, 1992, based in Helsinki. It will be held August 26-28 in Tallinn, Estonia. For further information, contact

Steve Huxley

Metsäpurontie 18 B 18

006630 Helsinki 63

Finland

Phone +358-0-754 2734

Fax +358-0-754 2296

The conference will be attended by speakers, commentators, and those who simply want to take part in the discussion or observe. The following contributions have so far been arranged: Domination and the Arts of Resistance; Globalization of the Emancipatory Process; The State of Native Peoples' Struggles Today; The Economics of Domination and Liberation in the Baltics; The Domination/Liberation Process in the Baltics; Popular Struggle and the Civil Society in the Breakup of the Soviet Union; The Nation as Dominator and Liberator of the People. The cost is perhaps \$100 for the whole seminar.

PUBLICATIONS RECENTLY RECEIVED

compiled by Paul E. Anders and Kenneth Haynes

- Beaudet, Jean-François. *L'Autre Révolution: Écologie et non-violence sur une planète en danger*. Canada: Éditions Fides, 1990. Discusses nonviolent national defense, pp. 125-126. With bibliographic notes; 166 pages.
- Bond, Doug, Michelle Markley, Shabhana Rana, and William Voegelé, eds. *Nonviolent Sanctions Seminar Synopses*. Cambridge, MA: Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, Fall 1991. (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA); 42 pages.
- Bond, Doug, Michelle Markley, and William Voegelé, eds. *Nonviolent Sanctions Seminars Synopses*. Cambridge MA: Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, Spring 1992. (Address above). 40 pages.
- Compagnolo, Iona, Johanna den Hertog, Jules Dufour, Douglas Roche, and Konrad Sioui. *Transformation Moment: A Canadian Vision of Common Security*. Ontario, March 1992. Copublished by Project Ploughshares (Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6, Canada) and the Canadian Peace Alliance (555 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1Y6, Canada). 165 pages, \$14.95 Canadian.
- Ebert, Theodor. "L'armée peut-elle être abolie?" *K Comme King*. No. 30 (November/December 1991) 12-14. Extracts from a response to Senghaas' article in a previous issues (see Senghaas).
- Helms, Philip W. "The Gentle Scouring of the Shire: Civilian-Based Defense Among the Hobbits." *Minas Tirith Evening-Star: Journal of the American Tolkien Society* 20(4) (Winter 1991) 23-30. (PO Box 373, Highland, Michigan 48357-0373 USA.)
- Gross, Natalie. "The Baltics—New Armies in the Making." *Jane's Intelligence Review* (May 1992) 209-210.
- Hurwitz, Deena. Review of *Living the Intifada* by Andrew Rigby (Zed Books, 1991). *Peace News*. April, 1992. (55 Dawes St., London SE17 1EL, England) Notes that Rigby's book emphasizes civilian-based resistance in an examination of the Palestinian uprising.
- Münster, S. "Pazifismus und Staatstheorie." *Graswurzelrevolution* 161 (December 1991) 10-11. (Schillerstr. 28, w-6900 Heidelberg, Germany.)
- _____. "Verabschiedung des Sozialismus bei Senghaas." *Graswurzelrevolution* 161(December 1991) 12f.
- _____. "Eine pazifistische Staatstheorie?" *Graswurzelrevolution* 162 (January 1992) 10-11. Commentaries on the Senghaas-Ebert controversy. (See articles under Senghaas and Ebert.)
- Priest, Lisa. "Civilian-based Defence Best, Inquiry Told." *Toronto Star*, Oct. 8, 1991.
- Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense. *Transforming Struggle: Strategy and the Global Experience of Nonviolent Direct Action*, 1992. (Center for International Studies, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA). A collection of reports on more than ninety seminars given through the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions from 1983 to 1991. General subject areas include the technique approach, strategy, research issues, and nonviolent struggles in particular countries. 141 pages.
- Schweitzer, Christine. "Drei Jahre Bund für Soziale Verteidigung." *Rundbrief* 1 1992. Both a retrospective and prospective account of social defense (soziale Verteidigung); includes a statement of their purpose.
- Senghaas, Dieter. "Que reste-t-il de la resistance sociale?" *K comme King* 29 (1991) 8-10. A translation and abridgement of articles by Senghaas in the *Friedenszeitung*, 1991. He argues that the contemporary relevance of civilian-based defense is limited and may interfere with other pacifist tactics and with international cooperation. (Centre Martin Luther King, Av. de Béthusy 56, Ch-1012 Lausanne, Switzerland.)
- Sharp, Gene. "Dialog" (interviewed by Mary Meehan). *National Catholic Register*, Oct. 13, 1991.
- Shuman, Michael, and Julia Sweig, eds. *Conditions of Peace: An Inquiry*. Washington, D.C.: Exploratory Project on the Conditions of Peace, 1991. Contains the following essays: "Stony Point and the New World Order," Robert L. Borosage; "An Active Foreign Policy," Dietrich Fischer; "A Separate Peace Movement: The Role of Participation," Michael H. Schuman; "The Ecological Foundations of National Security," David Orr; "Global Apartheid and the Political Economy of War," Arjun Makhijani; "Culture and Communication," Grace Boggs and Sharon Howell; "Epilogue," W.H. Ferry. Civilian-based defense is mentioned on page 19. 254 pages, with bibliographic notes. \$15.95. (Distributed by the Talman Co., 150 Fifth Ave, New York, NY 10011, USA.)

Windsor Conference in the News

Articles about the conference "Civilian-based Defense and People Power," which was held September 6-8, 1991, in Windsor, Ontario, Canada.

- Craig, Susanne. "Civilian-based Defence Has Its Limits, Dyer says." *The Windsor Star*. Sept. 7, 1991
- Desroches, Len. "The Soul of Civilian-Based Defence." *Peace Magazine* 8 (March 1992) 12-13. Criticizes the technical approach to nonviolent defense which some participants in the conference shared.
- Johnson, Kevin. "When Putsch Comes to Shove: The Case for Civilian-Based Defense." *The Lance* (University of Windsor), Sept. 11, 1991
- Mccartney, John M. "Windsor Conf. to Feature Gene Sharp on Nonviolent Alternatives to War," *Michigan Christian Advocate*. Aug. 5, 1991.
- Meehan, Mary. "Against This, Coups Don't Work." *National Catholic Register*, Sept. 29, 1991.
- Puls, Mark. "Thou Shalt Protest Peacefully." *Detroit News*, Sept. 6, 1991

BALTICS: SELF-DEFENSE OR U.S. UMBRELLA.....continued from page 6

military.

The Pentagon's Lithuanian scenario is one of seven that appeared in 70 pages of classified planning documents leaked to the *New York Times* by an official concerned that the U.S. military is inventing alarming war scenarios to prevent further force reductions or new weapons cancellations. On February 20, two days after Patrick E. Tyler published two articles about the the document in the *Times*, Pentagon spokesman Bob Hall said the scenarios "are not contingency plans. They are not predictive of what's going to happen. It's something which we use basically to crunch numbers." But because they were "developed...to guide defense planning," as Tyler put it, I don't think they should be discounted.

The Pentagon's Lithuania scenario postulates an "expansionist authoritarian government" assuming power in Moscow and bullying former Soviet republics over the rights of Russian minorities. Russia with support from Belarus demands autonomy for Russians in the Baltics. Finally 18 Russian and 6 Belarussian divisions attack Lithuania, which requests NATO help. A 5,000-man NATO rapid reaction force moves into Western Poland, followed by 18 NATO divisions and 66 tactical fighter squadrons. The United States ultimately commits seven divisions, a Marine expeditionary force, six aircraft carrier battle groups, four heavy bomber squadrons, and 45 fighter squadrons. NATO forces win in 90 days.

Given the destruction wrought, for example, on Kuwait during its liberation, it's unclear what would be left of Lithuania after such a defense. Nevertheless, if NATO develops concrete plans to defend Lithuania militarily, some Lithuanians might let Uncle Sam do it and stop supporting CBD. Why bother?

Demilitarization scenarios, however, could fit either the CBD or NATO umbrella plans. At a recent conference on defense policy, Donald Rumsfeld, who served as the U. S. secretary of defense under President Ford, suggested that the United States should encourage demilitarization in the commonwealth emerging from the former Soviet Union, and his logic might be applicable to the Baltics as well.

A report on the German demilitarization plan appeared in *World Peace Council's Peace News Bulletin* for April, which we reprint in this issue in the section "Around the World."

Source: General : Natalie Gross, "The Baltics—New Armies in the Making, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 1992. Details of the Pentagon scenario in two *New York Times* articles of Feb.17, 1992, by Patrick E. Tyler: "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold-War Era: Planning for Hypothetical Wars and Big Budgets," and "7 Hypothetical Conflicts Foreseen by the Pentagon." Bob Hall's statement is from "Pentagon Calls War Scenarios Budget Guides, *Boston Globe*, Feb. 21, 1992. Estonian situation: Jon Auerbach, "Estonian Troops Exchange Fire with Russian Soldiers, *Boston Globe*, July 23, 1992.

CBD DISCUSSED.....continued from page 14 ³

putschists. He also indicated that printed instructions for nonviolent resistance were prepared and distributed in various regions of the country. Mr. Vare took some recommendations from Dr. Sharp's book *Civilian-Based Defense*.

At this time, it is unclear what role civilian-based defense will play in the future Estonian defense system. As of December 1991, the Estonian Defense Commission had not included any provisions for civilian-based defense in its draft defense policy "white paper." While there appears to be a consensus that nonviolent resistance would play a role in the event of massive foreign aggression, there has been little organizational development along these lines.

There are significant problems in implementing civilian-based defense in the Baltic states. First, over 100,000 foreign troops remain stationed within Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Recent negotiations indicate that Russia is willing to withdraw these troops. However, until the last troops are pulled out, Baltic defense officials must prepare for possible attacks by renegade army units. The fear of terrorist-like attacks is quite high. Second, within Estonia and Latvia, the large Russian populations are sometimes viewed as potential collaborators should there be another attempt to reimpose authoritarian rule. Defense officials in these countries may be reluctant to train these sectors of the population in civilian forms of resistance. Third, in all three states, civilian-based defense is unlikely to prove successful against terrorism or small-scale attacks. A tepid response to these types of security problems may undermine the legitimacy of the independent governments.

Among officials in all three Baltic states, there is an understanding of the concepts behind civilian-based defense. The main question now being posed by these officials is how best to combine military and civilian forms of defense. For example, should civilian-based defense be the main line of defense against foreign attacks, a fall-back position, or solely a response to coups?

Given the geopolitical situation in the Baltics, these countries have no real military options in the event of a large-scale attack. The Baltic states may be the first to test civilian-based

defense, and this possibility presents both opportunities and dangers. If the first cases of civilian-based defense are not well prepared and resistance is tried and fails, the concept may be discredited. On the other hand, there have never been three countries side by side with the opportunity to plan a national defense policy starting from scratch. In that, the exploration of civilian-based defense in the Baltic states carries historic importance.

Bruce Jenkins is a special assistant at the Albert Einstein Institution. He has travelled to the Baltics and Russia several times. Reprinted with minor changes from Nonviolent Sanctions: News from the Albert Einstein Institution, winter 1991/92.

PROMOTING CBD.....continued from page 14

Anything which would tend to take this policy out of the field of realism and responsibility and back into the ghetto of the naive, romantic, and doctrinal should be strongly resisted. Instead, hard-headed attention is required in consideration of responsible and effective ways to promote civilian-based defense.

Civilian-based defense can be made to be a highly realistic policy which merits serious consideration for adoption as the defense policy of many societies. It is not a dream of utopians, but an exercise in the politics of the possible. We must act accordingly.

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I am grateful for the assistance of Bruce Jenkins in the preparation of this paper, presented to the conference on "Civilian-Based Defense and People Power" of the Civilian-based Defense Association held in Windsor, Ontario, Canada, September 6-8, 1991. This paper is not to be reproduced in any form without written consent of the author: Gene Sharp, Senior Scholar-in-Residence, Albert Einstein Institution, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA.

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE ASSOCIATION

154 Auburn St., Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139-3969, USA - (617) 868-6058

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August 1992

Dear Friend of CBDA:

We need your help.

• Check the date on the top line of your address label. It tells when your subscription or membership expires. If yours has expired, please renew it now. Use the reply form and the envelope inserted in this magazine.

• If possible, send a contribution to the Civilian-based Defense Association (CBDA)—tax-deductible in the United States. Take a minute now to write a check. *Your contribution is vital to our success.*

• The reply form that you enclose with your contribution asks what your profession is. Your response is optional. The information will enable us to tailor publication of some of our articles to our readers' professional interests; e.g., an article on how the legal or educational system could support Civilian-based Defense (CBD) in the event of an invasion or coup d'état.

• Spread the word about CBD. Tell your friends, legislators, and public officials.

• Let us know of your activities for CBD. We want to publicize them.

• Write an article for this magazine. We need a variety of articles: e.g.

• How to get a particular group (e.g., students or officials) interested in CBD

• Using CBD, how members of particular professions could oppose an invasion or coup d'état; for example, civil servants, merchants, and physicians

• A review of a book, film, play, or other work of art relevant to CBD

• CBD and particular nations (e.g., Costa Rica, Thailand, and Czechoslovakia)

• Degree to which the nation is ready for CBD

• Past efforts to promote CBD in the nation

• Groups that might be inclined to CBD

• Scenarios involving the actual use of CBD

• Defense plans/alliances currently in place.

• Give us some suggestions for CBD and CBDA. We'll discuss them at the next board meeting, Sept. 12-14, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. (You'll find the agenda for the board meeting on the next to last page.)

At this moment in history, opportunities abound for civilian-based defense, and with your help we will make the most of them. With the ending of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the Warsaw Pact, CBD is the keystone for a rational defense policy. Although any nation would benefit from CBD, motivation is greatest in some small nations that lack strong military establishments and reliable defensive alliances. The defense needs of the many small nations that have recently regained their sovereignty present a challenge to proponents of CBD.

The Civilian-based Defense Association

Organized in 1982 as the Association for Transarmament Studies, CBDA adopted its present name in 1987 "to allow the purpose of the Association to become more visible in the name itself." The Civilian-based Defense Association engages in educational activities to bring civilian-based defense to public attention.

What is CBD?

CBD is a method of defending a nation against invasions or coups d'état. With CBD a nation prepares its citizens to resist aggression or usurpation by withholding cooperation and by active noncooperation rather than military force. Tactics include strikes, encouraging invading forces to desert, encouraging other countries to use sanctions against the invader, etc.

A feature of CBD that distinguishes it from spontaneous resistance is that citizens learn how to use it before a conflict starts. Prior preparation and publicity enhance its effectiveness and also make it a deterrent to aggression or usurpation.

1992 CBDA Broad Meeting

The meeting will take place September 12-14 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Agenda

- Discussion on
 - What and where is the future of CBD?
 - Outreach to Native Americans
- Executive director's report
- Budget for 1993
- Evaluation of CBDA's activities since the last board meeting
- Review of 1991 minutes
- Prospects for CBDA
- Personnel and procedural guidelines
- Possible conference in 1993
- Board
 - Membership of committees and committee chairs
 - Appointment of board chair for next 12 months
 - New board members
 - Date and site of next meeting
 - Do we need at least some board members for whom CBD is a very high priority, e.g., Lithuanians
 - Appointment of executive committee
 - What each director plans to do for CBDA in next 12 months
- Magazine
 - Editorship
 - Advertising
 - Critique of magazine; suggestions
- At the last board meeting it was proposed that we have a "meeting and retreat for personal development, a working meeting." Board members could also comment on what groups they are involved in that we might reach out to.

Reports on the progress of CBD fill me with optimism; some examples that we report on in this issue:

•In June a conference in Lithuania that included defense ministry representatives from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Sweden concluded:

The strategy of civilian-based defense can and should be used successfully to guarantee the security of the Baltic states and, in particular, to have Russia withdraw its troops.

The success of civilian-based defense in the Baltic states depends to a great extent on the support of international organizations, individual governmental and nongovernmental organizations. One step in this direction is the development of a Baltic Civilian-Based Defense Mutual Aid Treaty to state concrete ways in which such international support would be supplied by signatory nations to any attacked member using civilian-based defense measures.

See Roger Powers's article in this issue for more detail.

•In Russia the Living Ring, an organization of those who opposed the coup in August 1991, is interested in CBD to oppose any future attempt at a coup.

•In North America, the Western Shoshone Defense Project plans to use nonviolent tactics to defend their claim to Western Shoshone sovereignty.

The potential for unarmed civilians to defend their nation has been shown repeatedly in recent years. Further progress will enable governments to decrease spending for arms and to concentrate on improving education, health, and the environment.

Civilian-based Defense: News and Opinion chronicles this progress and keeps you abreast of the trends and debates in this lively field. CBDA also distributes the book *National Security through Civilian-based Defense*, by Gene Sharp, which it published under its former name, The Association for Transarmament Studies. This little book has had a formidable influence. In a recent talk, Lithuanian defense minister Audrius Butkevicius said that Lithuanian independence began with this book.

Besides publishing this book and its magazine, CBDA maintains a speakers bureau, publishes pamphlets, holds conferences, has conversations with officials in various nations to encourage them to consider CBD for their country's defense and deterrence needs, networks with organizations that already espouse CBD, and encourages other organizations to adopt the promotion of CBD as one of their goals.

Many groups and nations that would most benefit from learning about CBD are poor and CBDA, currently underfunded, must take the initiative.

To meet the challenging goals implicit in these activities, CBDA would like to start paying its staff regularly.

Again, to do these things, we need your help.

Sincerely,



Paul Anders, Executive Director

Help!

You can help the Civilian-based Defense Association with supplies and equipment. The latter should be in good working order.

- A four-drawer filing cabinet (letter size)
- Comfortable office chair
- A laser printer that's compatible with a Macintosh computer
- A touchtone phone
- A FAX machine
- A copier
- An electronic scale to weigh letters and packages
- A postage meter
- A small portable tape recorder
- A transcription machine
- PageMaker for a Macintosh
- Video camera and blank tapes
- Books for our library (If we already have them, we'll put them to other good use):
 - About CBD
 - Recent reference books
 - Atlas
 - Encyclopedia

Phone or write to us, and we'll let you know if what you have would be useful. For books, just send them.

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