

# Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion

EXPLORING A NONVIOLENT STRATEGY  
FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

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## IN THIS ISSUE

Is Civilian-Based Defense Still Relevant in Post-1989 Europe? ...Front Editorial .....	Front
News and Announcements .....	2
Lessons to be Learned from Eastern Europe .....	3
Book Review .....	4
Netherlands/Belgium: Research Program Initiated .....	5
Raising Awareness about Civilian-Based Defense in the South African Context .....	6
The Washington D.C. Consultation on Civilian-Based Defense .....	7

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The Washington D.C. Consultation  
on Civilian-Based Defense  
*see page 7*

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## EDITORIAL

We who support the notion of a nonviolent, civilian-based defense in our various countries cannot help but have our convictions strengthened by the events in the Persian Gulf. The lesson to be learned, once again, is that we cannot just turn over responsibility for national security to the government. While we citizens of the United States might want to blame the President for getting us into an extremely dangerous situation, and the Congress for not getting us out of it, in the end we have to accept part of the blame ourselves. We continue to turn over to government all responsibility for national security matters.

It seems so efficient and reasonable to "hire" police forces and armies to "take care of us." But *we ourselves* become very powerless when we put guns in others' hands and give them the job of providing for our well-being. This is "agent" security, and while convenient, it comes at a price. We are paying that price now, in frustration and dread of impending war. Even though we don't want our "agent" to go to war he appears,

*(continued on page 9)*

## THE NEW EUROPE AND CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE



**EDITOR'S NOTE:** The following articles express somewhat divergent points of view about the relevance of civilian-based defense in post-cold-war Europe. The articles were not solicited and the authors did not write under the above title which we have supplied. We suspect there are many other points of view about this question and we will be printing some of them in the next issue. Readers' responses to the following articles will be welcomed. Please be as concise as possible.

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## IS CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE STILL RELEVANT IN POST-1989 EUROPE?

*By Maria Clelia Spreafico and Paolo Farinella, via Corridoni 109, 56125 Pisa, Italy*

The origin of civilian-based defense (CBD) undoubtedly lies in the climax of the cold war. Sir Stephen King-Hall proposed it in 1957 (1) as the best means — more effective than both nuclear weapons and conventional armies — to wage the final war against an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union: a war which, in his mind, was much more likely to be fought on the political-ideological front than in the real battlefield. (It is in a way paradoxical, after 43 years, to conclude that King-Hall was right, since the cold war has been ended by political, ideological, and economic factors, not by the military supremacy of either side.)

The other subsequent most important and ambitious books aimed at analyzing and promoting CBD as a solution for the defense problems of Western Europe (2) have also given as granted a scenario dominated for all the predictable future by the confrontation between two opposing blocks: a scenario in which the major threat for Western Europe was that of invasion by an overwhelming Soviet army. At the heart of CBD, therefore, has been the concept that it was necessary to provide an answer to widespread threat perceptions, and that the best answer was to prepare the citizens of democratic countries to defend themselves — through nonviolent means — from an external aggression.

Today's Europe is very different. The Warsaw Pact practically does not exist any more, with its former members struggling to consolidate their new democracies and to improve their economic performances. Negotiations on conventional armed forces have brought about massive disarmament, both in the amount of weapons systems and in military manpower deployed in the whole continent. The focus of the former confrontation, Germany, a place where nuclear war has been incumbent for decades, is now united, democratic, and a full member of NATO (an alliance also inevitably subjected to deep, albeit fairly gradual, changes). New pan-European institutions, based on the positive record of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), are being constructed to carry out a variety of crucial tasks: to defend human rights, to build confidence, and to promote cooperation and the eventual integration of all the European states. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that in a few

*(continued on page 2)*



## NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS

### UNITED STATES

A new book on civilian-based defense, by Gene Sharp, has been published by Princeton University Press. It is entitled *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System*. Order from Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, NJ 08648. ISBN 0-691-07809-2. 165 pp. \$19.95. Arrangements are being made or negotiated to publish the new book in Hebrew, Arabic, Polish, Hungarian, Slovenian, and Norwegian, according to a report on publications in the Biennial Report, 1988-1990, of the Albert Einstein Institution.

The Albert Einstein Institution has published a 22-page paper by Johan Jorgen Holst, entitled *Civilian-Based Defense in a New Era*. The paper was first delivered at the National Conference on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, held February 8-12, 1990, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It appears now as the Einstein Institution's Monograph Series Number 2 (ISSN 1052-1054). Holst is Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo. From May 1986 to October 1989 he served as Minister of Defense of Norway. Copies of the monograph are \$2.00 each, from The Albert Einstein Institution, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Phone 617-876-03121.

The Einstein Institution has also just published Monograph Series Number 3, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, by Gene Sharp. This 19-page paper is abstracted from his earlier three-volume examination of the technique of nonviolent action — *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Porter Sargent Publishers, 11 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108, USA). The paper was originally delivered at the Conference on Nonviolent Political Struggle, sponsored by the Arab Thought Forum, Amman, Jordan, November 15-17, 1986. It has been published in Arabic and Burmese, and is pending publication in Chinese. Monograph Series Number 3 is also available for the price of \$2.00 per copy.

### BELGIUM

A publisher is being sought to produce an English-language translation of the Dutch *Sociale Verdediging Als Logisch*

(continued on page 3)

## CBD IN POST-1989 EUROPE (continued from page 1)

decades the whole of Europe, including Russia, will form a loose confederation of democratic states, with a decentralized but unified government system to manage all common problems, including security. If this will happen, the danger of wars between the major European nations will be no more likely than it is today between France and Germany, or between Italy and Austria (countries which in the past have been frequently fighting, and even invading, each other).

What are the main threats in today's Europe? Unfortunately, the list is not short: economic difficulties and gaps; ethical issues; problems in managing disarmament and conversion; ecological degradation; involvement in dangerous Third World conflicts — especially in the neighboring, crisis-prone Middle East; massive immigration from the poor countries of Africa; organized criminality and terrorism; alcoholism and drugs; and several others. But the list does not include, nor will it for a long time, the possibility of invasions by foreign armies. The only exceptions are, perhaps the situations in which ethical issues *within* multinational countries like Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union reach a critical stage. While in this particular case CBD techniques may become very relevant, as in many similar Third World scenarios, this threat does not apply to Western European countries. Anyway, it will probably be better met by fostering economic/cultural progress and integration, as well as by protecting minority rights at a super-national level (e.g., through the CSCE).

The old wisdom of CBD analysts (3) advocated a gradual transition (or *transarmament*) from traditional (conventional and nuclear) military forces, to reduced, unequivocally defensive forces combined with a CBD component, and finally to a "pure" CBD system. As the invasion scenario has become unrealistic and irrelevant, this is no longer a viable strategy.

Military organizations and forces cannot be eliminated instantaneously, both for reasons of institutional inertia and for their "residual" tasks (peace-keeping, management and verification of disarmament, civil defense, etc.). However, they are going to be substantially reduced and reorganized. Here probably, the concepts of *non-offensive defense* and the neutrals' experiences of *militia armies* will play an important role. But this reorientation cannot be done by keeping intact the perception of threat and the image of the enemy which motivated both the previous military systems and the proposed CBD alternative.

In the main Western European countries, as a consequence, CBD supporters cannot pretend that nothing has changed and go on as before with their former activities (meetings, training, publications, proposal of new legislation, etc.) aimed at advertising the CBD concept and techniques to the public and getting some official support by the governments.

In our opinion, they should first of all make an intellectual effort to redirect their short-term objectives and plans — keeping intact, of course, the long-term objective of a demilitarized Europe, where all conflicts will be managed and solved by nonviolent means. Instead of proposing to the ministries of defense that military service and standing armies be replaced by training of the general population to resist aggression with nonviolent techniques — something which has a logic only in the cold war scenario — they should push their governments to quickly reduce military budgets, invest in conversion of military industry, adopt a non-intervention policy in the third world, and stop military research and development and the arms trade. Conscientious objectors, instead of training themselves as the future organizers of a nonviolent, civilian resistance, should work on the integration of different nations, respect for human rights, and protection of the poor, the homeless, drug-addicted people, and immigrants.

This kind of nonviolent struggle for a more just and democratic society has always had deep connections with the struggle for peace, in the positive sense of the word; but in the world of tomorrow these two aspects are going to become indistinguishable. Non-armed peace-keeping forces, under United Nations or CSCE control, may still be useful to help solve some conflicts, although they should not be seen as a panacea. But many more tasks are awaiting experienced CBD activists and organizers, if only they can think in a new way, consistent with the new world.

### NOTES:

1. S. King-Hall, *Defence in the Nuclear Age*, Gollancz, London 1957.
2. A. Boserup and A. Mack, *War Without Weapons*, Frances Pinter, London 1974; G. Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable*, Ballinger, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985.
3. See e.g., J. Salmon, "Combining Military and Civilian-Based Defense," *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion*, Vol. 4, May 1988, n. 4.

## LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM EASTERN EUROPE

By Henk bij de Weg, a member of the Dutch Working Group Research on Social Defense. The views expressed in the article do not necessarily represent the views of the Working Group. The author can be contacted at Fornheselaan 54, 3734 GD Den Dolder, Netherlands.

### THE PRESENT IDEA OF SOCIAL DEFENSE

The present idea of social defense (also called civilian defense or civilian-based defense) goes back to the fifties when it was introduced by military strategists like Liddell Hart and King-Hall. Though the idea had existed before the Second World War it had become "lost." After the idea had been "re-invented," pre-war concepts such as "Pacifist People's Defense" could become influential again. After the (re)introduction of the idea by

military strategists it was adopted by peace researchers and peace activists and it received a more widespread influence in discussions about war and peace, though it could only rarely leave the backyard where it had been cultivated originally.

When the concept of social defense was adopted by peace researchers and peace activists a new meaning was added to it. Originally it was seen only as a mere instrument, as another means of defense, which could be used in any circumstances. But now the concept received also a structural meaning. According to this view, social defense could be introduced only in a society which satisfied certain conditions, e.g., the presence of democratic, nonviolent relations within the society concerned. Later, mainly under the influence of the ideas of the movement "Women for Peace," yet another meaning was added to the concept — emancipation from all kinds of violence that a person could experience, be it violence in war

or be it violence in daily life. This view introduced a disconnection of social defense and defense in case of war, but in fact, it was a minority view. The majority view remained that social defense has a relation to war or resistance against dictatorial repression, and that it is a nonviolent alternative to international or civil war. It is sufficient to point to the recent discussions in connection with the work of the Dutch Niezing Committee and some recently-published studies in the Netherlands (like the studies by Koch, Klumper, and Schmid) [Editor's Note: See especially Chapter 5 in Steven Huxley's *Constitutional Insurgency in Finland*]. Of course, this relation between social defense and waging war was not surprising. What else could be expected in the age of the Cold War, with arms more destructive than ever, and rising defense budgets?

### CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SOCIAL DEFENSE

However, recent developments in Eastern Europe, culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall, have much changed the political situation in Europe. The cold war has become to an end, war between East and West (let alone nuclear war) seems to have become almost impossible and, as a consequence, most nations in this part of the world have begun to reduce their number of arms and soldiers. So why shouldn't the protagonists of social defense also stop development of their nonviolent weapon and leave the backyard where they cultivated it for years? Why not spend one's time now on more useful activities, like consolidating the newly-established East-West relations, or protection of the environment? Or why not rest on one's laurels? Without saying that the activities just mentioned are not important and useful (they may have a narrow relation with making the world more peaceful — which is just what the social defense protagonists are working for), perhaps a preliminary question should be answered before deciding whether or not the idea of social defense should be developed further. The question is: Isn't there something we can learn from what happened and is still happening in Eastern Europe? If so, we may decide to continue to work on social defense.

(continued on page 4)

### NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

(continued from page 4)

*Alternatief: Van Utopie Naar Optie* (Social Defense as a Logical Alternative: From Utopia Towards Option), by Professor Johan Niezing. He may be contacted at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Centrum Voor Polelmologie, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium.

### GERMANY

The German "Association for Social Defense" (Der Bund für Soziale Verteidigung) has published a new member's handbook which explains the purpose and activities of the Association. In an October 15th cover letter sent with the handbook, Professor Theodor Ebert encouraged membership recruitment, contributions, and patient contact with fellow citizens to encourage their consideration of a Germany without an army. The 20-page handbook is illustrated and in color. The Association's address: Friedensplatz 1a, Postfach 2063, 4950 Minden, Germany. Telephone: 05 71/2 43 39.

### ENGLAND

"The Social Defence Project" was established in 1988, in association with Lansbury House Trust Fund and the School of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. It has been principally funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, York, and the Barrow & Geraldine Cadbury Trust in Birmingham. Steering Group members include Christina Arber, Howard Clark, Owen Green, Bob Overy, Michael Randle, Carol Rank, Andrew Rigby, Tim Milne-Wallis, and Walter Stein.

According to Michael Randle, Coordinator, the Project is seeking a publisher for a book to be entitled, *People Power: the Building of a New European Home*. The first part of the book is a 30,000 word essay drafted by Randle with the help of the steering committee. It examines the implications of the events in East-Central Europe in 1989 for the concepts of civil resistance and social defense. The second part of the book will feature interviews with people who were actively engaged in the events of 1989 or during the preceding years in East-Central Europe.

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"... recent developments in Eastern Europe, culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall, have much changed the political situation in Europe."

## BOOK REVIEW

*The New Australian Militarism: Undermining Our Future Security.* Edited by Graeme Cheeseman and St. John Kettle, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1990. 231 pp, \$14.95 (paperback).

Review by Ralph Summy, Department of Government at the University of Queensland.

While militarism may be on the wane in other Western nations (the Iraqi crisis a one-off problem) and some people are even talking about a "peace dividend," Australia has quietly gone about the business of "beefing up" its military forces to become the regional policeman of South-east Asia and the South Pacific. Drastic changes in its geo-strategic thinking, equipment procurement, force deployment, arms export business, and perception of national enemies have occurred without the benefit of wide-ranging public debate.

Australian citizens are not even aware of the militarism they are committing or is being committed in their name. This book sets out to raise the alarm bells and offer some alternatives, including a strong endorsement in one chapter for civilian-based defence. In presenting a rational case of militarism's development during the Labor Party's nearly eight years in office, the contributors stand on solid — one might say irrefutable — ground. An attempt by the architect of the "new militarism," the former Minister of Defence Kim Beazley, to defend his actions in a rejoinder at the books end, rebounds badly and only serves to underscore his critics' previous arguments.

The editors define militarism in terms of Mark Thee's three principal characteristics — namely, 1) cultural values exulting aggressiveness, jingoism, authoritarianism, regimentation, violence, and class, gender, ethnic, racial, etc. dominance; 2) a disproportionate role for the military in conducting national and international affairs; and 3) policies that emphasize the threat or use of organized violence in resolving conflict. It is this third and last category where a resurgent militarism is most noticeable in Australia.

A new threatening posture is backed up with an increase in military expenditure and a restructuring of Australia's strike capacity. While the Government has been implementing its call for general fiscal restraint (during the last seven years the federal budget's proportion of GDP has actually declined 5.3 percent), real defence expenditure has risen by 9.3

(continued on page 5)

## LESSONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE (continued from page 3)

### FIVE THESES

In answering the question I will not give a full-fledged analysis of what has taken place in Eastern Europe recently. Rather, I shall simply give some conclusions in the form of five amplified theses:

- 1) Social defense should not be conceived of in relation to military defense — neither as an alternative for, nor as a supplement to military defense. Social defense is a phenomenon by itself. When the people of the Eastern European countries tried to get rid of the communist regimes they did not think and talk about their activities in military terms but rather, in terms of democratization, more freedom, improvement of economic circumstances, etc. In Western countries these terms do not usually stand for a justification of military operations against an enemy but rather, for a better way of life, and this is also true in Eastern Europe. This does not mean that social defense cannot be an alternative for or a supplement to military defense in certain circumstances but that is not the most obvious way of talking about it. Social defense reflects the way people wish to live their daily life and must be analyzed in terms of this daily life in the first place. With concepts like power politics and strategy one can reveal, then, only a part of what social defense stands for. It is better to start to analyze social defense as a social movement or as a way of social change, that is, in sociological terms, and not in political, let alone military terms.
- 2) The possibility of social defense is closely related to the nature of the society in which it is employed and to its structure. Only if certain structural conditions are fulfilled is social defense possible. It was only when the existing structure of society broke down in Eastern Europe that the non-communist opposition could become successful, and this structure broke down only because the societies could not fulfill their own goals (mainly in the field of production), and not because of the opposition. So people who consider the possibility of social defense to be conditional on the structure of society are right, but this does not mean that the structure must be nonviolent and democratic, or in another sense, "ideal." It is sufficient that the structure is such that one can work within it or against it, and that it gives enough space for opposition. On the other hand it means also that social defense cannot be used as a mere instrument.
- 3) Social defense is not voluntaristic. People do not resist just because they are (and feel themselves) repressed. They must see that there is a real possibility of success. This possibility may appear from a weakening of repressive structures together with a clear view of alternatives. In the case of Eastern Europe the weakening of the repressive structures became evident in the policy of the leader of the major power in that area, Mr. Gorbachev. The alternatives were shown by opposition leaders and dissidents.
- 4) A consequence of the second and third theses is this, that just pointing to the repressive character of existing regimes and social structures is not sufficient for changing them and starting a massive social defense movement. An elite group of opposition leaders or dissidents cannot start a social defense movement if the structural conditions are not met. But such a group can play an important part in preparing to make massive nonviolent resistance possible at the right moment and place. So, Charta 77 could not bring down the Czechoslovakian government at the moment of choice, but it could make resistance against the regime effective at the moment that it was possible to overthrow the regime.
- 5) Social defense is contagious. Social defense in one country can invite nonviolent resistance in other countries with repressive regimes, even though these regimes are not as weak as the regime in the country where the social defense movement originated. It may happen that a repressive government will give in out of fear, but in itself, contagiousness is not sufficient. Unless the repressive structures are hollow (theses 2) and unless there is an alternative (thesis 3), the repressive regime will be able to resist the social defense virus. So the success of nonviolent resistance may have influenced movements in African countries and elsewhere, but the just-mentioned conditions may make their success difficult.

(continued on page 5)

## LESSONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE *(continued from page 4)*

### CONCLUSION

If these theses are correct they have important consequences for the idea of social defense as it has been conceived until now, I think. For social defense as practiced in Eastern Europe and as described in the theses is quite different from the "traditional" idea, be it instrumental, structural or emancipatory. What is common in all these concepts, old and new, is that social defense is nonviolent resistance against repression. But in other respects social defense as practiced in Eastern Europe is different. For none of the conceptions in my theses form part of the established idea of social defense until now. But that means we cannot keep the idea of social defense unchanged and that we have to think over anew what it really stands for. The rethinking of the idea of social defense is, however, not only a theoretical necessity but it is also practical. For the changes in Eastern Europe did not involve an end of repression in the world and so much work remains to be done for the social defense protagonist. Only a clear view of what social defense is can make this work successful.

When we now return to the main question of this article, I think that the answer has become evident. Indeed we can learn from what has happened and still is happening in Eastern Europe, and conclude that the development of the idea of social defense is worthwhile and necessary.

### NOTE

*I want to thank Joep Creyghton, Tijmen van 't Foort and Giliam de Valk for their critical comment upon a first draft of this article. Of course only I am responsible for the contents.*

## NETHERLANDS/BELGIUM: RESEARCH PROGRAM INITIATED

*By Prof. Dr. Johan Niezing, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Centrum Voor Polemologie, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussel, Belgium.*

Now, with the cold war over, attention to civilian-based defense (CBD) seems, at first sight to have faded away. However, some rather new arguments for CBD are coming into the spotlight.

The first one stems from the new security structures in Europe. Cold war military postures of the various European countries having become obsolete, the question arises of the extent to which traditional, nationalistic militarism should occur in the European political context. The idea of a common security for Europe is, ultimately, based upon common deterrence. Why do politicians think only within that framework instead of making use of this unique historical opportunity for the beginning of a common CBD-type of security?

Another reason for renewal of CBD thinking derives from the increased opportunity for long-term considerations. Nuclear weapons still exist, and they will be used again, sooner or later. Now that cold war problems (problems of a middle-range type of decision-making) are becoming irrelevant, we are more entitled to think in terms of the long-range goal of making nuclear weapons themselves obsolete. Of all the proposed alternatives to military defense, only a CBD system could do that; nuclear weapons would be obsolete in the case of an alternative defense of a nonviolent kind.

For these two reasons, some people in the Netherlands initiated a "research on research" project. Their basic question was: "if funding were available, which types of research should be given priority, given the new political situation in Europe?" In other words, one must formulate a research program, and, after formulating it, be on the lookout for resources with which to execute the respective proposals.

This research has been made possible by a grant from the Dutch Peace Movement, KKN. It will be done by a young political scientist, Mr. Gilliam De Valk (M.A., University of Leyden), in close collaboration with myself, as a professor of Peace Research at the Free University of Brussels (Belgium). The production and publication of the final report will be supported by SISWO (Amsterdam). More details about this project will be disseminated in forthcoming issues of this journal.

## BOOK REVIEW

*(continued from page 4)*

percent. Defence has been the most favoured recipient in the reallocation of funds. The bulk of the increased military outlay has gone into equipment, stores and facilities, which have risen by 28 percent, while the amount allocated for personnel has actually declined by 6 percent. Of the large increase in new capital expenditure, most has been earmarked for high-tech modernization.

Why has the Australian tax dollar been re-distributed in favour of the Defence Department? And why has there been this emphasis on military high tech? Is Australian security so greatly threatened as to justify the new programme? And assuming a threat did exist, would increased militarization enhance Australia's regional and global security? Are there any alternative security arrangements and defence preparations that might improve the situation? These and other questions the book examines with clarity, candour, and academic rigour.

The "new militarism" is seen to stem from the Australian Government's response to the declining role of United States military power in the South Pacific and South-east Asian mainland (beginning with the Guam Doctrine). A study was commissioned, known as the Dibb Report, and it reported on the need to develop a defence posture of "self reliance." That recommendation was carried forward in the 1987 Defence White Paper. If the concept of "self reliance" held out hopes for ending decades of sycophantic pandering to US strategic interests and opening up policies of non-alignment, peacemaking, or radically new modes of nonviolent and non-provocative defence, such illusions were quickly dashed.

Instead, Australia soon became — as Richard Bolt notes in citing the observations of a former Indonesian Ambassador to the United States — "a hawkish military force" and a "regional military superpower." In Peter King's phrase, "solo forward defence" replaced the old "forward defence" of following in the wake of a powerful ally. Despite still operating within the larger US orbit, as well as joining with regional allies such as Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea, Australia's primary aim now centred on becoming the kingpin of its locality.

That locality was defined in the White Paper to "constitute about ten percent of

*(continued on page 6)*

## BOOK REVIEW

(continued from page 5)

the earth's surface." Not surprisingly, in military terms such a large area can only be controlled by a strike force with the capacity to engage in offensive warfare. The new high-tech military equipment that the Government has been deploying or has placed on order meets exactly these specifications. Amongst the long-range offensive weaponry of the new Australian arsenal are 22 F-111 bombers, 75 F/A-18 fighters fitted for in-flight refueling, 20-P-3C Orion patrol aircraft with a 3,700 kms range, 8 ANZAC frigates with a planned range of 11,500 kms, and 6 (possibly 8) Kockums-471 submarines which Beazley has described as "the largest conventional submarines in the Western world" and having "the most advanced underwater combat systems in the world." Although Australia's power military presence — a force capable of delivering massive firepower thousands of kilometers from its shoreline — dwarfs anything else in the neighbourhood, Beazley, either naively or disingenuously, refers to his policy as "fundamentally defensive."

Arguably, the only justification for so much relative firepower would be some serious threat to Australia's legitimate interests. But Beazley's own White Paper states that "(t)he military capabilities required for large-scale conventional attack on Australia . . . are beyond those currently possessed by any regional power . . . (T)his is likely to remain so for many years." But if there is no major threat why all the expensive hardware? Beazley's argument: "the timescales on which defence planning is done . . . (are) the year 2000 and beyond." Since, he contends, we live in an increasingly volatile area, we may face future threats. Lamentably, history is dotted with many examples in which obsessive focusing on worst case scenarios — and acting on them — ensures the outcome most feared.

The dire need for a redirection of defense policy poses the question what form it should take. Some suggestions are sprinkled throughout the book, but the question is especially tackled in the final chapter by co-editor St. John Kettle and the penultimate one by Peter D. Jones and Independent Senator Jo Vallentine. The last two authors outline a thoughtful programme for transition to "common security" modelled after the concept developed by the Palme Commission. "Common security," in turn, would be

(continued on page 7)

## RAISING AWARENESS ABOUT CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

*By the Working Group on Civilian-Based Defense: Richard Steele, Anita Kromberg, Gary Cullen, Rob Goldman, Rob Thomson. P.O. Box 2861, 4000 Durban, South Africa. Phone 27-31-301-5663.*

We feel there is great potential for civilian-based defense to be adopted as a component in future South African defense policy for the following reasons (amongst others):

- the major parties (i.e., the National Party and the African National Congress) agree that military struggle for political power is unwinnable, and have committed themselves to a "peace process" based on negotiation;
- the government realizes that heavy expenditure on the military is inappropriate, considering other pressing socio-economic needs;
- it is likely that a new government will be committed to reconstruction and reconciliation, and so will not place emphasis on militarization;
- a new government will face no serious regional threat. In fact, it is quite likely that a regional non-aggression pact would operate informally if not formally;
- conscription is unlikely to continue in the new South Africa. At recent conference between representatives of Mkonto we Siswe and members of the SADF (South Africa Defense Force?), agreement was reached that the military forces in the future South Africa should be based on a professional core rather than conscription. This is now the formal position of the ANC and the National Party.
- The National Party is already skilled with psychological and social methods of struggle — a major part of their military effort has always been devoted to "winning heart and minds" (WHAM), so the concept of civilian-based defense will not be unfamiliar to them. Similarly, practically speaking, the major means of struggle employed by the ANC and other anti-apartheid forces has been civilian-based — e.g., trade unions, strikes, civic associations, boycotts, mass marches, civil disobedience campaigns, etc. — so they too understand the importance of the civilian component of defense strategy. Our main object is to influence the formation of policy regarding military and defense strategies in the new South Africa, so that they incorporate civilian-based defense concepts.

There are three main groups that need to be reached:

1. Anti-apartheid groups that are likely to be major parties in a future government, and are already drawing up policy documents, particularly the ANC.
2. The South African Defense Force hierarchy, which is likely to still be very influential even under a new government.
3. The general public — to develop their understanding of civilian-based defense, and their support for it.

Our strategy as a working group is:


1. Canvas specific individuals in the ANC, Umkhonto We Sisze, the South African Defense Force, the South African Parliament, academics, peace movement, business, press.
2. Interest specific groups in the above topic, e.g., churches, End Conscription Campaign, Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, Centre for Intergroup Studies, Centre for Policy Development (University of Witwatersrand), Institute for Strategic Studies, etc.
3. Arrange small, regional seminars on the topic.
4. Arrange a national conference in 1991.
5. Encourage an exchange of information between South Africans interested in the topic and international groups and individuals working in this area.
6. Arrange visits to South Africa, as appropriate, of international specialists.

We see our task as being animators — we hope that soon a more formal structure will become the base for this work, e.g., one of the groups listed in #2 above. At the least, the national conference will need to be organized under the auspices of a formal institution. Our working group does not have the resources to handle a major campaign, and, as individuals, we are too closely aligned with the anti-conscription/anti-war movement in South Africa to be prime movers in such a campaign.



# THE WASHINGTON D.C. CONSULTATION ON CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

A report by Mel Beckman



About forty persons attended the Civilian-Based Defense Association's first "consultation" on CBD this past November 8th and 9th, at the Best Western Skyline Inn in Washington, D.C. The Consultation was an opportunity for directors of the Association to solicit opinion about how best to initiate a public discussion of CBD in the United States. It also provided an opportunity for representatives of other U.S. organizations and institutions to learn more about the concept and how they might help spread the idea within their own networks.

The Consultation was opened by CBDA Board Chairman, Philip Bogdonoff. After his welcoming remarks, he introduced Christopher Kruegler, Program Director of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University). Kruegler served as a director of the Civilian-Based Defense Association in its early years and in 1984 wrote his Ph.D. dissertation at Syracuse University, entitled, *Liddel Hart and the Concept of Civilian-Based Defense*. The title of his address at the Consultation was, "The Policy of Civilian-Based Defense in a Changing World: Relevance for the United States?"

Commenting first on the policy itself, Kruegler stated that, after 32 years on the table as an option for national defense, CBD is still a policy "without a country." No country has placed primary reliance on prepared civilian resistance as a principal pillar of its national defense, nor is any country considering that. The basic concept, as outlined by Sir Stephen King-Hall in his *Defence in the Nuclear Age* (1958) or by Gene Sharp in 1990, has not changed much. The same task remains, to discover how we can build on the widespread human experience of civilian resistance and deploy it in the service of national defense. But on the brighter side, according to Kruegler, the concept of CBD is still intact — it has not been "watered down" or proved to be unworkable.

Kruegler suggested that both the relative stagnation of the concept of CBD and its continuing credibility may be due to the concern that conclusions about it should be based on formal research. Both King-Hall in 1958 and Sharp in 1990 have asked for research, and that we do not go beyond the bounds of the "known." Those who have written about it, according to Kruegler, have largely heeded this caution. While the emphasis on research may be an intellectually honest attitude it can also be a paralyzing one. The stagnation in the field may be tied to a potentially false assumption that if we had rational proof about CBD that this would be the basis on which we would make national defense policy.

In the future, Kruegler suggested, we need to give more consideration to the *experience* that some societies have had with successful use of civilian struggle. There may be a "window-of-opportunity" to institutionalize nonviolent struggle in the national defense policies of those countries where the citizens have just had a significant experience of its effectiveness. Their rationale for adopting CBD would then be based, not on "200 researcher years of comparing case studies" but on a lived experience of its effectiveness. As examples, he cited Poland, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps South Africa someday.

In regard to "changes" in the world, Kruegler felt that it isn't so much a case of the amount of conflict being less but rather, that the configuration of conflict is changing. Nonviolent sanctions are playing a larger role in conflict situations than previously. There is also more elasticity in what is considered a defense issue. For example, both the drug traffic and environmental concerns are now discussed as national security issues.

(continued on page 8)

## BOOK REVIEW

(continued from page 6)

tied to a process of transarmament ultimately leading to "social defence." The programme's first strand is based on the proposition that "Australia is secure to the extent that its neighbours are secure, and therefore Australia must ensure that its security policy dovetails with those of its neighbours." The second strand, which incorporates the first, accepts the current need for "coastal surveillance, backed up by coastal and territorial defence forces to defend against violations of sovereignty and low-level threats." But it recommends "social defence for more heavily populated areas so as to provide insurance against a major threat emerging some time in the future." The arguments for "social defence" (meaning also civilian-based defence in this case) are developed at some length.

The title of their chapter is "Transarmament: A Proposal to Widen the Defence Debate." Among their proposals is a call "to increase expenditure on peace and conflict research." With the combined cost of the F/A-18s and the Kockum submarines alone "likely to exceed \$15 billion," there are ample funds around to siphon off one hundredth of one percent — or \$1.5 million (much less will do) — for investigation into the details of an Australian nonviolent defence policy. What is lacking is will and imagination.

Also lacking is a peace-oriented culture. Mark Thee's first characteristic of a militaristic culture seems to be growing in Australia. It may not have reached the frightening proportions that exist in some countries, but prospects are ominous. The Government's turning to military solutions reflects and re-enforces the values that guide people in coping with conflict in their daily lives. Especially for the psychologically frustrated and the socially and economically deprived, violence and crime become natural ways of dealing with problems. How could it be otherwise, seeing that the cues come from the society's leaders. Values of violence and dehumanization are transmitted through the ubiquity of the sports' popular music, dress, film, and sports spectacle. They are contained in unexamined assumptions and in economic and social relations. They have even reached into an element of the gender equality movement. The many forms of cultural violence within the society, and the militarism outside, are all part of the same problem and cannot be solved in isolation.

(continued on page 8)

**BOOK REVIEW**  
(continued from page 8)

Although the nexus between culture and military policy is acknowledged by the two editors, there is no systematic attempt to analyze the dynamic relationship. The book dwells on effects, not the sources from which they spring. Yet it is at the sources of values, myths, and structures where militarism, in my opinion, will eventually have to be challenged and defeated. There are two chapters in the book — one on “Aboriginals” and the other on “The White Australian Threat to the Treaty of Waitangi” — that disclose the impact of Australian militarism on racial minorities, but even they fail to probe the insidious influence that racism can play in forming policy.

The exposure of militarism’s cultural breeding ground awaits a sequel publication. The present book has superbly delineated the existence of militarism and outlined some promising alternative approaches, including a major role for nonviolent defence, but it has not begun the more daunting task of devising a strategy for abolishing or at least mitigating militarism. This means looking at the cultural obstacles and incorporating their removal into the focus of the strategy. At the same time it means moving towards a system of life-affirming values and structures. Only then will the fertile ground exist for the acceptance of something as radical as social defence. The limits of rationalism in the present cultural context need to be fully appreciated.

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**SPECIAL OFFER**

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**WASHINGTON CONSULTATION** (continued from page 7)

Kruegler then turned his attention to the question of what rationale might motivate attention to CBD in the United States. The problems of the current defense policy might be critiqued, said Kruegler, but he cautioned against making this our primary effort. If one wants to change something one needs to make the case for what one *wants* to do, and not just critique the status quo.

For Kruegler, the most compelling rationale for U.S. attention to CBD is that “it (the United States) needs to be able to support — politically, conceptually, logistically, and maybe directly — its friends and allies who may elect civilian struggle as their best option.” In support of this he cited the case of Panama. He said that Panama, by the end of 1988, had a very developed civilian resistance network and structure, well organized and equipped, with good command and control, flexibility, and native legitimacy. But the United States waited until civilian struggle failed, then pre-empted it and went in militarily. It would have been more right, cost-effective, and more of a contribution — strategically, logistically, and materially — to the future of life in Central America, if we had found a way to support the Civilian Crusade in Panama.

Kruegler felt that the remote danger of an internal coup d’etat in the United States does not provide much of a rationale for developing CBD here. However, he could envision the possibility that there may be a nonviolent struggle, somewhere, sometime, that the U.S. might have an interest in thwarting. The U.S. would then need to know how to deal with nonviolent struggle. He cited the case of the Rejectionists in South Africa who have defined themselves as a national liberation movement which may have to do years of struggle in South Africa against the pluralistic regime which may be in the offing.

If drug problems and environmental concerns are moved into the realm of national defense this would provide an additional rationale for attention to CBD in the United States. We would then need to be talking about nonviolent, community action relating to these concerns.

Kruegler suggested an organizational structure that the Civilian-Based Defense Association might consider in its efforts to increase public awareness of CBD. The Association might consider itself the “hub” of a wheel, with the members, and especially the directors, acting as the spokes going out to other organizations. The Association might organize itself in such a way that, by definition, a member is one who is actively promoting the agenda of the Association in some other group in which he/she is a credible, active, and respected member. All members of the organizations would be, in effect, delegates from and to other organizations. He encouraged the Civilian-Based Defense Association to retain its identity as a membership group having a specific interest in CBD. He said it might also have a role to play in fence-mending — reaching out to groups which may have been alienated from the concept of CBD in the past.

Finally, Kruegler expressed the hope that the Association’s newsletter, which he considers a wonderful product, would be maintained as the basic networking device in this topical field — the glue that keeps hubs and spokes together. He hoped, too, that it might become possible for the Association to send observers when significant nonviolent struggles are going on, and to find a way to carry the concept of CBD to receptive people in government when a situation like Panama comes along.

The program for the second day featured a panel of three persons who were to address the question, “How should we initiate public discussion of civilian-based defense in the United States.” The panel included David Yaskulka (Center for Common Security), Liane Norman (a founder of the Pittsburgh Peace Institute), and Edward Atkeson (Major General, U.S. Army ret.).

David Yaskulka, in his work with the Center for Common Security, had led numerous workshops and seminars for college students, including recent sessions with military students. He stressed the need to reach out to new audiences and to not wait for them to request speakers. We need to speak to them and let them know how CBD might be relevant. He proposed work with students — the future leaders, researchers, policy makers, etc. — as one avenue to consider. This has an added benefit in that credible, established institutions — the universities — are then associated with the concept of CBD. He stated that the Center is considering production of a video featuring a strategic war game in which peace studies students and military students would participate. One side would use military tactics and the other CBD. Each “side” would include a mix of peace studies and military students.

Liane Norman stressed the difficulty of teaching the concept of CBD without first showing the audience how war works in practice. She illustrated this for the Consultation

(continued on page 9)



## WASHINGTON CONSULTATION *(continued from page 8)*

participants and showed how it isn't the deaths of the soldiers which influences the government on one side or other to say "enough" and end the war. It is, rather, the people who *care* about the soldiers and who then put pressure on the government. Norman felt that most Americans know that defense of this country is not, has not been an issue. She also encouraged participants to think about equipping people to engage in civilian based defense by affirming the resistance to societal ills in which they already engage in so many ways. Just as domination is basic training for military defense, so is the practice of nonviolent struggle and active democracy from below the basic training for civilian-based defense.

Major General Atkeson spoke of himself a student of conflict, not a proponent of one or the other form of it. He suggested that Japan and the Eastern European states might have an interest in CBD. He saw the struggle of Lithuania against the Soviet Union as a classic case of CBD. Atkeson disagreed somewhat with Christopher Kruegler's discounting of the threat of coups in the United States. "Some years ago," he said, "I would have simply rejected it out of hand . . . until Irangate, and I saw some fellow officers take over and effectively run operations of the government . . . that to me is a real, at least attempted coup d'etat." He stated that he is uneasy about coups in the U.S. He was not sure how a policy of CBD could protect us from them but he would not reject it as an unworthy endeavor. Atkeson felt that this is a particularly suitable time in Europe to think about CBD as the community of nations there is looking for some kind of security structure to replace the old bilateral arrangements. In regard to introduction of CBD in the United States, Atkeson offered the possibility that it might have some role at the low end of the defense business — in home defense, the war on drugs, support for civil authority, support in case of natural disasters, etc. He suggested that attention be given to the National Guard, which is much closer to the people than the regular armed forces. Perhaps one of the fifty state governments, which control the National Guard, might be interested in experimenting with this concept. Finally, he encouraged participants to not neglect reaching out to conservatives as well as liberals. The latter might also become supporters once they grasp the idea of this defense policy.

The remainder of the Consultation sessions were devoted to discussion of specific things which could be done to stimulate discussion of CBD in the United States. Participants grouped themselves according to their interests. A number of work-areas were identified by the time the consultation ended and participants volunteered for various tasks. The Civilian-Based Defense Association's directors were to ensure that the projects and activities discussed during these sessions receive the leadership and publicity they will need.

The Association's first consultation on civilian-based defense represented another milestone in a continuing effort — the effort to include more people and groups in the United States in the exploration of how civilian-based defense may be relevant to our common future.

*"If one wants to change something  
one needs to make the case for  
what one wants to do, and  
not just critique the status quo."*



## EDITORIAL

*(continued from front page)*

as this newsletter goes to press, intent on doing it. Without asking our opinion he sent in the troops and now we will be accused of being unpatriotic if war begins and we don't support him. And so we write to our senators and congress-people, and we take to the streets to publicly express opposition to what our security agent is proposing to do — but all of that is a poor substitute for the involvement we should have had all along.

Unless we abandon "agent" security we will continue to be led into wars which we do not want, which are not necessary, and which will cause immense human suffering. We simply must take back from government some of the responsibility for security which we have given it.

*Mel Beckman*

## **CBDA BOARD MEETING NOVEMBER 10, 1990**

The directors of the Civilian-Based Defense Association held their 1990 Board meeting at the William Penn House in Washington, D.C., after the conclusion of the Consultation on Civilian-Based Defense. The directors were generally pleased with the results of the consultation and the willingness of many participants to become more involved. A search committee was appointed to interview applicants for the position of CBDA Executive Director. Several persons had expressed interest in the position. Mel Beckman, the former Director, will continue to edit the newsletter. A decision was made to hold the next Board meeting in the Detroit area in November of 1991, and to associate it with a conference or consultation on CBD at the same time. Directors George Crowell of Windsor, Ontario, and John Mecartney of Detroit will take major responsibility for planning and hosting.

*"The real power of civilian-based defense is the threat, or promise, to use the power of civilian society to prevent war and immobilize an occupant, rather than threaten to destroy that society in order to deny it to the enemy."*

*(from Civilian-Based Defense in a New Era, by Johan Jorgen Holst. Monograph Series Number 2, published by the Albert Einstein Institution.)*

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