

Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion

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CIVIL DETERRENCE

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
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NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENSE AND SOCIAL DEFENSE: THEIR CONVERGENCES IN TIME AND SPACE



THE NEED FOR A COMMON MASTER-PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

By Johan Niezing, Free University of Brussels. A contribution to the International Symposium on "Nonviolent Solution of International Crises and Regional Conflicts," Frankfurt/M., FRG, February 12-15, 1989.

In the past several decades a vast number of books and articles have been published about the necessity of a civilian-based defense system (social defense, or SD). Some governments gave proponents of SD the benefit of the doubt . . . they facilitated some research efforts and even tried to incorporate some SD elements into the existing military defense structure (Sweden, Switzerland). At the same time, many proponents of SD maintained their claim – they stuck to the idea of SD as a complete alternative to military defense. They opposed the idea of a "subdefensive" or "post-military" type of SD by pointing to its illusionary nature:

- modern conventional weapons are highly destructive and modern societies have grown more vulnerable. As a result, a "conventional attack" does not allow the persistence of any society to be defended by peaceful means afterwards.
- the two defense systems, the military and SD, are highly incompatible psychologically, and cannot be integrated in any way.

Both arguments make sense; at least enough sense to make one very skeptical of any proposal for "additional" SD measures. Nevertheless, the only way governments are willing to deal with SD is by interpreting it in terms of such additional measures. As a consequence, the proponents of SD have become divided into two groups: those who accept the idea of "integration," and those who strive for the introduction of a complete SD system as an alternative to any military defense. The latter group has become isolated for lack of any serious political support; this being so in spite of the logical qualities of its stance.

During the last decade growing attention has been paid to the idea of a non-offensive

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LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Mexico, D.F.
February 14, 1989

Regarding Latin America and CBD:

1. The problems of Latin America are quite different from those in the USA. We are not, as you are, preoccupied with the problem of armed aggression from without. We are, as you are not, preoccupied with poverty and political oppression from within.
2. For that reason all our attention must be directed to finding a way to generalize the knowledge and acceptance of nonviolent action as a means of controlling the power of the oppressors (whether public or private) and transferring this power to the citizen. In essence, what Latin America needs is a system of checks and balances in a democratic regime.
3. The present use of violence in Latin America is due on one side to the decision of the strong to retain power with the only means at their disposal, and on the other side, by lack of knowledge of the weak of the possibilities offered by nonviolent action.
4. Take Nicaragua as an example: 80% of the population does not agree with the Sandinista regime. However, they must suffer it because they have been led to believe that only by violence can they overthrow it. In this they have been helped by the U.S. Government. Millions have been spent on arms for the contras – with no result in sight.
5. At a small fraction of the cost the population of Nicaragua could be taught and trained in the methods by which the people are empowered and the regime is weakened. And all this with no bloodshed or destruction.
6. No, I don't see the need to discuss at this time future civilian-based defense and, at this time, yes, I see the urgency of discussing and teaching nonviolence as a means of solving our present problems.

Norberto Corella
Secretario de Relaciones
Partido Accion Nacional

MASTER PLAN/CENTRAL EUROPE (continued from page 1)

defense (non-provocative defense), NOD. All proposals regarding it, however different, have at least three characteristics in common:

- a) they are intended for use in the European theatre, trying to furnish some alternative to the offensive defense doctrine that underlies the defense posture of both parties;
- b) they try to push back the relative importance of nuclear (and chemical) weaponry;
- c) they present themselves as (part of) a framework of confidence-building measures.

Proponents of NOD are opposing the still-prevailing idea of a nuclear deterrence in Europe. Moreover, they are opposing the idea of SD as an alternative to any military defense.

Now, the question arises – isn't it possible to integrate, to unify both alternatives, SD and NOD, into a defense structure of a more reliable and credible nature than either of the two is able to furnish by itself? Logically the ideas are incompatible, at least as long as we are inclined to define defense problems within a national framework of analysis, and as far as we use rather limited time perspectives. We might help to overcome these incompatibilities by developing a "master-plan," less limited in time and space, by way of an alternative to the existing defense structure, and composed of a combination of both types of alternatives, SD and NOD. Each of them can be maintained completely, each one will be taken seriously into account; but paradoxically, by combining them in time and space we might overcome their logical incompatibilities, adding up their respective oneness to a complete alternative. Moreover, both types of proponents could be united too. Finally, we might help the proponents of (complete) SD to overcome the political isolation they have faced in recent years. Thus, this fundamental question could possibly be answered affirmatively, on the strict condition that we are prepared to broaden our perspectives of time and space sufficiently.

TIME: Nuclear weapons do exist and will continue to exist. Sooner or later they will be "used" again. Even the smartest system of NOD cannot reduce the chance of a nuclear holocaust sufficiently enough – that is, by making it zero. This also holds true when (political) time perspectives are extended: the longer a certain risk will last, the higher its probability. One may argue that:

- a) mankind is passing a "boundary period" within the history of life – that is, we are now to make decisions that will turn out to be decisive for the continuation of this "objective" history, the history of life.
- b) mankind is better than ever before equipped to understand this situation, thanks to the almost daily-increasing wealth of evidence derived from the natural sciences, such as genetics, astronomy, and molecular biology. We may learn the uniqueness of life, human life, the irreversible nature of evolution, etc.
- c) as a result of this awareness we have to be on the lookout for new parameters that can help us to translate our traditional problems into more responsive policies. The developing of a long-term perspective can certainly be viewed as one of those measures that may help to pass our contemporary boundary period rather safely. Or, seemingly paradoxically – the most contemporary kind of radicalism is to get rid of the middle-term political creeds of the past and to develop some long-term perspectives which will enable us to redefine our temporary problems in terms of human survival.

From this point-of-view NOD can only be considered as a temporary measure, as a kind of risk-reducing policy. Only a system of SD is able to make nuclear weaponry completely obsolete. Thus, as viewed from a long-term perspective, preference has to be given to SD, rather than to NOD. One might suggest, therefore, that NOD be used as kind of first step toward a more definite solution – SD. However, any transarmament to SD will be a long and comprehensive process; one must start early, in order to be able to proceed in the long run.

CONCLUSION #1: By expanding our time perspectives, NOD and SD are to be viewed as complementary to each other, not as alternatives, as is usually the case. A system of NOD must be amplified with SD elements, as a first step toward a complete transition to a SD system. SD must be viewed as a final phase, NOD as a transitional period.

MASTER PLAN/CENTRAL EUROPE (continued from page 2)

SPACE: Traditionally, defense systems are nation-wide; their boundaries coincide with the boundaries of nation-states. Modern weapons and their accompanying strategies have made these boundaries permeable but we are still inclined to define our security problems in terms of state-centered, "common" (i.e., combined national) defense efforts.

This anomaly can be found in many debates on alternative defense as well. To put it euphemistically, it is remarkable how much the ongoing debates among proponents of SD or NOD are linked to national spatial perspectives. As long as one moulds defense problems within national frameworks of analysis one is bound to interpret SD and NOD as alternatives to each other. However, if we enlarge our framework, the possibility of some spatial combination of SD and NOD may come into existence. One may vary the measure in which SD *can* be introduced and developed, according to the properties of the nation-states concerned. Some states are more suited than others for the installation of a SD system. Societal conditions and strategic position are decisive criteria. In Western Europe, for instance, the Benelux countries (densely populated, highly urbanized, fringe areas of the theater) seem to be more suited for the development of SD than is the BRD. In Eastern Europe, countries like Poland (and possibly Hungary) might experiment with SD, while in the DDR and CSR a NOD system must be given more attention. In short:

CONCLUSION #2: By extending our spatial perspectives, NOD and SD can be viewed as complementary elements within an integrated "experimental" alternative defense system. The measure in which NOD can be complemented with SD elements (as part of a gradual transition to a complete SD system) may vary substantially, according to the various properties of the respective geographic sub-systems.

Both dimensions – time and space – are closely related. A call for a long-term perspective emphasizes the necessity of developing a social defense system, this being the only logical alternative to the risk of nuclear war in the long run. The gradual development of such an alternative system cannot be performed in total isolation; it must be accomplished as part of an integrated system of alternative defense. And this calls for an expansion of our spatial criteria. It also goes without saying that the German concern for NOD (Strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit) has something to do with the strategic position of both German states; it should not necessarily be copied by other inhabitants of the European theater. On the contrary, if we could successfully install a NOD system in the "zones of confrontation," then some possibilities for SD in the fringe areas might become apparent. This, however, calls for a long-term perspective which, in turn, stresses the need to add some SD elements to the NOD areas, by way of first steps toward complete non-military defense in a more distant future.

PROPOSAL: Specialists from the Eastern and Western part of the European theater should cooperate in the development of a common "master-plan" for alternative defense. This plan should include a sequence of transarmament steps as well as a delineation of some zones of non-offensive defense, experimental zones of social defense, and zones of traditional military defense. These zones must be created in both parts of the European theater and be arranged in symmetry to each other. This master-plan must be submitted to the respective political authorities. The Vienna Centre might function as a coordinating Authority.

Selected Literature:**On Non-Offensive Defense:**

Bjorn Moller: "Perspectives on Disarmament in Europe – The Significance of Non-Offensive Defence Strategies," *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Tapere, 1988, Vol. XI, no. 3, pp. 104-114.

Dieter S. Lutz: "Zur Theorie Struktureller Angriffsunfähigkeit," Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Hamburg, 1987.

On Social Defense as a System of Deterrence:

Johan Niezing: *Sociale Verdediging als Logisch Alternatief, van Utopie naar Optie*, Assen (Netherlands); Van Gorcum, Antwerp (Belgium), EPO, both 1987.

Theodore Olson: "Social Defence and Deterrence," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Oslo, 1985, 1, pp. 33-41.

On Time-Perspectives and Risk Analysis:

Johan Niezing: "Time Perspectives in Peace Research," Chapter V of idem: *In Search of 'Security'*, Brussels, Vrije Universiteit, 1988.

Mats Bjorkman: "Time and Risk in Cognitive Space," Chapter 2 of Lennart Sjoberg (ed.): *Risk and Society*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Johan Niezing: "Friedensforschung, neue Gedanken, neue Themen," *Humboldt Journal zur Friedensforschung*, Berlin, 1987, 3, pp. 68-73.

**INTERNATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
FORMED**

Twenty-one individuals, from thirteen nations, have agreed to serve three-year terms as advisors to the Civilian-Based Defense Association. The Advisory Committee was initiated to help make the organization as effective as possible, by providing for critique of its ideas and activities by qualified persons in various parts of the world. Service on the Committee does not necessarily imply endorsement of the Association's policies and programs. The Advisory Committee includes:

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HELP WANTED

As *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion* becomes more and more an international publication there is a growing need for translations of non-English news items and articles. If you are able to translate accurately from some other language to English we invite you to volunteer as one of our translators. Let us know the language(s) in which you are skilled and we will send material to be translated as need arises.

SPEAKERS LIST NOW AVAILABLE

Groups wishing to schedule a formal presentation on civilian-based defense, or an informal discussion, can now choose from a listing of approximately thirty resource persons in twenty different states of the United States. Speakers will not represent the Civilian-Based Defense Association but rather, will present their own views about CBD. The listing includes some biographical information about each resource person, the titles of presentations they are willing to give and whether they are willing to speak formally, in a discussion setting or in either way. Arrangements for honoraria and reimbursement of travel costs are made directly with each resource person, not with the Association. The Association would like to add more resource persons to the speakers list. Individuals who wish to be included on the speakers list are invited to write to the Association at P.O. Box 31616, Omaha, NE 68131. New speakers will be asked to complete an information form and return it to the Association. Persons who live outside the United States may also request to be on the speakers list. To obtain the initial listing of speakers please send a self-addressed, stamped business envelope to the above address.



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BOOK REVIEW

Freed From Violence: Surviving by Democratizing and Disarmament. Author: Evert A. Huisman, Stichting Voorlichting Aktieve Geweldloosheid (Foundation for Information on Active Nonviolence), Postbus 137, 8000 AC Zwolle, Netherlands.

Review by Anton Heering, President of Haagse Vredesgroep Geweldloze Weerbaarheid.

A special feature of this book is that the text has been printed exclusively on the right-side pages. Pages on the left side have been reserved for items like documentation, illustration and commentary. By organizing his book in this way Huisman not only avoids the use of cumbersome footnotes but also shows the reader which data and events make up the background of his argument. The reader can thus judge to what extent the argument fits the facts.

But now the most important thing about the book – the content. As far as I know, this is the first time that an adherent of the “structural” view has elucidated nonviolent defense in a framework of facts and ideas in a broad social field. This approach guards against the temptation to assume too easily that military defense can be replaced by a system of nonviolent deterrence and defense without interfering severely with the overall pattern of our society.

Huisman’s book deals once and for all with that simplistic line of thought. He shows in various ways to what extent the military way of thinking and acting is entangled with the ideas and practices which mostly set the tone in political, social and economic life. According to the author (he keeps pointing this out in a sometimes slightly one-sided manner), our democracy is still very incomplete and imperfect, and is continuously threatened by authoritarian tendencies. For examples – our parliament being manipulated by the government and in turn oppressing a minority by means of a majority position; the business world, in which running things in an authoritarian way is considered relatively normal; and local authorities, who manage the affairs and interests of the citizens rather high-handedly.

Huisman suggests the ideal of a real democracy, a participation democracy. For the most part, this must still be developed. That is why one should not speak about “defense of our democracy” if referring to defense of our modern society with its parliamentary democracy. For even though the parliamentary party-system is of the greatest value, it needs many improvements to be called a real democracy. By a “real” democracy the author understands a society in which each and every person “participates,” so that every citizen joins in the collective thinking about society and participates in the decision-making process.

The shortcomings of our society’s kind of democracy, and their attendant inequities, result in a considerable limitation of the possibilities of nonviolent defense. Because of injustice many people live in a situation to which one could easily apply the term “structural violence.” They feel oppressed and thus their willingness to protect society against assault is gradually weakened. Internally, their ability to fend for themselves breaks down.

If, then, an enemy from abroad (or from the inside, for example in a coup d’etat) appears, resistance against an attack soon collapses. That is why, at the time of the German occupation we saw lots of people who were collaborators, who were too submissive and too willing to act upon German orders and demands. In such a situation, resistance becomes, at the most, a concern of individuals or small groups of people only – instead of a massive attitude of revolt and protest in which the whole population is involved.

What is more, in a society without sufficient participation people never learn to accept responsibility for the community and to stand up for justice and humanity in situations in which these are threatened. For this is the task of the authorities, is it not?

If this is already the case in times of peace, what can we expect in much harder circumstances – namely, when the country is occupied and ruled by the enemy? Thus, Huisman arrives at the conclusion that we are not only in need of an alternative, nonviolent system of defense, but primarily, and as a condition, an alternative social, economic and political system, based on a sense of responsibility and the right of every citizen to participate in the decision-making process.

(continued on page 5)

BOOK REVIEW (continued from page 4)

This presupposes, of course, a thorough change in the actual present balance of power, without which nonviolent defense will stand no chance at all. On page 457 the author summarizes his vision as follows: "The society that is capable of surviving and is worth being defended is a society that is on the move, that is evolving toward a participation-democracy."

I will not go into detail about Huisman's description of the strategy, tactics and technique of this kind of nonviolent society. His argumentation is cohesive. Yet, the reader might wonder whether the conclusions of his exposition are possibly not too theoretical in certain respects – in the sense that they are insufficiently compared with realizable possibilities. Two objections occurred to me while reading the book.

In the first place, it seems slightly wrong to point out such a strong relationship between nonviolent defense and the ideal of participation-democracy, for it still remains to be seen to what extent such a society is realistically possible. As far as I know, the author never seriously occupies himself with that question. While considering his view that anyone should be allowed to join in the making of decisions you might, for example, ask whether everybody is really willing and able to do this. And what do you do in the situation where everyone disagrees with everyone else – for example, in a discussion about social security. Many thinkers have already pondered this problem intensely – more or less successfully. If one cannot answer these questions concretely one had better not link the participation of all citizens with the idea of nonviolent defense as some kind of condition (which Huisman does, in effect). The more so because avowed opponents of the former idea will also be forced to reject the latter. I do agree that any system of social defense requires granting more responsibility to all the citizens.

In the second place, I have a great deal of trouble with the distinction between "non-violent defense" on the one hand and "defense without violence" or "social defense" on the other . . . a distinction to which the author obviously attaches great importance. In his mind, the former constitutes the goal we should all strive after. The other two he does not trust. He recognizes nonviolence as such only if the system is based on a certain attitude toward life, characterized by "respect for humans, animals, plants and things" (pages 135/137).

I quite agree with this fundamental starting-point for a *theory* of nonviolence. But by my standards, things go too far when Huisman attaches suspicion to the quite generally accepted idea of "social defense," expressing doubts about its goals and aims . . . and all this because not every supporter of social defense accepts his attitude toward life as a fundamental starting point. He states (pages 87/89) that many authors, writing about social defense, merely make it their object to maintain or to restore the situation as it was before the enemy's attack, in particular with regard to the existing political "regime." In short, that they look upon the goals (of social defense) in exactly the same way as those who are in favor of military violence.

Huisman does not consider these goals to be nonviolent (even though he can appreciate the *existing* parliamentary democracy to a certain extent). In this, his idealism is playing him false, in my opinion, and he does not sufficiently take into account the social reality. He forgets that, besides leaders and convinced supporters any social movement has lots of followers and hangers-on as well – who, more or less consciously, for diverse motives, support and thus strengthen the movement. Moreover, the boundaries between these various groups are changing all the time. Gandhi's struggle is there to illustrate that. As far as I am concerned, "social defense" and "nonviolent defense" mean exactly the same thing.

In spite of the few objections stated above, my final advice is that, anyone who wants to be more thoroughly informed about nonviolence and social defense, and the principles underlying them, can hardly avoid consulting Huisman's book.

FOR FUTURE REVIEW

The Conquest of War. Alternative Strategies for Global Security, by Harry B. Hollins, Averill L. Powers and Mark Sommer. Boulder, San Francisco, & London: Westview Press, 1989. 224 pages. Chapter Eight is entitled, "Civilian-Based Defense: The Strength of Bare Hands and Stubbornness."

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NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS



FRANCE

The Research Institute for Nonviolent Resolution of Conflict (L'Institut de Recherche sur la Resolution Non-Violente des Conflits) is publishing a study done by Alain Refalo and entitled, *La Place et le Role des Associations dans une Strategie de Dissuasion Civile* (The Role of Associations in a Strategy of Civil Dissuasion). This topic had previously been treated initially in *La Dissuasion Civile* (Christian Mellon, Jean-Marie Muller, Jacques Semelin, ed. FEDN, 1985. Available from MAN, 20 rue du Devidet, 45200 Montargis, France, for 50F., postage paid). The question of the role of associations in a defense based on civilians was felt to deserve further elaboration. The new research was facilitated by a contract between the Institute and two other organizations (le Fonds National pour le Developpement de la Vie Associative and le Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale). The 120 page study can be obtained from the Institute (55,40 F. postage paid) at BP 19, 94121 Fontenay sous bois Cedex, France. Tel. (16.1) 48 75 44 46.

The March 1989 issue of *Alternatives Non Violentes* (16, rue Paul-Appell, 42000 Saint-Etienne, France) includes a debate on nonviolence and communication. In part I, Jean Marichez outlines the important part played by precise vocabulary in any attempt to win others to share one's views about the value of nonviolence and especially "dissuasion civile." Part II, by the Defense Commission of M.A.N., is entitled "La communication n'est pas tout, reflexions sur le texte de J. Marichez."

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CIVIL DETERRENCE

By Christian Mellon, Jean-Marie Muller, and Jacques Semelin. Reprinted, with permission, from *Peace Review*, Spring 1989. *Peace Review* is published by Peace Review Publications Inc., 2439 Birch Street, Suite 8, Palo Alto, CA 94306.

Christian Mellon gained a Master in Peace Studies Degree from the University of Bradford. He now works at the Centre de Recherches et d'Action Sociales in Paris. He is the author of *Chretiens devant la guerre et la paix (Christians In The Face Of War And Peace)*, Le Centurion, 1984. Jean-Marie Muller is a professor of philosophy and is the author of *Vous avez dit Pacifisme? (You Said Pacifism?)*, Le Cerf, 1984. Jacques Semelin is a psychologist and historian at the University of Paris, and is the Editor of the review *Alternatives non-violentes (Nonviolent Alternatives)*. They are joint authors of *La Dissuasion Civile (Civil Dissuasion)*, Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale, Paris, 1985, on which this article is based.

The French position on nuclear deterrence is well known. "France has no intention of undertaking offensive action against anyone whatsoever . . . So we have a purely defensive situation . . . We've made our capability so terrible that no one would dare attack our country. That's what we call *dissuasion*." In these, and similar words, President Mitterrand has reassured his country throughout the 1980s that the little fellow – DeGaulle used to liken himself to the cartoon character Tintin taking on the grown-ups – won't get pushed around by any superpower bully.

It's called *dissuasion du faible au fort* – deterrence of the strong by the weak – and is founded on calculations of unacceptable damage, and whether upwards of a thousand multi-Hiroshima weapons counts as nuclear sufficiency for France. The problem being that while the *weak* is perfectly able to destroy large numbers of enemy cities, the *strong* threatens retaliation which would not only constitute unacceptable damage, but would leave France irreparable.

Is the risk morally, politically, and strategically acceptable? Philosopher Andre Glucksmann poses "the most serious and most banal of our modern every questions" when he asks: "Are we allowed to threaten civilian populations, ourselves included, with apocalypse? Does a civilization stay a civilization when it knowingly risks its own extinction?" Glucksmann, as we know, answers his own tragic question with a resounding "Yes," but we refuse to give our consent. Glucksmann's certitudes are too glib, given the probabilities of failure of deterrence somewhere along the line. It's neither realistic, nor rational, nor reasonable to be prepared to destroy ourselves to defend ourselves. And most French people know it.

Deterrence isn't an international insurance policy; it's a gamble. There are so many ways it could break down. Even our nuclear strategists know – and sometimes actually admit – that there are threats against which nuclear strategy is powerless. So we owe it to ourselves to think about the options. Prudence dictates that we envisage a scenario in which the President of the Republic is left with no margin of manoeuvre to make the argument of our nuclear forces carry weight. What should we do then? The fallibility of nuclear dissuasion implies, at the very least, that it should not be the sole basis of our security.

Yet security is a fundamental need of every community. This is the problem as we see it with proposals for immediate unilateral disarmament as a decisive contribution to peace. To the extent that any society's members feel that their security depends on the possession of armaments which are able to keep aggressors off their territory, the idea of unilateral disarmament can only lead to the most profound anxiety and insecurity. That's why our work is framed in terms of *transarmament*, as a program which both fits in better with existing reality and is capable of creating a dynamic process to change it. Transarmament puts forward, as a priority, not the destruction of those weapons people believe ensure their security, but the importance of imagining other means of defense which might do the same job, at less risk. Whereas disarmament implies a negative prospect, transarmament suggests an essentially constructive project.

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*Deterrence isn't
an international
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it's a gamble.*
—

(continued on page 7)

CIVIL DETERRENCE (continued from page 6)

The important thing is to think in terms of means of defense which neither use nor even threaten to use homicidal violence as a tool. In other words, we have to seriously research the full range of nonviolent possibilities, not just in an ethical perspective, but as a practical political activity.

Nonviolence is often thought of as an import from the East which doesn't easily transfer to Western culture. This just isn't true. Of course, Gandhi's example in India is particularly spectacular, but Gandhi himself was convinced that his was as much a Western as an Oriental approach, and his method was certainly far from orthodox in terms of his own culture. Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, writing in France in the 1930s, were converging on similar themes: "violence is always an impurity, and a practical ideal of nonviolence should always be the framework within which we work." Equally consistent was the rejection of fear and feebleness as components of nonviolence, which is instead defined as *the politics of strong virtue*. Nonviolent action always involves a struggle. One of its major roles is the awakening of active resistance in those suffering injustice, and even there it would be illusory to pretend that dialogue alone guarantees justice.

Our working hypothesis, therefore, doesn't envisage nonviolent civil defense as an alternative to armed defense, but as a complement or extra resource. One advantage of this is that it permits joint research between those who have made a personal choice in favor of prioritizing armed defense, and those whose ultimate aim is full-scale nonviolent defense. Another is that it calls attention to the practical problems of the necessary transition.

On yet another level, it means that the credibility of a deterrence based exclusively on nonviolent civil defense is not an issue. What is worth noting, however, is the crucial difference between nonviolent civil dissuasion and nuclear dissuasion. If the latter fails, the means of dissuasion cannot be used as means of defense – unless suicide can be construed as a defense. So there is absolute discontinuity between dissuasion and defense. Whereas if nonviolent civil dissuasion fails to deter an enemy attack, then the means intended for dissuasion can very effectively be put into operation as a means of defense. They are the very same. And not only can they be continued as long as necessary, but the

enemy need have no doubt that we would be prepared to use them, which is more than can be said for the nuclear deterrent.

The more we *civilize* defense, in the sense of putting it in the hands of the civilian population, as well as in the sense of rendering it compatible with the behavior of an advanced civilization, the greater our dissuasive credibility. Isn't it the great weakness of nuclear deterrence, in fact, that it lulls people into believing that the whole business of defense has nothing to do with them? Of course, our governments go on about defense being a common concern, and how the nuclear deterrent has no credibility without popular support. But what does it all mean? Passive acceptance? Nuclear consensus? Blind confidence in whoever happens to be the Head of State at the time? The biggest risk for the country is that in a time of real crisis, there would be widespread panic. Civil society would break down before the bomb dropped. Government instructions, as we know from regular defense exercises, would be: *Keep calm*. Government interest would lie in *immobilizing*, not in *mobilizing*, citizens.

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What emerges from recent research is that people are much more interested than their governments realize in the business of defense, and that nonviolent civil defense is an option which corresponds to real aspirations. General Dominique Chavanat, reviewing a number of opinion polls on defense issues in *Defense Nationale*, came to the conclusion that: "Defense has been essentially a distant system, complex and frightening, outside people's control, but there are clear indications of a profound desire on the part of the

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NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS

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NETHERLANDS

The annual meeting of the Dutch network on social defense was held last October. Lineke Schakenbos (Women for Peace, National Group on Social Defence, Postbox 963, 3800 AZ AMERSFOORT, Netherlands) reports that discussions included the Minden Congress on Social Defence (see *CBD News & Opinion* Sept/Nov 1988), how women translate social defense into action and life and how Women for Peace can help local groups working on social defense. They are also studying resistance in concentration camps and intend to learn more about social defense in Nicaragua (see *CBD News & Opinion*, Sept/Nov, 1988). This September Women for Peace will celebrate its tenth anniversary. The group feels that interest in social defense is growing in the women's peace movement.

ENGLAND

Howard Clark, of War Resisters International, reports that Andrew Rigby at the Bradford School of Peace Studies has begun a study of the Palestinian "Intifada" as an example of social defense. War Resisters International is planning for an invitational international study conference on social defense, to be held possibly in 1990. WRI can be contacted at 55 Dawes Street, London SE 17 1EL, England. Tel. 01 703 7189.

SPAIN

Issue #29 of *Papeles Para La Paz*, 1988, was devoted entirely to the subject of alternative defense. Articles (in Spanish) included in the issue are: "Defense Alternatives," by Alberto Piris; "The Debate about Alternative Defense in the United Kingdom," by Michael Randle; "Rationale for Non-intervention," by Randall Forsberg; and an interview with CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) about non-nuclear defense. Included in the articles are a number of references to defense by civil resistance.

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NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS
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MEXICO

A 1989 publication for use in workshops and retreats on nonviolent action, *La Resistencia Noviolenta Y Activa*, is now available from Centro de Estudios y Promocion Social, A.C. For more information, contact CIRIMEX, Fernando De Alba 659 Col. Chapalita, COD Post 45000, Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico. Tel. 21 48 78. Included in the new work are chapters on 20th century examples of nonviolent action and nonviolence and democracy in Mexico.

WEST GERMANY

In March 1989 the *League for Social Defense* (Bund fur Soziale Verteidigung) was formed. Petra Kelly, a member of the German Federal Parliament from the Green Party, and Theodor Ebert, professor and peace researcher at the Free University in Berlin, were chosen to lead the newly-formed group whose members include peace activists from religious, political, and other areas. The goal of the League is to overcome the military and its weapons and in its place to develop a nonmilitary, nonviolent form of self-defense – social defense. The League for Social Defense believes that now is the time to implement nonviolent forms and methods of conflict resolution, to abolish the conditions of violence, and to build up a demilitarized, ecologically responsible and just society. It will work towards these goals in local, regional, and international contexts and calls on all those who agree with its goals to pledge that they will work for nonviolent forms of conflict resolution, that they will not take part in any form of preparations for war, and that they are prepared to live without the military and its armaments. Petra Kelly can be contacted at: Bundeshaus – HT 718, D 5300 Bonn, West Germany. Theodor Ebert may be reached at: Frei Univ. Berlin, 1 Berlin 33 (Dahlem), Ihnestrasse 21, West Germany.

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CIVIL DETERRENCE (continued from page 7)

French people to exercise a more direct responsibility.” The responses show a majority (61%) affirming that “peace can be assured by other than military means.”

The specific means we have in mind are all ones which correspond with these aspirations. Our basic model is a standard one, nevertheless – the strategic exercise is to deter, and if this fails, to defeat, a rational enemy who might decide to seize French territory as a means to an end. The following are the most probable ends: *either* to gain political control of our country by establishing a friendly government in Paris; *or* to suppress our democratic forms of organization for ideological reasons; *or* to exploit our economic resources, including technical expertise and labour force. It is on these three areas, then, that nonviolent strategy should concentrate.

Practical measures to deter and defend in the first category – **political control** – would aim at making French society *ungovernable* by any foreign power. Ungovernable because the enemy would be unable to establish a lackey government which had the least trace of legitimacy in the eyes of the French people and the international community, or to effectively control the administration and police forces.

Heads of State may be the first to crack, so citizens need to be better trained to test and challenge the legitimacy of their leaders’ moves. Petain’s solution of ambiguity in partitioning off the Vichy government in 1940; Dubcek’s undermining of the Czech people’s nonviolent resistance in 1968; these accommodations have to be made constitutionally impossible, at least so we may recognize them when they happen. But there are other, legislative, steps to be taken in the protection of human rights and democratic procedures, which need to be given prominence now if they are to serve a useful purpose in the future. Nuremberg has taught us that we do need to think the unthinkable, juridically, to combat inhumanity effectively at every stage.

Local and administrative structures are potentially much more resistant than the central government structures, and the risks incurred by individuals less. Here too, however, advance planning and training are essential for the automatic delegation of power down to the most decentralized levels, in the event of certain failures of resistance at the top. The sort of education in personal responsibility implied here can’t be achieved without some kind of collective thinking through of the demands made on the individual by a resistance movement. Bearing in mind the general aim of a civil resistance, which is to deprive the illegitimate power the people to carry out its orders, criteria would have to be drawn up of which orders could safely be obeyed, which ignored, which sabotaged, and so on. Only then would the individual, when the time came, be in a position to make his or her own choices.

What happens to the police force in these circumstances is determining. Eloquent enough the record of 1940-44. Without the collaboration of the French police, the Germans would never have been able to accomplish their objectives, including the efficient rounding-up of French Jews. One of the most urgent matters for attention in the perspective of civil defense is the protection of police files from abuse. How secure are police records, particularly those of the *renseignements generaux* (general information) on the political activities and contacts of private citizens, from foreign takeover?

In the second category – **ideological control** – we surely have a powerful enough deterrent in the strength of our democratic practices and convictions, and in the danger of our liberalizing effect on the subordinate elements of any totalitarian system that tried to absorb us! Nevertheless, ideology is the area where we should properly examine the stakes of the game. What, potentially, are we fighting for? What are the values we most want to protect, and would be ready to take risks for? What responsibilities are we willing to assume?

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CIVIL DETERRENCE (continued from page 8)

The role of *moral authorities* like the churches can be an important indicator to a potential aggressor, and directly affects the chances of civil resistance, as historic examples show. Hitler's plans for extermination of the mentally sick were effectively blocked by the religious authorities in Norway; while in Vichy the collaboration of the majority of Catholic bishops certainly weakened the resistance; and for a contemporary example one has only to look at Poland.

In fact, the most serious problems encountered in planning for wartime cohesion on this ideological level are also the most serious problems of society in peacetime. The social or economic exclusion of large segments of the population; the gap between richest and poorest; the conscious or unconscious discrimination against racial and other minorities. The "survival of the fittest" is not a good model for a society which wants to defend itself and so survive. Objectively, the reduction of inequality is the surest way of creating a social consensus, and reducing a society's vulnerability to ideological intrusion. In other words, there is a remarkable convergence between social justice and civil deterrence.

The third category – **economic control** – ought to be the simplest. How to resist economic exploitation is an area where economists must have a great deal to offer, but have not been given the incentive to produce it. The threat of a general strike which has been well prepared is not excluded *a priori*, but there are diverse forms of non-cooperation which could come into play in any sustained conflict.

One such is the partial strike, in which strategic slowing-down of key areas of production can be affected by quite small groups of workers. Where this is deemed too dangerous for the personnel, a more generalized go-slow might be preferred. Sabotage is a heroic-sounding act, but it encompasses many subtle and nonviolent forms; and the scope for inventively non-collaborative work, in the tradition of the *Good Soldier Schweik*, is infinite.

Key areas need to be prepared in great detail, however, if they are not to be wholly vulnerable to enemy manipulation. Electricity supplies are an obvious case in point. But there already exist very complex emergency plans for the selective supply of electricity in case of disaster, and war-planning along these lines would be an enjoyable and challenging exercise.

Our conclusion is that it is possible to build up a system of nonviolent civil defense initially as an adjunct to France's current strategic doctrine. It would be ready to take over in the event the deterrent failed. It would be specifically trained to resist military occupation. And it would meanwhile add important elements of civil dissuasion to our present one-dimensional nuclear dissuasion.

The ideological foundation of civil deterrence is the capacity of the population to refuse to collaborate with the authority that an aggressor would wish to impose. This non-collaboration is expressed in disobedience to the illegitimate authority, but it expresses

first and foremost obedience to the legitimate authority which it continues to recognize. That's why the civil disobedience we are recommending has to go beyond the spontaneity of its historical precedents. It's not enough for the resistance to affirm its political legitimacy; it has to be organized to realize the strategic capacity needed to achieve its ends. Planning has to ensure the optimization of two partly contradictory projects: maintaining the functioning of society on behalf of the population; and paralyzing those activities which would profit the aggressor in terms of either ideological influence, political control, or economic exploitation.

The specifically civil form of deterrence we are advocating is quite an innovation. Most of the normal categories of traditional defense

thinking would have to be re-thought. For example, the state sector actually has rather a small role in our society and wouldn't suffice to mobilize a mass civil defense. Yet at the same time, even within the state sector, it would be no use organizing this kind of civil defense through the usual bureaucratic rigmarole of executive decisions and taking orders

NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS
(continued from page 8)**CANADA**

The March 1989 issue of *Ploughshares Monitor* carried an article by George Crowell entitled "*Nonviolent National Defence: A Proposal for Project Ploughshares.*" Crowell proposed that Project Ploughshares begin to build grassroots support for a Canadian policy of nonviolent civilian defense against external aggression. Crowell wrote that "as a national organization with strong support from the churches, with its network of local groups across the country, and with the respect it has won in the peace movement, (it) is ideally suited for starting such grassroots support. Work for NVCD could supplement and strengthen the vital campaign initiated by Project Ploughshares in 1981 to make Canada a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ)." Project Ploughshares has invited response to Crowell's proposal. *Ploughshares Monitor* is published at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G6. George Crowell is a long-time peace movement observer and contributor to the *Monitor*.

CBD AND YOUTH

If you are a teacher, parent, or other individual involved in the education of children and youth, we invite you to help the Civilian-Based Defense Association develop materials which can be used in classrooms and homes to communicate the idea of civilian-based defense to young people. Send us your ideas, visual aids, etc., and we will print them in a future issue of this newsletter.

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CBDA BOARD TO MEET IN OMAHA:

Directors of the Civilian-Based Defense Association will meet November 10, 11 & 12 in Omaha, Nebraska. To discuss agenda for this meeting, call Phil Bogdonoff, Board Chairman, at (607) 257-8404, or write to him at 107 Cayuga Heights Road, Apt. 2, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA.



WANTED:



NEWSLETTER REVIEWS

If your favorite newspaper or periodical accepts reviews why not write a review of **Civilian-Based Defense: News and Opinion** and send it to the editor? This will give many new people their first introduction to the notion of non-military defense and may help increase newsletter circulation. Be sure to include the Association's address with your review.



CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE AS AN OPTION GREETING INVADERS WITH NONCOOPERATION

By Paul E. Anders (Research Director at the Council for a Livable World, 20 Park Plaza, Boston, MA 02116) This article appeared originally in the May 5, 1989 issue of National Catholic Reporter. Reprinted by permission, National Catholic Reporter, P.O. Box 419281, Kansas City, MO 64141.

The wars in Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia and the Western Sahara have given way to cease-fires in some cases. In others, hostilities may well end soon. A deadly cycle seems to be winding down.

The protractedness and indecisiveness of much recent fighting and its cost in casualties and material and environmental destruction should occasion some consideration of civilian-based defense as a promising alternative.

What is civilian-based defense? Consider this scenario. It is the year 2000. An invading army sweeps across West Germany, meeting no military resistance. The occupiers issue orders to the conquered. The West Germans ignore the orders, go about their business and obey their own officials. The invaders get the silent treatment. The Germans refuse to give them supplies, which seem to disappear.

The civilians know what to do because several years previously the government decided on this policy and trained them. The Antiaggression Embargo Pact, concluded in 1995, takes effect and many nations sever trade with the invading country, impound its assets and deport its students.

The invader gets tough, but his brutality against the unarmed Germans turns world opinion further against him. Many of his soldiers desert. Back home the invader's population grows disillusioned. A new government takes office and orders the army of occupation home.

Tactics like those against the imaginary invasion form a strategy called civilian-based defense or social defense. Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia have already adopted elements of it. Yugoslavia's defense policy, for example, includes such unarmed resistance as boycotts and non-cooperation.

Civilian-based defense could help countries like the Bahamas and Costa Rica, which have no armies. Other countries could use it along with a military defense and eventually rely on it entirely. To many hard-headed people, this will seem like the ultimate pipe dream. However, Norway, Denmark, France, West Germany and the Netherlands – all in NATO – have officially or semiofficially considered it.

Like other defenses it has shortcomings, but they are less severe than those of military force. So long as we rely on military technology, we are likely to have nuclear weapons. These could kill much of or all life on the planet. Also, the growing destructiveness of nonnuclear weapons makes future wars impractical. In addition, in many countries, the military has supported repressive governments. This obviously will not happen if civilian-based defense replaces the military.

Civilian-based defense adopted in peacetime would discourage invasion. What army wants to occupy a country whose population is trained in nonviolent resistance? For months the Soviet army, for example, was unable to achieve its aims in tiny Czechoslovakia when the Czechs – though untrained – nonviolently resisted the 1968 invasion.

Civilian-based defense presents an invader with a dilemma. To control the invaded country whose people are not cooperating, he must coerce them, maybe by jailing or killing some of them. To keep his soldiers loyal and his alliances intact, he wants to seem reasonable, but when he uses violence against unarmed opponents, he looks cruel and he loses support.

Citizens have often opposed the repression of their own governments successfully and nonviolently, as the Marcos government in the Philippines and American officials who opposed integration in the 1960s can attest. The next step – a big one – is using it to defend against foreign aggression. A country could phase in civilian-based defense, gradually phasing out its reliance on the military.

Organized civilian-based defense takes dedication and more effort of more people but less money than the military. It requires that civilians be willing to put their lives on the line. It takes courage to oppose guns with boycotts, work stoppages and the silent treatment. But civilian-based defense is less risky than war, even for civilians. As the National Conference of Catholic Bishops said in 1983 about nonviolent defense, "Before the possibility is dismissed as impractical or unrealistic, we urge that it be measured against the almost certain effects of a major war" (*The Challenge of Peace*, section 223).

In an age of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, war becomes apocalyptic. Efforts to save the home country militarily could lead to committing mass suicide. With civilian-based defense, ordinary citizens such as grandfathers, nuns, housewives, you and I, and not just young men, defend our country. We can win using nonviolence, whether in Europe, Costa Rica or the United States.

CIVIL DETERRENCE (continued from page 9)

from headquarters. The organizational aspects of civil defense are much less mechanical than those of military defense, and human factors have to play a more important role.

One of the most important things to consider is the responsibilities which might be assumed by certain civil organizations which at present have no role in defense: trade unions and professional associations, for instance, the churches, political and social organizations. Local government should be involved, to a far greater extent than it is at present, in the preparation of this new civil defense. The kind of preparation we envisage is best described as social concertation: an organic mutual agreement worked out between the various socio-economic partners, in order to select and coordinate those methods which would be *best adapted to the terrain*. To be effective in a crisis, these would have to be worked out in advance. But it would be folly to impose them from the top down.

What our initial research-work has established is the feasibility of a nonviolent civil defense in France. Like any social innovation, especially one which impinges on such a sensitive area as defense, it's bound to meet with difficulties and obstacles, not least that changes in mentality as well as in fact are called for. But the key thing is to set the ball rolling in the right direction. In its favor are: the democratic pressure for fuller citizen participation in matters of defense; the minimal structural requirements of nonviolent civil defense; and the relatively small financial investment needed to set it in place.

Even more important, in our view, is the process by which such a system would be set in place. Over and over again, we have stressed the part which would have to be played, to promote not only the spirit of resistance, but also awareness of the means of resistance which we have at our disposal, by those institutions within which people daily live and work, in which they share convictions and livelihoods, and participate collectively in the cultural, moral, economic and political life of their country. Each social movement and organization has its own internal logic favoring the sensitization of its members to the principles and methods of civil dissuasion.

Once this social dynamic is set in motion, who knows where the debate will end? What is really at stake for us as citizens, in our concern to defend our country and its values, whether with military or nonviolent means? We can ask, and maybe answer, some of these questions by refining our notion of civil deterrence.

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For Further Reading



The Civilian-Based Defense Association makes available a variety of printed materials about CBD. Also available is an English language bibliography listing approximately seventy books and articles having some direct bearing on civilian-based defense. General works on nonviolence, containing no discussion of CBD, are not included. To obtain an order form, and/or the bibliography, send a self-addressed, stamped envelope to:

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