

Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion

A PUBLICATION OF THE CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE ASSOCIATION


Volume 4 • May, 1988 • Number 4

IN THIS ISSUE

Combining Military and Civilian-Based Defense	Cover
Letter to the Editor	2
Pax Christi International Document	3
News & Announcements	3
"Schweik Action Wollongong" Handbook	4
Book Reviews	5
CBD and the Countries of Western Europe	
Britain	4
Ireland	4
Finland	5
Belgium and the Netherlands	5
Switzerland	6
Sweden	6
Austria	7
Denmark	9
France	10
Italy	10

CBD AND THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE

In this issue we give special attention to news and opinion from Western Europe. We asked our members and readers there to bring us up-to-date on civilian-based defense discussions in that part of the world. The articles they wrote and the information they supplied will be found throughout the pages of this issue.



COMBINING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

By Jack D. Salmon, Dept. of Political Science University of West Florida, Pensacola, Florida 32514.

Civilian-based defense (CBD) represents such a massive reorientation of traditional defense thought and practice that it is easy to reject the whole concept as impractical. Also, as Brian Martin has pointed out¹, the political structures of virtually all societies are dominated by elites with vested interests in continuation of military-based defense. It is difficult to imagine a contemporary national government choosing CBD as its sole means of defense.

This need not mean that CBD can have no role whatever in future national defenses. Modern means of military defense can be immensely destructive of the society they are intended to protect—perhaps even irrationally destructive, producing Pyrrhic results. A major war in Europe today could easily replicate the destruction of World War II, without using nuclear weapons. Ruling elites should be receptive to an auxiliary defense mode that offers possible improved outcomes, if we can solve the problem of integrating two such dissimilar systems.

The inherent flaw in reliance upon military defense alone is that if it fails, the society sheltered behind it is left completely unprotected. CBD as a back-up to military defenses may be a prudent measure. A counter-argument, that any "failure-anticipating" policy (e.g., CBD or "guerilla" resistance) would lower morale and/or distract resources from the "first line" of military defense, cannot readily be refuted. But it is also true that committing all of one's hopes on a single gamble should be avoided in either military or political strategies.

Advocates of defense based solely on CBD must also study "integrated" military/CBD defenses. Transarmament requires that, for some (probably fairly extended) period of time, two different defensive modes, military and civilian-based, must co-exist. Although the necessity of a transition period has been noted often, serious consideration of what that means is usually avoided. If the two modes are not well-integrated and

(Continued on page 2)

The July issue of *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion* will be on the countries of Central and South America.

Espoo, Finland
March 14, 1988

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Why do you never include in your paper an analysis of the realistic possibilities for the adoption of CBD by the USA or any other nation? For my part I believe there is no chance at all of the American political-military elite seriously considering CBD in any significant manner during this century. This, and a whole range of other pessimistic views on the subject, are strongly supported by the January 1988 report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. The work is entitled *Discriminate Deterrence* and was put together by an awesome assembly of America's foremost experts in "security" and military matters. Many of those who study CBD fancy themselves as "pragmatists". In the course of deep reflection and broad study I have come to believe that it is an illusion to believe in the conversion of our world's military decision-makers to CBD in any form - except perhaps as completely subordinated to military structures. I challenge you to prove me wrong and I sincerely hope you are able to do so. I invite any correspondence on these matters.

Steven Huxley
Haarakuja 5 C, 02320
Espoo, Finland

SPECIAL OFFER: PAST ISSUES OF NEWSLETTER

The first five years of *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion*, along with the two issues published during 1988, may be purchased for \$10.00, postage-paid (\$12.00 outside the U.S.). The sixteen issues, from 1982 to 1988, provide a quick review of developments relating to civilian-based defense during the past five years and an introduction to the people and groups who are most involved with the concept in various parts of the world. Write to: Civilian-Based Defense Association, P.O. Box 31616, Omaha, NE 68131, U.S.A.

COMBINING DEFENSE (Continued from page 1)

vigorous during the transition, the society will be vulnerable to an aggressor who would be required to defeat only a reduced military force and an immature CBD. This "window of vulnerability" cannot be avoided except by finding ways to integrate the two concepts. No national government would, or should, be willing to gamble on potential aggressors being willing to wait until the transition to "pure" CBD is complete. If it is not possible to combine violent and nonviolent defensive methods, at least during a transition period, there may be no future for CBD. It is therefore incumbent upon advocates of CBD to face this problem squarely.

The objective of both military and CBD is the same: to make it impossible, or so expensive, for the invader to govern that he will give up and go home. As Gene Sharp² has forcefully reminded us, this is war, an attempt of one society to impose its will upon another. But the methods of military defense are quite different from those of CBD. There is virtually unanimous agreement that if attackers feel themselves threatened by violence they are likely to respond with violence. At the very least, this would mean that the costs of using CBD in conjunction with military defense could escalate dramatically. Our problem is to find ways to integrate two very different methods of waging war, and yet to keep them sufficiently distinct that neither the attacker nor the defender fails to maintain the distinction.

Defenders will presumably have been trained in the system and will understand its basics, but it is critical that distinctions be both clear, robust, meaningful and compelling to the attacker. These are stern requirements. Clausewitz's famed "friction" in war (Murphy's law applied to warfare, i.e., if anything can go wrong it will) is a recognition of the confusion and fear of combat: attacking forces, both officers and troops, must be able to tell military from civilian-based defenses quickly, reliably, and repeatedly. Sophisticated classifications of sabotage, for example, may be difficult to maintain with "friction." Distinctions must be sufficiently robust that both attacker and defender can view occasional violations—violent outbursts under what should be nonviolent conditions—as exceptions, not a shift to new rules.

These requirements are conceptually similar to those for limited war. Prof. Thomas Schelling³ has observed that good limits should be intuitively obvious and meaningful, regardless of whether they make military sense: for example, no crossing of national borders, no bombing beyond a river, no naval actions (or only naval actions), or sending military advisers but no organized combat formations. Applying this logic to integrated military and CBD, I have identified four variables and a key concept to organize their use.

The distinguishing variables are organization, timing, geography, and type of action—i.e., violent or nonviolent. The key concept is isolation—not mere separation, but isolation—within an integrated defense.

There is universal agreement that being able to separate military from nonviolent action is the minimum requirement for a workable integrated defense. At a gross level the separation is simple, but there are potential trouble areas. Some actions intended to be nonviolent, in the sense of non-injurious to people, contain elements of risk. Explosive demolition of a railroad bridge, for example, may be intended for a time when no people are nearby, but "friction" may produce an unscheduled train, a defective fuse, an inspection party appearing without warning. An integrated defense may need to avoid blurring the military/CBD distinction by such risky actions.

Geographic theatres of operation are a familiar military concept which can be applied to nonviolent defenses also. By confining each kind of action to its own area both attacker and defender may be better able to operate within limits. For example, the tradition of "open cities" may serve an integrated system well. Military defense within urban areas is usually very injurious to both the people and the social and economic fabric of the defending culture, as well as costly for attackers, both militarily and in terms of potential lost booty. By contrast, urban areas are the "natural strong points" of CBD. Each side has utilitarian reasons to respect open cities.

Military defenses customarily begin at the border, in what may be a fortified zone of defense with few civilian centers. Civilian-based defenses cannot have much effect until the invader has reached the site of the defenses—usually in urban or densely populated areas some distance from the military border. An integrated defense therefore will normally begin with military measures, then pass on to a nonviolent stage only if and when the invader penetrates the border defenses and reaches the rear areas. This "natural" timing can be clarified, made prominent, and used to separate the two forms of the integrated defense.

(Continued on page 3)

COMBINING DEFENSE *(Continued from page 2)*

Military defense organizations typically stress control of all units through a centralized command hierarchy. This is in keeping with the traditional role of military power as the "last argument of kings," and is thought to be more efficient and effective. Without debating whether this is intelligent military organization, it is clear that a CBD may be more effective if decentralized. Capture of a single "head office" might be enough to bring about surrender, or at the least to degrade effectiveness in a system dependent on central control. An attacker who instead must develop control over dozens or hundreds of separate, local civilian defenses has an entirely different kind and scale of problem. The civilian elements of the defenses therefore should, in peacetime, openly and explicitly practice decentralized operation.

Military defense should therefore focus on border areas and rural areas, attempting to stop the attacker at the earliest possible moment. This mission may be carried out by centrally-controlled forces or may be decentralized. But civilian elements should focus on urban areas, come into play as an attacker reaches them, and be as decentralized as possible (Note: decentralized is not the same as uncoordinated).

This gives us a strategic structure for an integrated defense, but it must now be operationalized. It is essential that both defender and attacker, especially the attacker, be able to understand and use these distinctions. If an attacker believes, or his combat troops believe, that any nonviolent action is merely the prelude to violence, merely another trick, the cost to the defense will increase. Military engagements are sometimes fought "to the last man." CBD must avoid provoking in the attacker a willingness to view the struggle in that light. To the degree that each factor in the civilian-based defense—the organization, timing, methods used, and geographic operations areas—can be kept separate from its military counterpart, the attacker and his troops will have less reason or even less ability to confuse the two forms of defense. To assist in discrimination, I propose the concept of "isolation" as a strategic key, and "isolation zones" as an operational policy.

Well before any "pre-invasion" tension period, a society planning to use integrated military/CBD should publish materials thoroughly describing and mapping isolation zones surrounding each element of its defenses. Defenses should be exercised according to these plans, and any potential opponent should be made as aware of them as are the defenders. Isolation zones could be as follows:

Method and geography: military defense would be applied only in designated, mapped areas, which would be clearly marked on published maps and by prominent signs and markings on roads, etc. Isolation zones would be established and clearly marked around any urban or other area which would use only nonviolent means: the defender's own troops would be forbidden entry into these isolation zones at all times, nor would overt violent acts be allowed in these zones.

Method and timing: in nonviolence zones, no overt actions of any type would be taken until an "isolation" period of time (24 hours?) after military defense measures had ceased in the neighboring military zone.

Method and organization: by well-publicized policy, the CBD organization would use the fact of invasion as a signal to implement its decentralized operations. Thus the aggressive act itself would "isolate" centralized peacetime operations from decentralized wartime activities and present the invader with a complex requirement.

The concept of "defensive defense" or "alternative defense" being explored in Europe⁴ seems likely to fit well with CBD. The most highly developed model of an integrated defense yet published is in the work of Wilhelm Nolte⁵. The above model for integrating military and CBD is intended to advance the study of this problem area by focussing on the specific issue of integrating without blending and confusing these two distinct defenses. It is essential that these questions be faced, since some combination of the two methods, even if only during a transition period, is essential and unavoidable.

FOOTNOTES

1. Brian Martin, "Social Defence: Elite Reform or Grassroots Initiative?", in *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion*, June, 1987, pp. 1-5.
2. Gene Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable* (Cambridge: Ballinger), 1985.
3. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard), 1960.
4. See "Special Section: Non-Provocative Alternative Defense", in *Journal of Peace Research* 24, No. 1, March, 1987.
5. Hans-Heinrich Nolte and Wilhelm Nolte, *Ziviler Widerstand und Autonome Abwehr*. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag), 1984; also Nolte's section in Dietrich Fischer, Jan Oberg, and Wilhelm Nolte, *Winning Peace* (forthcoming). (Ed. Note: See also "West Germany and Autonomous Protection", in *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion*, June, 1987, pp. 6-7, for an account of Nolte's proposal.)

PAX CHRISTI INTERNATIONAL: WORKING DOCUMENT ENCOURAGES STUDY OF POPULAR DEFENSE

Pax Christi International is soliciting comments on a preliminary draft of its new document on nonviolence. The draft gives support to popular defense in paragraph #20, which is quoted here:

"The fact that nonviolent defense as a socially organized way of resolving conflict is still in its infancy should not deter us from striving to understand it and promote it as an alternative to the generally accepted methods of conflict resolution, particularly as an alternative to defense by contemporary methods of warfare and deterrence. Organized popular defense (civilian-based defense) consisting of planned nonviolent strategies and tactics by citizens trained in nonviolent struggle, deserves more study and consideration than has hitherto been given to it. The ways of war rely on acceptable levels of damage to life and property. Nonviolent approaches to security, on the other hand, can best be understood as a new and radical stage in human maturity, a step toward methods of conflict resolution in keeping with our vocation as children of God, made in God's image."

Comments should be addressed to: Mary Evelyn Jegen, SND, Pax Christi USA, 348 East Tenth Street, Erie, PA 16503.

NEXT ISSUE

Focus of the July, 1988 issue of *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion* will be on the countries of Central and South America. What relevance might CBD have in this part of the world and what consideration is being given to the concept? Information, letters, and articles from readers are invited.

HELP US INCREASE CIRCULATION

We want to identify more people who could become interested in civilian-based defense. Please suggest persons in any country for our introductory mailing list.

**"SCHWEIK ACTION
WOLLONGONG" PLANS
HANDBOOK ON
COMMUNICATIONS AND
SOCIAL DEFENSE**

Lisa Schofield, Brian Martin and Terry Darling, members of Schweik Action Wollongong (PO Box 1355, Wollongong NSW 2500, Australia) are inviting contributions from various people and countries for a handbook which will contain practical material that is specifically oriented toward social defense, information which might be useful to nonviolent activists in a crisis situation such as a military coup. They see communications as vital to social defense since aggressors commonly aim to cut off communications to outsiders. Contributions should be local and specific. They can be built around one's own skills and knowledge or be based on research (especially interviews). The three editors gave several examples of the type of material sought: how to contact trade unions in Italy, who can intercept overseas telephone calls to the Netherlands, how to disrupt or realign satellite receivers in the United States, how to reprogramme computers used to run small-scale telephone exchanges in Australia, or how to communicate by short-wave radio around the world. They see this as an experimental project and invite comments, names of other people to contact, etc.

***Making Europe
Unconquerable:
The Potential of
Civilian-Based
Deterrence and
Defence***

by Gene Sharp

Paper, 190 pages.... \$14.95

Order from:
CIVILIAN-BASED
DEFENSE
ASSOCIATION
P.O. BOX 31616
OMAHA, NE 68131
USA

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE IN BRITAIN



By April Carter, 47 East Street, Banbury, Oxon, OX16 7LL, England.

Interest in the possibilities of civilian-based defense (CBD) was stimulated in Britain partly by Gandhi's campaigns, which dramatized the potential of nonviolent resistance, and partly by the need to find an alternative to increasingly destructive methods of warfare.

Both these themes were elaborated by the pacifist weekly *Peace News* when, in the later 1950s, under the editorship of Hugh Brock, it promoted the idea of nonviolent or civilian-based defense. *Peace News* also gave publicity to the civil rights demonstrations in the USA and published evidence of effective nonviolent resistance to German occupation during World War Two, to show the growing role for nonviolent action and its relevance to defense. Gene Sharp was assistant editor of *Peace News* in this period and was responsible for most of the research and writing on nonviolent action and CBD.

A few military historians and strategists also began to show interest in the possibilities of CBD, notably Basil Liddell Hart and Sir Stephen King-Hall. Liddell Hart, writing about resistance to the Germans during the War, noted the effectiveness of some nonviolent resistance. King-Hall, who had suggested even before World War Two that small countries like Denmark might do best to adopt a non-military strategy of resistance, issued a call in 1957 for the Government to set up a Royal Commission to study the possibilities of CBD. His book, *Defence in the Nuclear Age*, arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons required resort to new non-military methods of defending the Western "way of life", was published in 1958.

The British Government showed no interest in King-Hall's proposals and there has never been any governmental willingness to explore CBD. The peace movement in Britain as a whole also showed little interest in the 1950s and 1960s. But a number of people from both peace movement and more orthodox strategic circles met at St. Hilda's College, Oxford, in 1964, to examine CBD. Out of this international conference emerged the book, *The Strategy of Civilian Defence*, edited by Adam Roberts, and published by Faber in 1967. The mass nonviolent resistance in Czechoslovakia in 1968 prompted Penguin to re-issue the book under the title *Civilian Resistance as a National Defence*.

The renewed concern about the dangers of a nuclear war, with mass protests in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, was accompanied by a serious attempt by research groups close to the peace movement to promote alternative policies. Research has focussed particularly on non-offensive forms of conventional defense. But the unofficial British Alternative Defence Commission, in its first report, *Defence Without the Bomb* (1983), did also explore the possible role of CBD, both as a back-up to conventional defence, and as a total strategy. CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) circles have shown some interest in alternative defense, including CBD. The Conservative Government and the Ministry of Defence have remained consistently hostile to any attempts to find alternatives to a nuclear strategy, but the MOD is plainly aware of alternative thinking, and so are strategic theorists. The only political party in Britain which has taken up the idea of CBD is the Green Party, which has no Members of Parliament.

Research on the possibilities of CBD for Europe and Britain is now being undertaken at the Bradford School of Peace Studies. The Coordinator is Michael Randle.

Finally, a note on terminology: there has been some discussion of the best way to describe CBD. "Civilian defense" tends to promote confusion with official "civil defense" (protection against bombing, etc.). The terms "nonviolent defense", "social defense" and "defense by civil resistance" are all sometimes used.


IRELAND



A workshop on alternative defense for Ireland, arranged by the North Atlantic Network, was held in Galway last September. As a follow-up, workshop participants and others have decided to set up an "Independent Defense Research Group". It will write a submission to the Irish defense department, which is currently reviewing Irish defense policy. A preliminary outline for the submission indicates that an analysis of alternative defense strategies will be included, such as non-military (social) defense. The contact address is: Centre for Peace Research, 29 Lower Bogot Street, Dublin 2, Ireland. Sean English is the contact person. (This information was obtained from *Non-Offensive Defence*, February, 1988.)

Also of interest is an eight-page pamphlet written by Rob Fairmichael, entitled *An Alternative Defence for Ireland*. It appeared originally in *Dawn*, 95-96, 1983-4. It is available for 20 pence plus postage from Dawn, Box 1522, Dublin 1, Ireland.

CBD IN FINLAND



By Steven Huxley (Haarakuja 5 C, O2320 Espoo, Finland)

From 1809-1917 Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire. During the latter half of the 19th Century the upper strata of Finnish society developed a complex repertoire of means of survival and contention in relation to Russia: 1) **Cultural defense**: development of an inviolable society through cultural development and progress in civilization; 2) **Constitutionalist assertion**: this developed into the so-called "legal struggle" of polemical literary confrontation with Russia based on juridical and historical argumentation; 3) **Compliance**: the policy of accommodation or submission to Russia's will; 4) **Passive Resistance**: a more intensive application of approaches #1 and #2 combined with a whole range of means of protest, noncooperation and struggle which excluded acts of violence against persons, and, 5) **Violent struggle**.

I have, to date, written several hundred pages concerning this repertoire of contention in Finnish political culture. This material is to be published as a book.

In the late '60s there was a broad debate on Finnish security. One of the polemical topics was what the military called "weaponless resistance" and the peace movement called "civilian resistance". A whole variety of books and articles were published and the international literature on the subject became known in Finland. In the early '70s two consecutive government committees published detailed reports on CBD. Since that time no major work has been done on the subject in Finland. Tampere Peace and Conflict Research Center scholar Pertti Joenniemi did an analysis of CBD in the security debate (in Finnish). I translated the two government reports for the Einstein Institution and have written an article on security and defense in Finnish political culture. My article's aim is to provide the background necessary for evaluating the relevance of alternative defense concepts for Finland.

The Finnish decision-making elite, just as elsewhere in Europe, totally rejects the idea of CBD as a replacement for military defense. I believe that CBD will be (or has been) adopted in Finland only in-so-far as it supplements existing military culture and can be controlled by the economic and political elite. I think we must admit that the terms "civilian-based" and "nonviolent" are misleading misnomers in this connection.

BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS



A new book, written in the Dutch language, has been published in both Belgium (Antwerp, EPO) and in The Netherlands (Assen, Van Gorcum). *Sociale Verdediging Als Logisch Alternatief: Van Utopie Naar Optie*. (Social Defense As A Logical Alternative: From Utopia Towards Option). The author is Prof. Johan Niezing (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Centrum Voor Polemologie, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussel, Belgium). The inevitability of the future use of nuclear weapons leads the author to see as self-evident the need to choose a non-military, social defense. Social defense is depicted as a system, with emphasis placed on the inter-relationship of the separate parts of the system. Social defense is presented not so much as an alternative to war but as an equivalent of deterrence. There is a need for a gradual transition from military to social forms of deterrence.

About 50 people attended a two-day conference dealing with several aspects of Niezing's book, at Amersfoort in The Netherlands, October 9-10, 1987. Pax Christi/Flanders organized a special meeting about the book in Belgium in February of this year.

Niezing reports that there is interest in an English translation of his book but no publisher has been found to do it. Anyone who can help in this regard should contact the author.

In The Netherlands this February, the Dutch Network on Social Defense made a commitment to two social defense projects: 1) an information and education campaign directed towards churches, educators, the media, and peace, environmental and women's groups, and 2) a fund-raising effort, to provide money for studies in the field and for social-defense training collectives. Wim Robben, Postbox 90, 5280 AB BOXTEL, The Netherlands, is the contact person for the education campaign. Martien de Jonge, Duinoordseweg 15, 3233 ED OOSTVOORNE, The Netherlands is the contact for the fund-raising effort.

Two publications on social defense will soon be available from SVAG (Stichting Voorlichting Aktieve Geweldloosheid - Foundation for Information on Active Nonviolence) Postbus 137, 8000 AC ZWOLLE, The Netherlands. The first is a reprinting (in English) of all the issues of *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion* from November

BOOK REVIEWS

Nonviolent National Defense: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Applied Nonviolence, by Norman C. Freund. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988)

Review by Walter H. Conser, Dept. of Philosophy & Religion, University of North Carolina - Wilmington.

This volume will be of interest to all readers of this newsletter. In a straightforward and accessible manner, Professor Norman C. Freund presents an analysis of the need for an alternative defense system and an argument for the suitability of nonviolent national defense to satisfy that need. He states that the present levels of nuclear armaments have rendered all-out international warfare both impractical and immoral. Rather than providing adequate national defense, nuclear arms have only opened up a "pathway to Armageddon."

Freund's discussion reviews several of the familiar examples of nonviolent action used on a nation-wide scale, e.g., the Hungarian resistance to Austrian rule in 1859-1867, the Ruhrkampf of 1923, Gandhi's campaigns in India from 1918-1934, Danish and Norwegian resistance to the Nazis, and the East German uprising of 1953. Freund draws his accounts from the standard earlier discussions of these events, e.g., William Miller, Adam Roberts, and Krishnalal Shridharani. Freund's reliance on these often cited, but limited and dated secondary accounts points up the need for fuller and fresh new historical analyses of these and other crucial events in the use of nonviolent action.

Consistent with the evidence from other episodes, Freund points out that in these historical cases the resisters used nonviolence because of its practicality in the given situation and not from a devotion to pacifist principles. Building on this observation, Freund outlines the mechanisms, tactics, and specific actions of a nonviolent national defense program. Freund suggests, furthermore, that four preconditions frame the effectiveness of a nonviolent national defense: 1) the intention of a foreign power to invade and occupy one's country; 2) the diverse groups and peoples of one's country are united on behalf of the country's defense; 3) imperialist pretensions must be reassessed; 4) the nation's commitment to nonviolent defense is as thorough as its commitment to traditional military

REVIEW (Continued from page 5)

defense would have been.

These points (as well as other questions, such as the effectiveness of nonviolent action against totalitarian regimes, the degree of centralization among the leadership, the degree of secrecy in decision-making, the legitimacy of sabotage, and the effectiveness of mixed military and nonviolent defense systems) appear problematic to many observers. It is a strength of Freund's book that he clearly identifies these difficulties and stakes out his own position in each case. Appealing to reason, logic, and historical examples, Freund presents nonviolent national defense as a "viable, practical alternative to military defense." To those familiar with the work of Gene Sharp, Adam Roberts, or Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, Freund's volume will present little that is conceptually new. Yet, as another discussion of nonviolent defense in academic and popular arenas, where such discussion is all too rare, Freund's volume makes a valuable contribution.

Social Defence and Soviet Military Power: An Inquiry into the Relevance of an Alternative Defence Concept

By Alex P. Schmid, in collaboration with Ellen Berends and Luuk Zonneveld.

(Leiden: Center for the Study of Social Conflict, State University of Leiden, September, 1985. 469 pages, price 60 Dutch guilders.)

Review by Brian Martin (HPS Wollongong University, P.O. Box 1144, Wollongong, NSW 2500, Australia)

Only a few governments have given even passing attention to social defense, namely defense based on nonviolent action such as strikes, boycotts, demonstrations and parallel government. It is appropriate that the Netherlands government is one of them, since the Netherlands was one of the few countries occupied by Nazi Germany in which significant nonviolent (as well as violent) resistance occurred.

In 1982 the Netherlands government commissioned a report on social defense from the State University of Leiden. *Social Defence and Soviet Military Power* is the result. Its conclusion is that social defense would not be a viable method to oppose a Soviet invasion, the

(Continued on page 7)

BELGIUM & THE NETHERLANDS (Continued from page 5)

1982 to December 1987. Price: DFL 26. The second will be a 210-page report on Dutch political action for social defense from 1985 to 1987 in the aftermath of the publication of Alex Schmid's *Social Defence and Soviet Military Power: An Inquiry Into the Relevance of an Alternative Defence Concept*. The report, called SVAG, *Sociale Verdediging Nr. 2*, will be in Dutch and the price will be DFL 35.

Lineke Schakenbos, of The Netherlands group, "Women for Peace", reports that they hope to have a workshop during the upcoming Congress on Social Defence in Minden, Germany (June 17-19, 1988). Information on the Congress can be requested from: Kongressbüro "Wege zur Sozialen Verteidigung", c/o Friewo, Alte Kirchstrasse 1a, 4950 MINDEN, West-Germany.

Also to be noted is a new book by SVAG Chairman, Evert Huisman, entitled *Van Geweld Bevrijd, Overleven Door Democratisering En Ontwapening* (Freed From Violence: Surviving by Democratizing and Disarmament). 524 pp. The author discusses the relationship between the development of non-military defense and the development of participatory democracy.

SWITZERLAND

According to Jean-Luc Portmann (Centre M.L. King, Avenue Bethusy 56, CH-1012 LAUSANNE, Switzerland) little or no research on civilian-based defense has been done in the French part of Switzerland in the last two years. He states that research started in the beginning of the seventies but has never been supported by the Swiss Government.

A short publication which many might find useful, however, is entitled *Voies Nouvelles et Complementaires a la Defense Armee de la Suisse: Pistes de Recherches*, by Michel Grenier. (PRO-GIPRI, 41, rue de Zurich, 1201 Geneve, Switzerland. 32 pp., 1985.) The author argues that, since armed defense is insufficient in the case of classical warfare and illusory in the case of nuclear conflict, it is therefore necessary and urgent to study other possibilities for defense - especially the prevention of war and nonviolent civilian defense. Part III is devoted to the latter topic. The booklet ends with a very useful four-page bibliography of publications on nonviolent defense by various authors and groups in West-European countries.

CBD IN SWEDEN: A SLOW, BUT STEADFAST PROCESS



By Bo Wirmark (who has been personally involved in many, if not most of the activities mentioned in the following article.)

Interest in Sweden in CBD had its first boost in 1969. Four writers with their base in the peace movement (Bengt Hoglund, Lennart and Asne Lieden and Tryggve Hedtjarn) then published *Fredspolitik och civilmotstand* ("Peace Politics and CBD"). A Swedish translation of *The Strategy of Civilian Defense* came out simultaneously. Several other books were published later.

The books provoked a lot of debate on CBD, capitalizing on the interest created by the Czechoslovak resistance in 1968. Also, in 1969, a major political conference on CBD was held in the Parliament building, sponsored by the Social Democratic organizations of Women, Youth and Christians, with George Lakey as one of the speakers. The sponsoring organizations, together with the peace movement and the churches, have continued their support for CBD over the years.

In the fall of 1969 the Social Democratic Party held its congress. Several motions argued in favor of CBD. The party congress recommended that studies be conducted in this area. As a result, the issue was raised in Parliament in 1971.

The 1970's were quite eventful. The newly-established Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University arranged in 1972 an international conference of researchers with support from the Ministry of Defense; the Minister opened the conference. The Ministry also commissioned several studies from Adam Roberts on the possible role of CBD in Sweden's total defense. One of these studies focussed on the place of CBD under international law. In 1978, the churches' Ecumenical Development Week took up the topic and several foreign speakers knowledgeable about CBD toured the country. One of them was Gene Sharp.

(Continued on page 7)

CBD IN SWEDEN (Continued from page 6)

A major step was the government's decision in 1981 to set up a special committee on CBD. Its report was delivered in 1984, "Kompletterande motstandsformer" (Complementary Forms of Resistance"). The report in itself was quite brief, but a supplement was included - a fairly extensive presentation and discussion of CBD by Lennart Bergfeldt, a CBD researcher who served as an expert to the committee. (Ed. Note: see also "Sweden: The Commission on Nonmilitary Resistance", in *Civilian-Based Defense: News & Opinion*, September, 1984.)

The committee's work resulted in the setting up of a permanent "delegation for non-military forms of resistance" which has just begun its work. It consists of members of parliament, government officials and representatives of churches and other popular-based organizations. Four subgroups have been established, so far on a temporary basis: for organizational matters, education, information, and for matters relating to international law. It is hoped that a major city will agree to undertake a pilot project in planning for CBD on the municipal level. It is too early to say what will come out of this.

Two features are obvious in the official Swedish treatment of CBD. First and foremost, that the role of CBD is narrowly defined as a complementary form of struggle. Advocates of CBD have by-and-large accepted this as a matter of fact for the time being. It is hoped that its role may be expanded as the process continues.

The second, somewhat problematic feature is that up to now, the official definition of "non-military resistance" makes no clear distinction between nonviolent and violent forms of struggle. Some officials insist violent forms of struggle should be included if carried on outside the regular armed forces. Advocates of CBD respond by arguing with Adam Roberts for a clear differentiation in **time, place, and organization** between violent and nonviolent forms of struggle. Most likely, it will take some time before the issue is resolved. As a result of the activities mentioned above, it appears that public interest in CBD is on the increase. Several publications are under way. Churches have stepped up their involvement, through their common Swedish Ecumenical Council. Study material for use in parishes is being planned. The educational division of Radio Sweden is considering publishing a book with basic information. A translation of Gene Sharp's *Making Europe Unconquerable* is also under way. To sum up, one might say that the Swedish CBD process is a slow one, but it does go on.

THE DISCUSSION OF CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE CONCEPTS IN AUSTRIA

By *Andreas Maislinger, Universitaet Innsbruck, A-6020 Innsbruck, Innrain 52, Austria. Telephone: 05222-724*



(Ed. Note: This paper was presented at the 28th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 14-18, 1987, for the panel, "Alternative Means of Defense", chaired by Jack Salmon, University of West Florida. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the discussion of civilian-based defense concepts is divided into two periods. The first period begins in the 1950s and ends in the early 1980s. The second period starts in the early 1980s and continues to the present.

During the first period, Austria's participation in the discussion on civilian-based defense concepts was limited to the efforts of a few individuals. Unlike Britain, which hosted the first international conference on social defense in Oxford (1964), Austria did not sponsor any such international event. Nor did the Austrian government follow up on the Swedish government's attempts to promote scientific research on the possibility of integrating a strategy of nonviolence into the national defense plan. Furthermore, the Austrian scientific community made no attempt to provide a structure for researching matters related to the idea of civilian-based defense. By contrast, the German scientific community had provided a framework for such discussions in the 1970s.

Since 1985 Austria has reversed its past indifference towards the study of civilian-based defense strategies. In 1980, the Austrian parliament passed a law which mandated that all conscientious objectors enroll in a two day course devoted to the study of nonviolent resistance as it pertains to Austria's defense strategy. With this decision, Austria became the first nation to formally require a course on civilian-based defense as part of an official curriculum for an alternative service program.

Although they share a common interest in the study of civilian defense, scientists and

BOOK REVIEW

(Continued from page 6)

threat considered most likely in Western Europe. The main author, Alex Schmid, does see social defense as a possible addition to military defense.

Most previous critiques of social defense have been superficial and not backed by detailed study. This book does not fit this pattern. It contains a wealth of historical material and analysis and a carefully-argued conclusion. It is perhaps the most significant argument against social defense yet produced. Yet, it is not beyond criticism itself, as I will outline later.

The book contains four parts. The first is a short survey of concepts of nonviolence and social defense. The second is a major study of Soviet military interventions and nuclear threats since 1945, including conflicts within the Soviet bloc, conflicts between the Soviet Union and the West, and Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts. A short section describes implications for social defense.

The third part presents four East European case studies: Lithuanian resistance against the Soviet re-occupation (1944 to about 1952), East Germany 1953, Hungary 1956, and Czechoslovakia 1968. In each case, the events are compared with ten "conditions" for social defense to infer whether social defense would have been more successful than the resistance that actually occurred.

The final part of the book looks at social defense as part of a more comprehensive defense system, examines Sweden's psychological defense, and presents the resource mobilization perspective (which social scientists use to analyze social struggles) as an alternative to the social defense perspective.

Schmid's basic conclusion is that social defense would not work against a Soviet invasion, because the Soviet government is mostly immune to persuasion, publicity and economic pressures. As he puts it, "the Soviet military power instrument cannot be balanced by economic noncooperation and cultural persuasion alone as the USSR is economically invulnerable and culturally impenetrable" (p. 209).

The most valuable part of the book for nonviolent activists is its analysis of "model struggles", such as the nonviolent resistance of the Czechoslovak people to the 1968 Soviet invasion. Schmid points out that the Soviets had never planned to use violence themselves, so the limited success of the resistance was essentially one of (civilian) nonviolence opposing

(Continued on page 8)

(Continued on page 8)

BOOK REVIEW*(Continued from page 7)*

(military) nonviolence.

The important point made is that the outcome of many struggles, whether violent or nonviolent, depends only in a limited fashion on the methods used and the strength of the resistance. At least as important is the wider configuration of power internationally. For example, the Lithuanian partisans never had much of a chance unless the West came to their support. This was only likely in the context of World War Three, which is what many of them hoped for. With the conclusion of the Korean war their remaining hopes, and illusions about Western support, were dashed.

Proponents of social defense have long used historical examples to show that their ideas are not purely speculative. The toppling of the Kapp Putsch in Germany in 1920, the German resistance in the Ruhr in 1923, the Norwegian and Dutch resistance to the Nazi occupation, the collapse of the Algerian Generals' Revolt in 1961, Czechoslovakia 1968: these examples are frequently raised in discussions of social defense. Their advantage is that they show the potential of nonviolent resistance. The danger is that they become idealized as flawless examples. Schmid, through his analysis, has shown that such examples are much more complex than as often presented.

While *Social Defence and Soviet Military Power* provides some salutary lessons for supporters of social defense, its own assumptions are open to criticism. Schmid assumes that social defense is national defense, that social defense has no offensive capacity, that social defense must substitute for all the strengths of military "defense" (without examining the inherent drawbacks of military methods), and that social defense would be implemented simply by switching methods, leaving other aspects of society unchanged. In-so-far as these assumptions are made by proponents of social defense, then, they do need examination.

First, Schmid assumes that social defense is national defense, and that this would occur in one country (the Netherlands) without accompanying changes in other countries. In this situation, it is not surprising that the Soviet military threat would remain a potent one. An alternative is to see the introduction of social defense as part of a process that transcends national boundaries.

An analogy can be made with the anti-nuclear power movement. Arguably,

*(Continued on page 9)***AUSTRIA** *(Continued from page 7)*

pacifists have differed concerning the most important goals of such research. The pacifists' goal is to disseminate peace-promoting ideas to the public, make a wide range of people understand the issue, and by doing so to simplify and popularize scientific knowledge. The scientists' main goal, on the other hand, has been to analyze and scrutinize the concepts, and to try to find possible weak points and formal arguments against its application. Of course there are scientists who are also pacifists. However, in the final analysis, the scientific community focusses on scrutinizing civilian-defense-related concepts while pacifists concern themselves with popularizing the idea.

THE FIRST PERIOD

The first period yielded only a very few studies dealing with civilian defense in Austria. Only two books on the subject matter were published. In 1974, Heinz Vetschera produced *Social Defense - Civil Resistance - Permanent Neutrality*. Two years later Ernst Schwarcz published *More Security Without Weapons II: The Defense of Austria through Nonviolent Resistance*. The Schwarcz book approaches the subject of civilian defense from the perspective of a Quaker pacifist, while Vetschera, a member of the Institute for Basic Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy in Vienna, seeks to analyze existing concepts and relate them to international law as it affects Austria as a permanent neutral country.

In the 1970s, the idea of civilian defense attracted the attention of individuals outside of the military-scientific community and pacifist circles. Anton Pelinka, a professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck, was the most important promoter of civilian defense concepts within the broader scientific community. Pelinka popularized the concept through appearances in Austria's mass media. He argued that civilian defense should serve as a supplementary strategy in conjunction with a military approach.

The first period produced other developments which sparked new interest in civilian defense. In 1974, the Austrian parliament passed a law recognizing the right of Austrians to refuse service in the military on the basis of moral and religious beliefs. The passage of the conscientious objector's law stimulated the formation of discussion groups which, among other things, addressed the issue of civilian defense. These developments were, at least partially, a consequence of the movement for the 1969/70 anti-army referendum. At its height, thousands of Austrians participated in the movement against the army, but the referendum itself never took place. Nonetheless, the movement stimulated additional interest in alternatives to military defense.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Austria is the first country to introduce political training in the alternative service. The "school for alternative service", though talked about in Norway, did not materialize. The same holds for Belgium. In Germany there exists some sort of training but it is voluntary and lasts one week only. Very few people attend the courses.

The Austrian "Grundlehrgang" (basic course) started in February, 1985. It lasts for four weeks and is part of the eight months alternative service. Everyone doing alternative service is required to attend the course. It comprises six parts: 1) duties and rights of the alternative servants, 2) political education, 3) possibilities of nonviolent defense in the framework of the comprehensive defense system, 4) sanitary service, 5) self-protection and disaster control, and 6) technical aid. The first three parts are done in one week. The other parts last one week each. This distribution of time is a clear indicator that the ministry lays stress on technical services and not on the political education.

The legislation on alternative service was altered and the alternative service was integrated in the comprehensive defense system comprising military, economic, civil and mental (psychological?) defense. At the same time the basic course was introduced.

The peace organizations concerned with alternative service and the socialist youth organizations criticized this law which makes the alternative service a program aiding military defense, and for that reason they boycotted the drafting for the basic course. As a result of this boycott, the people who drafted the material for the course had difficulty putting through their ideas and views against those of the ministry. The outcome, therefore, was not too satisfying, but it was still quite progressive.

The new thing about this basic course is that for at least one week all the young men doing alternative service have to concern themselves with the political aspects of their work. It is a fact that there are a number of them who are not in the least interested in political questions. One has to ask what happened to the 10,000 to 20,000 alternative servants? Are they really an active and critical element in the Austrian society? There are some doubts because even critical and concerned students of political science are doing their alternative service in post offices without reflecting if that is a worthwhile activity.

(Continued on page 9)

AUSTRIA (Continued from page 8)

Until the beginning of this basic course, most of the alternative servants certainly did read something about defense-related issues. They argued the matter then and continue to do so in the basic course. The possibilities to attend seminars on nonviolence are not numerous. As such, the basic course has some value as a tool of political socialization. Another advantage is that the young men come together and get to know each other. This should facilitate the political work of the peace organizations.

The title of part 3 of the basic course indicates that one can only enumerate possibilities and not put forward an elaborated concept. There is nothing like a doctrine of nonviolent defense in Austria; this is not provided for in the national defense plan. Therefore, only feasible ways are dealt with, which by that get a semi-official status, since this chapter is part of the only authorized book for the basic course. Part 3 comprises: a) problems of the comprehensive defense concept in its political, social and ethical context; b) competencies and coordination of the comprehensive defense concept; c) outline on the methods of nonviolent defense; d) problems of combining nonviolent and military defense; e) historical examples of nonviolent resistance.

Chapter "a" was the most difficult one to draft. The views of the author differed very much from those of the ministry. The outcome was a not very satisfying enumeration of critical remarks on the comprehensive defense concept. For reasons of time, a lot of problems could not be dealt with profoundly - for instance, the role of Austria's armament exports in connection with structural violence. The aim was - and this could be achieved - to point out that Austria's defense policy has an impact on the conditions of the Third World.

Chapter "c" enumerates Johan Galtung's examples in his book *There Are Alternatives*. Chapter "d" emphasizes the basic problem that military defense does exist in Austria, but there is nothing known about nonviolent defense. So writing about the combination of them, knowing only either of the components, arouses difficulties. In the chapter it is pointed out that a separation of these two forms, by time, space, and institutionally, would help to avoid problems aroused when combining them. Chapter "e" tries to get a realistic view of the possibilities of nonviolent defense; a blind, euphoric sight was not intended. The chapter comprises examples ranging from the resistance of the Hungarians in the Habsburg Monarchy to Czechoslovakia in 1968.


The teaching method of the course is a very modern one: group work mainly, brainstorming, speeches no longer than 15 minutes, etc. The teachers employed are mainly teachers from grammar schools and pedagogical academies, but also well-known representatives of pacifist organizations like Mathias Reichl.

As mentioned before, there were a lot of controversies going on about the basic course. The organization for alternative service and the Austrian branch of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation organized a course of their own, lasting for a week, and called for the boycott of the last week of the basic course.

It is certainly too early to give a comprehensive evaluation of the advantages or disadvantages of the basic course. A lot certainly will depend on the teachers and on the political awareness of the alternative servants.

Differences of opinion over the actual meaning of civilian-based defense prompted the Austrian Ministry of the Interior to form a commission entrusted with the tasks of defining and operationalizing the idea. The commission on civilian-based defense consisted of individuals from three government ministries, the National Defense Academy, the Institute for Political Education, the Austrian Institute for Peace Research, and the Catholic Youth Organization. The author of the official textbook on "Possibilities of Nonviolent Defense in the Framework of the Comprehensive Defense System" was also a member of the commission. The commission examined the theories of the four best-known analysts: Theodor Ebert, Johan Galtung, Adam Roberts and Gene Sharp. The final report of the commission will be forwarded to the Minister of the Interior. At the minimum, the conclusions of the report should foster a considerable amount of debate within the Austrian government.

DENMARK



An excellent international newsletter, *Non-Offensive Defence*, is available without charge from the Centre of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Copenhagen, Vandkunsten 5, 1467 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Its aim is to facilitate exchange of information among researchers and other interested persons in the field of non-offensive defense.

BOOK REVIEW

(Continued from page 8)

stopping nuclear power in one country wouldn't be effective, since dangers would still exist from nuclear power plants in other countries. Therefore—this argument would continue—it makes more sense to include a variety of energy sources into an energy system, including nuclear power. This argument ignores the power of example and of cooperation across national boundaries, including the Soviet Union. Without the anti-nuclear power movement, the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl would not have provided any opportunity for challenge or change.

Second, Schmid assumes that social defense is without offensive capacity. Essentially, the social defense sits waiting for some aggressor to invade or take over before being stimulated into action. But social defense does not have to be restricted to this reactive mode. It is quite possible to organize offensive nonviolent actions, such as radio broadcasts, visits by activists, boycotts and nonviolent intervention (by "peace brigades").

The emphasis in the study is on Soviet military power. The Soviet government is portrayed as a monolithic entity, almost impervious to any concerns except maintenance and expansion of its own power. While this captures certain elements of Soviet political economy, it ignores the weaknesses in state socialism which might be studied. There are opposition groups in the Soviet Union, and there are divisions along lines of ethnicity, occupation and privilege. Furthermore, there are contradictions inherent in Soviet political and economic organization, such as the difficulty of generating worker enthusiasm for centrally-planned economic targets.

A social defense system designed to withstand Soviet threats would need to study these weaknesses in great depth. It would have a greater chance of applying pressure for participation and freedom within the Soviet Union than the present approach of military threats, which only helps to forge popular support by the Soviet people for their government.

A third assumption made by Schmid is that social defense must substitute for all the strengths of military "defense". Specifically, social defense is expected to withstand a potential Soviet invasion just as well as military defense. In short, military defense is seen as superior

(Continued on page 10)

BOOK REVIEW

(Continued from page 9)

because it can include everything that social defense does, plus military methods.

Schmid makes little mention of the failures of military approaches, nor of strengths of social defense not possible when violent methods are used. That military methods failed in Lithuania is grudgingly admitted in the course of the argument that social defense would have failed. The dangers of military coups, attacks on civil liberties, militarization of the economy, and weapons of mass destruction are not sheeted home to military approaches, but rather, are accepted as parts of the present world order. The argument that military approaches may foreclose options by fostering military buildups elsewhere is not dealt with.

For example, Schmid points out that social defense provides no defense against nuclear attack; he thinks a nuclear deterrent is essential. But of course this ignores the fact that possessing nuclear weapons is precisely what is most likely to make one a nuclear target and to stimulate the "enemy" towards building ever more nuclear weapons.

Schmid writes, "any across-the-board claim for social defense as a patent solution to contemporary national security problems must be rejected as irresponsible idealism for the time being" (p. 208). Personally, I haven't heard anyone make such a sweeping claim. In any case, it would be just as accurate to say (dropping the "national" out of the quote) the same about military "defense": "any across-the-board claim for military defense as a patent solution to contemporary security problems must be rejected as irresponsible idealism for the time being". Schmid doesn't make this point.

A fourth assumption made by Schmid is that social defense would be introduced without other significant changes in society. Yet the vulnerability of a society to attack or takeover depends on more than just formal "defense" measures. For example, a decentralized energy system using renewable fuels is less vulnerable than an energy system based on large plants and imported technology. A society which systematically opposes racism, sexism and large inequalities in wealth is less vulnerable than one split along these lines. Factories controlled by workers are less vulnerable than ones controlled by owners or bureaucrats.

Schmid does not portray social defense

(Continued on page 11)

FRANCE

Since its creation in 1984, the Research Institute on Nonviolent Conflict Resolution (l'Institut de Recherche sur la Resolution Non-violente des Conflits) has been stimulating widespread discussion of a possible role for "dissuasion civile" in France's national defense plans. In 1985 the Institute facilitated an international conference on civilian-defense strategies at Strasbourg. The Institute has just published a new report entitled "Energie et Dissuasion Civile". Several articles in the February and March, 1988 issues of *nonviolence Actualite* give information about the purpose, personnel, publications, current research, and funding of the Institute. To contact *Non-Violence Actualite* write to: 20, rue du Devidet, 45200 MONTARGIS, France. Telephone: 38.93.67.22. Single issues are 15 F. To contact the Institute write to: l'IRNC, BP 19, 94121 Fontenay-sous-Bois, France.

THE DEBATE ON CIVILIAN DEFENCE IN ITALY

By P. Farinella and M.C. Spreafico,** Study Group on Alternative Security Options for Italy, Forum for the Problems of Peace and War, Florence

The debate on the potential involvement of the civilian population during a conflict has been developed in Italy from two very different points of view, which bear contrasting political implications but surprisingly enough have sometimes addressed similar problems. On the one hand, the issue was raised within the military as a response to earlier NATO directives, at about the same time (during the 1970s) when the conventional military doctrines and posture of the country were being widely questioned (with an extensive debate on the viability of a territorial-type defence option for Italy)¹. In this context, it is important to notice that in Italian the term "difesa civile" bears some ambiguity, meaning at the same time "civil defence" (that is, preventive measures for protecting and defending the population from the devastation of war - in particular nuclear war²) and "civilian defence", namely the active role of the population in defending the social, economic and political structure of the country from a foreign attack, by non-military means³.

This linguistic ambiguity is reflected in the fact that in Italy during the last decade official military sources have widely discussed the usefulness of a kind of mixture of the two concepts in the framework of an overall national defence strategy. They have stressed the close connection to be kept between the civilian society and the military structure for an optimal planning of operations during a conflict⁴. The unifying idea was that of ensuring the continuity of social, economic, and political life during wartime, with a strong emphasis on measures of centralization and increased governmental control. Thus, although the new idea that the concept of defence may be applied not only at a military, but also at a social level, was for the first time widely accepted in the military⁵, one gets the impression that the "civilian" sphere is identified more with the existing State institutions than in the democratic life of the country and in the active role of the citizens. This might derive in part from the Napoleonic-type, centralized State bureaucracy and organization which is still characteristic of Italy. But this debate prompted some experts on military doctrines to analyse the relationships between military and non-military forms of defence, frequently referring, for instance, to the work of Adam Roberts. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence circulated official documents on the issue and supported an ad hoc study centre. In Parliament, an explicit bill for the actual implementation of "difesa civile", including elements of civilian-based defence, was also presented in 1979 by F. Accame⁶.

A completely different attitude has characterized the supporters of civilian-based defence in the non-violent, anti-militaristic and radical groups which have in Italy a long-standing tradition of cultural and political activity. The most important leader of these groups after the Second World War was Aldo Capitini, an original philosopher and pedagogue inspired by the Gandhian experience and influenced by Eastern philosophies as well as by Christian views. Left-wing Catholic groups have also been active in supporting non-violent ethical views. The concept of civilian defence which has been stressed by these groups has strong connections with Third World liberation struggles, with self-management and social struggle experiences carried out by non-violent means, and with the activities of conscientious objectors to military service bearing allegiance to

(Continued on page 11)

ITALY (Continued from page 10)

ethical principles.⁷ As a consequence, instead of "civilian defence" these groups prefer to speak about "non-violent popular defence"⁸, while the adversary is more often identified with an inner authoritarian power than with an external invader. (This may explain why Accame's proposal mentioned earlier was widely criticized.) This choice may also be due to the fact that patriotic or nationalistic feelings are comparatively weak in today's Italy, and other ideals (of social reform, of renewed and improved democracy, and of individual freedom) are much more effective in promoting collective movements and struggles. The activity on civilian-based defence has focused mostly on the organization of study groups, of documentation centres and of training seminars. Several foreign books on civilian defence have been translated into Italian, and also a few historical instances of civilian resistance in Italy during the Second World War have been "discovered" and investigated. Recently, considerable interest has focused on the proposal of constituting permanent non-violent forces of the United Nations for conflict prevention and resolution. Also noteworthy, in the last few years, is the interest shown in alternative defence proposals (including both territorial and civilian-based defence) by the promoters of the campaign for the "fiscal objection", that is, the refusal to pay taxes for an amount corresponding to military expenditures in the State budget. (Part of these withheld taxes are in fact allocated to support peace research and studies about defence alternatives.) This campaign caused an acute controversy between the Ministry of Defence and some influential Catholic groups and hence helped to popularize new civilian defence and transarmament proposals.^{9,10}

FOOTNOTES

1. See, e.g., C. Bess, "Le unita" alpine nella guerra territoriale", *RMI* no. 5, pp. 47-54, 1977; *La Difesa del territorio*, ISTRID, Rome 1980; V. Ilari, "Difesa civile e guerra territoriale", *Nord e Sud*, no. 11, 1980.
 2. P. Di Marco, "Il problema della difesa civile", (*Rivista Militare Italiana (RMI)* no. 4, pp. 59-65, 1978; B. Piazza, "La difesa civile", lecture given at Centro Militare Studi per la Difesa Civile, Rome, 6 October 1982; M. FPulcinelli, "Il soccorso sanitario nel disastro atomico", *RMI* no. 5, pp. 7-103, 1975.
 3. ISTRID, "Difesa militare e difesa civile", *Annuario 1981-82*, Ch. 4, pp. 153-155 (Rome 1981) and Centro Alti Studi Militari, Round Table on National Defence, 30th Session, reported in *RMI* no. 4, pp. 2-10, 1979.
 4. M. Vinciguerra, "La difesa civile nel contesto della difesa globale", *RMI* no. 2, pp. 35-40, 1979; B. Piazza, "La cooperazione civile-militare", *RMI* no. 1, pp. 58-62, 1980; and P. Feniello, "Difesa nazionale: organizzazione della difesa civile e suoi collegamenti con la difesa militare", *RMI* no. 6, pp. 93-104, 1983.
 5. F. Salvati, "Obiezione di coscienza e difesa civile", *RMI* no. 3, pp. 88-91, 1980.
 6. *Atti Parlamentari*, Camera dei Deputati, VIII Legislatura no. 53, 1979.
 7. A. Drago, "Verso un programma politico di difesa popolare nonviolenta", in *Atti del Convegno Nazionale sulla Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta* (Verona 1979); and "Difesa popolare e nonviolenza", in *Testimonianze*, pp. 51-72, 1981.
 8. M. Soccio, "Dalla peace research alla difesa popolare nonviolenta", *Atti del Convegno Nazionale sulla Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta* (Verona 1979); and "Difesa civile e nonviolenza", "Azione Nonviolenta" (*AN*), no. 4, pp. 3-4, 1986.
 9. G. Salio, "Una strategia mista come alternativa alla difesa militare", *AN*, no. 4, pp. 5-6, 1986; A. Zangheri, "Compromessi senza compromissioni", *AN* no. 4, p. 6, 1986; and A. Zangheri, "Il transarmo", *Rocca*, pp. 37-39, 15 April 1983.
 10. A. Drago and G. Mattai, *L'Obiezione Fiscale alle Spese Militari* (Turin 1986); "La proposta di legge presentata da Democrazia Proletaria", *AN* no. 4, pp. 23-25, 1984; "Proposta di legge di iniziativa popolare", *AN* no. 4, p. 26, 1984; "La lettera degli obiettori fiscali al Presidente della Repubblica Cossiga", *AN* no. 5, pp. 16-17, 1984; MIR - Padova, "Presentazione della legge sulla difesa popolare nonviolenta", *AN* no. 7/8, p. 23, 1985; Coordinamento regionale degli obiettori fiscali, "Proposta di legge sulla DPN", *AN*, no. 7/8, p. 24, 1985.
- ** P. Farinella and M.C. Spreafico can be reached at: Università di Pisa, Dipartimento di Matematica, Via Buonarroti, 2, I-56100 Pisa, Italy.

BOOK REVIEW

(Continued from page 10)

as being part of a wider process of social change toward more equal participation. In this, Schmid follows many writers on social defense who present it as a sort of "social fix", a pragmatic alternative to the present system. But social defense does not have to be an isolated change. Indeed, Schmid's critique can be read as a powerful reason why it is very unlikely to be so.

The study does contain a somber picture of Soviet military power, and the case studies are valuable summaries. It is a valuable counter to the tendency to blame the West and capitalism for every aspect of war and oppression. Yet, the focus on the Soviet Union is excessive and unbalanced. It needs to be complemented by an account demonstrating the threat to "peace and freedom" from the West, such as Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman's *The Political Economy of Human Rights*.

To have such a critical study is actually testimony to the increasing importance of social defense in thinking and writing about war and peace. Previously, social defense could simply be ignored or laughed at. With the continuing failure of other approaches to counter militarism and repression, attention has turned to social defense as one way which confronts the roots of the problem. Yet, if social defense is simply promoted as a "social fix", as is so often done, it is vulnerable to the criticisms that Schmid so ably spells out.

Ironically, one of the strongest grassroots movements promoting social defense is found in the Netherlands. Schmid's study has not noticeably dampened their activities. As usual, the activists can proceed while the scholars argue about whether what the activists do is really worthwhile, or even possible.

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE: NEWS & OPINION, ISSN 0886-6015, is published by the Civilian-Based Defense Association to provide information about CBD as a possible alternative policy for national defense and to provide a vehicle for the exchange of international news, opinion and research relating to CBD.

CO-EDITORS: Melvin G. Beckman
Philip D. Bogdonoff
Liane Ellison Norman
Address: P.O. Box 31616, Omaha, NE
68131, USA. Telephone (402)558-2085

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: \$8.00 per year in the United States. \$12.00 outside USA. See page 7 for information about upcoming issues.

PUBLISHED January, March, May, July, September and November. Readers are invited to send news, articles and other material for publication. Submission deadlines are the first day of February, April, June, August, October and December.
THE CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE ASSOCIATION is a non-profit membership organization founded in 1982 to promote more widespread consideration of civilian-based defense as a possible alternative policy for national defense.

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE: NEWS & OPINION Subscription Request

\$ 8.00 One Year Subscription, U.S.A.

\$12.00 One Year Subscription, outside U.S.A.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip Code _____

Nation _____

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE ASSOCIATION
P.O. BOX 31616
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
U.S.A.

**Civilian-Based Defense: News
& Opinion**
P.O. Box 31616
Omaha, Nebraska 68131 U.S.A.

NON-PROFIT ORG.
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
OMAHA, NE
PERMIT NO. 582