

Civilian-Based Defense

A PUBLICATION OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSARMAMENT STUDIES

EDITORS: Melvin G. Beckman, Julia A. Kittross, Philip D. Bogdonoff

NONVIOLENT ACTION IN DEFENSE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: MASSACHUSETTS IN 1774

by Ronald M. McCarthy,

Program on Nonviolent Sanctions

There is a Mode of Conduct, which in our very critical Circumstances we wou'd wish to adopt, a Conduct, on the one Hand, never tamely submissive to Tyranny and Oppression, on the other, never degenerating into Rage, Passion, and Confusion.

- Middlesex County Congress,
Concord, Massachusetts,
30-31 August 1774

Massachusetts faced a challenge starting in June 1774 that threatened to bring to an end the autonomy the colony had enjoyed for decades. The previous December, a crowd destroyed many chests of valuable British-owned tea in hopes of blocking the enforcement of taxes on it. The Boston Tea Party both provoked Parliament to respond and offered it the opportunity to reassert Britain's control over the colony's legal and political institutions.

The Coercive Acts, enacted in March and April 1774 were Parliament's answer to the Tea Party. These laws punished Boston by barring all overseas trade from the harbor. Government was shifted to Salem. The Massachusetts Bay colony lost the right to elect its own council (the rough equivalent of a senate), towns were forbidden to meet more than once yearly, and court administration was changed to rid it of the influence of local government.

The British government moved to enforce the Coercive Acts just as soon as they were made law. Warships blockaded Boston harbor and troops occupied the town. The British ministry sent the commanding general as governor and quickly appointed councillors to replace the elected ones. As the summer of 1774 passed, the governor and judges put the new regulations into effect wherever they could, trying to bring courts, juries, town meetings, and the legislature under their authority.

Even the many people in the colony who repudiated the Tea Party could see the danger in the Coercive Acts. If officials put these changes in place despite the people's objections, institutions and liberties built up over generations might be permanently changed.

The question was, how could enforcement of the Coercive Acts be stopped? Violent action was not completely ruled out as a last resort, but most felt that this point had not been reached. Violence posed added problems in that the support of other colonies would be lost and Parliament would be justified in further intervention. Besides this, Massachusetts had earlier experience of non-violent resistance to draw on.

In 1765, for example, crowds opposing the Stamp Act had at first employed the traditional sanction of destroying the houses of tax collectors and other officials. Leaders soon moved to contain the crowds, developing methods of mass protest such as parades and demonstrations in place of violent or potentially violent means. During the Stamp Act resistance and the subsequent campaign against the Townshend Acts in 1769 and 1770, colonial merchants cut off imports from Britain ("nonimportation") to bring economic pressure to bear on Parliament.

The pragmatics of the situation in 1774 dictated that action refrain from violence, threats, and destruction, yet effectively defend rights and liberties. There really were two problems. First, people who believed that the Coercive Acts undermined their most basic freedoms wanted to avoid making any possible contribution toward putting the laws into effect. However, not every office holder recognized the danger, and indeed loyalists among the judges and other officials applauded the Coercive Acts. The second problem, was to prevent such people from carrying out any changes in the government.

Countering the ban on town meetings was simple: the towns simply continued to meet at will. Widespread noncooperation left the governor no way of using his troops short of garrisoning each town, which he could not do. At the same time, the towns worked to prevent any violence. Concord town meeting, for example, decided in September to make the entire town into a "Committee of Safety to Suppress all Riots, Tumults, and Disorders."

Defending the integrity of the courts was another matter. Resisters reasoned that if the courts met and acted as if all were normal, it would in effect validate the Coercive

Acts. In rural areas, townspeople gathered in large numbers on court days to prevent the judges from holding court. In some towns, crowds entirely blocked court rooms and building entrances so that judges could not enter. Other judges pledged not to hold court if doing so threatened the country's liberty.

Jurors committed civil disobedience by refusing to serve when called. In Boston, British troops could stop any crowds from acting. But if the courts were allowed to carry on as always in this key community, the entire campaign might fail. So, when the highest court met in August 1774, all the jurors refused to take the oath and serve, explaining that their consciences would not let them cooperate in undermining the colony's constitution.

By late August, courts had stopped trying to meet, both because of crowd actions and because many judges agreed not to behave "contrary to the minds of the people." The council presented another problem. The appointed council was considered completely illegal by resisters, yet several councillors were willing to serve. Anger ran high against these councillors all over the colony. In some rural towns, crowds surrounded the houses of appointed councillors, shouting, breaking windows, or firing guns to frighten them. Several councillors fled their homes, seeking the safety of British-occupied Boston.

The people's rage and fear easily could have led to violence, and more violence would have occurred if councillors had not given in. Leaders also devised nonviolent sanctions, such as subjecting councillors to social boycotts. Methods were worked out to control crowds as well. Crowds often chose committees of five or six to talk to the councillors or judges, remaining silent and orderly while negotiations went on. A councillor facing one of the largest crowds of the era commented on the gravity and calm with which the people acted.

Expanding resistance called for new organizations. Some towns formed "committees of correspondence" before 1774 and dozens followed their lead after the Tea Party. These committees were outside the legal structure of government, drawing their powers directly from people's cooperation. The committees of correspondence recommended, organized and guided resistance, gradually taking over much authority previously in the hands of town government. In the critical summer of 1774, the committees and delegate meetings convened by the counties refined both the goals and the means of the resistance campaign.

No colony-wide body existed to set the movement's direction and many felt that one was needed. The British-appointed governor stopped the legislature from meeting to keep it from adopting this role. Instead, in October an extra-legal provincial congress took the legislature's place.

Once organized, the provincial congress quickly challenged the legal government for authority. It called on towns to pay their taxes to the congress rather than to the legal

treasurer. Many towns withheld tax money from the regular treasurer, enough to cause financial problems by early 1775, but not all were willing to send their taxes along to the provincial congress. Most importantly, the provincial congress, along with the other colonies, moved to pressure Great Britain to repeal the laws Americans opposed.

The First Continental Congress supplied a plan. The colonies realized as soon as the Coercive Acts were passed that they had to consult together, or each colony would end up simply acting on its own. Delegates from twelve colonies met in Philadelphia in early September and soon decided that unity was the key to action against the Coercive Acts. In early October, the Congress proposed a Continental Association as a basis for united action. The Association called for a commercial boycott to coerce Britain by stopping its American trade.

The Association intended to begin by halting all imports into the colonies from Britain, followed in nine months by banning nearly all American exports as well. The Boston Committee of Correspondence proposed a similar plan for Massachusetts alone in June 1774 but lacked support. With the congress's backing the commercial resistance campaign spread quickly in all colonies.

Groups called "committees of inspection" enforced the Association, largely by boycotting offenders. In Massachusetts, these committees grew easily from the committees of correspondence and linked the provincial congress to the local level. The combined parallel institutions soon could claim more effective authority, based on people's cooperation and support, than the crippled legal government.

By mid-autumn a problem of a very different kind faced the provincial congress. Members from the rural western part of the colony pressed for arming and training the militia, or even organizing a provincial army, as a precaution against attacks by British troops.

Troops made forays from Boston to seize military stores in September 1774 and again in early 1775. In September, rumors traveled as far south as Connecticut that the troops meant to attack the country towns or bombard Boston. A vast crowd of country people assembled spontaneously at Cambridge. The people became more and more unruly as the day passed, and it took the combined influence of the Boston and Cambridge committees of correspondence to prevent violence to officials living in the town.

People did not see how the nonviolent means they were using could defend them against soldiers. Obstruction was one thing, and Boston-area committees organized a boycott to keep the British army from getting materials and workers to build barracks and fortifications. In the face of military action, however, most Americans thought that only a military response was possible. When British troops fired on Massachusetts militia at Lexington in April 1775, militia from all over the colony responded in arms. Neither British nor Americans doubted that the war they had long feared began that day.

The eight-year War of Independence clouded the memory of what had gone before. While deliberately attempting to carry on their resistance campaign without violence in 1774, however, the people of Massachusetts had defended and preserved the major part of their autonomous institutions. In the provincial congress, resisters not only duplicated the legislature, but created a more democratic body than had existed before. When independence approached, the colony's governing institutions were soon revived largely intact, allowing the people to make their own decisions about what should be changed and what retained from their colonial experience.

LIDDELL HART AND THE ORIGINS OF CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

by Christopher Kruegler,
Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University

Readers who are familiar with the literature of nonviolence will recognize the name of Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart. He has been cited in nearly every major work on the subject since Richard Gregg's The Power of Nonviolence was first published in 1936. In much the same way that Rear Admiral Gene LaRoque, and others like him, provide credibility for some disarmament approaches, Liddell Hart has functioned over the years as a military authority, who, by evincing interest in civilian-based defense, has contributed to its pragmatic orientation. Since his death in 1970, there has been little systematic scholarship on Liddell Hart, and none specifically on his relationship to this topic. In a recently completed dissertation, I attempted to fill part of this void, having spent the summer of 1983 reading in the Liddell Hart Papers, at King's College, London. What follows is a summary of the principal findings.

Two questions suggested themselves at the outset. Why was a person of such eminence in the military sphere interested in nonviolence in the first place? What were the exact nature and extent of his impact on the field? Before attempting to answer these questions, a bit more information about the man may be useful.

Liddell Hart's first experience with war was that of a young British officer on the Western Front from 1915 to 1916. He was wounded twice, and was one of only two officers from his battalion to survive Britain's disastrous first offensive on the Somme in the summer of 1916. Not surprisingly, he derived from this experience a life-long hatred for senseless carnage in warfare. It took several years, however, for this reaction to crystallize into a mature critique of the war system, and of the assumptions on which it operated. His early career as a journalist and military historian is marked by a palpably schizoid approach to the problem of war: on the one hand, all efforts should be made to prevent its occurrence; on the other, one should be prepared to wage war as decisively and humanely as possible, in the event that preventative measures failed.

Most of Liddell Hart's professional efforts were concentrated on the latter part of this dual approach, so that he is best known as a crusader for military reform during the inter-war period. He was a leading advocate of tank development, hoping that mechanization would restore mobility and decisiveness to the battlefield. His most famous work, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, argued that a single lesson could be derived from all of military history, namely, that one should never engage an opponent in a well-entrenched position, and that if one fought in a way, time or place that was calculated to unbalance the opponent psychologically, a decision might be produced without undue violence or human cost. The obvious ambiguity of this approach resulted in his vilification by both pacifists and militarists, the one viewing him as ruthless, the other, soft.

This same ambiguity, however, makes him an attractive character to study, and ultimately accounts for his interest in civilian-based defense. It led him into discussions with Richard Gregg, Aldous Huxley, Bertrand Russell, Kingsley Martin and others who were interested in the possibility of exploiting nonviolent action for national defense purposes, since this seemed to be another way of mitigating the destructiveness of modern warfare. These discussions never entirely convinced him, but they caused Liddell Hart to keep a close eye on manifestations of nonviolent struggle during the coming war. His contribution to the emerging concept of civilian-based defense can now be said to fall into three areas: his statements on nonviolent action per se, arising from the contacts mentioned above; his critique of total war, as it evolved from 1939 onward, which shares many assumptions in common with early civilian defense advocates; and his active encouragement of Sir Stephen King-Hall, Gene Sharp, and Adam Roberts, in their attempts to develop the concept in the post-war era.

Liddell Hart's own statements on nonviolent action, while many in number, tend to be repetitive and not especially profound. His misgivings about its use for defense purposes were two: that (in his view) it could only be practiced by people with the courage and self-restraint of saints, and that it was dependent for success on the opponent's having comparatively high moral standards. One doesn't need to be a well-known strategist to make such observations: they can be heard these days in a line outside of any movie theater showing Gandhi, where they are equally superficial. The war years produced plentiful evidence of ordinary people using nonviolent techniques against ruthless opponents. While cognizant of this new evidence, particularly in the cases of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, Liddell Hart repeated his two standard objections many times, and one feels that he did so more or less out of habit.

He did add one genuinely new element to the discussion, however, by reporting that in his interviews with over one hundred German generals, imprisoned in England after the war, several had confessed to being bewildered by nonviolent action, and had found it easier both to counter and to punish violent partisan resisters. A major objective of my study was to find out which specific persons

and events had inspired these comments. Unfortunately, Liddell Hart either did not find the details worth recording at the time, or the statements made to him were "off the record," out of deference to his sources. He felt that the war-crimes trials of the forties were an exercise in hypocrisy, and was involved in the defense campaigns of several German officers, so it seems plausible that he might not have committed everything they said to him to writing.

On the more general problem of war in the modern world, Liddell Hart had a lot to say from 1939 on, and his position as a leading military intellectual helped him to say it with considerable force. The methods of total warfare, in which he included strategic bombing, conscription, economic blockade, and the demand for unconditional surrender, were both brutalizing and counter-productive, in his view, and could not be justified, even by the goal of stopping fascism. He felt that it would be the ultimate irony if, in a purported attempt to defend freedom, "a fresh crop of little Hitlers" were to be planted in Britain's own soil. (1) These attitudes were only accentuated when the nuclear era dawned. There could be no winners in, and no justification for, all-out war in the post-1945 world. Unlike many at the time, however, he did not imagine that, as a result, wars would disappear, and argued that the new era made both nonviolent and guerrilla resistance more relevant, if escalation were to be avoided. (2)

While he could not bring himself to condone civil disobedience, Liddell Hart stated publicly that members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Committee of One Hundred had a better grasp of the fundamental issues at stake in the arms race than did the NATO chiefs. (3) Their major weakness, he felt, was the lack of an alternative security system with which to replace the nuclear arsenal. He was therefore inclined to give defense by civil resistance a second chance, and by the Civilian Defense study Conference of 1964, was prepared to say that the new policy should "be made a subject of serious study." (4)

Liddell Hart never undertook such a study himself, which is a shame, because he had a very sharp mind for the kind of nuts-and-bolts tactical analysis that has yet to be well developed in this field. He did, however, encourage, correspond with, and criticize the work of several of its pioneers. Both Sharp and Roberts report that Strategy: The Indirect Approach had a significant impact on their work, and both were gratified by Liddell Hart's personal interest and support.

There are some related topics on which the Liddell Hart Papers are extremely rich. For example, he amassed a great deal of documentary material related to the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1932, where he played the dual role of special correspondent for the Daily Telegraph and chief advocate for the concept of qualitative disarmament, or the banning of offensive weaponry. The thrust of this concept, and Liddell Hart's rationale for it, has so much in common with Mark Sommer's "preservative defense", discussed in the last issue of this publication, that the two might be considered intellectual cousins.

There is no full-length biography of Liddell Hart, and the task of illuminating the many conflicting and ironic aspects of his career will be an enormous one for some future writer. One thing that is clear for the moment, however, is that this man, who is thought by some to be the foremost military thinker of our century, recognized, in principle, the value of developing civilian-based defense.

1. Private memorandum entitled "The Reckoning," 11 November 1940.
2. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare (London: Faber & Faber, 1946), p. 85.
3. In a letter to the editors of Peace News, 23 February 1962.
4. His conference paper is included in Adam Roberts, ed., The Strategy of Civilian Defense (London: Faber & Faber, 1967.)

The best way to survey Liddell Hart's work without making a trip to his archive is to look at his own Memoirs (London: Cassell, 1965) and Thoughts on War, an edited collection of his diary reflections, (London: Faber & Faber, 1944.)

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

"Civilian-Based Defense: News and Opinion" is published quarterly by the Association for Transarmament Studies. Subscriptions are \$5.00 per year (\$7.50 outside the U.S. and Canada). Send checks to A.T.S., at 3636 Lafayette Avenue, Omaha, NE 68131. The publication is offered as a vehicle of communication for individuals and groups who believe the concept of civilian-based defense deserves very serious consideration. The Association attempts to inform its readers about new ideas, publications, governmental action and other developments relating to civilian-based defense, both in the U.S. and abroad. Toward that end, the Association invites readers to submit news, letters and short articles for future issues.

Reprints of past issues are available and may be ordered singly or in complete sets. Complete the form below. The price includes postage and handling.

PLEASE SEND:	Number	Price	Total
Vol. I, No. 1	_____	\$1.50	\$_____
Vol. I, No. 2	_____	\$1.50	\$_____
Vol. I, No. 3	_____	\$1.50	\$_____
Vol. I, No. 4	_____	\$1.50	\$_____
	AMOUNT ENCLOSED		\$_____

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

_____ ZIP _____

Mail To: A.T.S.
3636 Lafayette Ave.
Omaha, NE 68131, U.S.A.

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS



AUSTRALIA

A.T.S. member, Barbara Meyer (6 Finn St., O'Connor, ACT, Australia 2601), writes that she uses "Transarmament Issues" as a title for a fortnightly show she does on public radio (2XX-1008 kh) on issues related to peace, disarmament, nonviolent social change and people's empowerment. She says her basic motive is "to get people thinking about abolishing the entire institution of war, which is fast losing its legitimacy for large segments of the world's peoples."

CANADA

The Autumn and Winter, 1983 issues of the "Humanist in Canada" carried a two-part article by Hans Sinn. The first part was entitled "Defense and the Future of Canada" and the second "Defense Policy Alternatives for Canada". Hans Sinn contends that present Canadian defense policy does not and will not help to prevent nuclear war but rather, makes it more likely in the long run. It also does not protect Canadian sovereignty and independence. The policy, he contends, is a direct expression of the absence of a specifically Canadian national will and purpose. Sinn feels that Canada is one of the few nations able to make radical changes in its plans and preparations for the future. Sinn urges that Canada "begin the exploration and experimentation with the concept of social defense. Such a policy would involve the civilian population in the unarmed defense of characteristic Canadian institutions and values against outside military aggression. The address of "Humanist in Canada" is Box 2007, Station D, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5W3.

ENGLAND

Two publications by Adam Roberts have appeared recently. In "The Trouble With Unilateralism: The U.K., the 1983 General Election, and Non-Nuclear Defence" (Bulletin of Peace Proposals Vol. 14, No. 4, 1983, pp. 305-312), Roberts suggests "that the 1983 election (both the debate and the result) highlighted the serious inadequacies of the idea of unilateral disarmament; but it has not necessarily foreclosed an emerging new discussion based not so much on what weapons should be abandoned, but rather, on what defence systems may make sense in the nuclear age." Roberts expresses hope that now, after the election, the kind of ideas touched on in the April, 1983 report of the Alternative Defence Commission (cf Defence Without the Bomb, a review, in "News and Opinion," Vol. 1, No. 3) may receive a hearing.

In a chapter, 'Britain and Non-Nuclear Defence' in John Baylis (ed.) Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy, Macmillan, London, Febr., 1984, Roberts argues that there is an urgent need to get U.K. and NATO strategies away from their present degree of reliance on nuclear weapons.

Adam Roberts is Reader in International Relations at Oxford University and a Professorial Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

UNITED STATES

A.T.S. member, Jim Davis (20 Avon St., New Haven, CT 06511. Ph. 203-624-7781) reports the organization of a study group on non-violence and transarmament at Yale.

In a recent communication, the Pittsburgh Peace Institute described its aim as "...the exploration and refinement of both the theory and the practice of nonviolent action as an effective alternative to reliance on weapons and armies trained in the use of systematic violence." Planned for late 1984 are college level courses in the theory of nonviolence and the nonviolent defense of Pittsburgh. The address of the Institute is 1139 Wightman Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15217. Ph. 412-687-4753. The Institute Director is Liane Norman.

On March 10th, Richard Taylor presented a talk on nonviolent defense at a conference in Des Moines, Iowa. The presentation was planned by Iowa Peace Network, in cooperation with Catholic Peace Ministry, A.F.S.C., and the Commission on International Peace and Reconciliation. Richard Taylor is co-author, with Ronald J. Sider, of Nuclear Holocaust and Christian Hope (Downers Grove, Ill. 60515, Intervarsity Press, 1982). Richard Taylor also spoke at the College of St. Teresa in Winona, MN, in September of 1983. Audio tapes of that presentation are available for \$7.95. Nonmilitary defense is described from a religious point of view. Send check, made out to Richard K. Taylor, to 307 W. Mt. Pleasant Ave., Philadelphia, PA 19119.

In Philadelphia last December, members of "Transarmament Network" approved a comprehensive proposal for the operation of their group. The organization works for increased public understanding and implementation of transarmament. Their proposed future activities were categorized according to Gene Sharp's "Steps in Consideration of Civilian-Based Defense" (cf "News and Opinion" Vol. I, No. 3). A copy of the operating plan can be obtained by writing to Transarmament Network at 4724 Warrington Ave., Philadelphia, PA. 19143. (Ph. 215-729-4663)

This Spring, the Association for Transarmament Studies will publish National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense, a new booklet by Gene Sharp. Printing is about to begin and details of cost, ordering information, etc., will appear in the next newsletter.

URUGUAY

In a March 14, 1984 article in Sojourners, Virginia M. Bouvier and Gail Lehman describe the current nonviolent struggle of Uruguayan people to regain some of the rights they lost to the military government in 1973. People reportedly organize largely by word of mouth. Cities have been darkened at a given hour. There have been strikes, work slowdowns and stoppages and students circulate humor magazines underground which attack the walls of competition and isolation that

the military government has built over the past decade. In November, 1983, approximately a half million people of a total population of 2.7 million gathered in Montevideo, the capital, to reiterate their demands for freedom, jobs, and a return to democracy. Uruguayans have borrowed a tactic from the Chilean monthly days of protest - the banging of pots and pans. On Christmas Eve, instead of the usual fireworks display, Uruguayans throughout the country sounded their pots and pans. The use of a common household item such as a pot makes it difficult for the military to single out offenders. For more information, cf the article, "New Winds in South America: Hope for Justice and Freedom in Uruguay."

CBD LITERATURE: THE SHORTCOMINGS

by Christopher Kruegler

Nearly eighteen months ago, Alex P. Schmid, of the Center for the Study of Social Conflicts, at the State University of Leiden, the Netherlands, sent a "state-of-the-art" type questionnaire to over one hundred researchers and activists interested in transarmament. The respondents recently received from him a compilation of their answers, which represent only a thirty percent response rate from the group originally approached. The low rate of return, Schmid feels, is a function both of the high degree of transience within this field, and the length of the questionnaire. (There were thirty broad, open-ended questions.)

One of the most crucial questions asked what the principal shortcomings were in the literature on nonviolence and civilian-based defense, and what could be done about them. What follows is a brief summary of the replies to this question, which should be seen in the light of one of Schmid's more general conclusions based on the whole survey. In his introduction, he writes: "Generally speaking, one is inclined to say that interest in the subject is greater than the amount of actual research done. The spread of the concept of nonviolence and the notion of civilian-based defense seems to outpace the maturation and intellectual solidification of the concept."

Those working in the field tend to agree with this assessment. While their preferences vary widely on matters of definition, and a host of lower-order tactical issues, there are many areas of agreement where the deficiencies of the current literature are concerned. There is general agreement that:

- a) the empirical basis for speculation about the new policy is thin, by which most mean that there is a scarcity of adequate descriptive case studies;
- b) the attempts at theory-building in this field have been few and feeble, perhaps due to the previous problem;
- c) a mutually reinforcing relationship between theoretical and empirical work has not yet emerged.

Other problems identified include the lack of systematic attention to such questions as the threat of nuclear blackmail against a transarmed country, a failure to apply the concept to specific crisis areas and acute conflicts, and too much (or too little) dependence on the traditional security institutions of national governments for the future development of the policy. Lastly, there is a widespread (but not universal) perception that much of the writing in this field has been ideologically based, and that this may narrow its audience and hamper its growth.

On the positive side, all of the respondents report that they are proceeding with work that will hopefully alleviate some of these problems. Works-in-progress include several case studies, some new theoretical and conceptual approaches, and feasibility studies tailored to specific countries' needs. If this group is at all representative of those concerned with the problem, the next two years or so should see a variety of interesting new publications.

DIRECTORS TO MEET APRIL 14, 15

Directors of the Association for Transarmament Studies will meet in Omaha this month. The current work of the Association will be reviewed and planning will be done for the next year.

To make the meeting as productive as possible, Association members are invited to contact directors and offer their observations, ideas and proposals to them. The directors' addresses and phone numbers appear below:

ROBERT A. IRWIN, 596 Franklin St., Cambridge, MA 02139. Ph. 617-661-8852 or 547-8242.

BERY J. ENGBRETSSEN, 6492 James Francis Pl., Grimes, Iowa 50111. Ph. 515-270-1006.

HERBERT W. ETTTEL, 4724 Warrington Ave., Phil., PA 19143. Ph. 215-729-4663.

JULIA A. KITTROSS, 3920 First Ave. N.E. Seattle, WA 98105. Ph. 206-633-1670.

CHRISTOPHER KRUEGLER, 2nd Fl., 43 Cottage St. East Boston, MA 02128. Ph. 617-569-8295.

RACHEL M. MAC NAIR, 811 E. 47th St., K.C., MO. 64110. Ph. 816-753-2130.

JOSEPH C. SPOTTS, 3648 Charles, Omaha, NE 68111. Ph. 402-558-6934.

MELVIN G. BECKMAN, 3636 Lafayette Ave., Omaha, NE 68131. Ph. 402-558-2085.

MARGARET A. SCHELLENBERG, 1844 Beulah Rd. Vienna, VA 22180. Ph. 703-281-2296.

MARY B. CARRY, 4214 Covered Bridge Rd., Bloomfield Hills, MI 48013. Ph. 313-626-1517.

A SEARCH FOR RESEARCH

If you have written on some aspect of non-violent action, please send us:

- 1) title of the paper, thesis or article.
- 2) a short (one paragraph) annotation.
- 3) information on cost for copying or obtaining copies and where the paper can be obtained.
- 4) a copy of the paper.

We will then do one (or more) of three things with it: A) determine whether it should be published in CBD: NEWS-OPINION; B) reviewed in the newsletter, or C) listed in this "search for research" column where readers will be encouraged to directly contact the author to obtain a copy.

Address information and queries to: Julia A. Kittross, 1514 NE 45th Street, Seattle, WA 98105. Ph. 206-523-4755.

"Heavy Casualties and Nonviolent Defense" was the title of a paper by Professor Gene Keyes presented at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Peace Research and Education Association in Vancouver, Canada. A 20 page paper, it "establishes a principle of strategic nonviolent defense called "sacrifice". It chides a tendency in nonviolent defense literature to underestimate potential loss of life. Nonviolent defense planning must be imbued with worst-case analysis regarding possible duration and magnitude of suffering. A populace must be ready to overcome exemplary terrorism and brutality. Nuclear extortion is an obvious danger. Ill-prepared resistance can be deflated by a whiff of grapeshot...It is more prudent for defenders to assume that casualties will be heavy, rather than admit they might be. Such a posture raises moral questions and religious ultimates, which have been discounted by modern exponents of nonviolent defense. But extreme consequences and moral wherefores cannot be wished away."

Another article by Gene Keyes is entitled "Strategic Nonviolent Defense: Five Policies." This 20 page paper asks "If a nation has the temerity to prepare a civilian-based resistance against potential invaders, what are its strategic policy options in lieu of guns and bombs?... (This paper) review(s) five potential policies from the larger strategy of a nonviolent common defense. They are: 1) Noncooperation; 2) Preservation; 3) Incapacitation; 4) Fraternization; and 5) Liberation.

Total noncooperation by an occupied populace is an improbable ideal, but there are many modes of semi-resistance plus direct and indirect nonviolent action to preserve morale and dislocate an invader. Preservation is a compliant/defiant policy focused on retaining social patterns in the face of alien suppression. Incapacitation is the non-injurious substitute for sabotage. Fraternization welcomes the "visitor" as a fellow-victim, closet ally or potential defector. Liberation is the dangerous forward strategy, to foment mutiny by the invading forces and rebellion in their homeland. These five policies are ideal types, and do not preclude other nonviolent possibilities."

Write Dr. Gene Keyes, Political Science Div., St. Thomas Univ., Fredericton, New Brunswick E3B 5G3, Canada, for information.

.....

Richard Chartier is writing a book on "Non-violence in Latin America" and is seeking comments and suggestions on the following outline:

FOREWARD: The relevance of nonviolent action in Latin America.

INTRODUCTION

- I. NONVIOLENT ACTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
- II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONVIOLENT ACTION/THE NONVIOLENT MOVEMENT
- III. THE LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT
- IV. THE VIOLENCE/NONVIOLENCE DEBATE
- V. THE NATURE/SPECIAL CHARACTER OF NON-VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
- VI. NONVIOLENCE IN PRACTICE
- VII. NONVIOLENT ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS ALLIES/"ADVERSARIES"
- VIII. THE FUTURE OF NONVIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROSPECTS/PROBLEMS

This book is to be published by New Society Publishers. Please send comments, suggestions, and for a more complete outline, write to: Richard A. Chartier, 23 Brookside Avenue, Suffern, New York 10901. Ph. 914-357-0490.

INAUGURAL RECEPTION FOR THE PROGRAM ON NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS — HARVARD

The Program on Nonviolent Sanctions hosted an Inaugural Reception Friday evening Febr. 17th for friends and colleagues from the University and wider circles. About 150 persons attended, including President Derek Bok. Professor Joseph Nye, Acting Director of the Center for International Affairs, welcomed the establishment of the Program, and Gene Sharp briefly described the purposes of the Program and thanked the guests for joining the staff in celebrating its establishment.

A brochure describing the Program and its planned research is available by writing to the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

YOUR EDITORS

PHILIP D. BOGDONOFF
2 Ellsworth Park
Cambridge, MA 02139
Ph. 617-868-5830

JULIA A. KITROSS
3920 First Ave., N.E.
Seattle, WA 98105
Ph. 206-633-1670

MELVIN G. BECKMAN
3636 Lafayette Avenue
Omaha, NE 68131
Ph. 402-558-2085



RETURN MAIL FORM

ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSARMAMENT STUDIES

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

_____ ZIP _____

TELEPHONE () _____

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION, IF ANY.

I want to join the Association. My dues are enclosed. (Members receive the newsletter.)

- _____ \$5.00 Basic
- _____ \$8.00 Household
- _____ \$3.00 Students & Low-Income
- _____ \$25.00 Organizations and Institutions
- _____ \$100.00 Sustaining

I want to subscribe to the Newsletter only. \$5.00 annually.

An additional contribution of \$_____ is enclosed to further the work of the Association.

NOTE: Outside U.S. and Canada, add \$2.50 for each membership or subscription.

MAKE CHECKS PAYABLE TO:
Association for Transarmament Studies.
3636 Lafayette Avenue, Omaha, Nebraska
68131.

Dues and contributions are tax-deductible.

**THE ASSOCIATION FOR
TRANSARMAMENT STUDIES**
3636 Lafayette
Omaha, Nebraska 68131

NON-PROFIT ORG.
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
OMAHA, NE
PERMIT NO. 582

